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T m first two pmagraphs of this work briefly esplain the
reasons which scemed to justily its publication. In the search
for original documents whicli the task I had proposed to myself involved, a grcnt qnantily of material was collected,
consisting of original clespatches, letters, notes, a i d diaries of
perAonA who had either taken p a t in the events described, or
had held high office at thc time.
The naturd result of examination and selection from so
great a mass of metter mas that, as originnlly compiled, the
work was on too large a scdc. It had to be done over agsir,
so as to reduce its dimensions by a half. Though, in this
process, much thet mas interesting to myself and to some
of my ii.iends has disappeared, I do not doubt that the book
has gained substantially.
The confidence and ltindness with which records of great
importance were placed at my disposal deservo grateful schowled,ment ; as also do the personal interest and trouble
taken by many correspondents in answering references.
The letters, kc., are ns far as possible transcribed as they
were written, though occasionnlly the retcntion of expressions
ambiguous or inelegant has resulted. Major Brondfoot oftcn
wrote important letters under grcat pressure, and the supply
of some verbal corrections or interpolations for the sake of
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PREFACE

lncidity seemed nbsolutcly necessiwy ; but these arc few and
for thc most part indicated by bracltets. Where there are
omissions, that which is left out is either irrelevant, or
likely to hurt the feelings of some survivor of the events, or
of his descendants and friends. But in a work of this kind,
where current errors have to be corrected, it is perhaps impossible entirely to avoid the publication of remarks which
may be displeasing to some. Serious and sincere endeavour
has been made to avoid this where no material injury to truth
seemed to be involved ; and if this endeavour has not bcen
always successful, I must ask my reader for kindly constrnction.
Transliteration of Indian names is a vexed and troublesome
business. I n qnotatioas the forms used in the originals have
as far as possible been preserved. In the rest of the test
unmes arc spelt according to the 06cial system as exhibited
in Ilunter's ' Imperial Gaxctteer of India,' only after the first
appearance of a name I llnve dispensed mith the repetition of
diacritical m a r k
As regards the frequent recurrence of the term ' political '
in an Anglo-Indian sense, it may be as wcll to recnll a few
words of Nacauly : ' The only branch of politics about nlliich
thcy [the English functionaries at Fort William] much busied
We
tehemselveswas negotiation with the native princes. .
mag remark that the phraseology of the Company's servants
still bcars the traces of this state of things. To this day they
always use the word " political " as synonymous \vith " diplomatic." '
I t will be observed thnt George Broadfoot's p r i ~ a t elife is
scarcely noticed ; nor mould the case have been mnterii$lly
different hd the morlr been issued on the larger scale origin-

..

idly contcmplatccl. In fact I lmom littlc of it, nor do the

papers in my possession throw mu011 light on the sul?jecL.
BuL it is only fair to say t11at in Lhc documellts quoled not a
ainglc sentence has bcen s~~ppressecl
with thc view of concealing defects in his choractcr or conduct.
The indulgence of the reader for many faulls in tIlc composition of this boolr is solicited. I have tricd to be accurate
nncl to svoid offence, but sm well aware that success is dil%
cult, and perhaps not possible.
Special acknowleclgrnent is due to the following persons
for a grcat variety of assistancc :To Col. Henry Yule, C.B., R.E., for holp and advice which
no words of minc can adequately describe. Prom its commencement he has taken the lrindest interest in this boolr; he
has read the manuscript of the work ns origin J l y compiled,
and the proofs in its prescnt co~iclensedform. This was done
by a man much occupied and in indifferent health; and here
I bcg to record my sincere gratitude for and recognition of
the inestimable nclvantage of thc corrections suggested Ly his
reading and esperience.
He has placed publisher and cditor under furthcr obligation by presenting thc autolype frontispiece as a frienclly
contribution to the boolr from one who, after more than forty
years, Imps a grateful and admiring remelnbrance of its
subject. The slrctch is mi~inly a rec~llection,~
but has received some aid from imperfect materials representing
Broadfoot in his younger cli~ys.
To Viscount Harclinge, for much information about Major
Broadfoot ; for many original letters and despatches connected
with the Punjab ; and for reading part of the manuscript and
adding remarks which have a special value from one vho mas
1 Vix. of Mnjor Broadfoot, ss hc rode inlo IC~rni~1,
in January 1843, nccom.
pnnying Lord Elleuborougl~from the Camp nl Pirozpur.

private secrctarg to the Go~~rnor-General
in 1814,and throug11oat the first Sikh war.
'Yo Lord Colchestcr, for perlnission to sec and use a great
nmnber of letters and despatches among the late Lord Ellenborough's pnpers, inclucling some witlen by Iktjor Broaclfoot.
The information thus acquired lias beon of great value.
To A h . R. N. Cust, for a memoranclum on the cvcilts of
the last year of I h j o r Broaclfoot's life, during which he WLS
that officer's personnl m c l confidcutial assistant. Also for the
l~st?of books, a11d for mnch genernl assistance and encouragement very ltindlg aflorclecl.
To Gen. S. A. Al~bott,for n memormclum describing events
before and after the outbrealc of the first Silch war, includiilg
the battle of Pirozshnh ; and for many othcr ininor but most
vnlunble aids.
To Mrs. Coliu Mackenxie, for letters, boolcu, nncl documents
relating to Afghanistan, to her distinguishecl husband, and to
George Zroaclfoot.
To Mrs. Jackson, for various letters and documents.
To 31r. E. 13. Baclrhouse, son of the lato Col. Julius B.
Backhonse, C.B., Bongxl Artillcry, for his father's dinry, kept
during the first Afghan war. It contains mntter 'curious a i d
surprising.'
To Mr. 13. W. La~vrcnoc,for lettcrs, papers, nncl journals
of his father, the late Sir Henry Lawrence, for lettcm to G.
13roaclfoot, kc.
To Sir Lionel and Lady Smith-Gordon, for original lcttors
by Elclrecl Pottingor.
To General Sir Frccl. P. Hnines, K.C.B., G.C.S.I., kc.,
for information respecting the early part of the first Sikh
War.
.
To the 1,ztc Sir Robcrt Nontgomcry, K.C.B., G.C.S.I. ;
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Sir Henry Eanrlinson, 1LC.B.; Sir Owen I3nrne, R.C.S.I.,
C.I.E.; the late Mr. C. C. Prinsep; Mr. I?. C. Dnnvers; Mr.
C. Grey; Dr. Rost, C.I.E. ; BIr. Wade ; and others connectecl
with the India Office, for n great varicty of assistance mo
conrteously given, And to their nnnles I must add those
F. 11.Lord Napier of 1lagd;ila ; Lady Ednwcles; Sir Alexander
Cunningham, I<.C.I.E., anclhisnephew, Mr. W. A. Cunaingha.m ;
Sir J. Campbell Brown, M.D., K.C.B. ; Gon. G. 13. Tremenheere, R.E. ; G c i ~ c r dMaclagnn, R.8. ;Lieut.-Gen. Sir Andrew
Clarlce, G.C.M.G., C.B., C.I.E., R.E.; Mr. T. H. Thornton,
C.S.I., D.C.L.; Major-Gcn. R. Young, R.E.; Colonel Sir
James Bromnc, K.C.S.I., R.Z. ; Mr. Boyd Kinnear ; nnd last,
but not least, Mr. John Murrny and his partners ; from r ~ h o m
I have receivccl advice and informntion of mnch value.
Great numbers of letters and cleq~atchesverc copied by
Mrs. Broadfoot, a work sprend over several years, and some
by Mrs. Woocl, to both of wllorn ~lcknowleclgmentfor assistance
is clue. I11 adclition, i\lrs. Broedfoot carefully esamincd both
manuscript and proofs.
The nnmes of tho boolrs chiefly consulted will be found in
the following note.
W. BIIOADBOOT,
~Mujov,3.33.
L A D D EN.B.
~ , : Scpl. 1, 1888.
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SERVICES

MAJOR GEORGE BROADFOOT, C.B.
CHAPTER I.
Introductory-Enrly yonrs of George Brondfoot-Appointed to the Madras
Army-Selected for service in Afghnnistnn-Chief events which precedccl
invnsion-Tho Zndus bridged at S~ltknr-Kabul oocupicd-Subscquont
Disturbances-Perwi1~1 Pnss, death of Licut. J. Y. Brondfoot-13rondEoot's
Snppors- Convoy of Bhnh Zsmiin awl tho ludies of tho Harem to Kabul
-Oonfusion and incapacity prevelont thcrc.

THEletters and journals of the latc llsjor George Bronclfoot,
C.B., contain much of the secret or unwritten history of some
of the most important and interesting events connected nith
our Indino Empire in its relations with Afghanistan during
the first Afghan war, and with tho P ~ ~ n j sprior
b
to anci et
the beginning of the first Sikh war.
Cnrcful st~tclyof thcsc records nppeared to estitblish tlleir
importance. The powcr and t:~lcat evident in many of tllc
papers; the noble sentiments cxprcsseil in some of them,
written when cslamity was avenging the ewors of a vicio~~s
system, and despondency Ilnrl settled denp in the hearts of
bravo mcn ; and last, but not Icnst, the errors, the csistencc
of which thoy inclicate, in the accepted histories of that time,
seemed to rvarrsnt their collection and publication.
The subjects referred to are the iirst Afglian war, 1838-42 ;
the administration of the Tenasserim Provinces, 1843-44 ; a l ~ d
J;

2

EARLY YEARS-APPOINTMENT

TO INDIA

cn.

I

the conduct of the policy with the Punjab, 1844-45, when the
Sikhs invaded British India and war was eclared.
George Broadfoot was the eldest surviving son of the
Rev. 'CVilliam Broadfoot. He was born at Kirkwall, in the
Orkney Islands, in 1807. In 1817 Mr. Broadfoot lefb Kirkwall
and settled in London. H e had no tie to the former plnce ;
his family, he used to say, came from the neighbourhood of
Bradford, in Yorlrshire, and a branc'h of them lived in Galloway and in the south of Lanarkshire.' The change to London
was welcome to Mr. Brondfoot, and of advantage to his sons
in the matter of education. George was sent to various day
schools and was taught privately ; his brothers were educated
at Westminster. As two of them are mentioned in letters
hereafter quoted, they may now be briefly introduced. William,
born in 1810, went to India at the age of fifteen, and was
appointed Ensign in the 1st European Regiment, now the
1st Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers. James Suthei-land,
the youngest of the family, mas born in 1816. H e was
appointed i n 1835, from Addiscombe, to the Bengal Engineers.
At an early age George seems to have given promise, of the
ability and resolution for which he was afterwards distinguished. One of his masters, Nr. Ilunt, spoke of him in these
terms : ' Mr. Broadfoot, you are indeed happy in your son :
his talents are of the highest order, and he has a spirit which
no difficulty can impede. There is no difficulty to him. Set
but a noble end in view, away he goes, straight to the. mark,
clearing every obstacle, distancing every competitor.' I n
character he was ardent, fearless, and impetuous; the head
of his class, and the leader of his companions in their games
out of school.
In'1825 he obtained a cadetship in the E.I. Company's
service and sailed for Madras. On arrival he was posted to
the 34th M.N.I. It is nnnecessary to dwell long on the periocl
during which he served with his regiment ; he used the time
well, acquired knowledge of the detail of regimental duty, and
the reputation of being a good regimental officer and an exceptionally good linguist. Two intimate friends of those early
Sir Hew or Hugo de Bradiutc,
of Lamingtou, was the Lend of this
branch ; his only daughter, Marion,

married :sir William Wallaoe, the
Scottish hero; lheir daughter married
Capt. Bnillie.
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days may here bc mentioned : Colin Mt~clccnxie,~
vho had been
a fellow-pssscnger to India ; nncl Dr, i\Ialcolmson, surgeon of
the regiment, to whom in aftcr years he wrote many intoresling lctters from ilfghaizisti~u.
After seven years' scrvice Bronclfoot returned to England,
rtnd mas absent from India for lhe unusually long period of
five yenrs. Whilst on lcave he continnecl to study his profession ; 110 tritvelled in Prance, Germany, nild Italy, inacle
himself acqnaintccl with their hislory am1 forms of government, ancl to some extent acquired their languages. During
the last year of his leave he was appointed Orderly Olficer a t
Addiscombe College. There he stuclied fortihation and other
branches of military education, lhen considered unneccssnry
for a n infantry officer. When I-emonstrated with for overworking, and told the1 his health wonld ~ufier,and thnt he
knew his ornil work well cnough, he replied : ' Well enough to
be food for powder, or to leacl a company properly into action ;
but to command a n army, to have the lives of other men clcpendent on you, is another sort of affair nncl rcquires a different
preparation. I11 India, when an emergency arises-and sooner
or later it will arise-the men fit to meet it will be fo~milout
ancl brought to the front. When work has to be donc, the
fittest man will gct it to do. No man can say wlzi~tthe morlr
may be : to -raise, organise, and coramancl an army ; to arrange
a q~~estion
of diplomncg; or to direct or assist in the civil
of boirlg
~clministrationof a province. Hence tho imporlr~,i~ce
prepared.'
It is strange to think that within the brief space of six
p a r s he was called upon lo raise ~ n c command
l
a regiment
of sappers ; to fortifjr Jnllilkbiicl as garrison engineer; to
reform the civil nilminislration of the Tenasseriru Provinces ;
and to conc111ct the cliploruatic relations between the Government of India ancl the Punjab.
On his raturn to I d a i n February 1838 hc wns appointed
to the Commissnriat Dcpartmelit of the bIt~clrasArmy, under
Col. Callen."
2 A distinguished soldicr nnd 0110
of the prisoners in Atgl~niiistnn. llis
life has latcly bccn writtrn by AIM.
RIncltcnxic, unclcr L h o titlc S / o t m and.
&nulcinc of a Soldiw's Lye.

RInjor - Gcn. Villinm Cullcn,
Rlndrns Artillcry, wns an olliccr ot
grcibt, talent tmd nn urdcnt ~.oformcr.
IIe wnfi rducntcd u l TVoolwicli, nppointed 111 1809 to tho A~t~llery,
rind
7% 2
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Broadfoot soon discovered much that required reorganisntion and reform. Supported by his chief, but opposecl by
almost all the rest of thc clepmtment, he carried his point.
H i s report mas considered to have been able nnd exhaustive,
a n d his services on this occasion mere brought prominently
t o the notice of Lord Auclrlnnd, then Governor-Generd.
Col. Cnllen snbmittecl the report to Lord Elphinstone,
Governor of Madras, who wrote ns follows :
August 24,1840.

I have been much interested by Capt. 13rortdfoot's memornncla
on the Tenasserim Provinces.
EIe is certainly a very able ofieer, and a great loss to us. I
slinll mrile to liim to say Lhat if lie does not find Afghanistan quitc
s o La.greeable as he erpectcd, that he must let me hear from him,
a n d thi~tif I can filrtller his views I shall have much pleasure in
s o doing; but I fear (for us) thnt they will not let him come back,
a n d p c l h p his abilities will be more usefully employed in that
qui~rtertllan they mould in a morc penccful sphere.
I sliell certainly requesl Sir S. \Vhitting1iam1s'1 early altentiou
to the subject of our force at Maulmein, and I shall pnrticulnrly
point out to him tho suggestions of Capt. Broadfoot. The evils of
t h e present system are so clearly demonstrated by him, and might
prove of such incalculable illjury to the Service, both in the most
extencled sense of the word, and in particular to the Madras A m y ,
tlmt I hopo we shall be able to induce the Suprernc Govclxmeiit to
apply a remedy.
Prom Borne expressions of Capt. Broaxlfoot, I am led to believo
that his report, and thc very interesting appendix, have been
already submitted in some shape or other by him to the Supremc
Goveriunent. Cell you inform me if this is thc case ? If llot, I should
be very n~ncliinclined to lay them before the Governor-General.
Believe me kc.
ELPHINSTON~
Bcfore this letter was written the war in Afghanistan had
commenced. William and James Eroncl Coot had already distinguishecl thernsclves ; it was n n t u r d , therofore, t h a t Georgc
a f t e r l~olclinginmy ofices was mncle
Commissary-General in 1834. I n 1840
he w a s Resident nt B e Court of Trnvancorc. He relired, bnL did not

rcturn to England, end died in 1862.
' Sir S~unlordWhittingham, Commander-in-Chicf, Madrns.
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should wish to go there. But the qnestion arose whether
lie mas justified in giving up a n appointment in which he
liar1 clone well, and going amongst compa~*ativestrangers lo
Afghanistan on the pay of his rank. After cnrcfnl consideration, Lord Elphinstone, Col. Cnllen, and Dr. 3fnlcolmson
npprovecl of his going ; nearly evcrybody else who was consulted, except himself, was agnhst the step. T\Then he got
the option ha determined to go, though Lord Auclilad very
bindly pointcd out t l ~ edificulties in his way, which worc such,
he thought, as to hold out the prospect of a hard struggle for
several years.
Before describing Brondfoot's somcnlhat exciting joorney
lo I(iibu1, it is desirable to recount briefly the main ii~ciclcnts
which ~recedeclour invasion of Afghnnistan.
In that country, consolidated into an cmpire in 1747 by
Shah Ahmad, AbdBli, Shah Shuja, the legitimate successor
to his throne, had been defeated and drivon away by Dost
Muhammad Khan, B6rabziii. The Shah, after many adventures, mas n ~ f u g e ien British India, and Rnnjit Singh, the
Maharaja of the Ponjab, had seized nnd held Peshewar.
British anxiety for the welfare of Afghnnistan wns first roused
mhcn there fieemcd to be a possibility of invasion by Prance
,and Eussia combined. That danger mas removcd by the
victorieu of the Duke of Wellington, but not before luissions
to the Piinjab nncl to Afghanistan hnd bacn sent.
I11 1837 British intcrest was agtlin excited by the ncws
that the Persians, instigaied by Russia, had despatched a n
army to besiege Herat, sncl Lord Ancltlnnd s e ~ at mission to
Dost Muhnmmacl under the conducl of Alexander Bunles.
Thab oficer, already lcnonrn as a, trnvcllcr in Central Asia,
had many qualiiications which justifictl his selection, but he
wns so hampered by rcslrictions as lo be able to make no
su~bstantialpromises of nid to thc Amir, whilst he was instrnctccl to demt~nclmuch ii-om him. The Amir vc1-y naturally
luriled f ~ o mhim to Vicovich, the Russian Agent ; Bnrnes's .
mission was wilhdrt~wn,and the GorernmenC of India look
in1mecli;tte steps to dethrone Dost Muhnll~madand placc Shah
Shuja on tho ILnbul throne.
What is I m o m as the Tripartite Trcaty w ~ negotiated
s
betwccn the Goven~n~ent
of Inclia, Ralijit Singh, am1 Shah

6

THE ARMY OF THE INDUS

Shujn, whereby the first and second parties contracted to
assist the third to re-establish himself on his throne.
A large force was assembled a t KarnB1, and on October 1,
1538, Lord Auckland issued his manifesto, in which Durand
has said ' the words " justice " and " necessity " . . . were
applied in a manner for mhich there is fortmately no precedent in the English language,' and of which Sir H. Edmarcles
rernarlie~l,~
that ' the views and conduct of Dost Muhammad
Khan mere misrepresented with a hardihood which a Russian
statesman might have envied.' Sir H. Fane, Commander-inChief in India, was to have led the British troops ; but shortly
before their departure news mas received that the siege of
Rerat had been raised, and that the Persian troops with their
accompanying Russian officers had retired. Though this
movement was determined by British action in the Persian
Gulf, yet no notice of the siege, howeyer brief, can be made;
without aclmowledging that the honour of the defence is due
to Lieut. Eldred Pottinger, of the Bengal Artillery, who appears
to have been in the city in an unofficial capacity disguised a s
a horse merchant. Consequent on this event the strength of
the British army mas reduced, and its command devolved on
Sir John Keane. Sir W. Macnaghten mas appointecl Envoy
and Minister, to the disappointment of Captains Burnes and
Wade. The mischievous device of separating the supreme
military from the diplomatic conduct of the campaign having
been accepted, it was thought necessary to associate with the
General a person of higher relative rank than that of Captain.
The arrangement had practically the effect of subordinating
a General commanding an army in the field to civil authority
which accompanied him wherever he went. No more perfect
contrivance to insure disaster could have been imagined.
The Shah with his own force accompanied the British
army. Space cannot be afforded to follow minutely the
movements of the troops from Firozpur to Rohri, and thence
across the Indus at Sulskur to Kandahar, Ghazni, and Kabul ;
but certain incidents mhich have been overlooked in some of
the accounts of the march, or about which information from
fresh sources has been collected, will be clescribed.
* F4~stAfglzan mar, p. 81.
a

Life of Sir H. hturcncc, vol. i. p. 233.

cn.

I

PASSAQE OF TIIE INDUB

7

Amongst these, one of the most sorious difficulties, successfully snriuonntecl, wns to bridge tlie Iudus nnd to pass the
army with its stores and baggnge across.
No one who has S C C ~ I tlmt river can doubt tho mngnitnde
of the task, evcn if every appliancc which science could suggest had been a t hand. 13ut on this occasion, a s on many
others, tlic engineer was confronted with the obstacle, slid
left to overcome it wit11 such nleans as uature h a d provided.
The Engincer of5cers with thc force were Cnpt. Thornson,
Chief Engineer ; Cnpt. Simders; L i e u t ~ .Anderson, Durand,
Sturt, McLeod, Pigou, and James 8. Brondfoot. I n r~ lettor
dated Shiliarpur, February 9,1839, the last-mentioned ollicer
wrote :
The Euginoers went on a l ~ n dto Bnkkur, nn island in the Indus
twenty miles from here. We were on the bank of a river, 1.100 yards
nide, with a tol~entlilto a mill stream ; nre had eight boats, and
there was nothing near us but a small village; here we had to rnalte
a bridge over the river. First me seized, by great esertion, about
120 boats, then cnt down lots of trees ; these me made into strong
beams and planks ; thero mas no rope, but wo made 500 cables ont
of n peculiar Icind of grass which grows 100 milcs from here ; the
ai~chorswcro lnncle of small trces joiued and 1011,clcdwith half a
ton of stone. O w mils were all made on the spot. TVQ thcn
nncl~oredthe boats in the middlo of the stream, in a line across,
leaviug twelve feet between each; strong beams mere laid ncross
the boats, and plaiiks nailed on these for a roadmy. This is the
largest military bridge which has ever been made ; nnd as wc had
no towns like Eiiglish ones to give ns worltmen and stores for the
aslting, you may conceive what labour we had in finishing it in
o h e n days.
Capt. Baclthouse, of tho Bengal Artillery, nn able officer
nnd intelligent observer, remarked : ' The Engineers give
themsolvcs, arid with great justice, no little credit for their
job : since they have hcre made themselves d m o d every
article in use, with tlm exception of tlie boitts.' H e has furthcr recorded with nittural indignation a n ar~.rai~gernent,
for
which it Brigadier-General was retiponsible, hereby his guns
7 At the islnncl of Bnlt1;nr there
nrc two oliallr& snid to llavc Leun

500 and 367 ynrds widc rcspoctiscly,
(B'ilal Af&n 1Vw, p . 133.)
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were on one side of the river and their ammunition on the
other !
After a narrow escape from starvation the army reached
Kanclahar, where the General committed the evtrnordinary
error of leaving behind him four 18-pounder guns, the only
ones with his force. suitable for breaching purposes. When
Ghazni was reached the wnnt of these guns became apparent,
and the position of the British force was critical in the estreme. Before it lay the fort of Ghazni, strong in itself and
strongly garrisoned. On either flank, at a distance of twelve
to fifteen miles, there were.two forces of the enemy under
Ghilzi chiefs, waiting to take advantage of any check which
might occur. And, most serious of all, supplies were nearly
exhausted. Here the army was indebted for iLs safety, and
the General for his rewards and peerage, to the resource of
the Engineer, Capt. G. Thomson.
He suggestecl two alternatives-to blow open a gate and
immeclintely assault, an operation the success of which must
always be doubtful and attended with heavy loss ; or to mask
the fort with a small force, and advnnce with the rest of the
army to attack Dost Muhammad in the direction of Kabul.
The latter alternative had to be abandoned for want of supplies, and the former wns, as is well known, successfully
carried out.
The resnlt of the capture was decisive. Dost Muhammad
coulcl not persuaae his army to face the British, so grent was
the impression caused by the capture of Ghazni, and the road
to Kabul was clear. That city was occupied without further
. opposition, and on August 7, 1539,Shah Shuja was seated on
the throne.
The army of occupation was reduced in numbers, part of
it having been sent back to India. What remained, instead
of being concentrated in one or two importnnt places, was
scatterecl in small bodies over a vast extent of country. Our
administration, though nominally that of Shah Shuja, ,was
unpopular, and disturbances arose in various directions. The
rising among the G.hi1zis may be here mentioned, as James
Broadfoot accompanied the force sent under Capt. Outram to
restore order. He surveyed a great deal of the Ghilzi country,
and after the expedition was over accompanied, in disguise, s
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caravan of Lohani merchants from Ghnzni to Dera Ismnil
Khan by the Gomal route. His reports on the jonmeys and
tribes receivcd high commendn Lion from Lorcl Auclilancl ; ancl
up to the present time (1888) they form the principal basis of
our informntion regarding that part of Afghsnistan and its
inl-labitants.
William Brondfoot was on detachment duty nt Blimiiin,
Saighhn, and Btijgtih, the latter being the farthest point in
the direction of the Oxus over occupiccl by our troops. H e
mrde a road from BRmitin across many passcs, including the
Paln and Dnnclan Shilran (' tooth-breaking '), which was then
intended to be a commercinl route from Kabul to Iihulum.
He was elso a t this time (1840) cleshed to raise n corps of
Hazai-a pioneers, ancl succeeclcd in enlisting some men. Those
formed the nucleus of the corps whicli was aflcrwards commanded by Cnpt. Georgc Broadfoot, and Imoi~nns ' Broadfoot'fi
Sappers. '
Dost Muhnmmncl, after wandering as far as Bolrhnrn ancl
suffering many vicissitudes of fortune, having got together
some followers, raised his stanclarcl at Rhnlnm. He was defeated in an cncleavom to penetrate towards Raminn, and
made his way into what is Irnoiim RS the ICohisttzn of Ihbul.
Sir Robert Snlc with a small force was sent to intercept him
if possible, and prevent his return beyond the EIindu l<ush.
Snle sent on the cavalry to prevent Dost Muhnmmnd escaping by
the Pariviin Pass, nnd thc latter, sceing his rstreat Lhrealened,
determined, with a small body of sisty or eighty Afghans, to
out his way through. Capt. Fraser, who commandecl the two
squndrons of the 2nd Bellgal Cavalry, ordered them to charge,
but the men wavered and fled in spite of the most earnest eshortatiom of their officers. What happened cannot be known
with absolute accumcy. The officers of the cavalry, nccompallied by Dr. Lord nncl James Broaclfoot, Lnl clcserted hy their
men, cllargcd the Afghans who were advmcing under Dost
Mu~uhammacl. Of six officers who thus charged, three-Dr.
Lord, Lieut. J. 8. Broadfoot, ancl Cornet Crispin-were Idled ;
ancl two-Captahs Prascr and Ponson1)y-werc c1e;perntely
w o n n c l e c l . ~ a m e sBroadfoot; was bnclly mounted ; he was
See SupplementaryPnpers, R. G.

S., vol. i. part iii. 1886.

Cornct Moffnt nppeare to havo
escnped unhurt.
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seen trying to prevent the flight of the cavalry, and it'mas
believed for some time that he mas killed by our own men.
This does not appear to have been the case, for afterwards
an Afghan, Jan Pishan Khan,' who mas present, reported that
when our cavalry fled, he saw Capt. Fraser in front and
James Broadfoot on the flank. When Fraser was mounclecl,
he saw James cut his way through the Afghans to a great
distance, when all at once the engineer cap, by which he had
hitherto kept him in view, disappe&redin the midst of a group
of Afghans, ancl, said Jan Fishan, ' having no more hope, I,
too, turned ancl rode away.'
This happened on November 2, 1840; next day Dost
Muhammad rode in to Kabul with one companion and gave
himself up to the Envoy. Macnaghten returned his sword
to the Amir, and made suitable arrangements for the c ~ s t o d y
of so brave and important a prisoner.
Pet this event did not help to tranquillise the country.
The Shah was discontented because he possessed the
shadow only of power, the substance being in the hands of
the Envoy. The English Government mere dissatisfied, because
they thought the administration in Afghanistan not altogether
prudent; and they presented to Lord Aucldand the alternatives of either maintaining our position in sufficient force and
at whatever sacrifice might be entailed, or of abandoning the
country and confessing failure.
The choice of either alternative mas evaded by the Government of India on the plea that the circumstances of the case
mere altered by the surrender of Dost Muhammad.
Occupation of the country was continued with a diminished
army. The immediate result was a n apparent increase in
hostility on the part of the people in more than one locality.
Such was the state of affairs when Capt. George Broadfoot
mas appointed to Shah Sliuja's force ; he was ordered to raise
Jkn Bisllirn (' devoted ' or 'lifesncrificing ') 'was the title given to
Saiyid Muhnmmad Khan, Chief of
Pnghmhn, 'on account of his gallantry,
His wife nppears to have deserved the
title as well as J a n Fishnn hinlself.
Lady Sale h a s recorded that when the

insurrection broke out in Kabul, Jan
Fishnn urged his wife to fly for safety
to Paghman ; but she replied : ' I mill
not leave you ; if you fall, me dio together ; if you nre victorious, me will
rejoice together.' Jan Pishan said this
answer was worth a lakh of rupees. ,
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n regiment of mpperB, and proceeded to Delhi and towards
t h e N.W. Frontier for that purpose.
H e mas accomp,zniad by Colin ~ a c k e n z i e ,to whose siatcrin-law, Mrs. Bayley, h e wrote the following letter descriptive
of t h e journey:
Delhi : October 10, 1840.
nfy dear Mrs. Bnyley,-Ihnd the great pleasure of receiving yonr
letter of September 7, with its inclosure for Colin, just as we mero
leaving Agm, and fully intenclecl to have ans\vcred it im~uedintely
on our arrival here, bnt I found it necessary the very first day, to
move into my tents a t the lines of the Sappers, away both from
city a i d cantollments, nnd ever since I ]lave been, from sunrise
till dark, literally surrounded by a mob. At length, homever,
affairs are
nz tmin to a certain extent, and from them to
you I turn with something of Llle feelings of the weary linigl~tof
old passing fiom EL wilderness, and seeing before him a fitir garden
and the bower of some beauty without peer. Being, however, but
a modern preux chevdier, I must be allowed to commence my
most unlillightly nud j e t
address to the fair ladye with a scokZi~~g,
well deserved, for your letler to me is little less than an apology for
nrriting at all ; or, as yo11 amrepleased to term it, h'ozddim~ me.
Now, i t is c h a r you take mc for a d o ~ n ~ r i g lmonster,
it
a Caliban,
and under this afllicting belicf I sl~allcontinne till you tell me the
contrary under yonr omn hand, and prove it by a letter containing
more than an apology, liowe~rerprettily written.
Colin and I have not lived together here, so I do not know
whether you have found him a puilctual correspondent or not. But
he has, no doubt, told you how we left, or rather sent on, our servants
and baggage from ~ & l l u r , ilucl went ourselves by Agra ; how me
were delighted with the Tnj, the Moti Musjid, and all the other
beauties there; how we went round by Puttchpore Sikri, Bhurtpore, Deeg, and Gobartlhun to IvIuttra; how me huntcd as we
went, and how the cheetas mcrc more snccessful than Coliu and his
fi.iend ; how Colin lost himself in a jungle, and was hunted for with
elephants and torches; how me mere ohjccts of great curiosity
throughout, for I had been recoplised as having servcd three years
with the native chi& in Afghanistan and Tnrltistan before our
armies \vent there ; how I had been a, prisoner in Cm~dahar(or
some other city) nlld professed I s ~ a m; ~ O \ Vit was useless to deny
it, as I had been recognised in Fnttehpore a ~ l dBhurtpore by some
who reinenher me a i\9nsnlman ! How Colin (with indignation
he heard it) was,
m t my son, n vely y o u n j w n w i o r setting
out nndor my nnspices; how t;he English up there, bcing mc.

ddssspoi,r, Government mere sending every one np who h e w those
countries.
At Muttra we passed part of a day with Col. Pattle, and a few
hours at tlllyghnr with Mr. and Mrs. Neavo. On arriving here me.
found Mr. Metcalfe had left, aud I fear [me] deprived Mrs. Metcalfe
of her night's rest by taking possession of the house after she had
retired for the night. Next day we. moved ; Colin, from his nice
sense of decorum, to the house of a namesake and kinsman of the
64th Regiment; I, fiom necessity, to the tent from which I write.
bf the lions of Delli, I can say nothing, having seen none of them,
nor paid a single visit, but oficial ones. But Colin saw them d l ,
and two days ago went off dawk to Loodhiana, and is doubtless
now adorning the harem of our master the Shah. He rode out to
Soneput, and had two falls, without serious injury to himself, but
with much to his horse. He was foolish enough to gallop over
unknown ground by moonlight, which, though beautiful, is a s
deceitful as other beauties are said to be by poets. He is very much
better than when I wrote, but still fm from well. I t is a very
great matter for him to have escaped the journey to Goruckpore. I
am sure it would have killed him ; even without it I was nt one
t i m very apprehensive about him. I hope very shortly to set oat
for Loodhiana, where I shall rejoin him.
I have begun a letter to Bayley, which I shall finish to-day or
to-morrow. In the mean time give him and all your. circle my very
best regards, and believe me, my dear Mrs. Bayley,
Most sincerely yours,
G. BROADFOOT.

I shall look with impatience for an answer to this.
Capt. Broadfoot succeeclecl i n recruiting the number of
Hindustanis ancl G h k h a s he. required, and these with t h e
Hazaras, raised near Btlmian by William Brondfoot, formed
the Shah's regiment of sappers. At first, when offered t h e
commancl by Lord Anclrlmcl, he declined on the score of being
unwilling to ~upersedehis own brother. Ilia Lordship, how-'
ever, took no notice of the r e f ~ ~ s a and
l , after some time sent
him orders nbout details which concerned the regiment to the

eonimmid of which he lmd been appointed.
Further objection was, of course, impossible.

It was also
ascertained that, prior to the arrangement here described,
Lord Auckland had decided, in ignorance of W. Broadfoot's
claims to the command, to appoint him second in command, a
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position mllich he collsidcred suitable to his subaltern raldi.
1 3 s Lordship, wit11 kind intentions, thought that it would be
more ngreeable to William Broaclfoot to bc superseded by his
brother than 1)y some stranger, ancl hence his refusal to conseut to George'a resignation. As a nlattcr of fact the supcrs e s ~ i o nnever took place, for William Broaclfoot received a
p l i t i c d qqointmeut under Sir Alesnnder B~wnes,and Georgc
remained commnncler of tho regiment. No men in it nrorc
more devoted to their lender tlim those rnised by William in
Hazara.
The regiment is thus referred t o by Mardiman in the Life
of Hnvelook :
Tlley mere instructed in all the duties of entronclhg and siege
operations, und wero eilcouragcil to become superior light troops.
I n their ranks were not only Hindostal~ees of evcry province, but
Ghoorltns, & ruen from Cabnl, Pesllawar, Eusofzyo, and Hnxnm.
Many of the men thus enlisted were desperate and intractable
characters, but they -itwe soon moulded by the tnlent of their chief
into dnring, skilful, and obedient soldiers. Cnpt. Broadfoot was on
his side like a, fnther to these men, in il.tter~tionto their real wants,
ndiile he esncted from them tho most implicit obediencc to his orders,
nnd punished tllcir faults with n soverity which many nroold I~avo
deemed forocious.
When Capt. Broaclfoot mas nbont to start for Kabul, hc
wax defiired to take charge of ancl protcct thc families and
attelldnlltx of Shshs S h j a and !&man. This wns n most
complicated nncl unclesirnblc addition to his cares, consisling
as it clicl of the blind Shall Zalnan and of somc 600 ladies of
the zenanns with numerous attendnnts. These, together with
a large nmonnt of treasure and bagpge, h c hncl to escort
through the Punjab, thcn in very disturbed statc, with its
t r o o p f o r t h e most part in open mutiny.
I t is to be regretted tllnt n m t of spnce makes it unnclvisnble to print C ~ p t Broadfoot's
.
reports of this journey in
mtewso, for they are of great interest nnd testify to his souncl
jndglnent, decision of character, and capacity for command.
The latter quality, inrb~cl,6ccnled to risc csactly in yroportion to thc clil'6cnlties and dangcrs ~ l l i c l lic
i was cnlled on
to face.
2

Edit. 1870, p. 87.
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The Lahore Darbar deputed three officers of position;
SarclAr Shhm Singh of Athi, Rai Kesri Singh, and Col.
Chet Singh, to accompany the convoy and afford assistance.
They further sent an escort of picked troops from the Sikh
army ; but these, infected by the spirit of mutiny then abroad,
were a source of danger rather than of protection.
Mr. Clerk: the Political Agent for Punjab affairs, in the end.
of April 1541 expressed anxiety for the safety of the convoy
consequent on the disaffection prevailing at Peshamar ; he a180
thus described an instance of the mischievous consequences
of the example of successful mutiny : ' A mutiny which lately
occurred in the Sappers and Goorkhas under Capt. Broadfoot's
commancl assumecl the same features which have marked the
commencement of most of the mutinies of late among the
Sikh battalions. They turned out armecl ancl demanclecl two
C ~
months' pay. They spoke, and were inclined to C O ~ ~ Uthemselves, most resolutely. But they mere met with still greater
resolution by Capt. Broadfoot and their other European
officers. The ringleaders were flogged on the spot, and the
detachment fell in ancl returned to obedience.'
Capt. Mackeson, Political Officer at Peshawar, nlrote to
Broadfoot to inform him of the mutiny there, and of thc
occupation of the road by f o ~ umutinous battalions. He
aclclecl that Avitebile4 had reported that they meant to attack the convoy, ancl begged that Broadfoot mould halt and
await relief unless Sham Singh W O U be
~ ~ responsible for his
safety.
Broadfoot replied that, having all along foreseen the probability of attack, he had taken precautions, and that therefore
a

W o w Sir George R. Clerk, G.C.S.L,

K.C.B.
4 Gen. Avitabile,
a n officer in
Ranjit Singh's service, was Governor
of Pesha\var and Yusufzai. His hospitality to our officers who passed
through Peshnvrar was unbounded.
He is thus described by Sir Herbert
Edwardes: 'With the intrigue and
ounning of an Asiatio, the broader
wisdom nnd self-dependence of a Europerm, and the reinorselessness of one
who professed to own no God, Avita-

bile, backed by a powerful Sikh force,
mas soon master of the valley, and
to this (lay is spoken of by the Afghan
population with the admiration of a
troop of jackals for n tiger. To do
him justice, though he stuck at nothing that mould serve his ends, he
did much good.' ( L i f e of Sir 8: L m rencc, vol. i. p. 29%) The Afghans had
the same respect for George Brotulfoot ;
they anlleil him the 'bla,laalc-coatedinfidel.' who was at Jnlalabad us Avitabile was at Poshnwar.

.,
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Avitabile's declaration supplied no reason for fresh prcparation or for increased ansiety on his account.
As to Sham Singh nnd the othcr oficers being responsil~lc
for the safety of the convoy, he fairly lauglieil nt the iclcn.
Ho pointecl ont that, owing to theh z c d and good faith, the
chiefs hacl incnrrccl gravc risk from the Sikh troops, and
that the Irnowlcdge Chat he (Bronclfoot) wonlcl protcct them
had hither10 saved them from violence, if not from death.
He furlher declined to halt and wait for snccour, nucl said
h e hoped he was not improperly conficlcnt in believing that hc
wonlcl repulsc ally attack the Sikl~smight nlalie. He was
aware that the utmost caution was required to avoicl clisnster,
but added, ' I t is, however, safer than stai~diilgstill, a.nc1 as
far as any military operation is certain of sncccssfnl issue
I consider this to bc so ; for if we clo not get on quietly, and
cannot force the passage, we shall, I donbt not, hold our
own till you send us assistance.'
H e accorclingly marched forward, ancl a t last came on thc
mutineers with guns commanding the road, at a plncc cnllccl
Saiclu, beyoncl Attoclr, on Lhe Inclus. The position was cleuicledly
critical-the
mntineers from Pesl~awar,with tl~eirguns, in
front, and his Sikh cscort, cqnally clangerous ancl rcndy for
plunclcr, in rcnr. IIe met the crisis bolclly-matched
Ille
convoy ancl his own me11 ilcross tlie river, and broltc thc
I~riclgebefore the Silt11 escort coulcl cross. Thus he inswed
freedom from nttaclr on Ihe rear, ancl conlcl concentrate his
encrgies on the dangcr in front.
The following letters to Col. Cullell and Dr. Iilalcolmson
contain accounts of Chis intcrcsting journey :

My dear Colonel,-It has been for a, long time my intention to
write LO yon, but you will believe tllnt to coniluct a large convoy,
with a, very feeble escort, across tha Punjab at finoh a period, required
every nlorncnt I could spare to obtaiu the requisite information of
w]lnt was going on amidst t l i ~scene of confusion,in order to provide
for ourselves. I forget whether I ever replied to your lelter contnining a inost flattering notice of me by Lord Elphlnstone. I
thinlt I did ; but if not, nlny I beg you to esprcss to his Lorclsllip
my cleep sense of his uniCorm liii~duess? Indeed, tlia indulgent way
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I was always treated malies me often regret that I could not carry
my old masters with me into the new world I am now entering.
I was long detained at Loodhiana and Ferozpore by being nominated to take charge of the royal families of Cabool on their way
to their native country. There is the old blind Shah Zeman, a host
of shahzadas, and a huge number of ladies of all ranks and ages.
It was a duty I could not well decline, there being no other officor
of the Shah's service present, though it was easy to see it was one
pretty sure to be troublesome and thankless. To complicate matters,
the Punjab was verging towards anarchy when we started, and
daily got into greater confusion as we advanced. The mutinous
troops were moving in all directions towards Lahore, and occasionally crossed our path. Tbey had already murderod or expelled their
officers before starting, and were governed by punchnyets "lectod
by universal suffrage. They mere suspicious of our intentions, and
from the first have been averse to our troops having a passage
through their territory. We were sometimes in danger of collision
with them, but by one way or other got clear through till, we had
crossed the Attock. Then four battalions in a state of mutiny and
six guns were bcfore us, encamped so as to command the only
road we could go by. Every effort was made to make them move,
but in vain. They said if we proceeded at all we must go by that
road, they being under arms and standing to their guns. Letters
from the Court, orders from Gen. Avitabile, and the entreaties and
menaces of the Valceels with me were ineffectual to get them to
go one march off the road. The report was through the conntry
that they intended to plunder the kafila, and Gen. Avitabile declared to the Political Agent here, he codd not answer for their
intentions towards us. So the Political Agent sent for a brigade of
our troops. I went to the mutinous camp, or at least to within 800
yards or so, and had an interview with them. The hostility of their
proceeding was pointed out, but in vain. At length they formally
declared the brigade, or 50,000 men, might come, they also were
soldiers and would fight. They said we might consider them enemies
or friends as we pleased ; they were ready for us. We parted with
a formal declaration that, having refused to abandon their menacing
position, even for a few hours, and it being impossible for us to
advance, but by pntting the kafila in their power, that they must
be looked on as enemies of tho three Governments.Vhe chief of
the Lahore Vakeols was with me and shared in a11 this,
Pamhdual, a committee of five
members, one of whom is presidont
nnd has a casting vote; afterwards
used t;o designate any representative

committee.
a British India, Punjab, and Shah
Shuja's Government.
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They mere wamcd no longcr to ventme acar our camp, or even
to approach thc hills \vhcre me wcre, or try to entcr the pass leading
to Attock. They despiscd us too much to heed the warning, ella a
gmfi of llm pnndlnyet wen t to our camp and stxycd beyond the time
allowed for them to consirler. I mct them among the hills and
made them prisoners. l ' l h prevented us from being in future
inundated by thcm. Tor two days mo thus remained with althe prisoners, with
most seven miles between us ; they derna~~cling
meliaccs of sttack ; nud n7c refusing, tho~igho h r i n g to hem1 them
over to the Bilth Vulrccls if they mould leave Lhc road, removi~~gsornc
of their guns as an evidcilcc of sincerity. They several timcs got
undcr arms, and once even advanccd n short disimce hi our direction ; bnt this last time tllcir hearts hiled, nnd t h y acccptcd the
terms just bcforc rejected, n m t beck Lo their camp in haste, and
crossed zz gun to the other sicleof the rivel,; dreading, no doubt, the
nppromch of the brigade, and fecliug they liacl not power even to
force om position. I relensed tho prisoners, and the mutineers
Began to loiter in crossing, SO that I could not ~ n n r c ltliut
~ day ;
but in thenight, moved, it is said, by ,y report of our Brigadespproaching, most of thein bolted across the river in great haste, and next
dny me passed on, and are now safe here.
I t wns necessary to be always on the look-out among tl~cso
peoplc, a i d consequently tlic work w ~ lleavy
s
for oflicers mil men.
Poor Orr, -ivlio acted as o w quartermilster, lms been fairly morltccl
into a rather severe fiL of illness, but, I a m glad to any, is now
ncarly well again. He is a n active, intelligeilt, a d higll-spiriLe13
young officer. Somc more of oar ~iuinberare ailing. Tho officers
are nll froin Rlndras, and arcvery fine youiig men. My own 11edth
stood well till thcw last few dnys, in fact till t l ~ c~ 0 ~ was
1 ; pretty
well over. Tlie position I mns in was one of extrcmc dcl~cncy;
tlierc was seldonl time to delibcmtc, and scnrcoly a ~r~onxare
could
be adopted, or aworcl s ; d or written, williout incurring Lha cansllre
of ono pnrty or tu~oR~er,Some bla~neme us rash i n not cnlliugfor
nssistn~~ce,
and in maltil~gt l ~ epnnchnycL prisoiiors ; nlid obstinate
ill ,lot surrendering hliein wliei~~ncilacrdwith ml attncli. Olllers
t
again swcnr tl~encwas no clanger at d l , ancl Lllc Polilicd A g c ~ hore
seems to think he dcared a w q the muhinccrs by n civil letter, to
which t l l ~ yreturned civil answer (I suspect Brigadier khelton is
tho rcal Simon Pnre). Tho fear of his brigade did the work.
However, 11ere me arc safely through the Punjab withont n shot
bcing fired ; a consummation few expected till i t has occur~cd.

' Sllclton's brigndo wns to march from Jlrlnlnbnd to rcliuve tho Itafila,if
necessary.
C
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In the mean time, whether I get credit or obloquy, I look back on
the whole transaction without seeing many errors in the course I followed. That, however, is but poor evidence of their not being
many and great.
The journey through the Punjab has given me a very high
opinion of old Runjeet Singh. Here is this large army utterly
disorganised, turned into a lawless multitude, going to their homes
when they please, but generally crowding to the capital. The
people chiefly Mahomedans, hating the Sikhs, but recently conquered, with the families of their old chiefs among them, yet
afraid to rebel. Old Runjeet's constant success, or speedy recovery
from defeat, and the vigonr as well as justice of his rule, have produced an impression of the stability and resources of his Sirkar,R
something like that prevailing in our territories regarding the
Company. The end, however, is fast approaching, and nest cold
weather mill probably see extinguished the last vestige of Indian
independence.

.

.

Camp near Csbool : July 3, 1841.

My clear Malcolmson,-As you must be beginning, like all my
friends, to think me negligent in not writing, I send this merely to say
that I am recovering from smallpox, and am still very weak: I was
seized with it at Peshawur, and it first showed itself oz6twardly at
Jumrood or Futtehgurh, the frontier post of the Sikhs. There the
garrison seemed disposed to molest us, or rather, actually seized a
lot of property and made an attempt at a search of the Begnms'
p a l k e e s . V h e excitement cured me for the moment, and I made
them clisgorgo by threatening to resort to force, and proceeding to
preparations. Avitabile, however, sent a soft letter to them (I had
treated them as thieves), and thinking he and our Political Agent
funlced, they seized cattle next day, and even came (the Killadar,'
or rather two of the punchayet dragging him) to my tent with intent
to be insolent.
I had again to rouse up ; they got frightened, and gave mo
Avitabile's letter to read, which I threw in their faces, saying no'
letters could make thieves honest men, and if m ten minutes all
was not given up I should no longer treat them as soldiers. This .
impudence had the effect, for impudence it was, seeing they had a fort
with 3 guns, and 1,000 men nominally (probably 700 or SOO), and I
had not 500 firelocks, and no guns ; but next day, when we mere
safe across the frontier, I sank so much that I did not oxpect to
weather the disease ; the reaction of the dispntes with these fellows
Government,

Palankins.
Olhaor in chergo of the fort.
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w a s nlmost too rnnch for me, m d I cnmc up hare in a palltee. I a m
still menk, and regain streilgth very slowly.
Our late journey was a very intarcsting one i n every way. I seo
s o m e noticcs of it in t h e p a p o r s + ~ l llies, or at least many lics and
m o n y errors. Sir W. &laciiaghten has reportccl of m e in terms of
prniso too strong, more than I deserve. Uurnes also is on the
s a m e side, but Iliaar somc ncwspnpers are going to assnilmo ; why,
I lmow not, but sncli i s the fn,shion i n thcse parts. If I can find
~ ttho journey I intended
time, I moan to draw ant n short a c c o ~ uof
i t for Col. Cullen, whoso goocl opinion I desire to retain. I can
t h c n mention wllaL duty requires me not even in sclf-defencc to
inention in n, newspaper (not, ho\\rcvcr, that I a m going to a~lsmcr
a n y of the tlirci~tei~ecl
attnclts), and this I shnll send open t o you
t h a t you also may see it. We have wit11 the ltrtfiln, n, Dr. Thomwn,2
a very e x c c l l o ~young
~ ~ fellow, a cl~emist,botanist, n d geologist,
t h c son of the Glasgow Professor of Che~nistry,and not a, dcgencr a t e onc. William h a s been clangerously ill, and still is very ill ; a
r u s h of blood to the head. Only yesterday did he take the f a ~ u u d h
t n m , mlcl now the lensL thing mould throw him back. I t aroso
f r o m exposure in ricling o~zLsevcml marches to rncct me wIlen ill,
t h e snll here being very hot. Alas I this is dismal work, n~irsilifi
hi111 in a room full of nll t!mt bclongccl to poor James. I I e [J.]
h a s left the reputation of estmordiniwy talenl and cxtrnorcliilary
brallcry. I t is to me qnitc aEcctiug to llesr tho iifghnns ;1nd otllors
t
our langnagc,'
spe;dr of him. ' The yonng Eroadfoot t h ~ spoke
t h c y call hiin, and to coinpere s i n d l will1 great, tho irnprcssion left
b y hiln on a11 classes of mtives is of tho sama ltincl (though less in
Dr. Thonins Tliomson \vns born
on Dcccmber 4, 1817. 110gnve proof
of unusunl tnlcnt nnd obscrvalion i n
R C ~ G ~ ~a C
t tlic
C
cmly age of savcnlccn.
I l e joined tho mcdicnl service of tho
E.I.C., arrived in Cdcnttn i n 1810, a n d
wns nlq~ointcdCorntor of thc Jluseum
of t h e AsinLic Socicly. H e was soon
tmnsferrrd to thc tncdicnl chnrgc of a
p a r t y under orders for Afghanistnil, a n d
nccolnpaniod theconvoy ondcr thccolnniniid of Cnpt.Bronc1foot. 1111641 h c
wns nppoinled to the 27111 N.I., nnd,
with the rcst of the ofliccrs of thnt
regiment, 1vn5 mado prisonor by tho
A i g l i ~ ~on
i ~Lliocnpitulnt~on
s
of Ghnzni.
I n 16.16 IICscrvcd with i h c army in
t h c Sntlc~jcnmpnign. Two yonrs laLcr
lic ~vnsappointcdnmombcrof tllccoin-

mission lodcfir~ethe boundary betmccn
I<nshinir and Thibct. 9'11~othcr mcmbcrs were Major Cunninghmn, B.E.,
nnd Capt.LI. Strnchoy. rio took cvcry
opportunity of collceting infor~nntion
nbont the Uorn and pllysicnl guogrnpliy
of the ~.arioos coiintries ha snw, nud
did much work in nltcr Soars i n eonjuuctiou with Sir Joscpli Floolter. I n
1861 110 a n s appointed Superintonclont
of the Botnnicnl Gnrdons in Cnlcutta,
null professor of holilny in tho AIcdical
Collcgc. Ih rotircd i n 1N1, rcLurlicd
to India for u short time in 1871 with
tho party scnt thcro to obsorvc tho
cclipsc, nnd d i d in 1878. IIu \ws tho
rmtZ 'I'ibct
autlior oI ll4,sto.i4 Ifii~ircln?ja
(London, 1852).
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degree) as that left by Elphinstone, which is altogether extraorilina~y
even now.
Sir W. iVacnaghten's report to the Government of India
of the arrival of the convoy is as follows :
To the Secretary to the Governmozt of India, Secret Department.

I have tho honour to report, for the information of the Right
Hon. the Governor-General in Council, the safe arrival at Cabul of
his Mn,jesty Shah Shoojah's family.
This event has been a source of much gratification to his
Majesty, and it will, I trust, have a beneficial effect throughout the
country. To the energy, tact, and judgment displayed by Copt.
Broadfoot, who had the superintendence of tho family, must mainly
be ascribed their having overcome the formidable obstacles opposed
to their progress, and their having escaped the serious dnngers to
mhich they mere exposed throughout a long and harassing march.
I introduced Capt. Broadfoot to the Shah yesterday evening,
and his Najesty was pleased to oxpress to that oficer, in the most
flattering terms, his gratitude for the kind, judicious, and considerate treatment mhich had been shown to the Royal Family, and
as a mark of his approbation his RIajssty conferred a horso, a
sword, and a dress of honour upon C q t . BroacUoot. which I trust,
under the very peculiar circumstances of the case, he may be per-.
mitted to retain. I have Bc.
W. H, MACNAGHTEN,
Enumj and Xinister.

Broadfoot's conduct of the convoy, though highly approved

by Government, was attacked in certain nevspapers, and in
a subsequently writLen history of the Sikhs is unfavourably
criticisecl. H e took n o notice of the attacks ; but, fearing lest
some paragraphs might be copied into English newspapers,
and cause pain or anxiety to his friencls, he wrote the following letter I;o Mr. Loch, a director of the E.I.C., in which
will be found a favourable opinion as to his management'
expressed by Gen., afterwards Sir Harry, Smith, a s well as
some other matters of general interest :
Cabool : August 4,1841

My friend Mr. Tliomason,3 the Socrstnry to the Agra, Government, lately sent mo a note to him fipm Mr. Roberlson, theLieut.a James Thomason, of the Bengal
Civil Service, nn eminent rnernber of

thnt disting~iishedbody of publia eervnnts, wns nppointed a writer in 1821,

.
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Governor, inclosing onc from GCIL Smith, the tldjulant-General
of tile Queen's troops, to whom I on1 nllogetller udi110~11. T h e
General hail just received accounts of the early pnrl of our journey,
aud of tho suppression of a mutiny of part of our little force ncnr
Lahore, nnd he espressecl himself of me, as a soldier, in l e m s which,
though I could hardly fecl I dcscrred [them], yet I confess gratified
me esceeilingly ; for, as Mr. Robertson snid in writing to Tliomason,
i t wns indeed ' Lnudnri a laudalo,' Gen. Smith being reclioned
one of tho first mcn in the Royal Army. It mns he who finally pnt
down the Catlirs in the lalo mar at the Cape, and, wiclcly as opii~ions
cliUer s s to the justico of that war, they moro m~miimonsamong
professional incu as 10 tlic abllity and vigonr of Gen. (tllen Col.)
Smith's operations.
Tl~erois rn~iclito interost one in this country. I am still too
superficially acquainted with what is going on to have any positive
opinions, bul I cannot help tliinliing wo leave the finnncial part of
the business too much out of view.
One good cft'ect from this occupation of n poor comltry by the
Rongal Army nil1 be, that a searching economy on i t large scalo
will be forced on the Slipreme Govenlmcnt. They will h m to~ do
throughout thc system what Col. Cullen, ~ u ~ d esor many iliffinnd Ilcld n vnriety of offices of tho -soLtloment nnd collection. Undor
uaut~ldescription Lill 1640, when he his yuidnnce John Lnwrence, Robcrt
Nontyomcry, Donuld Mneleod, J o l ~ n
took lcave to Ihglnnd.
On his return to India in 1811 hu Tllornton, Georgc Edrnonstone, nnd
~
their lesson, a n d
was nppointed Secretnry to the Go- ninny 0 t h learnt
vernment N.W.P.; rlevt ycnr he he- introdnccd Lhe snme system into the
cnrne n mcmhcr of the Gndr (Snddcr) IJunjnh. Blr. Tliomnson started tho
l3o:ird of lievenue, nnd in 1813 hc wns Gnngcs Cnnnl in concert with C n n t l ~ y .
~ r o m o t e dto tlic inlportnnt position of I l e rcfornicd mid improved every dcSccretnry to the Government of Indin partnlent of govcmment, nnd inlroin Lhc sccrct, political, legislalivc, duced a high tone into tho service.'
Lord Dnlhousie's estimnte of h i s
judicial, nnd rcvcnuc dcpartmenls.
blr. R. N. Cust has [avoured me value may be gnthered from the followwith thc following rcmnrks : ' Jnmetr ing cxtrnct from the order in which
T h o m n ~ o nnras Recrclary to thc Go- his dent11 was nnnounced : ' Conspivernn~ontof Intlin in Llic Forcrgn De- cuous nbility, devotion to the public
p n ~ l m c n l under Lord Ellenborough, survice, nnd n conscicntio~isdisclinrge
nnd ~uccccded Sir George Clark ntr of ovcry doty, have niarlted ench stop
Lieot.-Govcnior of the N.W.P., und , of his hononrnble coursc : wl~ileh i s
i s l ~ n t i hvies
ocenpiod lhnt post ten years, when in s ~ ~ ~ ~ a s s i ~ i g n d m i ~ ~cnpncily,
1865 he wns nppointetl Goven~or of estendod knowledge of nflnirs, his olcur
RIndrus, bnt 110 dicd nt Enreilly before judgu~ent,his bencvolcnco of chnrnc.
ter nnd wavily 01 clcmcnnonr, have
h e took np the n-ppoinl~ncnt.
' Hc carried out nll Rolwrt Eircl's ndorned and esallcd lhc I~igliposition
rcforms in the llevcnuo Dcpnrtmoiil j\hicl~he was wisely sclccLcd to fill.'
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culties, and with such signal success, accomplished in the Nadrits
Commissariat. The more I see of the service in different parts of
Inclia, the more highly do I estimate his services to the State.
Herat is occupying much attention at present in consequence of
the late news from Persia. Our error was in at first guaranteeing
its independence. During the siege our succour should have been
given on condition that, on the death of Kamran, it should revert
to Cabool as a lapsed appanage ; such terms would then have been
thought liberal. I t is now a great difficulty, for, as Sir J. McNeill
justly says in one of his printed letters, ' the case of Herat involves
that of all Afghanistm.'
But this ciificulty, and the many others arisingfi-om our advance
,
beyond the Indus, should be fully looltecl in the face, their cost
estimated, and their solntion provicled for. The greatest caution
should be usecl, precipitation w&ilcl be very dangerks, but delay in
commencing is equally so ; the present makeshift policy is ruinous
in its expense, and leaves us at the encl .of the year nearly where
we mere a t the beginning, only poorer.
Major Todd has just left ; he is about to memorialise your Court,
and he has certainly a strong case. I h o w too little to judge
between him and the Government of India, but the latter seem to
me to have committed the grievous mistake of punishing an error
of judgment as they woulcl a crime. Ln distant situations mnch
discretion is necessarily left to the local authorities, and in critical
circumstances the necessary self-possession and nice bdance of
jnclgment are hardly to be looked for where the fear of ruin for
life is felt, if the opinion formed does not coincide with that of a
superior a thonsaud miles off. I t is to be regretted, therefore, that
the Government did not transfer Major Todd, if his judgment
proved unequal to his situation, to a post where he would be more
a mere esecutive officer. That such precipitation should havc been
suffered by so just and temperate a man as Lord Auclrlsnd, is
another proof of how essential to the welfare and good government
of India is a body such as the Cowt of Directors. I t will be long
before India can be safely committed to a minister ; a changing,
party-riven I'ouse of Commons is no check, or rather would pervert
a well-intentioned minister.
Affairs at Kabul at the e n d of September 1841 were in
miserable confusion. Gen. Elphinstone was in a pitiable
s t a t e of health, absolutely unfit for duty. Sir W.Macnaghten,
n h e a d y appointed Governor of Bombay, was ans?ous t o go,
b u t unwilling to leave whilst existing distmbances m a d e it
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iinpoesiblo that ha could say ha hnnded over to his Ruccessor
s pacified country. The clcloy about this, and the apparent
increase rather tlinn decrcase of clisnft'cction, fieern to hatre induced n state of nervous irritation (by no means soothed by
ordcrs for retrenchment from Inclia), \vhich was fatal to t h e
harmony esson tin1 to good government.
Sir Alexn~lcler Enrnes \viW anxioll~lfor the En-voy's depal.twc, mid thonght he wonlil easily qucll tho disturbances
which had arisen, a n d reign in his stend.
The following clescription of Che cfiorts made by 13rosclfoot
to obtain some strictly necesfinrg information nncl instructions,
respccling an ex1)ediCion on -cvliich hc had becn ordered, aflords
n sad pictnre of irritable incapacity and feehhmss :

On Oclober 7, 1841, 1 received a note from 13ligadier Anquetil,
desiring me to prepare for imrnecliate field service 100 sappew, nnd
directing me, as there wore uo other oficers nvailnble, to proceed in
command. (Orr ancl Cunningham, with about 250 men, ware absent
on service in Zoormnt, nrest h f Ghuznee, the other oficer was
sick.) I rode into cnntorunents to obLain detailed orders, and was
told tlmt Tczecli mns onr destination, to punish the Ghilzi chiefs,
who hnd stopped the rleks, m d that I should l a w to destroy Lhe
forts. I w,s cliroctcd to recoivc f~lrtlierordcrs from Lieut.-Col.
Nonteath, who nras to co~mnnnd the expedition. I passed thc
night nt Bumes's, sitting np till near daylight in discussiolls tlint,
as matters hnye Lnrilcd out, were very cnrious, lor he and I differed
widely in our views, ancl he wag just then much shalien as to his
own opinions, though he seems to 11ime relxpscd.
I had senL to the artificers (nrmonrers mu1 smiths, mmerous in
Cabool) in the city to make some lni~iingtools not in the magmino.
(A11 ours gone to Xoomlut-no others), aucl the nrlnourers refused
to nrorlc for the Peringecs.' Bunleu sent an order without any
effect, and I took clown B party of our men, geve enoh srnitli his
work with lneu to keep him at it, am1 nest di~ygot the tools, the
best they had ever done for us in Lhe city. They were busy forging
l
said, for the
arms, for what purpose wo have since l e c ~ ~ o;c B~urnos
wandering tribes nbout to migrate.
Next morning, the 8th, I wailed on Lieut.-Col. Montcath, mhom
I did not before knom. He said 110 colllcl give me no mdors, hnving
received none himself, escept to mow townrds Jclalal~ad; thnt 110
did not cveu l a o m I was to go, but should be glad of my company.
"robrrlly

II

inislnlic for cast.
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H e declined to apply for information, saying he knew these people
too well,%dmitted all the dangers of going on service in the dark,
but said it was not the custom here to consult, or even to instruct,
the commanders of expeditions. He spoke bitterly of sending
officers and troops on wild-goose chases, bringing them into scrapes
and letting them get out if they could, for the Envoy's credit, but if
his politicals failed, to their o m discredit. He again refused to
refer for instructions, saying he had too much esperience of these
people, but permitted me to go to the General, the Envoy, or anyone I pleased. I vent to the magazine to learn what preparations
the Commissary of Ordnance was malting. I found he was making
none, or rather that none had been ordered, though he had been in
hourly expectation of orders. He (Lieut. Eyre6) and I put in train
the preparation of all he could furnish, in case I wanted things, and
I sent men to the city and cantonment bazaars to procure what the
magazine Jid not afford.
Eyre and I went over to see if Major Thain (Gen. Elphinstone's aide-de-camp) h e w anything of the proposed service, but he
wtts not at home, so I sent up m y name to the General, who was
very ill. He received me, however, with his usual cheerful lciililness ; insisted on getting up, and was supported to hisvisiting room.
This exertion so exhausted him, that it was half an hour before he
could attend to business, indeed several ineffectual efforts to do so
had excited him so much that I was sorry I had come at all.
He h e w , no more than Col. Monteath, the nature of the service, having merely received a n order to send him and so many
men. He did not h o w the number or strength of the forts, nor
whether anyone to act as engineer was going, and said he would
leave the provision of tools and stores to me ; and he did not h o w
whether sending Col. Monteath was a measure of precaution or
of hostility.
I pointed out that I could not prepare for a semice the very
nature of which I h e m not ; and as to taking, as he suggested, enough
to meet any possible emergency, that, in such a country of mountains, rivers, and innumerable forts, would require so much carriage
as to delay the expedition greatly to collect it, all pz~blic carriage
being sent to Zoormut ; while it would, from the enormous rates of
hire given by our Commissariat, entail on Government a great
expense, of which part, perhaps nearly all, would be useless.
He admitted a l l this fully, but said h e could give me no orders,
and expressed himself unwilling to refer to the Envoy .on a point
which ought to have been left to him to arrange. At last he gave
'5

The Envoy and his staff.

Afterwnrds Sir Vincent Eyre.
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me a private note to thc Envoy, begging him to listen to me, and
saying he considered what I n m t e d wns reasonable ; viz. to Itnow
whether there mere to be hostilities or not, with whom, nnd the
strength and position of the enemy ; and especially mliell~er forts
were to be taken and destroyed.
The Envoy scemed to be annoyed, said the General expected
him Lo turn prophet ; how could he predict whether there would
be hostilities or n o t ? and, finally, he desired me to state all my
wants to the General, and promised to st~nctionwhatcvcr the lattcr
proposed.
I mentioned the neccssity of lmowing something abouL the forts,
and he said IICn~ouldsend to the TVaxeer and loarn.
Hc gave me a note to the Gencml, which Lhe latter rend to me.
The Envoy used the phrase of being aslred to turn prophet, nnd
said he could not say whether there would be hostilities at d l ,
thongh he thought n force should pcrlleps still go, but not so soon
aslntely ordered ; not, indeed, till the Zoormut force returned ; but
in the mean time we are to be ready.
Thc General was much hurt and agitated on reading this note,
and complained bitterly of the way he T V ~deprived
S
of all authority
nnd reduced to a mere cipher. He was so evidently too wenk and
the subject, and m011 after
excitable for business that I chang~~d
would have taken my lesve, but aftcr leaving Ilim was recallecl, the
business Iuzving rcLuivecl to his recollcction. He said, as I hod
been thronm 011 his hands, he would not shirk the job.
He n ~ a d eme go ovcr again my retisoils for declining to estimate
for tools and stores in ignorance of the nature and extent of Lhe
work to be done. I-Ie tooh them down in writing, sttying he could
not otllerwise remelnber them ; they were those above mentioned,
only I nrlded that, if I did not estimate to meet all possible exigencies, any failure would be charged, without further inquiry, to my
incapacity, or Lo the ineficiency of the corps, not to mention the
public injury or ilishonour from a failure n little forethought
mi& have obviated He said I must not bc maclc to decide in
ignorance, and neither was i t fair he should, but he recoiled froin
again applying to the Envoy.
After much discussion, he asked me to go to Sir W. i\Iacnngllten.
The letter was peevish, and s p 0 1 ~of Gen. Elphinstone's being
fidgety. I said I was in this casc to blnme, lmving declinccl to bo
respousible without requisite orders. This led to a long cliscussion, and 110 seemed to seo t h retzsont~blcncssof ~ v h was
t
said ;
he mentioned again the Wnzccr, and asked me to come bilck niid
hear t l l ~rcply. He said there was no one wl~u had Lhc requircd informalion but Cnpt. RIacgregor, t l ~ cPoliLici~lAgent, who
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lmow all these parts intimately, and that till his return nothing
could be done.
I stayed with the General until it was time to return to the
Envoy. On going back, I found him apparently irritated at something. Ele gave me the Wazeer's information, which was that a
force ought to be sent to Tezeen, but that the rebels were about to
quit. As to their forts, they were very weak.
I said information so vague was useless. The Envoy called
in the Waeeer's man and some other Afghans, and told me to
examine them myself. They said they knew only khe fort near the
road at Tezeen, which I had seen myself from the road ; another at
Tezeen, on the hill, they could not describe ; they said the enemy
had other forts, some very strong, across tho river; on which tho
Xnvoy said we were not to go there. The men then said there were
other forts on this side, but the number, situation, and strength,
they knew not ; only they were all weak, and there was no occasion
for us to fear.
The Envoy interrupted me impatiently, saying there mould be
no fighting ; that he had resolved on sending Col. Monteath to
Bootkhak as a dem~nstration,~
and that immediately-to-morrow
morning ; that he expected the submission of the rebels that evening.
If it came, Col. Monteath would go on to Jelalabad; if it did
not come to-day, his march to Bootkhali would so terrify them that
it would be sure to arrive to-morrow. The Colonel was only to
have his o m regiment, two guns, a squadron of cavalry, and 100
sappers.
I asked what was to be done if the submission did not arrive.
Was Col. Monteath to return?
He saicl, 'No; in that case he will halt at Bootlrhak till the
Zoormut force comes in : it will be a demonste.ation; that w i l l be
sure to terrify the Ghilzi chiefs.' E e asked me if I &cl not think
this plan would answer.
I, of course, stated the obvious objections to it as a military
measu~e-that m y alarm produced by the march to Bootkhak
(ten miles) would be turned into confidence by finding we went no
farther, which would be ascribed to fear ; and that, if Monteath mas
to wait for the Zoormut force, he had better remain in cantonments
than move to the skirts of the plain, near all the passages into the
hills, a situation which invited attack, for the enemy could arrive
unseen, and Col. Monteath was too weak to pursue, even if able
to beat them. All this would strengthen the cause of the rebels.
Our course was to prepare diligently, and when the troop; coulcl be

' A military operation in great favour wilh political officers.
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spared, to movc in full force, and ncvcr to stop for a moment till tho
enemy were ntterly destroyecl.
These rcasons I gave to the Envoy late i11 the clay, buL now he
interrupted me on my saying they might be Lemptcd to attack
Montenth. He becamc angry, said these wore his orders, and the
enemy were contemptible, the Xastern Cfhilzis the most cowarclly
of AQhans (a foolish notion he and Burncs hnil) ; that as for rue
and my sappcrs, tnrenty men with picltases nrcrc enough ; it was a
pcnccnble march to Jelalabad, a d all that we mcrc witnted for mas
t o pick stones from u d e r the ,gun-wvheels.
I asked if these were his orders; he said no, only thc opinion
give11 at the General's request and mine, that the Gcncral mas
responsible, and inust decide on whaL snppers and tools nlust go.
Soon after I rejoined the General he rcceived a note, ordoring
Lient.-Col. Monteatli's inmedifite march, and containing almost the
above words as to the sappers and the enemy, but clecliiiing all
reuponsi bility.
The General was lost and perplexed, though he entirely agreed
in thoobjections as to the move, yet lie didnot feel himself at liberty
to prevent it. H e asltecl me to follow my ona judgment as to
reclncing the number of sappers, and what quantity of tools I moald
tnlte, hilt lllade me give my reasons, which he took down in the
form of n, memorandum adclressed to himsclf. Thc Adjutnntoame in, and to him the Cleneral referred.
C~cnernl,Capt. G-,
T h i s oficer, aftw abnsing the Envoy, spolte Lo the General ~vitha n
imperiousness ancl disrespect, and to mc, a stmuge~,with ail insolonce
L
i was painful to sce the oKects of on h e Gcncral, who get tricd
only to soothe him. He advised llie Gciieral not lo linvc anyLliing
to say to Macnaghten, to me, or to the sappers, saying Montcilth
h z d men cnougl~,and needed neithcr sqJpers nor tools. At lnst h e
took a newspaper, went to a window, and would no longer speak to
t h e General on thc subject, saying, ' You know best.' This man, I
have sinco licsrcl, was Lllo poor Cfencrnl's evil genius cluriag tho
snbsequont troubles. Tho Qencral's health Lhrew all business inlo
Cnpt. Q---Is
Iiands ; lie hnaied him indispensable, and in his
feeble stato of health could not contcncl against his insolent
despaired from t l ~ efirsl, alld kept tho poor
blustering. G-General i11 a stato of continual :u~dfnlnl iwilation.
T l ~ eGencrul aL length resolved to adllcre to his om11 opinion,
and made ale go back to Macnughtcn to tell him of it with the
reasoils, and so gnvo hi111 the opportuliity of conntermanding it.
TheEnvoy wonld hear no reasons, saying he h i d give11 his opinion,
; bul hc approvcd of the C+enetd's
a n d tho Gcneral was rcspo~~sible
having told me not to join Montcatli till the Zoorinnt force came,
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unless hostilities broke out, as I had much to do organising the
corps, arid was pitched in sight of Bootlihak.
He resumed the subject of my objections to his demonstration
plan, hearing them, though impatiently, as well as what I had to
say of the Eastern Ghilzis. He lost his temper, however, in answering them, and said if I thought Col. Nonteath's movement likely
to bring on an attack, I need not go, I was not wanted ; if I were,
there were others. I rose at once, and, saying a word or two as to
what had brought me there, declined to listen to such language (he
denied all intention to offend), and made my low bow. IIe seemed
very angry, though half sorry, bnt said nothing. As I was momting my horse, however, he came out, and held out his hand in
evident kindness, though still ruffled ; and so we parted, never
again to meet.
I went back to the General, and found him in bed and quite
worn out. He made me stay somo time, however, and told me
once more how he had been tormented by Macnaghten from the
first; reduced, to use his own words, from a General to the Lord
Lieutenant's head constable. ETe asked me to see him before I
moved, but he said, ' If anything occur, and in case you have to go
out, for God's sake clear the passes quickly, that I may get away.
For, if anything wore to turn u p ' (he alluded once again to the
Candahar and Herat quarter), I a m unfit for it, done up body and
mind, and I have told Lord AucMand so.' This he repeated two or
throe times, adding that he doubted very much if ever he would see
home, even if he did get away.
Nothing can be more unlike Macnaghten's general demeanour
than what is above described, <andit altogether astonished me. He
was always cowteous to everyone, and, to me, kind in the extremo.
Burnes, whom I saw for the last time after leaving the General,
however, told me he had occasionally seen the Envoy behave in tho
same manner, and that he was really a passionate man. &om
what Mackenzie has told me, I infer that during the last few days of
his life he must have been in muah the same temper. When the
Ghilzi insurrection broke out, he had heard of his appointment as
Governor of Bombay, and was on the eve of setting out. He and
Burnes were on anything but cordial terms, and he could not suffer
the idea of his leaving the country disturbed for Burnes to have the
merit of pacifying it. Both he and Burnes treated the insurrection
with contempt (Burnes called it, to me, a tempest in a teapol;), and
the rebels, absurdly enough, as less formidable t h m m y other
Afghans. Burnes had loudly exclaimed agaiust the policy which
caused the insurrection, though not till the insurrection occurred.
He .wes not, however, even consulted, before it, nor even after,
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by 7vIacnaghien and his party, as 11e was tl~onghtto be pleascd
at it.
I was very intimate with Burnos, and believed to Iiold his
opinions; an error, honrever. (I thought both Bumes and Macnn&ten grievously wrong, and in the samc way, t110ugl1 Burr~es
would have xnanaged thc bad syslem better than &Iacnrtghton.) And
my wenling to overrate the unloward events, and even predict their
inarcaso from the measures talten, wmas n~tamllyirrilalillgto n man
ahetlcly provolred.
Broadfoot's memorandum to thc General on the subject
of Lhe tools and stores is an excellent one, showing foresight
and cnntion, bul; it need not be reproducccl. H e learnt to his
astonishment thnt, though the bulk of the troops mere scnh
every winter to Jalalnbad, mhere they were virtually cut oft'
from communication with Kabul by the snow, yet tberc wns
no magazine either at Gai~clnruczlror Jalalabacl. When he
pointed out the necessity, Mncnnghten remarked that Ilc sl~olrc
a8 if h e mere in nn enemy's country !
As it WAS, when the troops moved out under Col. Monteath,
a severe reprimand was sent after Bronc1foo.t for talcing so
many tools, althongh he hail obtai11ecl the General's ~anction.
T h i ~reprimand vns crossed 011 the rand by a derntmcl for still
~ n o r c the
,
necessity for them and the wisdom of Broadfoot's
arrangements having been forcibly demonstrated. The re~~irnanclwns
cancelled in a very handsorue way, and BroizclSoot
was ullowed c ~ * t ebkrnche. He made largo demwlcls, whi&
could only be pzlrlially conlplicrl with ; but tho tools nnd stores
were mainly instrumental in Having Sale's force in J:dalab;~cl,
slilcl even the regnlar sappers of Pollock's relieving army had
to indent on Broaclfoot for tools.
H e remnrltecl, when considering Lhc matter some Cime aILcrmwds : ' V h c n at length the Cab001 insurreclion LroIrc out,
it seemed as if Proviclence had stiihlccl my neck on that
occnsion ; for Bnrnes strongly advised mo not lo talic tho tools
or I woulcl nlalrc cncwies ; ancl h e held ihe enemy h~ contelnyt. I'le thought mc 011 that occasion, and on one or two
othcrs, a sort of professional pcdmt.'
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CHAPTER 11.
1841.
Night attack at Butlth&-Letter to U r . Prinsep-First fight, Sappers engaged
-Scarcity of officcrs with N.I. regiments-Service with Sale's brigade ILhurd Kabul pass-Advance to Tezin-Attack between Jngdalnk and Surkhtib-Distinguished conduct of BroacUoot, F. Cunningham, Wyndham,
Coombs, and Sergeant-Major Kelly-Broadfoot's opinion of oficers with the
force-Outbreak at Knbul-Death of Sir A. Burnes and W. Broadfoot-Of
Sir W. Macnaghten-Letter to Dr. Malcolmson-Arrival of Sale's brignde
at Jalalnbad.

Tnn expedition, referred to towards the end of last chapter,
which was designed to overawe the Ghilais, marched from
Kabul to Butlrhak on October 9, 1841. I t consisted of the
35th N.I., a squadron of the 5th Cavalry, two guns under Lieut;
Michael Dawes, and a company of sappers under Capt. Eroadfoot, with Col. Monteath in command.
I n the following letter from Broadfoot to Mr. Ilenry Thoby
Prinsep a detailed account of the night attack by the Ghilzis
vill be found. The clemonstration was a failure, and Sir Robert
Sale with the 13th L.1, joined Monteath on October 11 with
orders to clear the passes.
I t should perhaps be explained that Butkhak is the camping
gronncl one march from Kabul in the direction of Jalalabncl ;
I t is mentioned by Bnrnes ' ns the place where Mahmud of
Ghazni buried the rich Hindu idol from Somnath.
Jelalabad : January 2, 1842.

My dear Mr. Prinsep,-In yesterday's letter we reached Bootkhak
on the afternoon of October 9. On being ordered to remain, I sent
back to Cabool the two Wazeer's men, and a small party (twelve) of
my ovn men, who had escorted stores bo. Of the twelve, one mas
a prisoner, and hnndcnEed, and one mas an unarmed orderly. The
remaining daylight passodin preparing the men's arms for use, and
in examining narrowly our position, and even pacing the distance
Travals inlo Boklrarn dc. p. 130.
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to cover for euemics ; for tlic ground was so unfavoumble to u s t l ~ n t
it secined as lhough ohoscn by a n enemy. At dnsk, word mas
brought that our returning party Ivns nttaclceil, and with somc hesitation lcave was given me io talcc the company out t o their aid. After
a march, or run, of two or throe miles, JVC arrived just in time to savc
our party, who nfter n g d l a a t resistance were about to disperse, being
surronnded and rednccd to five carlridges among them all. Wc
p~lrvnedt l ~ eenemy about n milc, to recovcr the body of o m of our
meu w11o had bccn Idled, and brought it in. !This was the opening
affair of thc prcsent Witr, and gave n good earnest of w11d I might
expect from the men of the corps, and nobly hnvo t l q justitied my
hopes, and rcmnrded nll trouble I have tnlccn : for, thongb forgottcn,
I sce, in thc Generid's despntchcs, they hayo literally borne the brunt
of overy :notion of importance, being Grst in every nssnult, and last
in the rctrent, and stn~idingfirm when all others prcsent (,rolrcz escepted, Europeans or natives) shrank from the fight. Thcirnot being
noticed is, I believe, accident. The Gcneml mas in his dooly, others
commanding did not chnncc to be \vhere the fight mas hot, and I mas
nfteraarcls too much occupied (oven i f inclined) to briug my own
doings to the notice of those who ought to have seen them. Bnt ns
it has gono evcn the length of ascribin,rr to others (by implication at
least) what tho Sappcrs did, I sllnll pcrlmps occasionidly enter into
more dotnil t l l ~ l l1sholdd O ~ ~ C S R ~bnve
S C done, mid mention n few
t11i11gsI shonld not otherwise 11nw alluded to.
I ~
nf
tjoon nfter our return to Bootlcl~itlc,the outposts R ~ I nolice
so~uldsfrom the hills as if they mcre occupied. I ngain went partly
up one nncl obscrvecl the direction kc. of the objccts notccl by clnylight. The Bfgllans with nio thought they hcnrd peoplo nbove us,
nnd forctold an nttaclc before morni~lg;but all was so silent Llint I
returned, a d was jnst entering my tcnt, when the crash of ~ n ~ s k c t r y
from the front, and both flanks, turned 11s all cut, nnd set o\~el*y
sentry nud guard round the camp firing. Our camp nlns on a level
spot, with rocky hills d o n g the front ; on tho lest ssopasated o111y by
the road to Ct~bool,and 011 the loft and rear n deep and wide ~vatcrcoursc. Tl~eseour ~ n ~ nforce
l l could not occupy wide tl~nygave
covor to the elie~nynp to our sentries; espcciully the left, nnd tlieto
were placed the Sappers, with a lmgo magazine containing tmellty
barrels of powder. In the ravine, homewr, on h e left, m;Ls n
picket of the %th, and Col. Monteath inluleclialely sent a coinpal~y
to support it, but this nus thro\vn into confwion by meeting the
picket jnst ~ u u n i n gin jn disorder pursned by the euemy, and tho very
young oficer (Xortoil) with them coulcl not rnlly thcm.
Anothcr co~~lpnny
was sent to tlicir support nuder auother oficer,
a little snnior ; biit matters did not mcnd, and at length they ~\-orc
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driven in on the cattle and magazine of the sappers. These last 1
had taken a little to the front of the line, and made to lie dowll
without firing behind a slight swell, which sheltered them from the
place. On learning a fire was
shot which fell thick on our .~.egulc~r
going on among our powder barrels, I went and removed the disorderly troops, and with the consent of the two officers (both of
whom I had commanded as cadets when orderly officer at Addiscornbe) took charge of their men, and rallying them behind the
sappers,mho were all this time steady as veterans, never firing a shot,
at length restored order m d made the enemy h a w off a little. I n
the mean time the fYo11t and flanks mere enveloped in fire, and Col.
Monteath was making excellent dispositions, so good that, notwith-

CAXP, BOOTRUAIC.
O O T O ~ E9R AND 10, 1341.
1. 35th N.I..Col. U o u h t h .
2. Sqoud. 5th CAV.,Cnpt. 01116cld.
3. 2 guns, Lieut. Dawes.

4. Shnh's Snppers, Cnpt. Drondfoot.
5, S~tl>i~er
UII@LIUO.
6 nnd 7. Cnrnp.

standing our vicious position, the enemy was fairly baffled, and,
after four hours of incessant firing, gradually withdrew without
penetrating our camp. Col. Monteath in this affair showed himself
a good soldier, and the bad position was not, I believe, his fault. He
mas sent out expecting to move quickly on to Tezeen, and finding
his camp misplaced did not think it worth altering. The loss fell
chiefly on the 35th, and mainly on the two companies thrown into
disorder. The enemy, too, suffered, for we foundblood in the wells
and heard the wounded call out to be carried away; but they would
have suffered still more heavily but for the premature fire of the
two compames on the left and some others of the 95th which drove
them back to their cover when advancing to rush in on the place
where the silppers lay. I had fixed bayonets, and only waited for
them to round a bank of about four feet which would impede their
flight, to make the sappers rise up and give them a volley, and charge.
T h y were within forty yards (46 paces) of the sappers ; we had
wheeled up (crawling) to face them ; once down the bank, nothing

LIL
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could Ilnw saved tl~em,for they wcre donbtful of our being t h e
(we heitrd their conveiw~tion)from our not being betrayed by white
belts, and stancliiig up like the rest.
The mni11 boily of tlia 96th wore very steady. I t is s fine regiment, but greatly ii1,jurod for want of officers, am1 especially of old
oniccrs. The i~ntivesa m pecdiarly ~ ~ l l l ~ ~ m i ~ by
g egriffins
~ l ~ l t ;r otherwise, one of the young onicers (Norton) would linve rallied his meu,
for lie is a fine promising young soldier, but it was his first itction,
nud the circurustaiices trying to an old officcr. All Col, i\lontenth's old officers prcsent wore employcd in important places, nnrl
could not be s11,zreil. T h c accident of my beiug t l i e i ~sn,\~c11011r ci~1l-1~
being entercd, or disnster n~ouldIinw followud, partinl if not total.
Some uielliocl illust be d e ~ ~ i s ctod remcdy tthc scarcity of olficers, and
I am not sure that the financial dillicnlty is n reel one ; for the eHiciency of tlie native army mould be so increased that fevwr European reginlcnts ~voulddo, and femcr native troops wonlcl be required,
as they could do more \vorlc: there wonld nlso be less for ally troops
to do, the turl~ulentlacltiug tlie c n c o ~ ~ ~ g c mto
e nfight
t
which arises
from partial success.
The enemy were cliscoumged by their fnilure, bnt this good result
was diminislled by thcir getting the beddiiig A ~ Lof tho piclrel :ma
afcw onillcls on the sltirts of the cnmp, for so closely did t h y pursuc.
IIad tllcir failure bucn c n ~ i y l c t c ,who lmows what it ~ n i g l ~hsvo
t
prevcnlcd ?
Here cdso I first hail proof of thc valoe of onr own Afghan troops,
when raised as nliile are, i.c, siibjoct to iLs rigorous discipline as the
r e d , a d ~ v i t h110 man of i~ltlucl~cc
among tlicm, b u t tho promotions
wadc for persond mcril by the comm,znder. The ~ ~ ( Z I I Cintroil~lcLI
tion of discipline is an error. Tlicse lnen are a boldor race t l i m the
Inrliu1s, more European mid lika Ewopeans, nilcl rcquire a sterner
disciplioe. Their comulwndcr must he fenrcd, though h c 111ust nlso
know m d manage thcir prejudices, and provide for their nwits. I
found the same ~vitllthe Burmesc. On Octobcr 10, Col. ;\lonte;~th
objcctcd to my rcturuing to C d ~ o o ltill the scrvice was ovcr, that is
for n wcelr; and on the 11th Gen. Sale with olllcr troops nrrived,
nad I wasjoined by Colin [Mnclte~izie]; but wvliat followed inust w i t
till to-morrow.
O n October 12,1811, the forcc uiiclcr S d c marchccl towards
Iil~uuclKabul t l ~ r o u g l lt h c pnss. Evcry stop of tho w ; I , ~was
clislmtccl. T h c e n e m y Iwld t h e hcigllts, fired o n o ~ i rtroops a
they i ~ d ~ m l c c ad n, d rctired whenever att:~cked. E n d y i n t h t
d a y Ehle was wonndccl, a n d t h e conmancl devolved 011
D
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Col. Dennie. The sappers were actively employed, some nncler
Capt. Broaclfoot reconnoitring ; others nncler Colin Mackenzie,
n-ho hacl accompanied the 13th in order to be present.
Mackenzie led the men well, and had the good fortune to
come up in time to help Michael Dawes when he and his
guns were in considerable danger. Broadfoot, in describing the
action, pointed ont that chance threw on the sappers under
Mackenzie, ancl on Dawes, the task of forcing the pass. H e
added: ' hilackenzie commanded in a way few officers conld
have done; the success was rapid and complete, and the day
was gained. Unqnestionably grcat credit was due to him.
Dawes showecl the coolness he ever showecl.' l\ilackenzie, remarking on this, said, 'He was the only man, except Broadfoot,
whom he ever saw wear a natural smile in battle.'
The 13th returned to Butkhak, and Monteath and his force
encamped at Khurcl Kabul in the valley outside the pass. Our
loss was six killed ancl thirty-five wounclecl. Negotiation was
tried, and Capt. Macgregor was sent to Monteath's camp as
Political Officer to make the desired arrangements. The result;
was unsatisfactory ; a night attack was repulsed, but the little
force lost eighty camels.
Meanwhile Sale was reinforced from Kabul ; and having
joined Monteath on the 20th, orders to aclvance on Tezin on
October 22 were issued.
The force here detailed marched on that morning, the
wounded General being carried in a litter :
H.M. 13th L.I., Col. Dennie, C.B.
35th N.I., Col. Monteath, C.B.
37th N.I., Major Gritliths.
Squadron 5th B.C., Capt. Oldfield.
Artillery, Capt. A. Abbott.

Shah's Suppers, Capt. G. Brondfoot.
,, Mountain train, Capt. Backhouse.
Troop 2nd Cavalry, L i d . Mnyne.
200 Jezailchis, Jan Bishan Khan.

The march was not well managed ; Lieut. King of the 131;h mas
killecl, and his men, having been led too far in advance, had
to retire, amovement which soon degenerated into fiight, with
the Afghans in pursnit. Eventually the force reached Tezin
and there in the fort, most providentially, forage for the cattle
sufficient for two days was found. I t is difficult to believe,
but it is true, that this force with from 3,000 to 4,000 cattle
b a s sent forward into a conntry where forage was scarcely to
be fonncl, without any arrangement for its supply.

It was intcndcd nest day to assn,ult and tala the varions
forts in the neighbourliood ; Col. Deimie with htdf the force
was to couinand, milh Broatlfoot as eugineer. But instead
of this, negotinlion with the chiefs was commenced by Cept.
Macgrcgor. Tlierc is some obscilrity as to why the ohaitp
was midc ; Dnrnnd, genernlly wcll informed, hns said that tltc
chief, not relishing the prospect of a fight,"'dcterrni~ted to
opcn ncgotintions and ngain to ovcrrench Macgregol. ; ' Backhouse thought it mas plain, ancl to none more so than to Macgregor, that the disiilclinalioit to fig111 nrns rather on the part
of some of our troops. Mr. Cnmcron, Icgal menlber of Co~~ncil,
collected mcl sifted the eviclence on this point." He conoluclecl
that Macgregor at that time became swnrc of the serious ancl
widespread naturc of the conspiracy, and thought it belter to
negotiate than to attack the fort. Great courage in going
unprotccted to meet the Ghilxis mas shown by him; terms
mere discusscd, nncl agents were scnt to remain with Nacgregor.
8itbsequent events mncle it amply clear thnt the chiefs had
no intention'mhatever of liceping fnith ; they instigatecl their
followers to attack our troopx, the agents or hostages being
siuzply spies. Colin Jhclrei~aicmben a pri~onerwacle the
acquaintance of one of these agents, who openly boasted of
circumventing the British on that occasion. An agreement
was mailc, and forage mas supplicd ; Sale, honrevcr, np~~carecl
not to valuc Lhe compact highly, for hc wrote in orders: ' Though
the enemy have given hostages, it woulcl be both imprudent
and unsafe in us to relax our vigilmcc,' kc.'
A discussion tool; place subseqncntly at a critical momcnt
as to whether or not hostages on thifi occasion ]lad been given :
13roadfoot nssertecl that they hnil been given m d were of no
vnlne, Macgregor clcnicd that we had taltcn h o s t a g ~ s . ~
On October 26, Sale sent back the 37th N.I., threc companies of Broaclfoot's Sappers, nnd half of thc mountain train,
to Kabar Jabar, bctmeen Tezin and Khurcl Ihbnl, to await tlic
arrival of a regiment oxpccted from Kabul. IIis object mas to
tnkc their carriage for the usc of the rest of his brigade; n,
proceeding not easy to justify when the colintry was in so dis-
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turbed a state. He marched that day to Seh Baba,%nd next
day to Kata Sang : the rear gnard on both clays having been
pretty constantly engaged. On October 29 they marched t o
JagclalakJ7 escaping an ambush laid for them in the Pari.
clarra, or Fairy's Glen, by avoiding that route and marching
by the high land.
On October 29 the brigade marched from Jagdalak to
Surlrhiib. In expectation of trouble the rear guard mas
strengthened : it consistecl of two companies of the 13th L.I.,
two companies of the 35th N.I., Lieut. Dawes ancl two guns,
the mo~mtaintrain, and a company of sappers. It was
nominally under the command of an officer of the 13th, but
was virtually co~nmancledby Backhouse. The sappers being
the last of the rear gnarcl were first engaged : they were, indeed, in action before they had quitted the camping ground
at Jagdalak.
The first three miles of the road are up a steep incline,
clifficult for guns and laden camels, commanilecl by the heights
on either side till the top is reached ; after that the pass becomes more open with a descent to Surlchab.
The plan adopted for protecting the march through was
that the advance and main body shonlcl detach parties right
and left to ascend to suitable posts, hold them till the baggage
passed, and then come on with it. An escellent arrangement
provided the main body halted a t the top of the pass to give
the baggage and these protecting parties time to join. Unfortunatelythis mas not done ; the main body moved off, ' leaving the posts referred to and the rear gnard to withstand the
pressure of the whole strength of the enemy now concentrating at the exit of the pass.' The parties sent to protect the
baggage, seeing themselves abandoned by the main body, with
one honourable exception, quitted their posts, and the whole
force of the enemy came down on the rear guard, which fell
into the greatest confusion and panic. The exception here
mentioned was a party of Broadfoot's Sappers commanded by
Lieut. F: C ~ n n i n g h a i n ', ~who stuck to his duty ancl obeyed his
orders.'

* Baba Isn's

tomb.
The nccent is on the second syllable, and d l the vo\\,elu nre short; i t

used to be written, Jugdulluk.

Francis Chantry Cunningham,
the youngest son of Allan Cunning-
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Tlie panic-slriclien coinl)anies of the 13th and 35th hnrried
forward in confmion to got out of the pass. The Ghilzis,
occupying the cover on either side, firccl into thc mass of fugitives, and thc villagers l>rcsseclup the pass after them knife in
hand.
At this jonctnre and anlid this confnsion ' most fortunalely a, few intrepid British were fo~~ild
to face 1he enemy,
headed by Ciq~l.Broadfoot : thesc were Capt. Wynclham and
Lient. Coombs of the 35111, Lienl. Cnnningl~amand Sergct~nti\Iajor 1Cell.y of the Sappcr~c,mil11 five or six sepoys of thc
S q ~ p c corps
r
who had remaiilccl wit11 Broaclfoot and Cuiluingham as orclerlics (the Sapper company lmd bcen i~gninsen1 np
the hills to skirmish) ; these ten or twelve charged tlie Ooloos,
or villagers above referred to,' and held them in cliecli ~ultil
they reached the exit of the paus. Poor TVyndham, who
was so ltme as to require support from two sepoys of his
compmy, could not retire will1 tlie others, and fell into the
hands of tho merciless mob ; boll1 the sepoys, to thch illfinite
hononr, stuck to him to lhe lnsl and shared his fale. ' Durii~g
this sccilc of terror d l nho fell wo~mdcclmere of course abnn
dolled ; t l ~ cenolxy LLSthry c m e up falling up011 thorn in hcaps,
nnd, as Ct~pi.Croaclfoot clcscribes it, " lilic houncls on n fox." '
Onu inen vere rmlliccl ' by Lhc clispositioas mncle at the ontlet hy Captains Eaclrlloousc and Puimicli, and rovered by the
bold hont ever maintained by Capt. Bronclfoot.' "cinforcelncnts mcre sent back from the main body, end the rcnr gaard
i~rrivcclat S ~ ~ l i l l ajust
b a l ~ o ~clnrlr.
lt
Nest clay, October 30,
Gaildamalr nrav renchecl withont molestation.
Bcngnl Engineers : Joscph Dnvy Cunninghmn, for sumo yenxi nn Assistant
scrvcd with distinction i n Uroitdloo~'~ to Llie Governor-Cienornl's Agcnt for
Sappcrs, 11s qunrtcmlnster, in Afghiin- tho N.W. Frol~lier,nnd nuthor of a
istnn during Lhe yenrs 1810-42 ; and Histislo~y of tlw Siklts ; nnd Sir
rccoived niedills for dnlalnhad and Alesandet Cunningham, K.C.I.E., still
Xuhol. He \vus nfter\\wds nppoinled living, \\rho was lor mnny ycars licnd
lo the Mysorc Com~nifision by Lord of tlic Arch~uoIogicnlSurvey of India.
E l l e n b o r o ~ ~ g l ~ ,retirod
a n d o n Dcccmber
* LcLlcr to thc Friend OJ' Gulio
'from Ihe pen of o i ~ c\vho wnr on the
31, 1861, ou account of bad henlth.
I"rom this time till 110 diedin Drcombcr spot : ' tlic previous qoolations nrc
nminly iron1 Unclihouse's dinry.
1875 hc wrote a good denl, and wtls a
I Cii~uclun~nlc
: ~lcccnton Ll~osccond
frcqoonl contril~i~lor
Lo the Srclzwrloy
Ir'cviw. l l e had Iwo brotl~cwin tho s)llnble, nnd all Lhc vuwcls shorl.

hnm tho pocl, was born in 1820, rind
cnlered tlie Jladrns Army in 1858. He
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Some interesting remaslrs by Broadfoot mill be found in

the following letter to Dr. Mulcolmson :
Sale's Camp, Gundumuk: November 4,1941.

. . . I would fain give you a history of the last month, but must
defer it. Suffice it to say we have had military operations far more
serious than was expected; instructive professionally by showing
that against even Afghans no rules of military science can be neglected with impunity, and interesting to those much employed from
the difficulty of the country and the boldness of the enemy.
On ten days we were more or less engaged with the enemy, and
in four of the more considerable affairs I had no reason to find fault
with the share allotted to me. I n fact me have been at the post of
danger always. In a fifth I had it all to myself, having had an excursion of about three hours, during which we recaptured 300 camels
and demolished a good many of the enemy. One day, a hot one, I
had Colin i\lackenzie with me, and a famous second he is : mother
time IVilliam was with me, also stout in fight.
Now I suppose you think I am loaded with hononrs. Nothing
farther from the case. I have never been mentioned in orders till
the very last occasion, and then in a way snbordinate to others who
had not my luck. Colin Maolrenzie was furious, and there has been
a great uproar on the subject, caused by an artillery oficer at a big
dinner here ( I was not present) attacking poor Col. Dennie about the
matter.
The truth is, Gen. Sale was mounded in the second action ; he
was not at the first or third, and goes in a dooly : he is entirely unacquainted with what happens at the chief fighting places. One
occasion of our doing something arose from a blunder of Dennie's,
another fiom the misconduct of the troops. No one likes to report
such things, and the General, who treats me most Isindly, and I am
sure considers me a tolerable soldier, contii~uallymentions to me
things as done by others which they did not do, and I do not undeceive him, as it would seem boasting, and might lead others, who
left their posts, into trouble. But all will come right : this country
will give more work, and I cannot but perceive a feeling to have
arisen that I may be turned to use.
Broadfoot then proceeded to remark on the qualif?cations
of the officers with whom h e was associated. He considered
-and the opinions of t h e ablest of his companions were, for
Col. Dennie was
the most part, the mme as his own-that
mholly unqualified for commancl. Among the senior officers

h e rockonecl Sale a n d Moi~tcuthto be t h e best soldiers.
then said :

Ee

We ]nust then come lorn for good officers, end first comes Capt.
Haveloclc of H.IvI.'s 13th Regiment. I t is the fashion, especially in
his own corps, to slleer at him ; his mannerH are cold, while liis religious opinions (Baptist) seclude him from society ; but the who10
of them together mould not co~npcnsatefor his loss. Breve to ndmiration, imperturbably cool, loolting at his profession as a scicnce,
end, as far nu I cell see or judge, correct in his views.
All our artillery oficers arc above tho average : two, llaclthouse
and D a m s , greatly so ; Baclihouse tl hero, though a mad one. Capt.
Abbott n superior officer too. Then we had Capt. Paton, Quartermastcr-Geiicral, a very brave and scnsiblo man, now gone to Cabool.
The rest are all below tliose nained.
Among the young liailds me many fine, gallant, and intelligent
lads ; none surpassiug, only one (Coombs) equalling, my two Mulls,2
O n m i l Cunninglmm. The former was wounded severely in his first
action, but is doing well.
Aild now do not wonder if the papers teem with stories, true or
false, on theso matters, and if my name be tidren in v i h , for we had
an awkward business for a short time in the Inst consiclerable affair,
and e haiidful of snppers saved scvcral 11mlcIred infantry, chiefly
European, from bcing destroyed by Afghans ! I ~voudclhave hushed
the matter up, but it was impoxsible, nnd all arc tnlliing of, and lyiug
much about, what really occnrred.
I orclcrcd a charge of bayoucts, ancl on getting enlong the enemy
--whom, hoqrevcr, me for the inonlent clisporsed-found uyself follo~vedonly bytwoofhcrs, C u ~ u ~ i n g h n(Sappers),
n~
i~ildC ~ O O L U (:35th),
~S
wouudod, also Wyiidhem, a poor lame Ckilchrist chum of mine, since
killed, our sergemt-major, a.nd five Afgllans of the Sappers, of whom
one full. The rest of the Sappers were engaged on the hill nbovo, and
of the infantry, European and native, oiily e part charged, and they
~toppeclshort bcforc getiing hnlfivay, fenrhg to close with our enemies, who were destroying our wounded !
You may imagine t l ~ ctalk this has c ~ u s e d and
, mill n~~derstnnd
tho papers ; hut the tliing wns aftcr all a Iriflo, n ~ i dby meaiis ~\rliicli
1must give you heroafter
got the panic-struclc rogues off nfitliout disaster till llley rdlied, inflicting heavy loss, far exceedi~~g
our
own, on the enemy.
The conntry from t l i s to Cebool is the stroiigcst me have yet
opcratecl in, and n 1itl;le confusion for a, few Ilundrcd jwds, in ;L, fight
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a dozen miles of rocliy mountains, covered with bushes, is nothing
but mhat might be expected.
I grieve to say that with all but old ITpvelock,not to be daunted,
nnd Sale, who does not horn the details, mid is a bold Inan moreover, except Monteath also, and some of the 35th officers kc., a strong
feeling of depression has been produced among men and officers of
the European and native infantry, and the regular cavalry.
Give the news to Col. Cullen, and he to whom he pleases.
Broadfoot finished his letter by ordering a pipe of Madeira
for the Sapper mess, and after his signat~ueis the following
postscript :
Bengal sepoys are good troops.
My corps Sappers, 600, is :
SO0 Hindoostanees .
.
, brave
. . . . braver
200 Goorhas .
100 Afghans ancl Hazaras.
. . heroes
And all from emulation beyond their several unmixed countrymen.

.

Meanwhile at Kabul o m evil system of administration
had borne fruit. On November 2, 1841, the outbreak occnrrecl ; Sir Alexander Burnes, his brother Lieut. Burnes, and
William Broacl'foot, were killed in Burnes's house in the ciby.
The treasury was sacked, and the mob was rewarded to the
extent of 17,0001. The only serious effort to relieve Bnrnes
and put down the mob was made by the Shah, and not, a s
might have been expected, by the English oficers in the cantonmen t.
The Envoy turned to the General for assistance, but t h e
latter was wholly unfit from illness to meet the crisis. Incapacity and imbecility among the senior officers was naturally
followed by demoralisation and cowardice among the troops.
The Envoy in these days of humiliation showed a belter spirit
than the military chiefs, but to no purpose: h e was obliged
to negotiate with the enemy, and became involved in transactions regarding them which, if the Afghan account may be
trusted, cost him his life.
H e was, as all know, killed by Akbar Khan a t an interview, and before long the Kabul force capitulated.
That nrmy paid clearly for the error ; with the exception
of the prisoners ancl hostil,ges in Altbar Khan's hands, and of
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Dr. Brydon, who escaped, they were ultcrly destroyed in the
passes thro1ig11 which Salc's brignde hncl fought its way. The
Envoy h a d summoned Nott nnd Snle to his assislance. The
former mas prevented by the season of the ycnr and bg other
considerations fronz compliance. When Sale received the
orders h e consultecl his officcrs mcl deeded that he could not
obey. This decision llns lrccn mnch qncstioncd. I)ur%ncl h a s
stated that ' i t wns regretted by some of tlic al~leslofticcrs in
I-Ierbert
his force, forernosl nmong whom I\ ns Broaclfoot.' "ir
Edwnrdes on t h e same subject hns said :
Of course it mill always remain moot point whellier Bale
could have returned or ~ i o;t and if lie hncl returned, wl~etliorit
moulc1,hnve saved the Kabul force. Prom Sde's onvl account it is
probable he could not have returnod in a state of etlicicilcy ; But
tliero nwrc at least two men ~vitliSale's brigde who would have
made nll the difference : one-Henry Havelock-wlio would Iiave
rocnlled tlie discipline and spirit of poor Elphinstone's suborclinates,
if mortal man could do it ; the other-George Grondfoot-who, in
the last resort, modd have dared to supply the nimy with a leu~lcr.~
Whilst Sale's force was at Gandn,nnli rumonrs of t h e
linbul outl~renlrreacl~cdthem : they are thus allncled to by
Xl'onclfoot i n n letter t o Dr. l l ~ l e o l m s o n dated
,
Gundaualr,
November 8, 1641 :
. . For a good many dnys W G Law 11ad no ~olnnlunicatioil
with Cabool, aud it is of courso clcor horn this tlml tllc coui~txywe
fougl~tthrough is again, in wllole or in p ~ ~ rclosod
t,
npinst us.
Wehave ruinours of the most estraordinnry nnd contradictory nature
as to occurrences t ~ tCabool, all ngreeing tllal there 11as been an
ontbrealt there, but differing as to rcsults ; some saying we were
besieged, others that tlie enemy mere defeated. Bumes, too, is
asserted to be iuurderod or n prisoner, bcsirles othcr officcrs, a11d
these latter reporls arc credited in camp. They interest me most
deeply, for the few oficers living in Il~ecity, nllof whom are said to
have bccn destroyccl, nre : Du~nesand his brother, JVilliam 13xoadAllqnetil,
foot, Colin Macltcnxie, Capt. Jol~nson,paynlaster,Bi~igtldier
Cnpt. Troup, and Capt. Tre~rorof the cawlry. T\'illiim livcd with
Gurnes in the hcart of the city, far itom succour ; they had a
havildar nnd t\vclvo mu1 ns s g~iirrd. Nest door, Cayt. Johnson's
, The
trcasury was griurded by o, iitltive officer and thirty iuen.

.
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42

DLSCOURAGEMENT AMONG THE TROOPS

n.11

rest mere near succour. Now some attempt at Burnes's house is possible ; but unless surprised, or unless Burnes might be wealc enough
to listen to terms offered end surrender, I believe they mould hold
their own, small their party was, even for twenty-four hours, if
they had anmunition. I know what TVilliam is as a soldier, and'
from Burnes's confidence in him, I knom, too, that he would command, and surely a first effort of our troops would be their relief. .
AS for us, though short of ammunition and nearly without
money, me may laugh at all Afghanistan if our troops are riqhthj
managed, otherwise me have already h d proof that the finest troops
may be discouraged to a degree painful to think of. Nay, further,
if me are true to ourselves and manage decently, we can hold out
famously, till relieved from Inclia, even if the whole country rise
ageinst us and our communication with Inclia be closed. But me
must rectify some great errors in our military arrangements; we
must not be without battering guns in a country studded with mud
forts, and me must have district magazines; one, for example, ot
Jelalabad, which during half the year is, in a military sense, deprived of communication with Cabool by the snow, and at all times
separated from it by monntains over which it is diilicult and frightfully expensive to carry stores.
I believe something has been written on the subject, for I spoke
to Havelock yesterday and formerly about the measures of precaution we required, aqd he concwred and went immedit~telyto move
the General about it. You h o w from former letters how high my
opinion is of Hnvelock, though it is the fashion here to sneer at him.
When I last wrote I alluded to the discozwagemant, to speak
mildly, prevailing among dl the troops except the Shah's people,
who are but few here ; an opportunity has occwed to get rid of it,
and again me have the satisfaction of hearing men and otEcers
speak as they ought of our enemies and themselves. On the 4th,
word was brought in that one of the great lords at court had rebelled.
Meer Ufzul Khan, the Urzbegee, and his son had occupied ol fort
about 3$ miles from our camp, and wns going to raise the country
on us. Capt. Mucgregor, the Political Agent, was a t dinner with
us, at the Sapper mess, when he got the final and certain news, and
after a consultation between him, Bacld~ouse,D a m s , and myself,
he went off to urge the General to attack at once; but returned
late, having totally failed, though he had cited Backhouse's and my
formal opinions ; nay, one staff officer (not Havelock) actually proposed retiring to Jelalabad! There were then thirty men in the
fort I but, of course, liltely to increase every hour. Backhouee and
I went, though it was midnight, and turned out Havelock. I pledged
my character as a soldier to find the means of taking the place, even
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if, as was st~id,tho artillery (which Backhouse and D&wes,escellellt
officers of artillery, clenied) mas too venlc to do itu part properly.
Haveloclc held the same views, but had bcen overborne. He sa\\.,
I i o n ~ k e the
~ , necessity of stoplling the cliscouragc~nent, especially
after tallting over our Jugdulnlt adventures, ancl said he 1\1ou1~1(10
n~lialhe could. W e mnnted a strong i~ilvuacdg u w l to moi7e at
t h e e o'clock and invest the plnce at dnybrcdr ; but it then came out,
tlie General had dcciiled (!) on not nttnclting, aild was listenilig to
some half-cnsto, who assured him the man m i g h t perhaps not be
hostile ; or, rnther, this mas the escnse. Col. Demie came in 011
hearing (he never sleeps, I believe) us in Havelock's tent, and wasbut 1must not g i w you all details ; suffice it to say, the iini~ledinte
move Hnvelocl~could not accomplisl~,but he got us oil' in the aftcrnoon of the 5th. The encmy fled, firing a few shots on Abbott and
myself recoiu~oitring;nnd though fYom rnismauageincnt they mere
nllomed to pass under our noses with slight loss, yet the benefit is
incnlculable. Our ow11 men once more in spirits for unythiiig, and
the enemy, as well as our own Afghan troops, undeceive& ns to our
beiug afiaicl to come near them. Nncgregor, too, has good informntioil that only the next day a large reinforcement nrns to have come
in,and Ll~ecountry would haye been up.
So now no fenr of us : never miiicl the newspnpers. 111 spite of
what has hnppened, n finer Brigade lh,m Sale now lins I would not
desire to see ; and if tlie worst coines to the worst, vc shall be cliscovered here, uaablc perhaps to rlo11111ch from rn:ult of mn~nunitiou,
but not to be hurt hy the enemy. More lilcely is it, ho~vevcr,that all
will blow orcr, und lhen if Lhe Calcutta, pcoplo act prudently, a ~ d
arc scconded by good msr~agcme~lt
hcrc, n little vigom in spring will
mnlte us all llle fitronger for this ontbrcalt ; and than for u, careful
revisiou, or ratller the forxnatioil of n definite systcin for the retentiou of tllis country on the cllenpest terms.
Now send illis to Col. Cullcn with my Iri~idest regards.
Send, if you cnn, a copy to Englnncl to Mr. Loch with tho same
mcssnge; ancl send all or pnrL to Col. Sim, o~ any fiiend at
Mndms ; but remember there are in this opinio~~s
not to get into
the papers, mcl you h o w how easily tliese things go there. Do
you h o w Lord Elphiastone? I think not. If so, ask Col. Sim
t o gise him the news. Col. Cullen will, I dare my, do so, but
the route is circuitous. I would have written to Lord Elphinstoile
myself, but, to say the truth, I am morlted like a horse, putliiig 11p
defei~cesto remedy in some & g e e tho vices of an al~ominablcposition they h w e thrust t l ~ eforce into, nnd must to work, G. D.
The mrm in cllnrgo of t h o fort.
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It may be as well to put a paragraph in the papers to counteract the clesponcling private letters sure to go down. Do not name
me, bnt say, on authority, we are well ; und having well thrashed .
the enemy, are ready to do so again.
On November 11, Sale's brigade resumed its march towards
Jalalabad. As carriage mas deficient, a quantity of baggage
and stores was left in charge of Capt. Burn, of the Khaibar
corps. This proceeding appenrs to be inexcusable when it is
remembered that thcre was then a general rising among the
Afghans, that the Khaibar corps was wavering, and that
Cnpt. Burn protested strongly against the additional temptation to mntiny and pl~u.xlerthus supplied.
Nevertheless he ancl one or t~voother officers mere left to
take their chance, as a l ~ owere Lieut. Cunningham ancl a
party of sappers who had been sent to destroy the Mamu Khel
fort.
The brigade showed n disposition to march towards Jamlalabad mith more haste than was either becoming or consistent
with the safety of the small detached party.
Backhouse, looking back from the main body, which had
reached Nimla, saw smoke in the direction of Mamu Khel, and
indications that Cunningham mas engaged. He told Broadfoot, who requesLecl him to apply to Col. Monteath for assistance from the rear guard. First Backhouse ancl then Broadfoot went ancl pointed ont the danger of the detachment and
the ample strength of the rear guard, but without result. The
rear guard proceeded on its way, lcaving Cunningham and his
few men to shift for themselves.
Late that evening Capt. B u m mith some Khaibaris arrived
in full flight, guns ancl baggage having been abandoned. Along
vith them Cunningham's party came in with nmmunition ex- '
hanstecl and having sufferecl severely. Even on arrival at Sale's
camp their danger was not over, for not being recognised in
the dark they were received by a volley from the guard. Capt.
Burn, mith ready prcsence of mind, made his bugler sound
' Cease firing; ' the order was recognised by Sale's men, and
the fugitives got safely into camp.
For a long time Broaclfoot failed to get Cunningham's services on this occasion properly aclrnowleclgecl. He at last
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succeeded so f i a~s to
~ get Snlc to poblish t h c f c d l o ~ ~ i garrii~g
son order.
(E\trnct.)

Dccombor 27, 1841.

The Major-Cellera1 has also to esprcss his best tl~nnltsto Liei~t.
Domso~i,w11o ably assisted Capt. C+crr,zrd,and to Licnt. Cuinli~~ghnm of the Snppers and Uiners, wl~oscpersevcrancc nnd resolution
ill ofl'eecting the dcmnlition of Llie fort appears to Lhe Major-Gcneral
deserving of the l~ighextcoa~mc~lrlation.
the margin of t l i i ~order Bronilfoot nclcled :
Licnt. Cul~~~ingl;ha~n
was sent with Scrgct~d-1IajorXollg and
Lllirly snppers to dcmolisl~tho fort by mining. In t l ~ moan
c
tinw Gen.
Sale marched for Jelalahd. Tho janbnz horse deserted, nnd the
memy attacked the pnrty at the fort uncler Capt. Germrd. Tho
fort was set on fire, yet Lieut. C. and his pnrty persisted till they
blow up the towers, though often obligecl to make new n h e s from
the flames approaching. On their T e t ~ e athc
t jeeailchis mero thrown
into confusion ; and the little pnrty of sappers and t l ~ esowars stnndiug f i m ~Lill they rallied alone saxcd them.
011

Nest clay, November 12, t h e brigitde marched from Pntclmbad to Jnlalnbad. Clol. Dennic co~nmai~clecl
t h e rcnr guard, in
which, o n this 0ccitsi011, mcrc the m o u n t t ~ i nt r a i n ; ~ n dall the
C C ~ tlw aclvance h a d loft thc
snppws. The enemy C O ~ ~ C C ~before
gruund, n o t w i t h s t s n d i n m h i c l ~Sale masched off a s nsuul. The
account of t h c lmssage of t l ~ rear
c
guard througli P ~ t e h n b a dwits
~\lrittcnby 13nclrhonsa, a n d i s exccllcnt.
The village mas crn\rdecl with peoplc on the mdls and on Ll~e
roofs of the houses as the rear guard pnssed; l ~ alLhoug11
~ l
Ll~ese
npparcntly unnrmecl villagers were bent upon having a,t us immediately they could, without bcing particularly noticed, join the other
body of savages hanging on our rear, still fl~eysal as quiet as conscious iimoconce itsclf vhile the rcnr guard pnssed by and amongst
tllem. Ny native oflicer wished to know why these scoundrels were
not pitchcd into, for, says hc, ' they will a11 fircupon us ill less than
five niinutcs after mc get past the village.' Everyonc h e m this ;
still our British forbeorallee will ncvor allow us to fire upon an
ellemy before hc has openly dcclarecl himself to be such.

Tile e s p ~ c t a t i o i lof nttnck was immcdintely fulfilled ; tlic
e n e ~ n yfollo\~etlt l ~ cr e a r on to a, plain a n d opeilecl a brisk lire.
I t is sibid t l l d Capt. Olcllicld nslrecl pcrrnission to charge, but
as ~CI'LISCC~.Licut. Maync's troop was s e n t back with
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ammunition l)y Salc ; and Bacld~onsehas recorded thnt Broadfoot, seeing the olqortunity, got Mayne's dctachmcnt to join
OIdficld, pcrsuacled the lnttcr t o charge without ordcrs, and
promised ewry support with tlic snppcrs. Thc cavdry drcw up
facing the cnemy and irnmcdiatcly cl~nrged,'Bronclfoot nncl
the sappers endeavouring to Iceep their pace. . . . The cnvnlry
6oon came to close quarters with the foe, who evidently little
espectod such a nlovement on our part, as they t h e w awny
their firearms i7zstnnter3, arid bolted clean ; not, Iion~cvcr,unscathed, for some sixty or sevcnty nt l c ~bit
t thc dust to rim no
more. This . . . crcatcd n, fine stirring feeling, and, moreovor, pnt a sudden and most complete stop to nny further nilnoyance during this march. . . Broadfoot and his Sappers,
seeing the cavalry in no necd of support, took a line of his own
to his right, and completely routed the parties on the hills whom
Dnwes had opened fire upon. . . .'
The official account of this &air agrees mainly with the
above description, the chief divergence being that in the formcr
it is sbtcd that Col. Dennic ordered the chwge. Hc :tt m y
rate thaiilced Cnpt. Oldfield for it, nnd Capt. Broadfoot for his
fioldierlilre and intrcpicl snpport of the cnvdry.
J~lalabadwas rcnclled without further molestation; but
during the night the enemy burnt the cantonments, and in tIic
morning Salo movccl into the to~vn,so hastily ni~din such confusion as to enconmgc our enemies and cliscouragc our fricnds.

.

Dcfonce oI Jnlnlnbnd-Cnpt. BroadEoot'~rcport nu gnrrison enginrer-Sortics
by tho garrison-Extmcts from clinry : from lcltcr to Dr. i%lcolmsonDefensivo mousurcs-Letter to Thoby Prinscp-J3xlrnctn
from diary-Dr. Brydon-\iTild's fnilure to forco the Xl~aiburpnss-Cnunoil of wnrLetter to Anvelock-Lelter from Ilnvdock-I-Iuvelock to Durnnd-Bronclfoot's memornndum-His opposition to tho proposod capitulnlion ullimately
succcssfnl.

TIIE town of Jalr~labnclis on the south side of thc Kabul river,
n little more t h a n halfway b e t n w n I<nbnl and Peshawnr. It
was a place of conside-mble i m p o r t a m e with a very fluctuating
p o p l n t i o n ; though nsecl as t h e minter residence of t h e Shah,
its defences were in a state of disrepair a n d dilapidation.
The following extracts from CapL. Brondfoot's note on t h e
defensive works will give an idea of the place as it was \ v l ~ m
occupied by Sale :
On November 12, the Major-General commanding, having 1~2.
solved to occupy Jellalabad, clirected me with n committee of oficers
to examine and report on the worlts of the place.
The committee reported unanimonsly that they mere not then
defensible against a vigorous assault.
As will be seen in the acoompanjhg plan, thc town is an irregulnr quadrilateral, having linlf of the western side salient and
the southern side brolten by a deep re-entering nngle. I t was surrounded on every side mith gardens and houses, inclosed fields,
mosques, and mined forts, affording strong cover to nn enemy;
these were everywhere dose to the w ~ ~ l land
s , in many places connected mith them. Beyond these on Ihree sides (N. E. and W.) nf,
from 400 to 600 yards r11n the ruins of the wall of the anciont city,
on which thc sand has accnm~zlated so as to form a line of low
.
heights, giving cover to the lnrgost bodies of men.
Two very solid walls,' 300 yards nprtrt, run from tho place to
this bank, thus inclosing on tlirce sides n space probobly occ~zpied
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originnlly by tllc h h g l d Einperor'x pnlnce, but fo~ulrlhy us Lo cont& 8 large mosqnc, and numorons jin~ilensand hottses occupicd b y
fnliecrs : one of tho gntes of t h e t o w t opcns into it, nnd i t was
tri~verseclhy n \wtorco~~rso
about tcn feat wide, wliich cutered the
town by a t u m ~ o under
l
the rampnA~%,
largo unougl~to admit scvcrtd
men abreast ; a, similar tunncl nIlowed it to pass out of the t o \ ~ no n
the enstern side.
Tlic walls of the town ostenclecl ihout 2,100 yards, w i t l ~ o u l
roclconing t h e bnstions, of wllicl~t h r o wore tl~irly-tl~rcc.The W O ~ ~
were of earth and i n the usnnl stylo of the country, vix. a h i g h
tliin raiiipart, bnt in a stnte of ruin, vithout parapets a n d without
clitch, covered may, or outworlis of any liilid.

I may m e n t i o n
To give sonlo idea of the state of the WO~']IB,
that, of the coinmittee scnt to inspecb Ll~cm on Noveinber 13, n o t
onc oscept mys sell succeeded in making the circnit ; large g a p s c11t
otf tho commu~~ication,
or insccuro Eooting ro~~lpellecl
the ollficers t o
descend among the nrljoining inclosares, from ~ v h i c hit mas clillicdt
to find the \yay [to tllc rampart].

S
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Broadfoot was busy repairing ancl improving the works,
ample use being founcl for the tools vhich hc had insisted on
tnlrulg \\lit11 him, which, indeed, had to bc supplemented by more
made on the spot. Poocl mas snpl)lied mninly by means of
tlic cscrtioris of C q ~ t 19ncgregor.
.
That officer, in n lettcr to
Cnpt. Maclieson, clntecl November 30, 18-11, mcntionecl that the
Afghnns avoided the open plain, but kept up n, dcsnltory fire
on thc dcfences. TS7hilst this wns going on at one side of thc
town, grain, flour, and otllcr supplics were brought in unopposed at thc other. Such mas the Orientd method of conclucting a siege.
The enemy returned to close qnarters on November 28, and
R scconcl sortic, commnnclccl by Col. Dennie, wns organiscd.
Again thc irifnntry wore mismanaged, with the csception of
l3rondfoot's Snppers, who drove the enemy from the inclosnres
along the Kabul fitce of the fort, and took Piper's Hill, Idling
eight or tcn of them. The cnvnlry, as bcfore, did well, and hnd
thcy bccn snpported by tllc infnrltry the results moulcl have
been morc cleuisivc. As it \Ii8S, the garrison was unmolested
for n long time, arid thc enemy applicd to ICahnl for a, reinforcement of 1,600 cavalry ; ' n tacit hut w r y hnilclsome coinpliincnt to our 200 horse under 01dficld and IIayne, although
the Gcneral saw no ilccessity of ueiltioning thcir scrvices in
his order of thanks.' a
The entries in Broadfoot'c;small diary licpt nt this time are
for tlic most part dry records of' work rlonc, but occasionally there are referelms to ollier matters of interest. On
Dcccnlber 14 hc nppcnrs to have lleard from Mncgregor of
Willimn Eroadfoot's death. The entry is : 'Alas ! my fears
\\rere trne ; he fell with Bmncs on November 2. 19noblc nncl
belovccl TVilliam. On that day twelvenlonth Jnnles wts slnin.
Bittcrrress of hcitrt is my portion, and, alas ! for home.' On
the 1 Gtb he recordcd :
The Geilerid still interfering with pnrties nbout loopholes, for
wllicll his mania continnes. A report in to-day tl~iltour troops at
Cabool have bee11 driven fro111 tho cantonment to the 13ala Ilissnr.
Anothor by n, lnnn writ 011 purpose to spread it, that n capitulnlion
has tnken place, n.nd our troops we in full retreat on this place. The
latter ahsurd ; but if trne .rvo arc bound by no cnpitnlation thcy make.
JJackIionxc1sdiary.
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EXTRACTS FRO31 BROADFOOT'S DIARY

CH. III

December 18.-At the works as yesterday. I'ieard f ~ o mCabool,
the letters dated the loth, from Sir W. Macnaghten and L d g Sala.
A11 inactive since the 23rd, only three days' supplies : rumonr said
the Candahar reinforcements werc near, but no certain accounts.
i\lore details of the events of the 23rd ult. Colin Mackenzie
again mounded. The cavalry charged through o m infantry. The
loss of our troops was very small, not enough to account for their torpidity. The Envoy complains of their inaction : the General nrges
the Envoy to capitulate.
I t would be insanity to do so. They would inveigle our troops
into the passes, and on the horses dying of hunger and cold would
attack them, seize the g m s , and starve or massacre the men reduced
by want of food, shelter, or fuel.
The Envoy wishes to postpone capitulation to the last. I t is
wrong to judge on insufficient information, but grievous errors seem
to hnve been committed ; may they not be fatal !
Why were not the troops concentrated from the first, and o pitched
bottle fought with all our strength? On Novembor 23, it seems,
eighteen companies of infmtiy and some cavalry sallied under Brigadier Shelton. Cavalry, 5,000 it is said, charged and rode through
their ranks and back again. A fresh troop of Lhe 5th Cavdry charged
the enemy's horse and recovered the gun. We pursued the enemy,
who rallied, and forced us to retire to the cmtonmcnts. Since then
nothing has been done: thenumbersof the enemy are less, bnt their
boldness is greater.
Capt. Woodburn was on his may to Cabool with about 100 men
when the insurrection broke out. He was attacked, but threw himself into a fort, which h e defended till his ammunition failed, when
he capitulated, on the enemy swearing on the Koran to keep faith.
I& and his men were no sooner in the enemy's liands than they
mere murdered. Woodborn was reckoned the best ofticer in the
Shah's service. Macgregor considers it probable the military will
drive Sir W.Macnqhten to grant Mahomed Acbar the termsweheara
of, viz. Shah Shooja to reign, with Dost Mahomed as his minister.
December 19.-Heard of Sir W. Macnaghten's answer to the
enemy on their proposing Dost Mahorned's recdl, our departure for
Peshawar, and on news of that being done, their returning to the
provinces under a Borulrzye escort : our people to lay down their arms
e t once, and giva np the married men and their families as hostages.
Sir William replied, ' Death is better t l m dishonour : we tlust in
the God of battles, and in His name bid you come on.' 3
2 It is said that this reply was
suggesled to Sir W. Maonnghten by

Colin ~ack;nsie. Storms and S Z L ~ .
shine of a SoWbr's Lifo.vol. i. p. 236.
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LETTER TO DR. ~ I A ~ . C O I , ~ I S O N

With tl~isspiritthey will do \vcllycl; but, ~ ~ ~ l i i i p p li l y~ ,militiiry
e
nathoritics :Lro said not to sharc it.
Bccc7nber 23.-ihoi1g the people the rcport is rife tliat the
X n ~ o yhas capitnlalerl. hltogelllor i1nprob~~l~lc--i1~cre~lib1c;
it \\lould
be insnnity; hut all rcports scem to ooncor ixs to soluc acconlmodntion hnring laken place. Mncgregor proL,~blyguesses rightly thiit
Mahomed Acbar Iillnn, iindiug l~imselfbut i l secondary person, 11;ls
made his own terms with us, and thttt thus the robollion is brolicil
up, or a t least tlisnaion produced.
V n s aslcecl by some oficers of the 13t11, w l ~ c t l ~Icsib\\'
r nny of l l ~ e
fightiug iu thc Iihooril Cltbool pass ! This from nieil who111 we lxeceded ; who wore not evcn in sight while the S a p ~ c r sand I>a\vcs's
guns (Llie li~tternnnble to act) were d o n e dislodgiug thc enemy from
his principal positions ! This i s indeed llle h b b l c repntation.
Received 1130 pounds mole of country powder. I nm promised
soluc sulphur and seltpetre by a Hindoo, hut i t must come from
Baliihagl~,imd Mccr Ufzul, Nazir, with 11 fern horsemen, is stopping
the r o d . Ever) thing is diWcult for want of money. Nncgregor
compltzim bitterly of Mnclteson, but is now, happily, beginnilig not
to lean on him. llttrd frost, weather ileligl~tfal.
Dccenlbo. 24.-Tlic road ttcross the town, from the Cilzee bnstion, is a greah improvement, or mill be if finishod. One side call
now support the olher with reinfo~~cements
in a moderate time. A
few hours' work will finish the right fla~ilcnnd face, but lo-morrow
i s Cl~ristmasDay and n general holiday. Seventy-five cn~uel-loads
of barley and I n d i m coiw nrrived for the cattle ; they are very ill
off for forage. There is a good deal in the country, bnt we wnnt
money.
Cool Shah and Uslu~nRlmn, with otl~ers,nrging me to co~ninit
Lo them tho revenge of TT'illiam's ilesth. The fornier wants leave
to go as so011 as he can be spi~redto murder Anicci~oollilli Khan,
Logarce. Alas ! poor William, just arc thcir praises of theevalinnt, generons, and gentle mert tho11 indeed.
Dccc?~zbcr26, C'l~~ist7nas
Dcq-A 110lidayfor all 11ands. Dined
wit11 the 13th L.I. No n e w in. Wrote to Malcolmsou.

The follomjng csLri~cLsw e from this letter :
Since I last mrotc, littlc lias occl~rl.erlhere, and we h n w 11ad no
ilejvs from Cahool, 111011g11rumours of ovcry liiild nho~uiid. . . .
111 the mean time, we are busy pntting np dcf~nces,rind, lhougli
executed very roughly, they nre nhendr beconling fo'ormidaLlo
against sncli encinics :is are liltrly t o oppose ns. The work 1x1s
been, and continnes to be, ;I great onc. The wi~llswcre rninons,
and, in a great portion of the circnndcrc~~ce,
rnorc accessible from
r 2

7

$

the outside than the inside. This is aheacly all changed. Nothing
can be more admirable than the cheerfulness and g o o d d l with
which the troops labour. Never was a finer body of men assembled.
Confidence, too, is greatly restored, and we are tolerably well off for
provisions. Bad we but money me should be all right, but me
have none, though some, I hear, has a t last been despatched from
Peshawur.
We have also got a small quantity of powder from the neighbonrhood, and are gettinghonses [built] for the troops. Altogether,
we are getting into that state which would render it clearly our
duty to hold our ground here, whatever may be determined on at
Cabool. But I trust they mill submit to no unworthy terms.
My health is good : the work from the first day till now I have
taken great interest in ; in fact, mere it not for the bitter loss of
William, I should be happy, for I am actively employed, and cannot
but feel myself, or at least hope, I am useful.
I have some thought of publishing a short statement of our
operations (that is this force-not the Cabool people), at any rate I
shall draw one out, and you shall see it. EIavelock is going to
publish also, and I shall give him plans, sections, &c., and show
him the paper I write.
People seem to think here I am one of those sure of the
brevet-majority and C.B. It may be so, and I should certainly be
gratified exceedingly were it so, for I should feel conscious of at
least trying to desesve i t ; but the want of William, and the thought
of the sorrow at home, embitter every thought of the future. How
he would have shone in the present gloom at Cabool !
I hear there is an ' Englishman ' paper in (I have not seen it),
saying we must have succumbed before succo~u.scan reach. Do
not fear for us. This force if rightly managed will hold its own.
I t was indeed once in a bad may, but, as I wrote yon at the time,
it would have been our own fault had i t been destroyed. We
could always, if we had not got provisions, have fought our may to
meet our reinforcements; and now, if we manage well, we could
sustain 71r.erethe attack of aU Afghanistan. Despondency has been
our chief danger here. Do not lot it extend to India, or evil might
indeed befall. And make them keep off a Burmese war. But I
forget you are out of the way of dl these things in the far West.
December 26.-At work as before. Opened a road Gom the
new bastion to the Cazee bastion, a most useful mork. Newspapers in from India-the Cleneral's despatches-the Sappers never
mentioned I General indignation thereat-spoke to H~velockand
Wade pretty freely regayding it.
December 27.-Trying to make the best of the vicious tracing
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of these old works, Treasure 25,000 rs, arrived from Peshawur at
last, brought by horscmen in t11c sonice of Torabaz E l ~ a u . More
on the road. The horsemen seen~edmuch astonished at the works
me have put up.
The first brigntlc of tlio reinforcemenls arrived a t Peshawur on
the 24th. Clcrlt's seacling on these reillforcements was a vigorous
nncl wise mensurc. The ol?jects to be gaincd justified risking them
i n the Punjab. We have to a certain extent saved ourselves, but
me owed much to the ltnowledge tho Afgl~nnshad that theso troops
mere on their way. It encouruged our friends, and gradually dishenrtcned thc enemy.
Have had no time to write to anyone. No news from Cabool.
C ~ i i ~ n g h a rand
n Gerrard at length noticed in ordersq for the
Mamoo Khel aflair. This is in consequence of a letter (oflicial) sent
in by Baclrhouse, remonstrating on thc neglect of it hitherto. The
General uses my words regarding Cunningham persevering in the
mining wllcn the place was on fire. I t was paid no attention to
fomerly.
Uscembe~28.-At work ns usual. Lost the morning in going
round the place with Col. Monteath to choose an encamping
gyo~u~cl
for the troops coining up. The Colon01 does not willingly
aclopt suggestions, as I found at Khoord Cnbool, whcre i l required
poor Jenkins's death m ~ dthe loss of many men to convince him how
faulty mas the position of the right picket. He agreed to occupy
tho rocks, but dcclinecl placing tllc troops so tliat the fort and
t h y could help each other; and gavc reasons which told more
strongly against his position than ih o t l ~ e r . ~However, I obeyed
orders in'going. Rain fcll, and I got wet : not very well a t night.

Thc entries regarding the nest few days refer ns usual to
t h e progress which nrns being made with the defensive works.
A report, afternwds confirmed, of the murder of Sir W.
Macnnghten is also noticed. With reference to the effect this
news might have, Broadfoot wrote : ' A11 I fear is panic in our
lenders, and consequently in thc troops. We are strong if t h a t
be kept off; strong enough to do grcnt deeds. 12einforoements
are at Peshawnr. I n a meek or ten days they shonld be here,
and if my voice can do anything to urge our leaders, me s h d l
then resame, whnt with such enemies should solclon~b e nbandoned, the o£t'ensive.'
See p. 4s.
Means apparcxitly thnt thcrensons
given by Nontealh told nlorc against

the position he wit;hcd to pot Lhc
troops in thnn agninst the one advocated Ly Cnpt. Urondfoot.
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Janzinry 1, 1842.-Little doubt seems to be nom entertained
of Sir W. Macnaghten's fate. They must have had very hardmork
at Cabool; me shall no doubt hear of great suffering alld much
heroism when the communication is reopened. Poor Trevor was a
fine fellow. Wade spoke to-day of a report of the state of the
works, and mention of the Sappers. . Spoke to I-Iavelock about it.
Wrote to Thoby Prinsep.

..

The first part of t h e letter referred to has already been
quoted ; t h e second, with the exception of a long postscript,
m a y nom appropriately follow.

I
1.

1

I

I

You of course know all our news from Macgregor's communications. The reinforcements are soon expected; and as to the Khyber,
if they cannot force that they are hardly worth having, or rather
their commanders might be spared; but the Khyberoes will, we
hope, not oppose. The rumours of poor Macnaghten's murder are
confirmed from every side, and the details reported you of course
know. I am truly sorly for him ; he was a ldnd man, and specially
so to me as a friend of yours. I-Iis late firmness, too, redeemed
many errors. They have hnd a severe struggle at Cabool, and
still have ; but if they are only well handled, and in each effort
esert all their strength, they mill deliver themselves. If they continue in jeopardy, their relief must be our care. A winter march is
an undertaking of great difficulty ; but nothing is impossible with
forethought, due preparation, and calm obstinate courage. But
theso are rare qualities, all wanting here ; gallantry and rightheartehess me have, but not the nerve to loolc the very worst in
the face, and by preparing, or even unprepared, to meet it unshaken.
I have crossed the Alps twice i n different parts in winter, and
have travelled in German mountain^ in snow, and once had to
travel on foot the Apennines also, and I was born in the latitude of
St. Petersburg. The dangers, and the means of meeting them, of
a minter espedition I have therefore some notion of; scarcely another
~ n a nhere has, and mlde the majority speak of the attempt in a may
unbecoming Inen caIled to a struggle hlte ours, others consider i t so
easy that its unavoidable difficulties will, as we have already seen
in other cases, scare them a t the moment when vigorous perseverance done can save. An attempt to relieve Cabool at once should
be made, if me find any tolerable prospect of success in doing so,
but ought not to be risked unless absolutely necessary. With
arrangement we might do i t ; even with such moderate share of it
as we are likely to have, we might get through if the weather .was
See p. 30.
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fine; but if snow storms come on and wo are vigoronsly opposcd,
we should have to strain evcry nerve to avoid sigl~aldisnste~.I nm
now g l d Colin is wounded, or he mould himc bee11 with poor AIacnnghten.
TT1lial n trngic history is this me nre inalting, but yct hon7 noLlo
o struggle to be engaged in ! Enougli to mnlte men of women.
Onc good, a great good, will ariric from this e ~ ~ ino
l : trcnty is
now possible till it be dictated by us as conqnerors-by us, here,
together wilh the i~einforcemeutswe will hope ; but even sllould it
be by a ncw army of the Indus, our destruction would be a less
evil lo lhe State than m y treaty impeding n h t ought llow R~ILI
easily ciln bo acl~ieved,t l ~ cconqncst of t l ~ i scountry. Rcccde fronl
it we never can, or it ceases to be in our interests, or even ilcutr:~l.
We must regard it u,s a fortress to be Iiclcl for tho secu~ityof India ;
a certain espense, indeccl, but an irievitnble onc, anif one to bo
diminished to the utinost. This diminution cnn only Lo cffccted by
govedng it oz~?~scZves,
not introducing Indian regulations moro
than English law, by wl~olesalo,but aclministerin:: and improving
its finances, nnd tmnquillising it by brealiing all milita1.y power
but our 0 ~ 1 3 ,and, to tho eslent necessary to secure these objects,
adlllinistcring justice.
Ne~rermind these fclloks gatl~eriug,we l m e m a h this plnce
now dcfcnsible against an :~ttacli17e vive iorcc ; formcrly we could
llot 1,nve liopt the111 out i l they had tricd to get in, t h y could llnvu
forced us to (L street fi&l ; but our true line of defcnce is going out
and fighting, arld if that be rigl~llydol~e,no few of them; bt tho
worst come, yon may l l a ~ cnil army round by Cimdnhar bcforo t h y
G. B.
have succeeded in demolishing us.
Macgregor is a good nian ; it is not with him t h nvcrsion to prcvions preport~,tionlies. As I mas cilwying this to tho postmaster, I
learned the afflicting intclligonce that poor Colin svas nit11 A h nnghten, nna is 1ion7 a, prisoner in Cd~ool. irIost dccply do I synlpathise with you all and with nll his relations. Gut thorc is yet
hope, and good hope; they hnvo not yet nlurclcred tmy of the
prisoners, nor is it likely thoy mill now clo so, for it mould defei~t
their end in saying them at first. hl the mean time, their deliverance must bo our aim ; and if I have hitlle~tonever ceased to urge
prepai-mtion on our leaders for e\Iery erneqency, and to illalto it, as
far as concerned me, n ~ ycHorts s h d l not ~li1clicnnow h a t primte
affectiolljoins N i t l l . t h ~sense of duty niid the cn11 of honow. L)ouldy
needful is it llon7 that i~ blow shonlcl bu struck thc moillent tho reinforcelnents arrijre ;and while thc dishenrtcnil~gucws is still sprcnding among the enemy, let it be followed up encli day by nccounts
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of a fresh blow inflicted on them. This will spread dismay and disunion among them at Cabool. Should they carry off their hostages,
we must follow them wherever they are harboured, be it in Herat o r
Bokhara.
Thinlc not these are mere opinions founded on feeling. If we
mean, among a ~varlikeand hitherto never perfectly subdued people,
to avoid incessant rebellions, with all the expense of repressing
them, and continually being ready to meet them, it must be by
showing them once for all, that much as we have borne, it is not
from weakness ; that no combination is beyond our power to crush,
and that from our power there is n o refuge. Nothing but showing
beyond all doubt that insurrection ishopeless, milleffectnally prevent
it ; but that zuill do so, and now is the time to secure ourselves for
the future.
But what are me to say to Pottinger's communications : a retreat
on us, to evacuate the country ! and this the defender of Herat!
the most fortunate man at this moment in Asia I Filling a sifuntion inswing a harvest of glory, a man would part with ten years
to have so fair a trial. There must surely be circumstances we
lmow nothing of to bring this. on? If they do agree to abandon tho
country, it will fearfully complicate onr evils for a time, for we here
are in no way bound by snch convention till tho Government of
India ratifies it, and that of course you will nevor h e a m of. Nor
con they include us iu any convention. A general, not the absolute
ruler of B state, can only capitulate for those under his o m orders,
for the instant he capitulates he ceases to command; abdicates,
ipso fncto, all authority over all not in the same straits as himself.
I-Ie yields to force ; those not subject to that force are not bound to
yield to commands he, no longer a free agent, is compelled to give.
But will they not revenge our resistance on the retreating force ?
They will, perhaps, try to do so, but that breaks their truce also,
and, united, we can be at them. In any case let us fight to the
uttermost to rescue OLW brethren or make them victorious, but not
sell our country as the price of saving them from attack.
What a, change from the unvarying glory of the last half century, when snch questions are seriously discussed. But all will yet
be right, if you and we acquit ourselves like men. We shall soon
lcnow of the retreat commencing, if ever they attempt it, for the
whole country will rise, and then, come what may, our duty is to
prolong the struggle till able to conquer.

' WhenBrondfootwrote thcaelines
he did not know thnt Pottinger had to
he best of his nbility endesvoured to

rouse the chief military officers to a
sense of duty and of honour-without
success.

,
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But younger, or ot lcast more energetic, men must be employed.
Scniority will not answcr. Brevot rank should remccly the evil.
Rnnli given for scrvice no on0 ci~ngrudge 01, cnvy. This brigade
has doue moro than ~ n a ~ forces
i y where tlic bre~fethns becn given ;
and as I feel injiihticc done to mc, m c l thc public loice beforc thc
despntchcs appenrcd in prinL liad pointed me out for anyL1iilig
given, I sliall ask the General to remedy his injustice ; aud if h e
docs not, s l d l send you a statcment of thc case, to sllow how
matters really stand.
If Potliiiger attc~nptsto cnpitulalo m~clrctrcnt, they will probably inveigle thorn into the pnsses am1 nttaclr them, m~rlheavy
indeed would be their loss without cattle, fuel, or food, :~ssailed
]light tlnd clay mnidst the snow. Consider that onr brignclc (mismanngccl ccrteinly, bnt will they do bctter?) lost 260 lrilled and
wou~ldedbetwen Cabool ilnd Gu~~clumuk.
As to Sliah Shooja, the pnrtner of the Icafirs, the country will
regard his fate with indifiercnce. Pension him liberally, bnt do
not govern tlrongh him : either you n d t o him suc11 a cipher tliat
h e and his, being the scorn of t l ~ ccoontry, mill hate and t h n m t
UFI, who nlalrc them so ; or clse, powcr ill liis or any other Asintic
hands, so situated, will be escreised nltcrnately with i'cebleness and
tyranny, but always clninsily, odiously to tlic people, nnd cxpensively to us. Nor is there nny brcncli of faith ill this. IVe set up
the Shah i ~ tour om11 cllilge that he nligl~t 1xcp hfgllanistiln
friendly to us, but 11e cilnnot perform his part of t11c coi~tracl; hc
cniu~othold it for hinlself; and the saluc ~iccessityof sclf-preserwtion tlint jostificd our sweeping away thc d c f m t o rulcrs to ~llnlie
room for this esperiinent, justifies us in resorting to other mealis
when t h e fi~il. Especinlly as the Shah could not fi~ilto be a11
enormons gnincr compared with what he was a t Loodhiana. Our
choice rosts between this course tlncl re-enacting, without the same
cscuse of novelty of situation, the Canlatic history of Chunda Sahib
end Mahomed Ali and Waln J a h down to thc forced nbdicaLious of
Lord Wellcsley'~administ~ations. Clamour of ininstice there mill
be in either case: ia the one, once for all, aild n, drain on our
finnnces pcrula~ientlylimited, and brought under our own control ;
in the other, for a generation or two, with the accompani~~~ents
dl
lliat timc of misgovernment and its results, discontent, revolt, and
waste of o w resources.
Now this is pretty well from me to n member of Goveri~ment;
but a rcport is just ill that t l ~ cenemy nro gathering again at
Ealabagh ; lilrely enough ; we shall probably have hard work before
you road this, and some, if not ninny of us, Le for cver nl rest, tl.1~1
none more likely tlmn myself, for my escilpe hitherto has gone
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beyond the chances, for though forgotten in the despatches, no fear
of our being omitted in the hour of danger. So be it. But if angry .'.
at my presumption, be appeased by the reflection that the offence
may never be repeated. Should this happen, the truth will then
out, and what little bubble of reputation I ought to have will be
accorded to me dead, and I trust please my friends, and in time
soothe my heartbroken relations at home, for such this fatal 2nd .
of November must have made them. . .
If I fall, pray inquire as to the services of the Sappers, and do not
forget my two oficers Orr and Cunningham, and two sergeants
Kelly and Bruen. They have done good service to their country, and '
do not forget the corps at large. But, to turn before parting to something better, give my kindest regards to all your circle, and say I
,
fully expect yet to take the place in i t once more I so greatly valued,
and shodd it be minus a n a m or a leg, the ladies will have pity on
the pazuura estropid. And Colin, too, I mean to bring with me.
Believe me kc.
G. B~OADPOOT.

.

Extracts from Capt;. Broadfoot's diary are now continued ;
they serve to show much that was passing in his mind, and
illustrate some of the difficulties with which he had to contend.
The continued exposure to the glare of the sun had brought
011 severe inflammation in one of his eyes, and the hard work
and bad food seem to have made his general state of heslth
unsatisfactory. He had urged that plans of operations in
case of certain eventualities should be prepared, and that
oficers should be made familiar with them, so that when the
time came no delay in taking action might occur. But this,
like much else which he urged, though wise and prudent, was
opposed.
Recommended once more that a plan should be fixed. Macgregor
objects the uncertainty of events. True, but let us fix with reference
to probable or even to all conceivable issues, and s0e what answers
in all cases, and be ready to execute that at once when reinforcements
come.
Jccne~my7.-bastion finished before breakfast. Some grasscutters
destroyed by the enemy near Khoosh Goombuz ; our cavalry pursued
them in vain. Hindoo merchant has sulphur at E l l a e Bukhtnn on
this side of Chahar bagh. Urged Macgregor to get the General to let
me tdre out a detachment to bring in that, and Nacgregor suggested
forage also. An excellent hint, but the General told Macgregor that

,

.
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he clid not wnnt powdcr ! but would see nbout fornge, Nothing lins
been done-deplorable imbecility ! csposing us to the contclnpL of
Lhe country, and encouraging [our enemies].
I had armngcd to get materials for gzzbions, b a t the native [who
wns to go out and collcct them] wantcd a guard. On aslting for it
the General could not see tho use of gabions ! I said in cnsc of going
out to nttnclr thcso forts in t l ~ neigl~bourl~ood
e
they would be required
for batleries. I l e did not sec the use of batteries. I told him he
would not get his nrtillcry to do much without tl~em,a d on his
denying this incrltioned ilbbott's refi~singto continuo firing nt Tezeon
under a nmsltetry fire. Ho denied this l I realIirmcd and said it
was this that made me attach the fort. H e denied my sttack, and
said Col. Denuie and the 13th took it. I told him thuy did not; and
that the Bnppers alone did so. I3e said then i t mado very little re:
sistnnce, and mas open ! I mid the resistance wns little, but I had
to force a n entrance, and blow oE the bolt of the wicltet to get in.
H e seemed ashanled, and thongllt, I fancy, of his despstch.
Ho has also prohibited the removal of the huts ou the ramparts,
declaring them useful ns thc men arc on tl~cirposts ! forgetting that
ao mllch parapet is lost and the rampart rendered impassable except
by narrow doors through huts eucumbered by bedding kc.
Wrote to Tlloby Prinsep.
RIacgregor doubtfill, I gricvc to find, nbout holding out.
J C L ~ C9.-Three
L'I~
Aclliltzyc ~ O ~ S C ~ ~brought
C I I
in n peremplory order from Gen. Elpl~instonelo Cen. Snlc to quit Jelslilbad
for Peshawur. The order was ' to be delirered by tho new
Ciovcl~nor.'
Answcr : that it is of a n old dale, and not dclircred by the person
named ; aud as Mahomed hcbar T<hnn's proclainntions are about,
calling 011 the peoplc hcrc to attitolt us, what security have mo that
wc shnll Lave a safe passage to Peshnwur ?
I n the wean time the reiiiforcclncnts arc a t Juurood, ai~cl
runloured to be farlher on.
O w duty in e i w y case is clear-to stand fnst to the last, unlcss
our Govclument resolve to abandon the contest, an ullliltely contingency.
Wrote a fcw lines to 3Islcolmson and Thoby Prinsep. Hoar
Colin Maclrenzia m d the others sre released ; I fervently trust i l is
truc.

Referring to t h e refusal to obey Elphinstone's order, Broadfoot wrote to 31;~lcolmson:

...

The Generd decli~lesnoting till further advices are received.
This is nll right, but the trying time will be whon tho force (if ever)
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comes
We must then encourage the old General by every
means to hold out, for this place is more defensible now against
Afghans than many places held out against better troops for very long
periods at the earlier epochs of our Indian history. I for one protest
against yielding ; but I must close.
I n a postscript h e complained about the omission in
despatches of mention of the Sappers, and said h e mas about
t o address a remonstrance to Sale.
They are the only corps omitted, and I the only commmcling
oacer, and yon may print if you like that they have been scan&lously used in burldng their exploits and even ascribing what they
did to others, as the capture of a fort at Tezeen.
Jmuary 10.-Eyes too much inflamed to write. News from
Cabool of the 4th. Lawrence mites for Pottiugcjr, and snch a letter I
contrnliictory and absurd. Sturt wites the General-the Khg's
party looking up unaided by us-and we I I blush to think of itsuch terms ns we have mac1e.g
Attempts made to corrupt our men reported to me by themselves,
hitherto unsuccessful ; but not so, I fear, with the Juz~ilchees.
,

~ tthis
' very oritical period s part of Capt. broad foot'^
diary has been lost. From January 1 0 t o February 1 the
leaves have disappeared, and all endeavour to trace them has
been fruitless. When Major Broadfoot mas killed in 1845, the
diary was in the hands of the late S h 11. Bavelocli, who sent
i t to Broadfoot's successor in ogce, Sir FI. Lawrence, from
whom it was received some years after by Major Broadfoot's
family without the pages referred to.
On January 12, Backhouse recommended t h a t the camp
follomers should be armed to increase the number of available
defenders ; and on the 13th, Dr. Brydon, severely wounded and
clinging to an exhausted pony, mas seen from the wa,lls and
brought in. H e was, with t h e exception of the prisoners and
hostages in Akbar Khan's power, the sole survivor of t h e unfortunate ICabnl army.
IIis dreadful story still furthey depressed t h e Jaldabad
garrison, already in snficiently low spirits. But they hoped
much from Wild's force at Peshawar. These hopes were not
'

Refers to the Elrbul force.
Thesil remarks refer to the news

from Kabul and the terms under which
Xabul was evaouated.

on.
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ha red by Broadfoot ; he clivinecl correctl-j-the probable failnre
of assistance from that s o ~ r c eand
, on lcnrning the destruction
of thc Kabul force, he, as garrison engineer, laic1 the facts regalding the state of Jalalrabad before Major-Geu. Sir R. Sale,
and pointed out that unless he were prepared to hold the place
to the last extremity, he shonld retreat that night, and fight
his way on1 of thc country. A plan of operations was preparccl ;
the rctrent was to be conducted as a mililary mcasure ~ ~ i t h o u t
convnntinn or agreement with the ci~cmy. But Sale, believilig
i n Wilcl's assistance, clecicled to remain, and wrote to the Commander-in-Chief that hollnd resol~edon thc most cleterminecl
defence of the place, relying on the promise of carly relief, tho
neccssity for which h e again strongly nrgecl.'
Wild's brigade fnilecl to penetrate the IUlaibnr, and Sale, on
learning this, seems to have been appnlled by a situation which
rt few days beforc he dcclincd lo contemplnte.
Will1 tlic assistance of Capt. Nacgegor he clcvisecl n schemc
for the evacaalion of Jdalnbncl uncler a coi~vontionwith the
Afghans, and on January 26, 1812, he summoned a council
of war to listen to ancl approve of proposnls in mhich the honour
and safety of tho garrison wcrc involved.
Broadfoot, as has been stated, had foreseen thc danger, and
when confronted with it was difierently nfiectecl. Tlw following
extracts from a letter written on January 25 to Mrs. Bnyley
show the line of concluct which he co~~siclered
shonld be followed
before h e was awnre of the proposals about to be recou~mcncled
to the coi~ncil. It ~ h o n l dbo mentioned that the news of the
I<nI>ul disn~lersnppeared to have completely paralysed the
Goveruor-General and Council in Cdculta. Instead of putting
forth all their strength nntl using every resource a t their disl~osalto relieve the Jaldabhcl garrison, the Government seemed
nnable or unwilli~lgto give them prompt assistance.
By labours rarely equalled we Lave given time to the Goveinlnellt to relieve us nlld retrieve tllc nntionnl fortunes ; they have
llot ~zsedtlle oplmtuaity, but scnt bnttalioiis iustead of armics, nnd
wc shall perhaps, nsy probably, perish. But we shall fall with
llo]lou~, with the consciousaess that history mill acquit ws of
failing in our ilnty, and acknowledge that even Lhough destroyed
llave given time for tllc first dangerous terro~to subside,
1 hfnjor-Gen. Sir R. Sale to Major-Gen. Lumley, January 13, 1841.
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and rendered the conquest of this country still possible, though
with a clificulty and national effort tenfold greater than if advantage had been vigorously taken of our resistnrlce. Gen. Pollock is
approaching, but he has with him two battalions only, and will
find but four, defeated and dispirited. If he succeeds (and four battalions woulcl have easily succeeclerl at first), we may yet hold out
here till the army for Cabool arrivos ; but if he fails (and every
obstacle will now be accumulated against him), none of us may
live to tell the tale of our fall; but glorious, or at least honourable,
rely on it, it will be.
The proceeclings and decisions of the council of war, when

it first meL and afterwm-cls reassembled, are of all the events
conilected with Sale's. brigade the most memorablc and important. For in that assembly the question whether to defend
the place to extremity and maintain untarnished the honour
of their arms, or to negotiate with the enemy for capitulation,
was cliscussecl and eventually decided.
The c o ~ ~ n cconsisted
il
of Major-Gen. Sir Robert Sale, president, with the following oficers as members: Col. Dennie, C.B.,
13th L . I . ; Col. Monteath, C.B., 35th N.I.; Captains Abbott,
Baclrhouse, and Macgregor, Bengal Artillery, the latter being
the Political Officer ; Capt. Oldfield, 5th Bengal Cavalry ; and
Capt. Broadfoot, of Brotlclfoot's Sappers, gnrrison engineer.
Captains Havelock encl Wade wore present as members of
the General's st&, and recorded proceedings; but they had no
vote, and consequently could not directly influence the decision.
The records connected with the proceedings mere in Havelock's
charge, and the following correspondence mill explain why Capt.
Broadfoot thought it necessary to clraw up a memorandum on
the subject and to obtain Haveloclr's testimony to its accuracy.

.iMnjor Broaclfoot to M a j o r fIu.~..sLoclt.
Steamer ' Enterprise : ' April

10, 1843.

My dear EIavelocl~,-You remember my coming to you in
Ferozpore after meeling Macgregor a1 Maddock's, and yow telling
me of your having been deprived somewhat suddenly. of all the documents regarding our Jellalabad parliaments. I then, I think, told
you I should draw out a sketch of what I remembered of them, and
leavo copies with my friends. Well, the night of my departure from
Delhi, I wrote one in great haste and left it with Durand, together
with what was more trustworthy, as not Liable to errors of memory,
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vix, snch copies of documents as I 11ad prcscrved. Now, in tho
forrncr Lhere n7as thc trace of the ludicrous portion of the debates,
and of m l ~ a twas worse, too visible ; there were nlso omissions, kc. ;
so I hnvc, in thew respects, lunended it, and propose sending you
a copy of tho amended one, and asking you to apprisc Durimd aud
myself if you fo1111c1
any points erroneo~~sly
stated, dislil~guishing
butwecn wlint you m y merely not remember, and what you know
I an1 mistakcn in.
Illavo not time, l ~ o m c v c ~bcforc
,
gcttting ont of the river to
malie another copy for Durancl. I therefore end him this with n
requcst that llewill forward it to you. I<incllypoint out to him any
errors you may notice ; nnd if you thinlc it wort11 while, lccep a copy
of tllc paper. If yon would like copies of the clocuments I have, you
shall 11nve Lhein. Among t l ~ c mis tllc French lctter which made such
a n impression, ancl the copy of my own reasons for voting a s I clid.
Should YOU h a w copies of thc Pcrsian pnpors, I wisl~you mould
let me have transcripts, though, on second tl~onghts,your heving
been reccntly deprived of Lhem may r c n d ~ rit improper in you now
to communicntc thcm. You had them as in Cen. Sale's confidcnce, and nre Lound by his wish for concei~lmcut. I had them as
a voting member, and am not so bound ; but mincl, I nevertllcless
dcsiro not publicity.
I bolieve I told yon it wns a note of mine to ~Iulcolmson,written
a t the time, mhioli m d o the nicrc fuct of comicils having tlssenlbled
lmon.11; but I find from ivIalco1111soii it was not.
Thnt note went with tho oficitll pnpers (JIacgrcgor's) by il c o ~ s i i l , ~
who was killed; or, at any rate, never rencliecl. Anotlicr mnn cnrried
a linc from me to Jla~lies011,bcgging hirn to give my news to Mnlcolmson ; and in this I nmltione(1 my rcgret I L ~what I took for
granted he laiem, our having o i h ~ dto capitulate; nTcmero then
waiting the answer.
I need not tell you this suininnry is by no means intendcd ns a
full account of the councils. Snch nn account is nearly impossible,
a s you know, from the hcat ancl irregularity of tbc clobntes ; two or
three discussions going on at the stirno time occasionally, and the
same arguments urged and ausmered over and ovor. I llnve merely
endeavoured to give the general scope of the reasonings on both sides
a n d the results. I think the ncco~mtof tho letter actually sent is
something near the iuarlr, and thnt is the nmin point.
I am going now to an old scene, but to 11cw duties,=and have some
difficulties to encounter ; and I confess to you, I nevcr heforc cilt~red
2

CossirZ, ,'r~+, aouricr, messenger.
had been nppointed Corn-

' He

missioner of the Tenasserim Provinces.
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on duties with more anxiety or less cheerful anticipation. Save
perhaps on first gokg into Jelldabad, amidst aLl that you remember ;
but then there was the stin~ulusof the enemy at the door. However, now as then, I shall do my best, and for the best.
I am very sorry I was not able to see Mrs. Haveloclt, but here is
the dak-boat, and I must conclude. Let me hear from you ; I shall
write on this voyage, and despatch it from Maulmain.
Ever kc.

G. BROADBOOT.

P.8.-I have no time to m i t e to Durand. I must send him this
for trmsmission. The pencil marks mere for you, but there is no
harm in Durand seeing them.
i t h j o ~ .T-Ic~reloclcto JdcLjor Broadfoot, C.B.
Kussowlee : May 1, 1843.

My clear Broaclfoot,--I got some clays ago yonrs of the loth nlt.
I have perused carefully your notes on the councils in Jellalebad,
a i d compared them with such memoranda as I have still in my
possession. I consirler that they contribute a fair and correct statement of that mhich occurred. There are certainly one or two little
incidents mentioned mhich I either did not observe or have for-,
gotten. I do not recollect Col. Monteath, for instance, having
quoted poetry. But I might have been out of the room at the
moment, or my attontion might have been attracted to something
else (for in all jackdaw parliaments such distrnctions are frequent), or
the fact of the gallant Colonel's usual declamation having sonlething
of the character of prose upon stilts might have prevented my remarking that he had taken a flight bodily into the poetic region. I n
every material point your recollections so closely coincide with mine,
that I have not thought it necessary to append any remarks to your
paper before returriing it to Durend. I propose to copy it to-day,
and shall be most thankful to you for a transcript of your reasons
for your vote, as well as of the French letter, and any other documerits which you may have regarding the couucils.
I was only yesterday, by a letter from my wife, made aware that
you had been at Serampore at all. I share in her r e g e t that she
mas in Calcutta at the time. John Marshman's numerous avocations have prevented him from sending me a line for, I think, the
last two months.
I have to thank yon for the copy of the ' Englishman ' containing
your letter respecting the Koodee Kheil affair.' Here, too, my
This refers to the action at Mamu Khel, shortly before Pollock's force
marched to Kabul. See pp. 134-152.
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recollections generally confirm yours. I did not lmow, indeed, that
tho dctacliinent of the 9th had been fornlally placed a t your disposal ; bnt I saw yon lending the attack which they made. I thiidc
the ouly man who fell mas a grenadier, and, if so, Ogle, who probably wns with his company, wits your senior ;but we h o w that in
l c s the pursuit at ICoodce Klieil was
Ilelter-sltelter s l c h ~ ~ t a ~ (and
eminently such) portions of troops often act under the orders of a
forward junior, whilst a s c n i o ~is carried along with them, inedvertent, of Lhe circumstance, or unwilling or unable to reclify the error
in Llle hurry of cvents. Col. Taylor is an active, very gallant, and
intelligcilt officer, too, but not a man of very clear ideas or somd
judginent, and has shown the defects in his character in this instance, by exposing publicly in the columns of a newspaper, the little
jenlousy excited i n his mind by the assertion that you had commanded a part of the Queeu's 9th Regiment.
I do not Itnow what ltind of diflicnlties you have to encounter in
governing tho Tennsserim Provinces, but will gness that they inay be
those wliich, in peace or war, my small experience has always shown
mc to be the most formidable-viz. the selfishness, obstinncy, nnd
imbecility of those who ought to be coadjutors, but whose minds nro
absorbed, tliat of each in the pursuit of his o m private ends, et
totlu &I illis.
Most sincerely do I wish you success, and pray yon to believe
H. HAVELOCIC.
me, ever kc.

P.S. May 5.-Before dcspatching this, your Irind letter of the
16th rceched me, bnL to it I will reply separately ancl at the lcngtll
EI. If.
the generosity of its sciltiinentv merits.
I liave taltcn a copy of your paper regarding the councils,
1Mc!ior IIacolock to Cript. Dznanil.
Kussowlce : May 1, 1843.

My clear Ihmnd,--I l i a ~ er e d over Broaclfoot's memoir regarcling tlic councils of war in ,Jclli~l,zbad,and compared it with such
~nurnoroncl~
aR I possess. I consider it a faitliful account of tliat
wliich occurred.
As was to Bo expected, some minor incidents have ndhered to liis
momory which havc escilped mine, such as Col. Jlonteath's quoting
poctry and the like ; and of course if I mere to tell the story I sliould
introcluce like pcrsonal oi~ecdotcs,which ho has forgotten, such as
tho ~stoulldingvcheruenco with which Olclfield ercldmed, ' I for one
will Iiglit here to tho last drop of my blood, but I plainly declare that
I will never be ahostage, and I an1 swprisd anyone should proposc
snch n, thing, or think tlmt an AKglliu~llSword is to bo talton for anyF

thing.' Gut tile account of thc debates as given by Broadfoot is SO
correct that I 1i:bvo tl~ouglitit lulneccssnry to attacll ally rernarlts to
his sketch. Oldfield am1 Eroadfoot jwro tho only two who voted Z L
the first council absolntely u p i n s t trcating to quit the country.

~

As to tho imputcd esccssesof our lroops in the last campaign, R
distinction is to be drawn between tlic pinisllnlcnt inflicted by
authority, such as tho destrnction of the bazaar and Inosqne nt
Cebool, Khurls Baltsh Khnu's fort n t Tezeeu, and tlie oonflagmtion
of Istaliff, Lugliinanee, Charelrar, kc., und the irregulzritics of tho
troops a d followers arising from a relaxed discipline.
Tka former in my opinion vere far too slight, and o ~ g h to
t have
been carried mucli farther, cert;linly to the ntter destruction of tile
Iiala Hissnr, and the devastation of the valley of L o g t ~ Tootoo,
,
l~nd
IIissaruk ; all tho Gliilzie vi1l;igcs ilear Jogdullnck, and fillally Teem,
the Khyboree capital. The lntter,' of course ought lo have been none
at all; the previous provocation considered, they were noh great.
But a, heretic like ine con hnrclly hope to be listened to on this subject, seaing that I liolcl tlie ultrn, and perhaps irregolr~r,opinion of
the expediency of Ircel~ingAlTghnnisLm altogelher, in the way of
complete snl)jugetion, sftcr I l i i ~ i l ~oricc
g come thore.
Kindly forward the accompa~iyingto the Tenasseriln gorernoy,
I-I. HAVELOCK.
and believe me kc.

Copt. Du,nnrl fn dfa.jo~ B ~ o a d ~ ~C.B.
of,
Unrrnokpore : July 17, 18.13.

Ny dear r>roaclfoot,-I linvnlong kept these papers x i t h the vicw
of myself tnlting acopy of tlrern; bat fincling t h t tliifs renieins us little
ad\wux%l as on the a a I~received them froul Iinveloclr, I return tho
doouinents with his two notcs, one to yomsolf, one to me. Tllc latter
you can at your couvenie~icereturn to ma, If you cnn by a confidentin1 person have a copy ma& for me of youy memoral~dmn,I
slionlcl be obliged.
We reached this place on the 12111, and on the 13th Lord Ellenborough resumed his seat in Council.
I hope soon to hear good news from your qnnrter ; nnd scnd this
to the Foreign Ofice with a reqnest to Tllomnson that i t may Bo
sent v i t h the nest Gover~~meiit
despatches for Moulmein.
Mr. Gird is continued as 1)epnty Governor of Bengd. IIr. h h d doclr is Iflid up wit11 a troublesome thumb. All clse much as usual
in this quarter, by no mcms a fi~\~ouriLe
one wit11 mysclf.
Yonrs sinccrely,
H. M. DURAND.
' The leller:' l i d rs, the irroguloriLies from relnsod discipline.

ca. rrr
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. Brondfoot's m e m o r ~ n d u mrcferrcd to i n these letters will
be found of great interest. I t is printed as nearly us possible
a s i t is written ; t h e original is in h i s own h n n d w i t i n g , t h e
remarks on t h e margin nre partly in his tmd pnrtly in Hsvc-

lock's writing.
COUNCILS OF WAR IN JELLALABAT).
Notrs b!/ Jfajor Brou(l/ool n l ~ l
l h ~ ~ byi >Idor
- ~ ~ RtW
Hnt?clock.

Mcnw~c~~tduwa
2121 1liCajo~B~oaclfooton
poccedings of tlzc C O ~ L ~ of
LC~~S
WCLT.
Here is all I have regarding o m

councils of war, or at any rate all that
was wiitten nt the time. The affair
l~appe~m
thus
l :
Early in January, Cnpt. Mackeson announced his purpose of dividing Brigadier Wild's forae : of course
failure wils looked for. On the 13th
Dr. Brydon came in. To hold Jellali~budnow became of groat inlportance,
but of LW great difficulty. Not cxpucting help from Peulianw, nnd not
believing Gcn. Sale and Capt. Mncgregor equal to face a strugglc such us
might occur ; linowing then1 both also
to bc in the habit of keeping away the
belief in dnnger, rather tllnn of estimtltiitg and preparing for it ; I bogged
Over the Cabool gatc, C q t . IInveloclc to lay the cnso before
about hn1E on lionr ltILcr I3ry- the General, and tell him, if lie found
don came in, Holcon~bcreported I~imsclf unequal lo a defence to estlie nlnsmcre as goi~;gon close
tremity, he should r e t r e ~ ttlint night
nt linnd. I took out some of the
The
Snppers, but VIM rocnlled. On when it was still possible.
coining brick I f o ~ ~ athe
i i gates General resolved to stsnd his ground,
shut, r ~ n dthc Genernl nnd all and the letter to tlie Commnnder-inthe oflicers over the Cabool Chief was written.
gate ; the poor Genernl~loolting

out with n spy-glnss Cnboolm r d . I t wns there our conversation took place.-G. D.
I perfectly rccollcct this.
H. II.

"

Ton, I hclievr, kept IL
dotniled joornul, and ~ n n yre-

The defcat of Col. Wild's force in
the Khyber mas maoonced.
A letter from Shah S h o o j d ~was
received asking Capt. Mncgregor mlmt
11isintentions were, ~~otlling
1nore.b
I t rnn tluns : ' Your peoplo have
r 2
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nlembcr if thcro wns nnything
G. B.
elsc.
Nothing of importance.

R.H.
= In this, or in the one lnid
before tho seoond council of
war, he intirunted that if ~ v c
only supplicd him with money,
he did not mnnt our troops, but
would hold tho country-for US.
G. B.
A11 Shnli Shoojn's privntc
letters spoke much of money,
and of his not requiring our
troops, but especially thnt lnicl
befoi.o the second council.

.H. H.

We 11nd previously had
nll the pnpcrs said to benr on
tho qucstion rccd to us and
Inid on the ttrblc ; but this was
kept buck. 11 lind been received before Brplon cnnle in.
G. B.

CH. 1x1

concluded n treaty with u s ; you a r e
still in Jelldabad; what are your intentions? tell us quickly.' A private
letter from the Eing was full of professions of hiendu11ip.c
The conncil of mar mas called, a n d
assembled at Gen. Sale's qumters.
The General said he had cdled us
to consult on a matter on which Capt.
hIacgregor and himself mere agreed,
and which Capt. RI. would explain.
Capt. Mncgregor then detailecl t h e
circumstmces we were in as h e viewed
them : h e and Sale saying we h a d
nothing to hope from Government.
Capt. &IIacgregor,moreover, said that,
though he yeserved his right to clo a s
he pleased, he was milling to hear our
opinion as to offers h e had from Mahomed Alrbar (now in Lughman), t o
treat for the evacuation of the country
and restoration of Dost Mahorned.
The excitement in the council of war
was great.
I maintained me had no grounds
to think the Government had abandolled us, though their measures wero
weak. Gen. Sale, iu the heat of ilispute, quoted the terms of the French
letter, and Capt. h l a c g r e g ~ ~cienied
they were so strong. I insisted on i t s
being pro(lucec1, when thoy were found
to Be as Gen. Sale said. The indignation against the Governor-General
(and Government, including the Commander - in - Chief, but chiefly t h e
Governor-General) now went beyold
bounds. I tried to urge that a new
Governor-General was on his way out,
ancl perhaps in India (me did not know
he was coming round the Cape), mllile
tllo Duke of Wellington was now i n

"
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My eyes were so inflnmod
thnt I could not copy it, though
I hnd nll the pnpers for sorno
dnys for thnt purpose. Indeed,
I wns obliged to enlploy C1111ninghnm in thc English doounlents. You of ooorse had tho
originals, but did not Wade got
from your mooftec copies of d l
the Persian lctters, including
our own a s sent to Cnbool?

G. 13.
Copies, I think, were taken
of all or nearly all the Porsian
papers,nnd sttachedwith tmnslations to the proceedings of
thc oooncils. All these pnpers
I had in my possession, and
gnve 1111 to Sir H. Bnle on our
rcturn towards India; I think
i n camp a t Jcl1Jabad.-H. H.

ofico, nnd a feeble mar policy iinpossiblo, but in vain ; and Col. Dennie
and C q t , Abbott took advantage of
tho vehemence of my lang~iage to
damnge my argnrnents with those who
hesitated.
I therefore proposed adjournment,
which was carried. Col. Monteath, as
we went out, espressed his concurrence
in it being om duty to hold out, and
quoted soine not int~ppropriatepoetry,
I shodcl have said that after
detailing the case, Cnpt. Macgregor
and Gen. Snle informed us thnt they
had resolved to yield and negotiate for
n safe retreat. Thoy laid before us ta
letter they wished o m nssent to. I t
was Persian, in reply to Shah Shoojn.
As well as I remember, it was as
follo\vs :
Thi~t we had roceived II.M.'s
letter ; that me hold Jellnlabnd and
the country .only for him ; aria, of
course, if he nsliecl it, we were ready
now to go back to India ; but, after
what had happened, we thought i t
necessary to propose the followi~~g
terms :
Tlmt we forthwith evacuate Jellalabad and tho country.
Tlint me would give four hostages
to show onr sincerity.
That the King mas to send a force
to escort us in safety and honour
to Peshawur ; that is, with our arms,
colours, guus, &c. ; and that this escort
mas to be commanded by one of the
princes, his sons.
That Ihhomed Alrbar mas to be
mithdri~mnfrom Ningmhar before we
quitted Jellalabad.
Thnt hostages were to be given
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us as Ear a s Peshewur, tllore to be erchanged for our hostages m d prisoners
in t h e Afgllans' hands.
Tlmt these hostnges were to be
Sooltan Jan, finid to be n favourite
cousin of 3hhoined lilcbar ; n son of the
hTawa1) Zemnn Khan, Darultzye; a son
of Alneenoola Khan of Logur; with
Not Ghilzie, but Shin- some (Ghilzye, I think) Shdnwaree
wnree, Afreedce,and Nohmnnd, and Khyberee chiefs.
I think.
EL H.
That we wore to be assisted in the
The phrnseology of this
lettcr, in thc original, wns so inntter of supplies ancl carriage.
At night I visited Capt. Hnveloclc
s~ibmissivethnt on rending i t
I could not help throwing i t on tho aflair, and I found that though
from mc, and it fell to the h e thought with me, he disap'prored
ground. I had forgotten this of t h e warmth of my language. Ncxt
till romindedof it by nn Afghan
morning, therefore, I put all I had to
chic£(ljuralcut IChnn's brother),
who heurd it from Capt. Mac- say on paper. Capt. IIaveloclc agreed
gregor's mooftee, who was pre- to every word, nnd during the subsesent occnsionnlly, and wit11 quent meeting occasionally intirnakd
other Afgllnns, nt the door of his adhesion to these views, but he hail
thc room ndjoining (i.0. Capt. no vote, though present as one of the
Mncgregor's room). I mention
General's staff.
it us it mado n grcnt sotsalht
TVlien the conncil met, Col. Dcnnie
among tho Afghans, as I nfternild Capt. Abbott employed on their
wards hesrd.
G. B.
side ridicule, and hints of my judgm e n t being obscured by warmth of
feeling. I obtained a hearing, however, for the paper, and argued every
point, tnlting votes first 0x1 the propriety of treating at all, and then on
some of the details.
At this meeting Col. Monteuth
avoided me and seemed gloomy; ho
s a t near Capt. Ivlacgregoi,, who, in a
long conversation, completely gained
h i m over. I wns now alone, I thought,
a s to votes, but was surprised in the
m a i n point to gct that of Capt. Olclfielcl.
To treat for nsurrcnder on the above
t e r u s (one esceptecl) mas cnrried.
Our giving hostages wns not cerf

f
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6 I do not think it cnnlo
to 1% votc. Col. llennic, I renlembcr, treated the objection
a s if it wore merely from n
spirit of opposition, and tho
general fcoling seerncd ~ t r o n g
t~gninstDIG, save Cnpt. Bnckhouse, who aeeniccl to have but
one fceling, viz. indignation at
our supposed ~bnndomaent.
G . B.

ried, though Cap t. Mncgregor volunteered to go hiinself as onc ; he nnd
Gen. Sale contended caraestly for this
point.
6 I objected to showing fear of
Mallolncd A1tlm.r by asliing for his
removal ; but this was carried agninst
1ue.

I proposed to demand d l our
prisoners beforc going, nild used every
argument 1 could. None spolro at first
in reply ; but at lcngth Gcn. Sale
Their nrgnmonts, I think, ant1 Capt. Mucgregor opposed it, and
wcrc tllat iL ans uselcss to ask aftor a sharp discussiou between us
for Lhem, whore we ought, in three my proposal fell to the ground.
fnct, togivc additional I~ostngos,
I proposed that if tho country mas
nnd that our nslting for Ihen~
mould only ~rcjudicotho present to be evacnated, we should do it as
arrnngemont, which \vould ro- a military operation, deceiving the
store tlicrn to us at Pcsliawur.
enemy as to our intentions and fightG.B.
ing. Against this w-as urged our
having surrende~edour cnltlo, a measure I h d 8 few days before vehe' I dare sny yon remeiiiber mwtly opposcd. I proposed a plan
the plan ; you nut1 I wcre for for still effecting the opemtion; the
a time alonc, nnd wa tnlked of
details were listened to and 110 objeci t several times. Dennie himtion
made till Col. Dennie observed
self becnnie a convert nftor
so~neweolcs, nnd held forth on thcre mns g c l ~ h i s i n the plan, when
after a short discussion nll thoughts
i t after his wont.
G. I
!.
I recollect goncmlly, but of it mero given np.
f

sliould like to bc reminded of
H. II.
nll its details.
Save in the matter of
hostages. You reminded IIIG
of his energy in saying 110
nrould fight, but never be a
hostage.
G. B.

Ct~pt.Olcifielcl took little or no
part in the debates. Cspt. Baclihouse
seemed only to hnve the one feeling
above mentioned.
I objected to certnin Persian
phmses in the letter as abject, and
they mere altered to a certain degree ;
when, the offer of hostages being
omitted, the letter as abovc give11 mas
carried,

'

.
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1 You mny remember old
Dennie's rather startling doctrine ns to Jnilh in w c h ninlters.
G. B.
Quite well,-H. H.

.

Yon inay remcinbcr his
pushing this 80 far Lhnt I
nsked, ' Why then show fear by
risking what we nre not likely
Lo get?' on whicli ha lmchd a

littlo.

G. B.

CH. 111

After all the votes, on my congmtulating thorn on the f i g r e -ive should
make if a relieving force should arrive
just as me were marching out,' Col.
Dennie protested that in such a case
he would not go. I said we wonld
lnnlte him, as faith must bc ltept. This
caused morrimeizt as we broke up.
Gem Snle-or rather Cnpt. Macgregor, for he was the chief spolresmen-arguod that we were abandoned
by the Clovenlment, who would send
nothing save Wild's force, which had
fniled. That we could not hold out
much longer-conld not retreat-and
that the plan now proposed was safe
and honourdde. Capt. Mncgregor so
confidently assuzred us of his belief in
Afghnn good fnith under this treaty,
that few at last seemed to doubt it.
EIe said Sir TV. Mncnaghten had
mismnnoged in not getting hostages,
and that had he done so the Cnbool
force would have been nlive.lll I n fact
ho said the securities now demnilclecl
mere so great he fcared they would
scarcely bo given. As to our prisoners,
they would be got back when we
reached Peshawur. He also said the
treaty being opened gnve us time to
see if Col. Wild made another effort,
and its result. But this last argument
was not pressed, as we were bound by
our ofl'er. Not that we formally ngreed
to this, but no answer was made to rno
when I said so.
On the other hand I nrged :
The improbability of our entire
abandonment by Iho then Govcrnmerit-its still grenter unliltelilloocl
under the new one ; tlnd I relnelnbor
refewiig to Capt. filaolteson's ow11 ex-
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Do yon remember the disc ~ ~ s s i oon
n this point, and old
Dennio's exclamation, which
cnnsed the disonssion to end
in my being cried down? I
spoke of uniting vigour with
moderation. D. cnlled out,
' Oh, ycs, moderation I snclcingt
Rro. Nonc of your modornlion 1
bring the whole oounlry on us I '
referring to one of the mensnres
talked of in discussing Ihe mode
of retreat. And the old n n n
got up and walked about in
ngitntion.
G. B.
Hostages were announcod
in Gen. Sale's orders and roported to Gen. Elphinstone. I
wns blamed for opposing one of
them in n fight at the time.
And nftermnrda met him in
chnrge of Capt. RIncltenzie on
his mission t o Gcn. Pollook,
when he reminded me of [my]
having newly killed hill1 when
he mns a 11osl;nge. These are
my gronnds for still thinking I
was right.
G. B.
I hnd urged that we hnd
only a right t o snve t h e troops
wllen so doing was more useful
to the State than risking their
loss, whioh I denied in onr
case. I denied nlso thst our
service wns n mere compact
with Governmont, which failure

pression regarding the French letter,
as the resdt of the first panio only.
Bnt Cnpt. hlncgregor opposed all this,
and urged in favour of his opinions
his esperienoe about men in high
places.
I denied our holding the place for
Shah Shoojnh ; and our right to give
it up except by order of our Governmen t.
I maintained that me could hold
out even till relieved by Candahar, in
fclct for any time we lilted ; could
colonise if we lilted ; also that we
could retreat.

I denied the value of hostages;
asked what good Capt. i\lacgregor7s
hostages at Tezeen had done us ?
Cnpt. Nncgregor vehemently denied
me had ever received hostnges6 a t
IIlezeen.0 I mentioned several things
to show we had, but as he persisted in
his denial, I said I must have been
under some estmordinary delusion,
and that of course nny argument
fo~udedon it must fidl to the ground.
But I still hcld hostages utterly morthless while the enemy hadour hostages
and prisoners in their hnnds. I asked,
what would they do if attacked? Gen.
Sale said, ' Fight.' I asked, ' Why invite all Afghanistan round you before
fighting?' I n answer to another question the General said he wodd execute
a liostege if we were attacked. I nslred
if he vrould do this i f A e enemy before our hces hanged two ladies for
overy man we put to death.
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in tho lntter to snpport us cnni t wns
ccllcd ; bnt nmint~~iued
n duty to our country which
we could not decline, however
the Govcrn~ncnt(which I ndmitted ?iszinl& represcntecl our
conntry) might Lrent us. I n
frrct the discuasionswore carried
to n depth neither usunl nor
snfc. First principles arc not
to be snfely appronclied oven,
snvu in ' fit compnny thoogh
few.' The notion of n o w lu
c o m t q / , however, rnthcr than
c o m x r i u i l l b 11~1 GoucmorC i o w a l in Cozi?roil,should be
n ~ s d o moro fnn~ilinr to our
ofliccrs and men. In 1111 these
view^ Cn~it.Hnvcloclt csprcssecl
dccidcd concurrence, though
otherwise tnking no share i n
tho dcbnlcs.

This wns the time of OldBcld's outbreak.
G. 13.

9 Gen. Snle, Cnpt. Macgrcgor,
Capt. Havclook, and myself
had before discussed the obodionce duo to a snpcrior officer
no longer n frec ngcnt. I held
nonc was due by those themsclvcs frce; thnt n gcncrul rcduced to capitulate wns not a
frec ugent, nud only cntitlod to
co~nulnndthose in tho snrno
dilemmn with hin~self. The
discussiou nrosc from Gen. Sale
being ordcred by Gen. Elphinstone to surrcndcr Jcllalnbad.

CR. III

Capt. Abbott maintained our right
(being a,bandoncd by the Governmcnt) to look to our own s d e t y only,
and ridiculed what I said to t h e
contrary.
Capt. Abbott sn.id if me did not go,
our hostages in Cabool would bo pit
to death. I replied, that any party
which chose lo kill prisoners could
thcn gain its objects.
As to gaining time, I as1;cd Cnpt.
Ifslcgrcgor if the enemy would deltty
ono llolir his prepiwation~bccanse h a
was negotiating; or if 11c woulcl n o t
rntlier quicken them on learning by
this ofler to capitulate, that our hearts
had f:ded us. HG did not answer,
or rather (I believe) he agreed they
woulil uot delay-in fact the a r g ~ u x e n t
was dropped.
I opposed giving hostages a s clisgracefd. Col. i\.fontentli mid nobody
would go.&' I said I would if ordorecl.
Tlint a,s long as we were a n a r m y I
sl~oiilrlobcy all orders ; but ollco me
capitulated, I slioold cousider myself
free to nct as I pleased a t the first
shot which should violate the capitu1ation.q
Thc letter went to Cabool signed
by Capt. Macgregor. The debates appenring interminable, i t mas ngreecl
that each member who chose sllould
record the reasons of his votes.
I mrotc mine Imowing they woulcl
be read when people were calmer, a n d
I added the 7th as I mas cnrrying t h e
pnper to Capt. Haveloc1~'s offloe, o n
henriug officors at a workiug pilrty
tdlc of Capt. Abbott having spolten of

' ' And well would he linvo nctcd
on the deep resolve of a n heroic mind

had mattcrs come to such u point.'b'irsl A f g l m WLW,p. 398.

%
' tB
.' nv@lOcc'
nlonc sul'l"Jrtcd
m y views ; nntl I run not sure
vrhcther h e did not wid1 them
to be rigllt
tl,nl, feel
vinccd they mcre. He mould, I
imagine, Lave ncted ns I woold,
but IJ~OYCns in nn cslrerno cnse
justifying disobedicnce thnn us
i n one annulling Ihc lender's
aulhority.

I hnd in former times
thoagllt we clullg too closely
t o Jcllalnbad, which when ma
entered i t wns n source of wcnknew rnther thnn strength. We
were less nssailnble outsidc, n11d
might besidce havc bcen butter
employed. But w ~ z othe Crrbool
forcc was gone, and Jellnlubnd
our only hold on Xorthern
Afghanistan. To nbandon it
might have produced a disnstrous impression in India, and
would have grently auglnented
the difliculty of regaining our
credit ae wc did.
* Did not old Dennie write?
Q. B.
Col. Dennie recorded his
rcwons in writing.
H. H.

my being mild &bonk tile strcngtll of
Jelliilabnd, and not I{nowing tho e s t c ~ ~ t
of OW f i x , as i t used to be called.

Col. EuZonteall~ recorded his rcasons; chiefly rclii~nceon the opinion
of Capt. filacgregor, Political Agent of
Jellalubad.
Capt. hbbott recordcd his, ineluding a joltc against the opposite views,
which he said wonld no doubt gnin u s
n considerable s L t m of pofitl~umousreputntion, but our duty W:IS to preserve
the troops, kc. I3e dmclt also on tho
uselessne~s of holding Jcllidnbnd, it
place so weak that Ihglish troops, with
llenvy orhance; would talw it in n few
h o u r s , ~aud, I think, nlentio~~ed
tho risk
to our hostilgos.
nalu not suro whether :tnyone else
recorded his reasons.
Nest day tho dibh was begun, which
greatly raised the men's spirits, depressed by seeing these co~mcilsm o m ble, though ignoraut of what passed.
Cnpt. Bacl&ouse no sooner recovered from his anger ngainst tho
Governor-General, t11m he saw what
he hnd clone.
A few clays after this Lieut. D a m s
of the Artilleq, who lived nt the 35th
N.I. mess, mentioned to me remarky
of 001. llontei~thrnl~ichhe could not
hut 1vhic11 showed me he
\\ras returning to his first views.
I llow jvithout scruple tallied to my

"
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Major B~ocvlfoot'sMel

friends of the co~u~cil
wore dl rendy when
from Cabool. These
terms were acceptecl
once, me must evacuo
Be ready to fight :
aclvantage if faith w
us on the way to Pes'
But if, as me m
ansmer was (lelayecl
clogged with condit
tions, we were free to
The nnswer came
snid : ' Ifrou are sinc
let all the chief gen
With this nlsocamc[~long,
incollercnt, prirntc lettcr from
S h d Sl~oojnhprofessing
~
friendship, nbusing thc Barukzyes,
and saying our misiortuncs
arose from neglecting his advice, &o.

SC~S.'

'

A cou~lcilwas callccl, when Uen.
Sale and Capt. Rfncgregor urged us to
affix our senls to the former letter.
I proposed reconsidering the whole
mat tor, RS their answering our proposal
by a doubt of our sincerity set us free;
and I read a draft of a letter telling the
Shah that as he and the chiefs had
not chosen to answer our proposals
even by a yes or a no, we now referred
them to the Governor-General, whose
orders alone me mould obey.
After hot debates this wes rejected
as violent. An excellent end most
ten~pernteletter proposed by Oapt.
Baclibouse, to tho same effect, was
also rejected.
Gen. Sale used strong language
about cur opposition, nnd high words
followed,but me adjourned, anil mot in
good Ilumour an hour after.
oapt. Abbott and Col; Dennie had
also come to the conclusion that we
~lloulahold out, and the latter, with
Col. Ifonteatll, prepared o, letter which,
though not very clear, was not a con-
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" Or hoping
not come.
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tinuation of the negotiation. This mas
adopted; Gem Sale and Capt. Macgregor alone continuing to think capitulation the best course; the former,
however, resolviug to be guided by the
the day might opinion of thecouncil ; thelatter l1 warnG. B.
ing us the day might yet come when
nre should regret having neglected the
clinnce of such terms as he could now
get for us. The messenger was sent
back to Cabool.
Next day a letter came from PeshaT V U ~telling us every effort monld be
made to relieve us. The ditch was
nearly round the place, and the men in
higher health and spirits tlian they hncl
ever been.
G . B~O&DFOOT.

Thns was the council of war led, at last, to adopt the
more honourable and wiser conrse-to dcfend Jalalabnd at all
hazards-mainly by the exertions and streiigth of character of
George Broadfoot.
The first to support Broaclfoot, lct it be recorded to the
honour of his memory, was Capt. OlclfieId. The next nras Backhouse; then after an interval there followed Dennie, Monteath,
a d Alhott ; and there were left in the minority, blind apparently to the lessons of the Kabul disaster, Sir R. Salo and
Cnpt. Macgregor.
It may readily be imagined that to the majority of the
members of this council of war, all brave and good men, thc
recollection of their having temporarily agreed to support
the proposals laid before them, was anything but agreeable.
Naturally they deeired, especially after the crisis had passed,
to bury the transnctioris in oblivion; and when that was impossible, to persuade themselves that the reasons aclvanced by
&cgregor as Sale's mouthpiece were sufficient to justify the
garrison in acting solely with reference to its own safety.
This was what Broadfoot denied m army or a soldier could
ever clo ~rithontclishononr. ' Safety was to be consultecl, but
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not safety only ; nor ever, except subordinately to the good of
our co~untry.'
On this occasion Broaclfool's warmlh of language, want of
sclf-restraint, and violence, have been unfnvourably criticiserl ;
and thc pnralysing effects of responsibility hnve bccn urgecl i n
excuse of the proposnls l d d before the council.
There can be little cloubt that when Broaclfoot learnt lheir
nature, his expression of coillempt nncl anger mas clear and probably violent. B u t the crisis was one in which mocleration of
lsng~mgeancl cnlniness of utterance might have failed. When
comrades are seen hesitating belween duty ancl clisgrace, ancl
capitulation woulcl hnve involvecl clisgrace nnd probably clestruction, then no language which can arrest them can Be too strong,
and no action too violent. There are liincs ~w~lien
it is w l l to be
angry. And Bromclfoot's anger scrvcd its purpose, for a n ncljonrnment became necessary and a clay's delay mas securecl ;
' and thns,' wrotc Durniicl, ' for a while he obstrnctecl tlie rash
timiclily which threatened lo cleslroy Snle's brigade.'
Vith reference to thc excuso urged, it is suflicient to say
thnl nien liable to Be paralysecl by a sense of responsibilily are
unfit for supreme co~nmnncl.
The council may be saicl to have been finally dissolvcd on
February 12. During the interm1 bctwwwn its first assembling
and fins1 dissolution many cvenls of inlerest to the gnrrison
occnrrecl. Lieut. Maync captured 730 sheep a i d 175 lieacl of
cattle; an important capture, for provisions mere scarce, and
one which enrngcd the encnly ns much ss il raisccl the spirits
of the garrison.
At this time Rroaclfoot's diary is full of references to his
constnnl encleavours, unfortnnatcly without success, to inclnce
Sale to sally forth ancl bring in forage. The follo~~ing
extracts
rcfer to such matters nncl olhers of interest.
A rna.11is snicl to be in with news that Maclteson is at the rno~zt]~
of
tho Rhyber heating vith the chiefs. I hope not true. Therc sho11Id
be no treathg till we have force to compel without delay the acceptallce of the terms most suitable to us.
Pottinger writes to Macgregor that the continuing to treat wit11
the enomy after t h En~oy'smurder n7as against llis will, nnc1 tile

CII. III

FORAGING EXPED1'~IOXS URGED

19

doing of Geu. Elphinstono, urged and supported by Erigadier
Bhelton.
Abdool Glluffoor tdlting agnin of the country people laying their
loss of the cattle to mo-the &fir with the spectnclrs and red
Beard who is here a s Avitabile is at Pcshawnr. This is true, I
believe-our owu Afghans havc trumpeted me a good dcal, ancl I
shall meet no nlercy if 1fidl iato their hailas.-Amen I So be it !
The Genernl much annoyed at the poor fugitives of the Ci~bool
force saying Mahomed llcbus Khan's sowars preventecl refugees gctting in, and that $Id. A. I<.had ordered the destruction of the
Feringees. Tho Gene1.d seems indeed convinced of the frie~iclship
of the Snrdw, i l l least for tho future. . . He thinlra lie and i\hcgregor are getting over liiin by negotiation. I-Ie also is elated by
rnmours of Gen. Polloclt being about to force the pass, and will
scircely listen to plans of defence. Hc hns also positively decli~redagainst bringing in forage kc. from C h a r b ~ g or
l ~ any neighbouring vilh~ge,and said he would nevcr sally by night if we wero
besieged. Haveloclc and I haw becn urging a foray for nmiy
nwclts. At lenst I have, and lately Havelock 11ns enrliestly joined.
We are short of forege, and the neighbonring villages aro open or
fecbly fortified. By going out at 4 LJI. nro should be at say Cliarbag11 by daylight. Tdce 800 infnnlry, all the cavalry, and six guns.
The village is open on 0110 side. Let us bring i n d l a r m , ammunition, and clothing f o l d ; also as much gmin and forago ns our
aa,tLle nnd all the cnttle of the village can carry ; also all that the
hihabitants male and fcmde call c a r q : setting the men loose to
bring i n the rernaii~deras n ranson1 for their females, and if resistancc is made, destroy the villnge. We thus supply to a, certain cstent, perhaps to n great extent, a, pressing w ~ ~ nand
t , repair in s o ~ u e
degrec the error of giving up t h bdli of our cattle to tllc enemy,
while wc should break the coufideucc given them by tlie clisastor
of tile C:lbool force, thus onfeebling beforehand their attnclts on
us, and inspiriting our own inon. Tlie news of such a blow odd
canse hesitation and discourt~gemontamong tlie tribes opposing
Cfell. Pollnck, and probably canse all, from this side of the Xliyber,
to retun1 for the defence of their own homes. Ent the poor
General is tied by the fear of retnliatioiz on tho captives in Laghnian.
I l l e a ~I\Iollteath is tallring now as if 110 repcnted his vote at
tllc collnciI of war. But surely, after voting and leading others to
vote for treating, he does not now inem to refuse to abicla by
the collditions he offcred, if thc enenly accept tliein. I for one will
bc a p i l r l ~to 110 perlicly ; mcl tliougli I opposecl trcnting a t all, yct

.
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nnd the terms being offered by us, I shall give my
for nlding by them, disastrous nnd sl~amefulas I think them,
for to \"elate faith would be worse still.
l\Ionteath brolie down sadly there ; ivhcgregor got hold of him,
and fear is infectious.
Larlcc Nnilr Heera nrrivecl and reported Bygrave alive, and well
treated by a chief named Nizarnoocldeen. He truly says the want
of bzcldoh~ut%asworse than the snow, nild cxclailned to me, 'Ah!
sir, if we had hnd you to lnalre the buudobust you made in the Punjab, we ~houldall have arrived ! '
The indignnticn of our men is deep mil universal, and vengeance
is tllcir only thought. Their confidence in our ultilnatc success,
too, is unshaliou.
Vigorous nud sliilfd measures will yet sct d l right. May Polloclc
well support his present character. He has o noble field before
him, and much is expected of him. He is of an able family too. I
hope to sce h h a peer, the Grst of our service since Clive.
A poor wretch, a servant of poor Major Ewart, reached tho
nearest villnges, and was then cut down and left for dead, but
crawled in.
Shnll we never strike a blow to malie these men respect us ?
bcillg

Dado-bosl: nrrnngcment, plnn, method, or scttlen~cnt.
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Dcfcnce continued-blajor-Gcn.
Pollock-Enrtllqnnke at Jalnlabnd--Arrivnl
in Indin of Lord Ellcnboro~igh-&is corrcspondencc nnd policy-Eis cndeovours to restore confidcncc-Dcfcncc continued, sale'^ ' nftcr ordors 'Skirmish, Nnrcl~24, Brondfoot scvercly wounded-X'ornge pnrties-Extmcts
from Bnc1;house's diary-Action, April 7, described by Backl~ouse-Siege
r a i d : nrrivol of Pollock's force-Governor-Gencrnl's ordcrs, ' That illuatrioas garrisou '-Lord Ellenborough to George Broadfoot-Lcttcr to Nalcolmson, recapitulation of events-Afghan cruelty nnd trcncl~cry-GoveinorGcncml's ordcrs on Pollocli'a arrival-Colin Mackensic's services-Letter to
Mrs. 13nyley- Extracts from other letters.

TIIE events of the siege of Jaldabacl from the time when
defence to extremity nlns choscn in preference to capitulation,
till near thc end of March, will not be recorded in great detail.
There was much similarity between one day's work and that
of another. Forage parties and nrorlcing parties were sent out,
ancl somewhat timidly recalled when threatened by the enemy.
There werc, honrever, a few events which deserve more prominent mention, first of which was the arrival on February 11
of the news of Ihe birth of the Prince of Wnles. I t is curious
to contrast the length of time occupied by the transit of the
news from London, over three months, with that which would
now suffice. Now, such news would Be known in Peshanw on
the same day as in London, nncl three days instead of three
months it would reach JalalnBad.
Tho nest news of importance, received two days later, was
that Major-Gea. Pollock had nrrived in Peshawar to command
the force which was destined for the relief of the garrison.
Pollock was the third officer iiominated for this command ;
the other two had Been Sir Edmund Williams ancl Major-Gen.
Lumley .
Tlre Governor-Genernl cxpressecl his satisfaction vith the
selection of Pollock, and declarc;l his intention to invest
C;
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him with con trolling political authority. BIajor-Gcn. Polloclr
had seen service i n Lake's campaigns at Dig nnd Bhartpnr
(1804-5) ; ill 1824 h c comrnnndecl thc Artillcry with credit in
the firsi Rnrmesc war. H i s repntntion v a s that of a safe and
cnntious officer, who, if not i11 the first rank as a commander,
would not at any rate rcpent thc errors committed by Elpl~instone a1ic1 Shelton. H e ~ v n jsustly crcclitecl with correct lrnonrledge ancl q11wcciotioa of the native soldicr, on whom the
success of his expedition in~zstgreally clepcncl. The orders he
receivecl nwc such a s to limit his operations to the relief nncl
\ ~ ~ i t h c l r , of
z ~ the
~ d garrison from Jxlalabatl. When he rcnohcd
Pe~hnmarhe fonacl nn enormous proportion of Wild's force in
hospitnl, snffering from the most clallgerons ancl infections of
all mnlnclies, clemor,zlisntion. The officcrs too, it is grievons
t o rccorcl, were clisheartenecl mc1 hopeless. The new comrunnrler, with judgment nncl skill cleserving of the 11igl:llcst
praise, snccessf~dlycombntcd Lhis clcplorablc stnte of sfli~irs,
and ovcrcame the
of his forcc Co enter the Khaibar.
In this work 11c was ably nssistecl by C a l k Henry Lawrence,
~ 1 1 0had been sent to Peshawar by Mr. Clerk to facilitate Silrh
co-operation.
ii, mighii have been disnslrous-mas
The nest event-and
the severe eartliqualre, on Febrnary 19, by which ' in one
moment the labours of three months were in a great measure
destroyed.
' No time, however, v a s lost : the shoclis hnd scarcely
ceased, nrhen thc whole garrison mns told off into worliiiig
partics, and before night ' the forLifications were substalitially
repaired. Broadfoot v a s on the vorlts when the cdastrophe
happened ; he turned to a friend beside him, and said, ' Now
is the time for Akbar.' His first thought was of the opporLunity afiordcd to thc enemy.
I-Ia~~eloclr
was sitting beside Salc writing a letter for him:
they hacl just time to oscape from thc housc when it fell in
ruins.
Baclrhouse h a s recorclecl hiu irnl~rcssions: ' For more thnn
a minute the carlll rolled like tllc w a ~ e sof the sea ; \it11
difficultyonc conlcl ltecp his legs on level ground. Most of us
sxpectcd the earth would ope11 and swallow us. I affirm that
I

Oapt. Ci. Broadfoot's rcport.
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this was my om11 and the general expectation ; and more, it
struck me that the end of the world mas at hand. The idea
was of course momentary ; it passcd ; newr shnll I forget it.'
Another imporlant event which occurred a t this time was
the arrival of Lord Ellenborough in Calcutta, ancl the clcpartnre of Lord Aucklancl. The new Governor-Generid nrrivccl
and assu~nedofice on Fchruary 28, 1542, at a crisis till tlicn
uilparallclcd in the history of Tndin. IIis predecessor's policy,
that of tlie Wl~igGovernment which had appointecl him,
one of intervention in Afghanistnn in order to insure greater
safety to British interests in India from exterior aggression.
Errors of aclmiuistration, civil and military, had resultccl in
tlie Kabul disasters ancl the paralysis of British power and
influence thronghoul Afghanistan. At this juncture a Tory
Govcrnmeilt displaced the Whigs, nncl Lord Ellenborougb
mas selcctecl to succeed Lord Aucklancl.
His prcvious career had proved him to be hnrclworlcing, nble,
and conscicntions in the discharge of his d n t i e ~; and as President of the Board of Control, he had acquired some special
knomledge of India. Though a Tory, he was nil arclent and
thorough reformer ; and like others of that class hc thereby
incnrrcd the hostilitj of thc idle snd iucfEicient. I n acldition
to these, the preponderating class of respectnble mediocrity
viewed all Lorcl Ellenborough's measures with suspicion and
dislilrc. They granted him talent, but denied that hc had
principle or stnbilky. Eis more vicious enemies have not
scrupled to charge him mith every possible offence, and to deny
him a single redeeming quality.
One thing clear to any soldier who has had the privilege
of reading his letters on military subjects is, that he had a
grasp of ewry professional detail which woulcl have been
highly creditable to one Eraincd in the army, ancl which in his
case was eslraordinnry. IIis letters lo the Commaiider-inChief and to Major-Generals Pollock ancl Nott contain ample
ericlence of this ; nlhilsl their corrcsponclence with him, tlie
letters addressed to him by the Marquis of Wellcsley and the
Duke of Wellinglon himself, bcnr high testimony bo his military knowledge and capacity.
I t ia not intended, nor woulcl this be the proper plxe, to

" Bnckhouse's dinvy.
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ellherfll]lyinto thc merits sncl demerits of Lord Ellcnborough'fi
ndmhlistmti~~~.
As L% principal actor in the scene, hc musl;
alll)enr often in these pagcs ; facts will be staled as far as they
are Itnonril and relevant, and letters and clespatchcs qnotcd.
TIlc lleducti~~ls
made from them can be tested by the c a p a c i l ~
ancl finowledge of the reader.
I t hild been Lord Aucklnnd's custoin to correspond privately
with allnost every person in India who held an irnporlnnt
llO"tion. Hc thus got separate opinions, mhich, being in a
sense private though entirely on public affairs, mere exprcs~ed
with freedom not nclmissible in official lettcrs. This practice
nras continned by Lord EUenborongh, mho in addition kept up
a voluminous correspondonce mith many slatesmell nnd men
of note in Englancl, and with many foreign diplomatists.
On ilssuming charge of his office, Lord Ellenborough fo~znd
the Government totelly clemordised by the news from Afghanistan. He found letters arriving constantly from the chief
oficers nncter him, Rome recornmencling one course of netion,
others another. Mr. T. C. Robertson urged him to leave Calcutta forthwith, imcl come nearer the scenes of aclion, where
he could see passing events without ' the mists that ever seem
to obscure the vision of those who look nt the affairs of Inclin
through the medium of the CaIcuttn official atmosphere.' His
Lordehip nras also recommencled to bring none in his train,
in situations of influence, who mere in any wny committed to
thc policy 'of which we are now reaping the fruits.' Mr.
Bobertson proposed a simultaneous advance from Xnnclnhar
and Peshamar on I<nbul in order to obliterate the traces of the
rcccnt disaster. Mr. Clerk held the same view and acl~rocntecl
similar measures ; when these had been effected,he considered
that me might mithclmm from Afghanistan mith dignity and
ilndiminished honour.3
Sir Jasper Nicolls, the Commanrlcr-in-Chief, on the other
hand, espresscd a strong opinion against thc reoccupation of
Kabul. These views had to be considered by tho GovernorGeneral, by mhom :L line of policy had to be cleclnrecl and
adopted.
On March 15, after n fortnight's experience and study, a,
brief period considering the issucs involved, the opinions held
Conlmnnder-in-Chielto the Ciovarnment of India, Janonry 24, 18~1.2.
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by the Governor-General in Council as to the memmres to be
pursued in Afgl~anist~u
wcre d e ~ l a r e d . ~
First : ' the possession of Afghanistan, could we recover it,
would be a source of mcnlrness rnther than of strength in resisting the invasion of any army from the west ; and, therefore,
that the gro~uldupon which the policy of the advance of our
troops to that countl.y mainly rested has altogether ceased to
exist.'
Seconcl : the conduct of Shah Shuja mas cloubtful, and not
s~zchas to compel the British Government, done, to maintain
the tripartite treaty.
Tllhcl : that military considerations alone must guide the
course to be taken with the view of relieving our men in Afghanistan, and of re-establishing our military reputation.
Lastly: the falscncss and danger of the position of our
troops in Afghanistan were recopisecl.
I t was pointed out to be erroneous ' to suppose that a forward position in Upper Afghanistan mould hrive the effect of
controlling the Sibbs,' or in Lower Afghanistan the Biluchis
alid Sindians.
Thal which mill redly and mill d o n e control the Silihs, the
Biluchis, and the Sindians, and all other nations beyond and within
the Inrlus, is the Itnowledge that we possess nn army, perfect in its
equipment, possessed of all the means of movement, and so secure
in ils communications mitli the country ti'oin which its supplies arid
its reinforcements are drawn, as to be able at any time to act with
vigour and effect against any enemy.
In war, reputation is nlrength ; but repntation is lost by the
rash exposure of the most gallant troops ~ ~ dcircumstnnces
e r
which
reudcr defeat nzoro probable then victory ; and ti succession of reverses will dishearten any solrliers, and, mosl of all, those whose
conrage and devotion have been mainly the result of their confidence
(;hat they mere always led to certain success.
All unnecessary risk was, therefore, to be avoided ; but the
object of inflicting signal punishment on the Afghans was
deemed suflicient to justify some risk, care being take11 to
insnre success.
The advantages of entering Kabul prior to retiring from

' Ciovernor-Qencral to the Corn.
mnnder-in-Chief, Nuroll 16, 1848.

The policy was d s o nnnounced to
Nott, Pollook, mcl Clerk.
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the country werc recognisecl, as also thc fact that Gen. Pollock, not heing then strong enough lo force and kccp thc
Khnibar ~ r i t l ~ o the
n t first rcserve Lrigaile, conlcl not bc permitted to occapy an ml~w,ncedposition beyond tllc pass. The
despntch is an arlmirnhle one, and 1 ares nothing to be desired,
if the propriety of a policy of n~itllclrnwnlfrom Afglianistm
be concecled. Considering that the Pnnjsb mas independent,
and linble any day to be actively hostilc, it would seem that
the only dternative to mithclrawal mas the conquest of the
Sikhs nncl anncx~tionof their conntry, a measnre absolutely
out of the question at that moment.
The nntive army
then greatly demornlised, and the
reputation of the English as invincible nus lost. Lord Ellenborough's cnrly endeavours were to restore confidence and to
encourcqe the troops. To this task he devoted himself with
characteristic encrgj7.
Necessarily ignorant of t l ~ ct~bilitiesand chnractcr of his
generals in the field, Pollock nncl Nott, he endea,vourecl by
inquiry, by corresponclencc vith them, and by noting their
nctions, to aficertnili how far he might snfcly trust them in the
very rcsponsible positions they occ~~pietl.
h c l now to r e t u n to Jalaslnbad: it does not appear thnt
during the early part of March 1842 the clnties perforruecl by
Ero:dfoot'~Sappers were in any nrnycxceplional ; nevertheless
on the 11th Gen. Snle, enlightened, it may be hoped, as to the
injustice he had clone them h desyatches, issued the following
' :~fterorders : '
The Major-Gcneral, hnving had reason to believe, froin the
nntwe of the inforn~ationgiven to him yesterclny, that the enemy
was attempting to hive i~ mine ~uldersome part of our northern
defences, consiclered it to be expedient to order a sally to be made,
to ascertniu this point, and to destroy my works that might have
been commenced.
1-10 urns fully sntisfied mith the inuilizer in mhioh the detnils
of Lieut.-Col. Dcnnie performed that d~ity.
placed 11nilerthe con~~unnd
It fell to the lot of the detnchi~lcntof the corps of Seppcrs under
Cnpt. Brondfoot to bo thc nlost actively t ~ closely
d
engagecl with
the enemy on this occtlsion ; and those troops, nnder theix commander, fully ~naintnineclthe character for bolducss, n11d stcaclii~ess
under fire, wl~ichthey have fully merited from the colninencernent
of the opcrations of tllis forcc in the pilss of Iihoord Cabool.

Everywhere, niid at nll times, in thc judgment of the MajorGeneral, they havc donc tho duty both of useful sappers ma vnluable lighli infantry soldiers ; and i~everhas their conduct in tlie
lutter capacity been more creditable than this morning.
Tho sl<irmisliersof the detachment of the 35th N.I. and as ~nany
of the 13th as were tlius enlploycd were equally worthy of commendation.
Broaclfoot remarlred on this :
Lieut. Orr, Lieut. Cunningham, a d the two sergeants very
conspicuous. We were much in advance of thc 13th and 35th: mcl
on the force retiring, xere in close action. TIN other two corps
did not wait for us, and we were charged by the cavalry as soon as
tho 13th and 35th disappeared. We repulscd them, and retired
over bad ground follomcd by their whole force, which nre had to
repel. The above officers and non-commissioned officers were most
useful, and showed the greatest coolness and bravery.
Sale's tribute to tho services of the Snppers and of their
commnncler is in its way snfliciently handsome. Por the
benefit of non-military readers, it is proper to explain that
orders of this kind are not fornmded to Government nor mnde
known to the public. Tho injnry, therefore, done to Broadfoot
nnd his corps by omitting to mention their services in despatches, mas R, public injury likely t o affect him in his public
capacity ; the amende here made nrns solely an acliaowledgment
of Sale's error, not a public correction of it.
The skirmishing on March 24 mas on o larger s c d e than
usual ; and a9 on this occasion Erondfoot nrasseverely wo~mded,
and as the references to the snbject i n his letters are brief, the
following description is borrowed from Uackhouse's journd.

...

At
Forage pnrties attacked this morning on the river side.
the west wlall the action between our piuties there and the enemy
in the ravines was closer and warmer. One of the 18th a i d two of
thc Sappers were IdlIed, when they were ordered in.
On seeing our parties retire, the enemy r~lshedin a body of some
hundreds from tlie ravine, nud, ~litdercover of the old bank of the
river, up to the post our troops had just qoitted, and two of them,
sword in hand of course, actually nscended to the top of the bank.
CapL. Broadfoot, who was retiring mith his Sappers into tlie
place, seeing this, rnshed back followed by his men, and regained
his old position, and inln~adiatclyafter ran down the bank, and
with two or three men attacltcd the foremost of tliu enemy hand to
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hmd. He cut one down with his sword, while one of t l few
close to him bnyonetcd mother. Thc whole body of the eile~uy
i~n~nedintely
tnmed, e n mctssc, in uttcr co~lfusion,back to the ravine
from which they had emergcd, while the sapper party pitched in a
fire of musketry from the ella of the west mall, mhicll they hail rcoccupied. llrondfoot now rnn np the bank to d l his men down to
charge the flying enemy with the bayonet; but in the act of doing
so, most unfort~u~ately
received a shot througll the hip.
The Sappers, sliortly nfter, mere ngeill cdled in ; but the enemy
did not attempt a, sccond time to follow them from the ravine.
Capt. Alhott, writing of the same airair, said t h a t on the
enemy annoying our covering party, Capt. Broaclfoot attacked
them, ttncl drove them back with loss. That then t h e y collected
in force, and Broaclfoot retired towards thc old walls, and much
skirmishing followecl. At length, the Sappers being called i n
from t h e walls, the e ~ l e m yrushed vdiantly o n their rear.
Bronclfoot turned with a few men, charged, and killed three
with his own ha11d, driving back thc whole body in confusion.
I-Ie was wounded in t h e hip; one European a n d one sapper
were killcd, and two or three mouudecl.
E i t h e r description ~jhomethat the affair was a gallant one,
and the wonncl reccivecl was severe."
The occurrence is referred to in the following cxtract from
garrison orders of 1\,Iarch 24, 1842 :
2. The Rfajor-General regrets extremely that the severe mound
received this morning by Cnpt. Broadfoot, garrison engineer, mill
deprive him of that officer's valuable services, he hopes but for
fi short time; and at his request, Lieut. On- is appointed to perform
the duties of that ofice.
3. The Blajor-Geuernl mas highly gratified this morning by the
spirited innilner in which a detachment of I-I.M.'s 13th L.1. ~ m d e r
Capt. Fenwick, and of tho flappers and ilIincrs undcr Lieut. Orr,
the whole lcd by Capt. B~ondfoot,drove the enemy in confusion
Sir John Campbell Brown, K.C.B.,
n surgeon who joined Sale's brigade

\vith Capt. H. I?. Durn from Gandumak,
was stnndingon the ~ s lwatching
l
the
skirmish. He soddenly noticed Brondfoot, snpported by two men, making
his way towards the gates, nnd sent
out a doolee for him. When brought
in ha was vory pale, and his f l ~ c ewas

Bathed with perspiration. His sword,
covered with the blood and brnins of
nn ndversrry, was still in his hand.
The doctor loolted into the doolee, expecting to bc told nbont the wonnd ;
but Brondfool'sfirst words mere, 'Well,
Brown, I lind no iden n, man's head
was so soft ' I
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a i d with loss from n work nttaclled to the north-western wall,
whicl~they had temporarily lalren possession of upon our working
and foraging parties rehiring.
On this Bronclfoot relxnrkecl :
Lieut. Orr very forward on this occasion. His party immediately supported me, and \V:M hotly engaged.
This causcd for a day or two n little more respect on t h e part
of the enemy for our foragers and working p l i e s . B n t soon
the old arrangelnent prevailccl : a dozen or so of Alrbnr Khnn's
men drove in our people ; or, to be more correct, our pcople were
recnllecl on tho appenrnnce of this formidnble body, and scarcity
of fomgt: a s n natnrnl consccjnence followed.
Sale gravely cliscnsscd how many seers%of grass a n d of grain
nrere required to lcccp l ~ o r ~nncl
e s ponies in henlth. H e asserted
that grass cut one clay was hay three days nftornwds, a d Lhat
10 lbs. of it were enough for a horse. Hc preferred nseless argumcnt of this kind to the psnctical measure of sending ont a party
soficiently strong to protect thc grass cutters and foragers. It
is n~elnncholyto contcmplstc. Btrl it hns a hnmorotrs side also :
witness the following clescription by Backlronso :
These forage pnrties are quite fwcicnl ; theynre either so posted
as to nffoorcl no protection to the grass cuttors, or the grass cutlcrs
inwrinbly stray beyond their protection. Then down coine a few
of tho enenly : in run the g n s s cntters, and the General immeiliately
orcters the forage parties to r l u in also, no matter what their
strength lnny be : and so our troops are, daily, drilled to run before
a twentieth part of their own numbers ! . Thc enemy, after bentiiig our troops in, then go home to chan' about it ; snclshortly after,
~ t f o ~ n g opwties at all,
out again go the grass cntters, w i t h o ~ any
except perhaps half a dozen dismounted troopers, and cut a good
day's supply.
The enemy, having gt~inedono victory hi the morning over our
troops, do not trorlble themselves about the p a s s cntters a second
time, but mcrcly send a few footmen to fire long shots at the unfort~uatesquatters; a i d there they now sit, some hundreds, in tho
marshy gro~undopposite bc,river gate, while ten or twelve of the
ellemy are every minute se~~cling
a shot amongst them from a distance of about 400 or 600 yards. But blacky movos not : theso
Hindustanis are capital sitters under any circumstances.
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~t should, perliap, bc cspltlinecl for the benefit of the
mliuitiatcd, that our black fellow-subjects hl lhe East gene(lo e v c q . t l ~ i ~in~ ng way precisely contmry to that which
obtains *I tthis country. They usudly write from riglit lo left,
we from left to right ; in spenlting of parcnts thcy say mothcr
and f&tlicr,a e say father and mother ; as a mark of respecl
t11cy uncovcr tllc feet, me uncowr thc hencl ; when a t work,
cutt*1g grass for example, they sit clown, or squat, in a, manner to ns unattainable, while in this country the mower or
reaper stands.
Just before the end of the month, Bnclrhouse from the d l a
Hiim one of his guns, which had fallen into the enemy's hands in
the Iinbul disaster, paraded by them with pomp and circumstance, and ans not allowed to go out and retake it. Full of incliguntion hc went to his tent, ' after mitncssing about as cIisgrncefnl a sight as it has been, hitherto, my lot as a British
oaicer to bchold.'
A large number of Alrbids pcople wcre on their way to the
Iihdbiir, and one ' of my former guns (which nras lost with the
K i d d force) has just becn drawn past this place, within threcquarters of a mile, and abont 200 of the enemy's horse nnd
foot, who w r e scattered nbont, its oldy protection. 111less Lhnn
t n ~ n t miilntes
y
the gun might have been in this fort. . . The
Ckneral is worse than I haw hitherto called him.' And the
proceeded to supply the omission. Nothing could persuade the General to sally oul.
' I much fear that there are a good Inany other officers,
besides the General, who vish to have as liltle to say to the
enemy as possible ; amongst them Lieut-Col. Montedh, C.B.,
nppenrs to be very rune11 against nnylhi~iglike a n active
dcfence. . . .' He added that he was glad to be able to say
thnt Col. Dennie was nonl ' quite on the other tack.'
It will be seen how completely Backhouse had recovered
from the state he was in at the first conncil, when he voted
against Broadfoot. Even vhen Pollock wrote anno~mcingthe
postponement of his izdvance to the relief of Jalalabad, nnd
when suspicion was still in his mind that Government (lid not
intclld to exert its strength to save them, but to procrnstinnle
' in the sure m d cerhin hope thnt t h e must ultimntcly floor
us all, alld that there the ulnttar n ill end,' he co~lnselJed~iigour.
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' We have only to attack Alcbar with vigonr to floor him nncl his
altogether, and it is nndonbtcdly thc General's duty to makc the
altempt now that an opportunity oflerg itself; most officers in
the gnrrison nlSeof this opinion, and Cnpt. Havelocli has said
all Iio could to the Gcizernl in favour of it, but ill vain.'
This want of vigour embolclened tho hfghnns so much, that
t h y actually brought their floclts to gmze within 600 y ~ r d of
s
the malls ; a proceeclinq which at once dcstroyed the forage :end
stimnlnted the appotites of the gnrrison.
At length the Gcneral was pcrsuaded to permit an attempt
to capture the shcep : sncccss rewarded tho enterprise, 481
sheep mere brought in, ' a very pleasing addition to our commissariat resources.'
The Afghms were furious, and Bbbnr
swore he woulcl h a w t11e sheep back; but, as Baclrhome snicl,
he must look sharp about it, ;ls ' the flock is going the WRY of
all flcsli pretty fast.'
It is worthy of record, and by 110 means the sole instance
of similar conilnct on the part of our native troops, that the
35th N.I. gave up their share of the slicep, 40 in number, t o
the 13th L.I. because they bclievecl that Europeans required
animal foocl more than thcy clid.
On April 6 and 6 it was reported that Gen. Pollock had
attempted to force the Rhaibar pass, nncl l i d fniledAkbar Khan, on hcnring this, caused a salute to be fired,
which inducccl the officers of the garrison to wait on Geu. Sale
and beg that he would lead them at once against the Afghans.
The General opposed the proposal, and rDjscd many objections ; worcls ran high, and the case seemed hopeless, but nt last
he agced to makc the attcmpt. The success of the enterprise
is well known, and is recorded in a clespntch mhich, thou& not
frec from error, is less misleading than others from the same
sou1'ce.
A few estracts from Baclrhonse's description of the fight will
be fouild of intercst. The force was divided into three colnmns,
the centre under Col. Dennic, the left nnclcr Col. Montenth, and
the riglit, in the absence of Capt. Broadfoot, wounded, under
Capt. Havelock ; the whole being commmcled by Gon. Sale in
person.
Referencc to the sketch of Jalslabad and its environs
' Extrnct from garrison order.

P. 47.

92

CAPTURE OF AICUAR KHAN'S CAMP

CII. IV

mill greatly m i s t t h e reader in following Backhouse's de~cription.
'All got quiclily out and formed iu columils, with sliirn~isl~ers
in advance of enoh column, wlien "forzuauZ" mas the word for
this day. The enemy soon oponed a peppcring fire on tho right
eoltunll as it passed to the right of the " old patched-up fort," which
was the ad~ancedpost of t h e enemy, and occupied by 200 or 300 of
their best men. Havelock kept moving and toolc no notice of this
old fort, the plim being' to go stmight on to the enemy'scamp, a n d
disperse or destroy their horse, their principal strength.
Oen. Sale,Ilowever, who was with the centre column and passing
to the left of the "patelied-up fort,"ongotthg well peppered, ordered
the 19th to carry it, and in the attempt we suffered considerably : in
fact, our whole loss wtls snstaincd hew, nnd, of course, fell principally
on the 13th.'
T h e guns were sent for, Abl~ottand Mncgrcgor battering
one bastion, Backhouse and D a w s another.
Dming the delay occasioned by these proceedings, the right
column hnd got diead, just in advance of 'No. I Port,' and the
euemy's horse had collected and some of them had come down
upon it. Havelock here halted, formed square, and bent them back.
Thc left column, which was also halted, now became threatened by
the enemy's cavnlry in force, d e n Gen. Sale was persuaded to leave
the old ' patched-up fort' and push on to the main object.

Then were the Afghans driven beforo our t r o o p for some
three miles inlo Alibm's camp, where, though they fined a fern
guns, nothing like a s t a n d was made. As t h e English c a m e
in at; one side, Alibar and his followers bolted o ~ z ta t t h e other.

' Although Gen. Sale did not pursue, the rout of the enemy was
complete, and they dispersed in a11 directions, leaving fonr guns (a11
thoy hod), all their tents, with three standards,' a i d plenty of grain
mil supplies.
It is impossible to say mhatthe strength of the enemy mighthave
been ; but in nll probnbility they mere ncither nlaterially above or
below 2,000 horse a d 1,000 foot. Nor is it possible to say w h i ~ tho
t
enomy suffered in killed, as all those killed at a distame by the guns
were, of course, carried off, onr steady ailvanoe nnd frequent halts
giving Bern ample time. Not above thirty dead mere counted on tho
field, nine of these being inside the " patcl~ed-npfort," where our own
loss in killed must hnve equalled that of the enemy.
' Our ollly regret is the loss of poor old Col. Dennie, of the 13th,

who fell whilo gallantly bringing on the regiments to try nnd get
into the " pntched-up fort." '
Descrilh~gthe fighting nt this fort, Backhonse continnccl :
There must hnvc bcen some strango worli going on here, the
13th putting their mnsltets in through the loopholes, and firing
in, mhile the enemy were in the same manner firing out at them.
The rascals inside pulled one of the 13th illuskets in, and the lHLh
in exchnnge polled one of thcirs out, which proved to bc one of the
late 44th."
The result of this gallt~nt affair mas ttmt the gnrrisou
achieved its immediate rclicf. ilkbar retired, carryiug with
him t h e prisoners from Lughman, and his nrmy mas uowhcre
t o bc seen. Backhonse concluded his description by moralising on the statc of man, the state of military life, and thc
value of' its honoors and rewrds as eseruplified by the fact
t h a t to Sir Ti. Sale, to his Staff, and to his regimenl would fall
tho chief rc~vardsand glory of the defence of Jalalabad.
Polloclr's i'orcc nrrirecl on April 16, unopposed save ctnring
two clays iu the Iihaibar pass. Aftcr great escrtion the Silih
troops had been indnced to CO-opcrah. There are two entrances to the Rhaibar pass, which unite aC Ali Jhsjicl ; t l x
shorter, seven miles long, called the ShAdi Bagitiri route, and
t h e other, fourteen miles long, the J n h ki ronte. l'ollodi
selcctecl the shorler, and the other, with i~ longer exposure to
danger, mas sssigllecl to our allies. With this arrangement
we can have no quarrel; in the general interest of the espedition the hnlder task was assigned to the Silrhs ; but if they
~kicerfilllyiulclerioolr it and performed it gallantly, we might
expect, at lenst, that the thnnlcs of the Gcncral would Be
tendered to them, and that they would 1)c favourably mentiollccl in clespntuhes. Far from it, their services mere as
c o ~ q l e i e l yignored by Pollock ns those of Broadfoot's Sappers
had Been by Sale. Fortunately in both instances the clear
sight of the Goluxnor-General detected the omission, and the
errors mere rectified.
No description of the defence of JalalJml wonld bc coml l l e t ~without the insertion of Lord Ellenborough's notification
which he issued a t once on hearing the glad ticlings of the
Tho 44111 Regiment w s part of the Kabul Force reccutly clcstroyccl.
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victory of April 7. I n it he a+plied t o the garrison the tcrm
illustrious,' which it l m s borne eyer since, and which it well
clcscrvecl. I I e appcdccl successfully Lo the spirit nucl foclings
of t h e t ~ r x ~ and
y , it is n o 1 too much Lo say t h a t tho notificat i o n in question is a model of WhaL such it document shoulcl
bc, writteu in snch c i r c ~ ~ m s t n i ~ c e s .
Sir Willinru C t ~ s c u e n t t, h e military member of Co~ulcil
in Calcutti~,w o t c :
Your Lordship's orders,' of the 21st and 30th April, amouncing
the victory of the illustrious gnrrisoi~of Jnlitlnbad, and their consequent rewards, ' will be peruscd by cwry solclier thron&out India
with foelings oi' pride a ~ gratitndc,
d
and will add more to the real
strongtli of the army than would be effccteil by an augmentation of
10,000 men.'

Sir I-lerbert Edwardes, long afternwcls, reinnrlied on t h e
fine s y ~ n p a t h nncl
y
trail1 of t h e words which revivccl tlic spirit
of the army.
Benarcs: April 21,1842.

The Governor-Generd feels nssured that every subject of t h e
British Governmmt will pernse with the deepcst intorcst and setisfaction the reporl h e now coiumnuicates of the entire defeat of tho
Afglim troops under Mahomed Akbar Khan by the garrison of
Jellalabnd.
That illnstrious garrison, wliich by its constancy in enanring privation, and by its valonr i n action, 11as rtlready obtained for itself
tho synlpathy and respect of every true soldier, h n ~
now, sallying
forth from its n d l s , ni~ilerthe command of its gallant leader,MajorGen. Sir Robert Sale, thorougllly beaten in open fiold an enemy
of more than three times its nunhers, taken the standards of their
boasted cavalry, destroyed their camp, ancl recaptured four guns
which, under circamstmces mllich can never again occur, had during
t h e lnst winter f d e n into their hands.
The Govmor-General cordially congratulates the army upon the
return of victory to its r a ~ l l i ~ .
He is convinced that there, as iu nll formor times, it will be
f o ~ m d ,while, as a t Jellalilbad, the Eiwopean and native troops,
mutually supporting ench other, and evincing eqnal discipliilc and
valonr, are led into action by officem in whom they justly confide.
The Governor-General directs that the substance of tllis noti-&-
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cation, and of Major-Gen. Sir Robert Sale's reports, be carefdly
made linown to all lhe troops, and that a salute of twenty-one guns
be firccl a t evcry principnl station of the army.
Carcful search has been made i n voluminous records, public
and private, for a clue as to what first brought Brondfoot's
services i n Jalalnbad prominentlj to Lord Ellenborougll's
nolice. No trace of any intcrcst having been used has Lcen
found ; a n d since S d e ' s earlier clespatclies, a s h a s been already
stated, omitted t o mention lhese services, his Lo~.dship'searly
rccognition of t h e m must be credited partly to thc insight
into character a n d quick appreciation of talent which he, in
common with olhcr great rulers, possessed t o a n eminent
degree ; a n d partly, in all probability, lo i h c general sympathy
with t h e a r m y which he hnd always evinced.
The first leller the Governor-Geaersl addressed to Broadfoot was o n hearing that he h a d been severely wounded. I t
is a s follows :
Allnlinbnd : April 25, 1842.

8ir,--T: heard with greal regret of the severe wound you sustaiuecl
lately in action i n Jelillabad. I trust that it mill not for any
lcngthencd pcriod prevent your service in the field, where your conduct has h e n so distinguished upon all occasions. I sho~zlclbe glad
to hear from yourself horn you are.
If yon should be capable of nctive s c ~ i c e I, will endcavour to
find some mode of employment for yon where yonr presence will be
useful. If yon should 110, ill prescnt, unable to act in the field, I
will oncleavo~wto find somc enlploynlent for you which mill not
require great bodily action.
I remain, sir, yonr faithful friend nnd servmt,
ELLENDOROUGH.
This letter, it will readily be ncltnowledgecl, is most kind
a n d considerate. I t is, moreover, one which would attach the
officers of thc garrison to Lord Ellenborough a n d his Government ; for they could not fail t o rejoice a t the evident interest
talterl i n one of themselves. To i t Broadfoot replicd :
Jelalabnd : i\Iny 14,1842.

My Lord,-I lind yesterday the lzono~zrof receiving your Lordship's letler of the 26th d t . , and I beg to assure you that I am not
more flattcred by so great and unexpected n distinction as your Lordship's approbation so expressed, t h m I am penetrated by the ltiiiilness of your inquiries aid offers of protection.
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My mound is so nearly Ilealed lhat I hnve alrendy in part resumed
my duties, and have every reason to hope that in a week or ten
days I sliall be fit for active service in the field, ~vhcrcit mill be my
endeavour nud my pride to merit your Lordship's favour better than
I can ~ r e t e u i lto hnve done hitherto.
With reference to fnture employment, my ambition is to scrw
the Government and illy country in llle may yonr Lordship inny conif, in subordinslion to Lhis, I
sider me most likcly to bc useful ; 2~11~1
might express n wish, it mould be to scrvc in tho field till thc end
of the mar, whether with the corps I h i l ~ enow the hononr to coinI h a x kc.
ruand or otllermise.
G. BEOADFOOT.
A

To the Right Honourable Lord Ellenborough.

T h e following letter, n ~ i t t e nwhen snffcring from his mound,
refers in some mcasure to evcnts already clescribed. Allusion,
it will be obscrved, is made to corresponderrc~with Colin
Naclreiizie, t h e n a,prisoner at Badialmd. On April 26, Altbar
Khan sent him to Jalalnbail on parole lo negotiate for t h e release nf the prisoners. I-Ie returned, unsuccessful, on t h e 29th.
Jclalnbacl : April 17, 1643.

My dear i\lalcol~nson,-Pesterdny gel^. Polloclr's force arrived,
and for the first time for several months me received letters, all
fornlcr cornim~nicatioi~s
having been confined to a scrnp of paper
(on public business) small enough to be concealecl in it quill, and
this only two or three times amonth. We had four months' English
news to receive. From you I received your notes of Jmuary
15 nnd 27, and your letter of the 17th ; and ain merely able to certify
under my on7n hnnd that I am dive, and would have been well bnt
for a wound received on the 24th ultimo, which is getting better,
but still lays me up.
The papers will probably give you morc or less accurate sccolunts
of our doings here. At present I camlot; and perhaps by the
time I have strength enough, the talc mill be too old to tell. Tllere
has been some secret history, which will now probably ilever be
known, but which mill mlieil me w e t 1dare say interest you, for me
have been in circnlnstnllces rare in British armies, or even i n modern
mar, and such as could not fail to try men severely.
Briefly, our history is that our defensive worlts mere far arivanced ;
me mere, in fact, secure against such enemies by the middle of
Fehunry. Then came Mnho~nedAcbar Khan, who, speoclily findillg
there mas little hope of carrying the place by arms, proceeded to
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blocbedo un. On Februnry 19 nn cartl~qualxdnmngcil our dcfcnces
wry. seriously, and allnost destroyed tlie towvn. Great Inbolu 011
the part of the troops soon set matters right. About the cnrl of
the month tho enemy coinn~encerln system of d m o s t dnily attncltg
on our foragers and working parlies, and on tho fort itself; cacll
contest of course had its own little history, now hardly worth recording ; nt all eveuts, 5 an1 too wenk.
On Nhrch 24 they attaclted with niorc t l ~ n nordinery boldness ;
bnt a sortie, commailded by your lilmblo servant, overthro~vthpm
in a lnnnner tliat prevcnteil tliem over returning. They s y , till
then, the more snngnine hoped to tnltc the plnce, but after that ill1
despaired ; but I got ti bullet iulo my body for m y pains.
After scvernl days of rest me toolr tlic offcnsivc by going nlld
driving i n a flock of their sheep, dispersing nnd Idling the guards,
who fled, Nothing tlle~ioccnrreil till the 7thl when the enemy's
crimp was nttncltcd, nnd he fled, leaving g m s , tents, and 811 in our
Iianrls.
They henrd of Polloclr's s u c c ~ s sin the Khyber, Iliougli to us it
was reported our troops were defeated. P;Iahomecl Acbar fled early, '
end carriccl off tlie prisoners nnd hostages fiorn Lughmnn.
T h e country is in terror of 11s. i\.Iallo~nedAcbar's prescnt abode
nnil intentions arc not very well known.
Tho Slinh is murdered, nnd all in confusion a t Cnbool, l3uI I nlnst
stop. I meant to inclose a lettcr home, but tliis will be too carly
for t h e mail, nnd I a111 mlich euheusted, you may ensily believe.
A p d 20.-After seven months mithont phy, nzy poor fcllow~~s
are
in rags, arid their mnuy wants, now we are relieved, have occupied
me to exhaustion, nnd so much so that I could not finish this tillnow.
It is n o l certainly known where tho poor prisoners mere cnrried
after the defest of the enemy on thc 7th. Negotintions were in pisop e s s (not very hopeful) for tlicir relense, but no intercourse has laltcn
pluce since Acbar's flight.
I send you a copy of poorColin's lnst lettcr to me. I never had
but one bcfore, though tkc other prisoners wrote oftcn; bul they and
wc mere obliged lo be rcry cnntious, as'nll letters wore sent open and
transhted to Mahomed Acbai,, by a Dellii College student with him.
A letter scnt secretly by Pottinger reached tliis, but the circ~iinstnnce
mns discovered (by our despntclics b e i ~ ~iiztcrceptod),
g
and caused
severeusagciu~clthreels to the poo~*prisonors,I v r o t e very oautiously,
and spolte vcry respectfully of i\Ialiomeil Acbnr ; but they toolr i t into
their heads I wns an obstacle to tlic attainment of their wislies; rind,
yon will see by Colin's lelter, interdicted for a timo correspo~ldence
with me.
Colin AIacI~cnzio.
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Tl7e 11avebeen qnite slioclced, i11 getting newspapers, a t tZlc conduct
of persons in Peslin\vnr, or the provinces, writing to the p%pipers
fn,b~.icntioiislllnt must have caused grcnt misery to the suffering
rclntives of those who 11n~vefallen. Peoplc ltno\nl hcre to be ]tilled
axe said to bc alive; nlid Dr. Brydon or a Jelalabnd leltcr coolly
quotedns aulhority. A l u ~! there is little reason to loolc for a, single
IZuropean except those Irnown to be in Cabool, and lntely in
Lugbinan. Poor Brydon too, -nrliosccollectediless in trying circumstances, mil whose cnution alld accurncy of memory, areyemarlrable,is
mndc to father every sort of contradiction. H e is recovered of his
wouncls, and rnaldlecl this morning with a detachment to the Khyber.
The affnir of the 7th was a very brilliant one : errors there were,
but these will always occur. I was of course not there, beinfi tllen
in the enrly stage of the wound ; but my place was sdmirablffillod
by a better man, Hnveloolc, who commanded my column. I hope it
will be the means of getting him his promotion.
Geu. Polloclt'e difficulties have been great, from the previoils
failurcs nnd the depression among the troops. I t lias filled m e with
s l i m e to hear of the way officers tdlied there ; and I fear this mlmanly, nay ilisgeceful, state of things is not yet at an end ; but this
has existed in every a,rlny even under able leaders. I t ruined Sir
John Moore, a.nd Wellington's correspondence shows how he h a to
contend ngau~stit. Mismnmagement and feeble com~nandersalways
produce it. Vigour and success remove it.
Pollock's nttnclc on the Afreedees seems to have been judicious
and well esecuted. At Daltha tliere was a little mismanagement,
but, I believe, 7 l o t his.
I am bedridden, a d hardly ltnom what is going on. There are
dificulties regarding snpplies, and a hesitation appnrent, that mnlte
m e fear a little tho want of previous preparation and forethooght,
ns well as of a fixed plan, without which no military enterprise call
prosper.
TVhot are d l the p a p e a raving about Acbar's humanity and innocence ? Tho Afghans and Acbar are no worse than other nntionsin
the same stnto of civilisation ; but ferocious cruelty ai-~cltre~cliery
a r e universal nmong them. Acid to this the B4sllomedan religion
and I h e fanatical excitelnent lately raised, and yon will wonder at
nothing. Why, what I have seen with my own eyes, and whnt I
IZIIOIY to have occnrreci, mould makc quiet pcople's blood rnn cold.
I ltnom that Macnagl~ten'smurder wns consiclerecl by hiahomocl
Aclm's n e a ~ w relations
t
(to OIN of whom I may, when well a d at
loiswe, or mhen mo mcct, introduce youj as a clever and legitimate
strntngern. Hnii poor Mncnaghten been in any degree acquainted
with mankind, hacl hc cven known what Afgliai~sare, hc would no
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nlore lmvc gone out ns he did, than he would have shot himself.
Why, the old grey-bearded men camc out mith oaths and protestations
of pity, and will1 bread in their l ~ ~ ~ n to
r l sn, poor fugitive oficer nenr
this, to th+ow him OR' his guard, and having succeeded in doing so,
mith a lcnife ripped up his belly as he mas patting the man on his
shoulder. Now this they loolc upon as an act of piety nnd clevcrness. ' Yon do not Itnow how to make war,' said a Barukxye chief to
1170. ' YOU take a place, and spare tlie people : nay, give rcwsrds
to your enemies (too true of Macnaghten), when you should invite
the h ~ i to
d meet
~
you, and seize and Itill them, and then take the
place-kill every man m a o l d woman, have the women ravished, and
the boys and girls given to the troops. Then all the neighbouring
places are nfrnid, and submit. That was how Dost bhhomed conquered the Iiohistan ; but he was a wise man till the Iiuzzilbashes
ruined him' I This mns a very superior man, and a very near relation of the Dost ; n first consin, son of Pnteh Khan's elder brother,
by tho same mother, a very different relationship here from brotherhood only by the father.
But I must stop; my strength fails, and the inflammation of the
eycs throatens to rcturn.
I I~nveonly lind one interview with Gel?. Polloclc ; he mas kind
an11frnnk. My impressioil was, that hc is much sbove anything
nro havc yet soon in this country. What hc has done 11ns been mell
dono, though difficnlt ; but it still remni~wto bo seen whether lie is
quite equal to the very arduous Lnslc before him. I trust n~idhope
he is; awl if so, and if Goven~vrentdo their duty, all will be well.
Yo11 ~ncntiona note inclosed in yours from your chief secretary ;
but it cnnw not. I hsvo heard of him.
You will observe the religious tone of Colin's letter.2 I t is not
nlore so than his letters ma conversation on all occasions. Ho llns
bocn veryreligious for several years, and ever since his wife's death.
Write to yours ever aifectionutely,
G. BRO~~DFOOT.
trust all yours are mell at home.
Tllc nround is low in the right side, through the top of tlie hip
bone into the abdomon ; ball cut out between navel nnd g o i n ; a
very narrow escape. Rend my news on at once to Gen. Cullen,
a d say to-nlorrom I begin, but it may take lno days to finish,
letters both to him and Lord Elphinstone. From the latter I have
a most kind letter. The unfortunate General, his relation, will
now be made the scapegoat of all. His error (1)eiag bedridden)
was not resigning the command in name as well as in ~eality.
Thc IcUcr is not rcproducod for want 01 spnce.
11

2

100

ORDERS ON POLLOCK'S ARRIVAL

cu.

IV

Too weak to copy Colin's note : to-morrow you shall have both
G. 13.
that ancl his former one. Yours ever,
You say many about you were intorested for me. Thnnlc all
most Iciucily. I know not how it is, I feel every lrindnoss still most
and yet seem to myself, since ll'illiam's cleath, utterly
seared and burnt np in the heart. The fi~turois joyless.
Broailfoot's letlers a t this time are naturally full of refcrcnccs to the prisoners. I n one to Mr. Loch, after mentioning
tllat two lollrhs of r q e e s had bcen offcrecl, and three lalihs
~ given if necessary for their release, he
(30,0001.) W O U I bo
remarked : ' A little more vigonr in our military arrangements would secnrc their release better than treating with
such men.' This view was shared by Lord Ellenborough,
who has been, it is believed unjustly, accused of inclifforence
to their fate.
Brodfoot never omitted a fair opportunity of recorcling
his appreciation of the services of his subalterns ; in the letter
just cited, he wrote :
Young Orr is my adjutant, and a most gallant and intelligent
soldier. Another officer vith me is a son of Allan Cunninghain the
poet ; and two braver or more promisii~goficers are not in the service. If I lost them, this force, large as it is, conla not roplacc
them (excepting one young officer, Lieut. Mayne, of the Qnartermaster-General's Department).
On hearing of Pollock's arrival at Jalalnbacl, Lord Ellenborough published a general order announcing the fact, and
directing the issue of a medal to the garrison. The following
extracts have special interest as showing his clear perception
of t h e nature and value of Pollock'e services, ancl of those.
rendered by the garrison.
AlInhnbnd : April 30,1842.

The Governor-General has recoivcd a report from Major-Gon.
Pollock, C.C., dated the 1Gth instant, announcing liis arrival at
Jelldabad.
The Major-Gei~erdhas thus carried into offect the orders of tho
Government in a manner whioh entitles him to the highest approbation.
Receiving the co~n~nand
of the m n y at Poshawur nnder circumstances of peculiar dilKculty, Iic has, in tlic midst of now and unfore-
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seen clnbarrassments and disappointments, preserved a firm mind,
and, justly relying upon his own jndgrnent,l~ehas at last, witl~equal
discretion and decision, accomplished the object he mas directed to
effect.
The Governor-General requesls Major-Gen. Pollock to accept
his acltnowledgments of tlie good service he has thus rendered
to the Government of India, and begs lie will communicate to tlie
gallant ollicers and lroops under his command t l ~ eentire satisfaotion with n d ~ i c thcir
l ~ coilduct has been regarded on this occasion.
Tho Governor-General has already, in communicating the ilespatcll from Major-Gen. Sir Robert Sale, R.C.B., dated the 7th
instant, expressed his high sense of the services of that officer, and
of the garrison of Jellnlabad, tcrminating on that day by a decisivo
victory, whicll would have left nothing to desire had Col. Dennio
survived to enjoy it.
The garrison of Jellalabad having on that day acl~ievedits safety
by its own prowess, and being now reunited to the army by the
movements of tlie force ~ n i l e r the command of Major-Gen.
Polloclt, C.B., it remains only for the Govcmor-General to testify
his opinion of the just claims of that g a r r i s ~ nto tbo gratitude of
tlic Government and of their country.
The Governor-General, talting into . consideratiou the many
great privations to which the troops composing the garrison of
Jellalnbad weFe exposed during the blocltaile of that place, r~ndthc
noblc fortitnde with which all soch privations wore borne, as well
as the various losses the troops sustained, is pleased to direct that
a donation of six months' b a t h be made to all the oficers, noncoir~missioneil ofhers, and privates, European and i~ative,who.
conlposed tlie garrison of Jellalabad on April 7, 1842.
One or two opinions of distinguished soldiers on Lord
EllenLorough's notifications and general orders hxvc alrcndy
been quoCcd : the impression they made o n Brondfool may 11,c
gnlhered fvom Che following estrrwt f ~ o ma lotter dated
May 16, 1842, to Dr. 11alcolmson :

I

Have you seen Lord Ellenborough's order ? I t s effect has been
extraordinary. When such is seep to be the head, the miserable
grumblings we have llad will quicltly cease. There is great discriininntion in praising Pollock. This is of the Wellesley school, a d mill
soon raise the tone of the troops to that of the great Marquis's
tiurn.
IIc llas evcn addressed lo IIN :L most handsome a d lrind Icttcr,
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which, even not deserving, I confess I felt vain of. I send you a
copy, which pass on to Gen. Cullen and home.
Broadfoot next rcferred to Colin Maclcenaie's fruitless mis-

ion o n behalf of t h e prisoners, aid to his having rcturneil to
n captivity which then seemed l~opeless,though some of his

[riclids urged thnt circumstances which had occurred had rclei~seclhim from his parole. ' Poor Colin-most noble Colinthe nloclern Regulus as Havelock truly ~ t y l c shim, has becn in
again on his fruitless mission. Heroism such a s his may gild
even defeats such as ours.'
Of Gen. Elphinstone in the same letter Broadfoot wrote
that he was a high-minded, generous, and most unfortunate
man. H e did not surrender to t h e Afgllmls, ' but was entrapped and detained in spite of repeated demnnds to be sent;
back t h a t h e might perish with his men. 136 was reduced to
m e n t d and bodily imbecility by disense, but never ceased to
be a brave and high-spirited soldier.'
I n n letter to Mrs. Bayley, dated Ihjl 3, 1842, in which
the good service perfornled by Colin Macbenzie a t Iiabnl is
detniled, it is mentioned t h a t when Sir TV. Rhcnagliten was
murdered, Maclrenzie and George Lltnlrence
were savagely attacked by the multitude, and Colin's life saved only
by [the] extraordinary exertions of a chief (Moyunoodeun Khnn), who
literally ridred his own life to savehim. This chief has all along been
011~of the most active and boldest of our enemies both at Cabool
and here ; but between him and Colin there is a strict allia~lee.
Oddly enongh, there is every reason to believe it was this very men
who womded me. H e intimated as much to Colin, and gevo so
nlinute tm account of tbe transaction that he must Ilave beell present. I-Io performed the feat with a double-barrelled gun, the
plunder of some unfortunate officer. For his cnrc of Colin, however,
I have sent him word tlint if ever he falls into the hands of thc
' Bfaclc If(tfirs,' as my men are called, to seek me out, and heshall bo
saved. .
As for me, I am pretty generallylmomn; and, among other dosignations, rejoice in the title Tor kaloe Foringoo, nild Feriyoe Siyn7~
posh, which in Push too and Persinn signify ' black-coated Feringce : '
this, from a, velvet shooting jacket of Colin's which I bor~ozoedin
Cnbool, and, having worn eight months, shall never return.
Regarding Colin thore are nmny coi~jectures: that he is 111~
brother is certain, but then his being Sir TV. i\lacilngIltci~'sson is
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pnazling, seeing that I have no claim to that honour. T h e graver
slialte their heads a t it, as confirming some strange stories of tlie
domestic manners of tlie Ihfirs, and doubtless conclude our expuleion
indispensable to the preservation of Afghun morality from corruption
by such esamples, a s there is little hope of our looliing up our ladies
as me ought.

>

Broadfoot's n e x t letter to the same lady is quoted in full :
Jelnlnbnd : May 20, 1842.
My dear Mrs. Bayley,-Last i~iglitI had the very great pleasuro
of receiving your letler of the 29th of April, and though this is our
latest day for the overland mail and I have not yet written home,
I cannot defer at least thanlring you for your kind remembrance of
me. Would that it had arrived but a few days earlier ! for then poor
Colin mould have shared my pleasurc ; bnt he, alas ! is once more
anlong tho Afghans, whom, however, barbarous as t h y are, his
hcroism and virtue have filled with admiration. I h a m just been
visited by solno leadiilg me11 of tlie tribes westward of this valley,
who spolte of his self-devotion us to tliern incomprehensible, for,'
said they, ' h e is not deceived, he is a wise man, and lcno~rshow
Afghans observe trealies; yet he goes bnck, when he hns it in 111s
power to remain i n safety.' When Colin was last I~ere,we heard of
Mahomed Ak<bax going to Cabool. Sonle, whose opinions nre of
w i g h t , doubledColin's obligation to return, but lie would not listen
to this. My own opinion was, though Maholned Altbar's renewil~g
hostilities s 1 1 0 ~ how
d little he was sincere, yet tlint, as h e was not
bound to abstain from them, Colin was not h e to r o m \ i n ; but
I did think him entitled to remain till it was Ii110wn whether t h e .
escite~nent of this new mar would render his present escort insuficient to protect his passage, and above all to learn whelher the
same cause had produced any popular outrage on the other prisoners.
Colin agreed, but urged but too truly tlint deluy on his part might
provoke these outrages, a i d he therefore departed.
W e have not yet henrd of him, but there has h a ~ d l ybeen tinlo
even if lie go only to Tezeen, though he will most likely h a w to
go t o Cabool. Anxious about hi111 we cannot but be, yet I know
the men with him nre desirous to protect him, ~ n Id believe them
able to do so, for they are relibtions of the principal chief, near relas
tions, and the esteem they perceive Colin enjoys here l ~ n co~~firmeil.
their opinion, already very high, of his value as a ho&fige in their
hands. These men fougl~ta g i ~ i l l ~119t all the way from C'nbool to
Cfundumnlr, and then, returning to Cabool, fought there till thoy
accolnpanied Rlahomed Altbar Lo this place. Tliey wore a good deal
wit11 me, boil~gfond of LaJting Lo us of tiny nihirs wliorc t h y lincl
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cllanced to sce any officer they rcmeinbered, and they one and all
of Colin with unfeigned wonder. I-Iis defence of his fort a i d
cutting his wny after nll to cantonmcnts, whose occupants did noh
dare to go to him, and his brilliant valour to the last, nmle thcm
doubt his being of the same race ns those who, alas I but too ol'ten
showed cliflerently beforc thorn. 'Had he,'snid t h y repeatedly,
beell ruler, the victory would ]lot llave been ours,' for they well
]inow who did, and w11o did not, ndvocate vigorous measures. They
also spoke with reverence of his wisdom ; ' for,' said they, 'lie spealis
ns ltings and wuxeers cannot speak.'
13ut I must not forgct to adz you to put for him a question to
Thoby Prilieep, which, however, I nm not sure anyonc but Lord
Ellenborongh can answer ; nanlely, whether, bccanse of the generid
filure a t Cnbool, all who served tliere will bo excluded from
I~oiiours? Exclnsion is in siich cases very common, and with
rcason, in genoral, becauso disnster is nsunlly owing to mismanngemout, n d i t would not do to reward those who, having brought 011
a public misfortune, display ooarage, or even skill, in meehng it.
'I'his would almost induce men to get into scrapes in order to be
hononred for gutting well through them. But in cl~sesmlicre o m
seL of men cause the misfortune, and otl~ersdiminish its extent, or
its disgrace, bytheir courage or sldl, the latter surely should, and I
bclieve usua.lly do, receive their reward. But Colin Ims, besidcs
the latter morit, n separate claim altogether from the others. 011
November 2 he was not in the cantonments, nor wit11 R~igadierShelton, but in a fort in the city. He was attacked-they were not; with
them 1111was iuclecision, or fccble eftorts llle defeat of which deinoralised the troops-with him n clespernte dcfence (with less Lllen
100 Jezailcllees and tliirty of my Snppem) for two days, and finally
cutting though the enemy n snfe pnssngo, not only for his men, but
for the zoiues and Jamtilies of my ~egimemt,who were left at Cabool,
[ancl 11oveJsince [been] massacred.
Surely such an action ne this will not miss its rcward because
the lii~geforce to which he fought his wny failed in following his
exhmple. There may be delay for inquiry, but I feel certain that,
nntler Lorcl Ellonborongh, Colin will not, in the end, want the
honours h e has so nobly meriled. IIe was with me wllenI received
a most ltind and flattering letlor fromLord Ellenborough, and from
i t first conceived hopcs that he would not be overlooked, and cayried back to his fellow-prisoners the belief, which mill lighten t l ~ c i r
captivity, thnt the new Government is one likely to oxcite tliejr
armies to the elTort nccossnry to their delivora~ice. Unfortunntely
be loft before Lord E.'s order was received, nliicli would havo
prontly doliql~todhim, for none felt more tllui he how bitterly clis-
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couragcmcut of the heads had prepared the Cabool troops to sink
into misfortuna.
You nre, I Iillow, almost angry that I should bore you witli nll
tliis, which, you will perceive, is for Thoby, who ought to be greatly
flnttcreif by having such a clianncl of correspondence. But you
mill forgive m e wlien you remember it is at Colin's request. One
thing inore lie nslred me to say; namely, that had we been able to
advance on Cabool before tlie terror of the enenly liad subsided, we
should, by this time, havc had every prisoner ; but theti tlieir release is now indefinitely postponecl. I will not farther plague you
Ly writiiig at Thoby on tliis suLject ; Lut must my to yourself
inerely that I do much fear we cannot hope for their deliverance now, on any b u t terms not to be thought of, till we have
renewed the enemy's terror by fresh victories ; and t h e I hope
soon to contribute m o ~ zpetit possible to obtain. Easy, wi tli sucli a
force, they will be, and I hope early.
W h a t you tell mo of Lord Ellenborough's ltind views with
regard to m e has greatly surprised me, as I camlot think how lie
could have thought m e worthy of so much. I fear you are hcro not
blameless, and all your most lriiicl circle, witli Thoby ns the organ,
i n raising an opinion of pffizovre mi that I shall find i l hard to
ilisnppoint only moderotcly. Pet I will not say I am not greatly
gratified thereby, a s I was by his letter, for it is most lcind ; and
above all, his lasti order shows not only tlie hearty m~ilerstanding
a n d value of their doiugs that soldiers rejoice nt in their rulers, but
a cliscriminntion (in praising Gen. Pollock, for esnmple) uot of
late years usual. I trust, however, the Governor-General mill not
think of placing m e in any situation Bengal officers look on nx
exclusively their own ; for it would bring on him a s t o r n ~of unpopularity which rather than, ill return for sucli kindness, be the
cause of, I would descend, 'unsung, nnhonourod, to the grave.'
B a t ballring of song, I am all impatience for Mrs. Cameron's lettor,
of which, pray, i n m y name, iinportunstely remind Iier, with her
husbnnd's lines on the late action and Col. Dennie's fall. And I
too, if I rend your lettor aright, a m thought worthy to be at lcast
dlucled to by the Muse. If I be not already the vainest of mcn,
nothing now can lteap me from becoming so, for wllen the t h o ~ g l l t
of m y own unworthiness is about to save me, straigl~twayit is e s pellocl by t h t ~ tmost irresistible nnd subLle poison, delicious poiso11
of t h e soul, praise from beauty's lip or pen, the former being ill
reserve, I trust, till I briug brother Colin to help me to obtain it.
You are right i n guessing I was disappointed i n noL being ablc
to commancl the third column on the 7th, for such would lmve been
m y post, as conmianding a regiment ; but I wns ablc lienrtily to

rejoice that my misfortune brought conspicuously forward ono of the
best officersin the service, Capt. Haveloclr, of the 18Lh, who that day,
to the public advantage, toolr. my place.
Only one of Thoby's letters 11as reached me; tho other, lilre my
history, has gone to enlighten Nahomed Alrbar.
Poor Colin saw Miss Irnpey's death in the paper the evening
before he went, and was innch affected by it. He will be exceedingly
glad to hear what you say of poor Mrs. Mnclrenzie's getting over the
shock, mlieil I can communicate with him, for he expressed much
concern regarding this. Give lny warmest regards to Bayley, to
each of your sisters, and every member of your circle, and believe
me, my dear Mrs. Dayley,
Most sincerely yours,
Q. BROADFOOT.

1 am greatly obliged by your malring Capt. Hillior write, and was
much pleased on hearing from him. I hope he will be pemanently
appointed to Lord Ellenborough's stail',
If Iilo not get an oitrly answer to this, I shall concl~idethe length
of it llns fi.ightoned you, and that you are even too angry therowit11
to scold me ; so write out of compsssion. I t is believed ] m e that
Mahomed Alibnr is in possession of the Uala Hissar at Cabool ; the
nnfortunatc royal family being in his hands, or at least they can be
ao when lie chooses, for the titular ltiug is, in fact, a prisoner. Thoy
wont up from Loodllinna, you perhaps remember, under my chnrge,
ancl found me so gooil a papa that thcy occasioi~allyscnt me messages nfterwards. The last was after I had left Cabool, entreating
me to rotunl, and tdie them back ! They will now be reduced to
starvation.
The following extract refers to the wouild received in the
skirmish of March 24 :

I did intend to send yon a long letter this month ; but want of
strength still compels me to lie down several times a clay, and writing
especially fatigues, so that my ordinary business, or rather the unusual prom of it, after so long being shut out from the world, is inore
than I cmi well accomplish, working too overy moment I can. To
say the truth, too, I expected to have been more nearly recoverecl
than I am; and therefore wrote some long letters I slloulil certainly
havecleferred till after yours, lind I ltnown what was to be. My vouncl
l i d healed where the ball entercd, and was d l but well wlloro it was
cnt out ; but after two clays of uneasiness both wounds yesterday
opoaod again; and to-clay sonle throads kc. were extracted, ancl n
splintcr of bone is coming. I t is now clear tlial Lllore is mucli within
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that lies no business tliere, and that the haste it cannot help nialrillg
to Ileal, is an Rnnoynnce ; for each splinter of bone nnd encll bit of
thread or cloth will reopen it nild till a11 are out, I shall not 1jc
quite well. I n the mean time, as old Gen. Sale tells me, it is as gooil
as R seton to my liver tl~ishot weather, being on tho right side. 111
spite of it, I daily gnin strength; and sliould tliere be anylhing to
do, I shall be in my place.
About this time Lhere appcared in a Madras newsl>nper
mention of Ihc council of war and of the vote for trcating
mill1 t h e enemy with the view to evacuating Jalalabad, ~vllich,
now that t h c success of the defence mas assured, it wns wishetl
to keep sccret. 13roadfoot1s services and opposition to the
vote were mentioaecl. Broaclfoot saw the account, snspecteil
Malcolmson of having furnished it, and nlns displeased. For
Malcolmson wrote to Miss Broadfoot on June 17, 1842 :
As there will now probably be no letter from George for this
steamer, which sails to-morrow, earlicr because of tllc moilsoon, I
slid1 copy his last, except some little mere official details conneeteil
mith business. Poumust not, and I do not suppose you mould, allow
his views to find their may into the pnpers, as he wrote me in very
ill lluinour last month when inclosing the letter to you and to Miss
Suthwland, under the supposition that I had witten a v~enzoirof
thc czploits of ~ O Z L brotl~cr
Y
hi one of the Madras pnpers, which I
have never yct seen nor lieard of except from l~imself, His news I
always sencl on to Gen. Cullen as he directs, and tkc General to Lord
Elphinstone, and of comse part is canght up and finds its may to tho
papers. But they cannot keep it a secret if they mould. You will
see by the papers I send, that George will receivehis honours, and no
doubt more substantial rewards ; for mith all the faults of this Government realmerit is sought out a d made use of for its own sake.

In further explanation of this episode a letter from Dr. Malcolmson t o Gen. Cullen of July 18, 1842, is quotcd.
I received yonr letter in due course, and mas sorry that I had
mentioned the article in the M a d m paper b e f m I got yonr letter.
I suppose it was o w friend Retchen who mentioned what, however,
could not long renlain a secret. He liad written to me some time
beforc and was most mxious to hear of Broadfoot, and I told liini
about the council, not thinking it requisite to be so reserved after
Mr. Clerk had sent me, in a, clemi-official way, n copy of o note by
nroadfoot fourteen days after lie nlust 11sve received it, from which
I infcrrcd that it was no longer a secret.
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I hnvc since h e n ~ dfrom Erondfoot, vesed because he thought I
nrns, nnd npproving of what I had done. Hc seemed to have forgotton what he wrole, which was indeed only a few lincs, sending
on lctters to his sisters. His letter of Jmm 11 mas n~rittenfrom
the fort of a certain Wir Ali Khan, on the side of the river opposite
to thnt on which Jeldabad stands. He says : ' I never seriously
thought you imprudently communicative, but being annoyed, let
out my spleen on t h e most intimate fricnld I have, as 0 rnnn provolted carries home his ill humour to his wife. \Vliat vesed me at
the moment wns, that the letter being ascribed to me, seemed like
boasting on my part, and also that I suspect the council of war
has been burlced. We lind a second council of war afterwards on
Shah Slioojah's reply coming down ; the panic had ceased by that
time among the members, and though athe Gcnerd and Political
Agent merc still for capitulation, even urgently for it, the opposition carried the day and broke it OK The Shsh, by not pronlptly
accepting our first offer to go, gave us an honourable opportunity
of baclting out; I implored them to deliberate o day, but Gen.
Sale was obstinate and bullied ; the Political Agent bsclied him, and
wve had a very stormy meeting. But the capitulation was got rid
of, and the Shah's messenger despatched. Nest day came news of
the Cfovernmei~tand Polloclc being dctcrmined to relievo us, and
great was the constornation of the capitulators.
There had been no dawlcs to report it at the time, and I have a
considerable suspicion the proceedings and my protest, or rathor
reason for vote, mere not sent down in reply to congratulatory letters
on the firnlness evinced i n standing out.
This being the case, any publication of the matter by me would
have made me the object of extreme ill mill, wliich it is clifficult to
avoid if yon do your duty fa,ithfully, impossible if it be lrnowvn you
have chanced to do it when others took a different course. Did I
send you any copies of papers about it ? I had forgotten thc note
to hlnckeson ; I remember I wrote it thinlcing that of course lic
must liiiow it fronz Macgregor.'
The note to n9aclreson here referred to was copiccl by Mr.
Clcrlc and sent t o Dr. Malcolmson, who i n t u n had copies
made and senl t o Miss Broadfoot. Thero are evident discrepancics i n the dates, b u t they are of no c o n q u e n c e .
In forwnrding the copies in a lctter dated Decelnbcr 31,
1842, Dr. Nslcolmson remarlrcd :

I do not tliinlr that I sent you a copy of his Qlote to Cnpt. Mticlic.
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the scenes in which Capt. Broadfoot played a pi,must prevent nny exbensive quotation from these documei~ts.
What l~appenedmay be thus briefly stated. Polloclr was
nuthorised to procurc carriage, and the Goysnlor-Gencrnl
exerted himself to thc utmost to help him. As soon ns Lord
Ellenhorougl~'~
conficleace in Nott was restored, which wns very
soon after thc I<nndahar episode above mentioned, and some
progress had been made in the equipment of Qolloc1~'sforce,
hc gave Nott the option of n~ithclranlinghis division by marching
on linbul, where he mould mcet Pollock, who would then retire
the combined army by -the KhaiLar route. Correctly anticipating Nott's reply, he wrote to Polloclc and intimated hix n~ishes.
It was reported at the time from Randahar, and the rcport
scems to have been repeated in the Life of Sir George Pollock,'
that on a n occasion of receiving ordcrs for withdrawal, Pollock
wrote to Nott advising him to disobey them. Lord Ellenborough noticad the report, but adcled in a letter to Pollock
that he clicl nol belicve it. The General replied, ' It is very
gratifj~ingto mc that you have done me the justice to believe
that I could not advise Gen. Nott to disobey orclers. Any
letLers that I havc written to Gcn. Nott have been conficlcntid ;
but he is a stranger to me, and, if I am correctly int'oormccl,
jenlous of hie commancl ; it is therefore most improbable that
I aonlcl so far have forgotten myself as to have aclvised him to act
contrttry to orders.' To furthcr exculpate himuelf from such s
charge, he sent to the Governor-General copiex of all the letters
he hail written to Nott, and expressed tho hope ' that they will
I)c found to contain nothing which could warrant the construction put npon them.'
The only other step tdten by the Govcmor-General which
ncecl be lnentionecl hcre, was the withdmwnl of power from the
political agents, ancl their subordination to the military commnnclcrs. Lorcl Piizgerald, then President of the Board of
Control, in a, pri\;~teletter remarliecl : ' The Duhe is clelighted
~ ~ r i your
t h hsving withdrawn power from the political agents,
find confidccl it to the military commanclers. IIo attributcx
our latc reverses to the intcrfcrence of civilians, fully as
mu& as to advcrsc clin~ateor professions1 incapacity.'
Rcferri11g to n, recent attempt on thc Queen's life, he said :
P. 2'37,

' I t was in every respect a cllildish affair, but it has naturally
excited unensiness and alnrnl in t h e palace ; I clo not lneali in
tho breast of thc Queen : hers is ,z spirit unconscious of fear
for herself, but shc is haunted with a notion of danger to her
hnsbancl and hcr ohilclrcn.'
During the halt a t Jalaldmcl, Broadfoot wrote ma119 letters
ancl was employed on sevcrnl small expeclitions. A selectioll
from the former and some estracts rcgnrding tho latter may be
pcrmittecl.
The Shah's service mas abolishecl from the clate of Elis
dcafth ; the irnmecliato result being that the officers in it \\rcre
all sucldenly rcdnceil to half pay, whilst; they were still favourcd
with cloublc work a n d clonble expense. Dr. Forsyth, the superintencling surgeon, to whose clevoted service ancl attention both
ol'ficers and men owed much, was in consequence plungecl into
serious dilficulties. Knowing this, Broadfoot wrote to Mr.
Loch, nncl after csplaining the circnmsta~lcesbegged that
c,zdctship might, if possible, be given to Porsyth's son. The
letter, it will bo concecled, is a n aclmirablo one, and its rcsnlt
7\41 hercnftar appear.

'

Jelnlnbnd : June 21, 1842.

RiIy dear Mr. Loch,-I intonded to have written yon at lengtll
011 various topics this month ; but early in June, I was srxclclenly
oraurod with my ow11 corps, a troop of horse, and 200 Native
Inf2~ntry,
to cross tlio river into the district of Besooil, which was
tllreatcned by Azeoz I<Lnn, our first besieger, and Abclool Ghuffoor
I(]lnll, Barukzye, a cousin of the ox-hmcer's, who llas figured on
both sicles in the lato traasactioiis. The river is wide nu1 rapid,
allcl our means of crossing it havo been strangely neglected. It
collseqn~~itly
Look mc throe clays to cross my party.
Tllc ellomy made oft' on our approach, mzcl I was orclerecl to rcto coL1~'cLs~pplics,mil protect the collection and arrivnl of the
ro\;nnIle. Those dulies, nnd that of rcnclcrinji a bod position safe,
g ~ ~ y1
(1:10 pretly I~nrd\vorlc lill three or b u r days bnck, when I was
ortlorotlbncli to occupy Iho groiind 1 d l vacant by a, brigade goi~eto
pcsll Eolillr, ~lnilcrBrigadier Monteath. I t has only, tliorefore, been
to-,lnyI 11nvc boon nblo to write, a i d I hnvo complelcd the abstmct
(,I Liout. J C ~ ~ Clinrri~tivo
I'H
ns inore liltely to interest yo11 tlian anyIlliag u ] ~ o , sociiig Ilow fcw are the \vitnessos loft of lhese trans:LCbiolls.
I ] l i d liopod to liavc ~ t m you
t
nil onllino of onr own opcratioils;
but Lhouo c ~ t dutios
m
throw nlc so much in arrcar wihh my proper
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work that I sho~ildnothave felt quite justified i n writing more t h a n
the narrative just now, had mo not recently been somowhat L L H ~ O nished by lmrning that tlie Shah's servico i s abolished s.et?.ospectivsly ; that is, from the date of tlie Shah's death. I callnot bllt
hope there is some mistnlte ill tliis, ~ n Gen.
d
Pollock, in that hop01
has referred khe casc back to Lord Ellenborough.
This is a heavy inco~~venience
to ns all, who hnd calcuhted our
expeuditnre on the faith of its continuance, a t least till we quitled
Afghanistan; but it has fallen n~ithsuch ruinous soverity on one
of the best and most useful men in the force, tliat it has co~npleletl
the iriclination to do mhat private gratitude a d a sense of duty a3
commanding tho corps had almost before induced mo to do, viz.
to malro Iinown to yon Dr. John Forsyth, our surgeon i n tlie
Sappers, and late superintending surgoon of tlie Shah's force ; and,
though I lmow I huve the very revem of any tltle to use so great
a, frccdom, to recommend to your patronage, provided i t should be
otherwise cliseng&ged, his eldest son, who, if liko his fi~thcr,will
never discredit it.
Dr. Forsyth is an offiber of long standing nnd high charactor,
but of little or no private intovest. A tionso of lhe strength of his
cloinls on public grounds obtai~~ed
him, I~owevcr,&om Lord Auckland's Govel.nmeat the appointment of snpc~intending surgeon
of the Shah's force ; and he mas doing all t h n l an ablo a n d oonscientious man could do to render his own brauch eficient nnd
economical, when tho recent trouLdes brolre out. Moreover ho
acted s s tl rcgimcntal surgeon nlso, thereby saving anothor salary
to Government.
He was not bound to accompany the Snppers on this ca~npnign,
his station being at liendrluarlers; but he volunteered to do 80,
and grcatly has the service tl~erebygained. In times of great despondency, which yon may liereaftor hear psrticulnrs of, t h e Sl~nli's
troops never pi~~:tooIc
of it, and I have alwnys ascribed this, in no
incor~siclerable degree, to the example held o u t by one s o much
respected ns Dr. F o ~ q ~ t lto
l , the young officers, of rr, nlnnly and
gentlemanlilte tone of thought, of cheerful self-devotion arid subgnllantry in tllc fiold.
mission to hnrdsliip, as mcll as cl~ivalroi~s
For in some of our hardest fighls t l ~ cDoctor, wllcn n o other onioer
happened to be new, joined our men in very perilous situations a n d
nnimated tlicir efforts.
Of his great sldl professionally, young Orr andmyself aro gmtoful wilnesscs, for two more dnl-lgerolis wout~dswere never curotl ;
but his skill nnd tenderness with our sick a i d wouricled a r c ndmirable ; and to tliis do I, in no small dogrce, ascribe tho fidelity i ~ l ~ r l
extraordinary escrtions of nou-commissioned officors and moll 01
1
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tllc Shah's force. Thc l ~ e a tand burden of the clay fell on them,
both in combat and in labour, and yet their pay is snmller nna
every advantage less than in the regular service; save in what, in
war, weighs more perhaps than anything else, their medical attcndance. Every man was sure among us, that if l ~ i he
t mould not be
nbnndoned, and that succour was certain, and tender care. I n situatior~sof such peril, on the march, that we were tardily supported
by other troops or not a t all, onr doctor, with liisdoolies and camels
for the wounded, was ilevor wanting; and however sudden the call on
us, t h e first sliot nv~ssure to bring np the doctor nnd his est;zblishment. To lcnow the value of this and the confidence it gives the
men, one must see the troope enjoying it, besideothers less fortunato.
The other (ley when we were across tho river, the sick mere lefl
here ; bnt they dnily deserted the hospital, aud inade their way
across to their own doctor.
I-Ie married early, and Mrs. Forsytli and a large family are now
in England. FIe is the contrary of rich, of course ; and his eldest
son, now seventeen, is a source of both cost and exceeding anxiety
to him, nnd the present rednotion in his pay, I imagine, increases
this anxiety. The youth's predilections are, I Lelievc, for tlie n d i tnry life; but his father has no acquaintance with, I belieye, any
dheclor, or none sufficient to hope for a cadetship.
NOW,though I have ventured to lay before yon his claims on
the service and my own obligations, I am far from the presnmption
of thidting yon ought to pay public debts ; still lees that one already so much in your clebt a s myself, ought reasonably to trouble
you for personal fmonrs. P e t I remembei. you before, giving csrletsl~ipsto young men, merely as Lhe sons of gentlemen made hno~vn
to you by Qen. Cullen, as old and deserviug officers; and I am
sure yon will forgive nly malting so good a man Itnown to you, in
the hope that should you have a cadetship for which you have no
particulnibclaimant in view, yon may be pleased to bestow it on his
son. But for the nece~sityof nsltiug the youth's nanw and address,
I would not have told Dr. Porsytll of my purpose of mriting to yon;
bnt I lmvc told him that m y intercourse with you has been a series
of hvours received by nle, and Lhat I have comeqnently anything
but clitinl~on yon ; so that he must not hope for anything unless
froin your having %: spare appointment, and being so good as to give
i t on the g r o u d of Lhc father's worth.
mine is Mr. Alexander Grigor Porsyth. His mother,
T l ~ youth's
e
Mrs. Porsytll, resided Iatoly in Lirerpool, No. 5 Grove Street, but
may possibly l ~ a v egone to Scotln~d. But a letter for hcr will rcnch if
ncldressed to i\9essrs. Pryce, Grifi ths and Uo., Cilliter Street, London.
Should it he in your power to confcr this great favour on Lliis

I
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family, may I beg you kindly to nolify it to Mrs. Borsytll? to wllolll
it woulil indeed be a grateful surprise, for I have caotiollocl tllc
Doctor not to raise espectntions which such poor advocacy as rnillc
cnanot hope to save from disappointment.
I take the liberty of again inclosing a few lines to Cspt.
Macltcnzia's mother, which YOU will oblige me by forwarding. Sillcc
I wrote it, an ofler to negotiate for the rclense of tlle prisoners llas
been made by &hhommed Shah Khan, in whose p o ~ ~ ~
tl~ey
e r are ;
but the letter hns no date, and is very vugne, i~ltogetllcrwearil,g
the appearance of a acheme to ycnd a confidenti;~lspy hel.~,lnore
than of a, r e d negotiation. 1 have not, therefore, mentio~ledit.
Wit11 best wishes to Miss Loch end the young sailor,
I remain kc.
Ct. 13.

'

The first sentences of this letter refer to an cspedition
across the I<abnl river, organised and comrnmled by Broad foot
whilst his mound mas still open. A piece of cloth was extrnctccl
from it on the da8ybefore he wrote this letter; he was e v c n
then unable to wear e smorcl or lie on the right side, wllich,
with the right leg, had not recovered from the dangerous ~ h o ~ l i .
Yet his cstmordinary energy and ileleriniimtioa euabled hitn
to carry oul his worlc with complete success ; n11d his letters,
in nurnbcr, lengLh, and vigour of expression, sl~omno signs of
a lnssitude which h e surely must occnsio~lnllyh a w fclt.
A few extracts from notes, dated June 4, 1812, about the
Besnd expedition a r e here inserted.
This evening received through Gen. Sale an order from Gen.
Pollock to cross the riwr with the Sappers and l)on~sonlsl~orsc,
Besoorl being threatened by Axeez Khan m d Abdool GhufYoor Khan.
Saw Polloclr at Macgregor's.
Broadfoot recorded that the conduct of the little force, whnt
they were to do, where they were t o go, and wherewithal t h e y
were to be fed, was left to himself.

I represented the state of the country as onc difficult to move
troops in, arid that before I, posted a t the Cabool liver, codd cross
tho rice-cultivated country [deeply watered ond intersected nlith
irrigating c,znuls and s~ntlllwnterconrses], the part near the hills
might be plundered aacl the enenly safely retired. Aloreover, f
montioned that it was a country I could not ventwe to cross
at niglll, seoing that the nnrrow paths could be easily cut througll
and rendcred as bad as the sqwnp on either sidc. I t was also men1 2
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tioned that the cavalry could not act till nre crossed the cultivated
t r ~ c tinto the stony plain rising to the hills. The slcetch shows
roughly the positioll of Besud, the irrignled oulLivntion, the stonjr
$&in, and the hills. The cultivation is a, rich rice plain, now inundated, full of forts rind gar don^.^
We mere to start next morning. Got in tonts and ~mrnluition,
also arms for recruits. Spoke to Mayne about boats.
Broadfoot spent the whole night preparing for the d a r t .
TVhen morning came ho was disappointed, as Mayne hiid only

a boat and n o rafts ready. Consequently the move could not
be made. The Commissariat, a department in which the
? The
following desoription of
Besfid by tho lnte Sir HenryLnwwence
confirms whnt is snid about its cultivetion; the nuthor is informed by
Pol. H. 13luir, B.E.,who served in the
wnr of 1870-80, that cultivation hns
grontly dccrenserl, owing to a longcontinued disturbed state of thnt part
of the country. ' The district of Besud
is n porfect gnrden, for which tho
Greal C;nrdener 1111s provided nnturnl
bnl\\wla of thc strongest kind. North
nnd west ruggod hills, 1,000 feel high,
with one pnss into Kunar nnd another
into Lugllninn. Enst tho Kunnr
river, nnd fioulh that of Kabul, both
vory rapid and for half the year unfordable. The vnlloy is about sis
miles long and lhree broad, irrigated

by cuts in every direction. Not less
then thirty forts nnd villages, nnrl us
mnny gardens. Just now the crops
are rice, with n little tobacco nnd
Indian corn. Wheat, barley &c. nro
groan in the spring crop. The inhabitnnts are ohiefly Arabs ; their
Mnlik is closely connected with 8
Shuje; his [the Mnlik's] great-grnndnunt having been n~nl.ried to Shnh
Ahmud ; \dien he wns I mere follownr
of-Nadir Shah he smv tho pretty lnss
filling her wntorpot by tho river-side.
Tho said lady was tho mother of
Tnimlir Shnh.'
If the Sikhs look the country Lawrence had no doubt thnt tho revenuo
as computed by Rlacgregor might 110
doubled.
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machinery soon rusts if not kept constantly a t work, failed to
send cattle in time.
Much exhausted from being up all night. J$lrote letter to
Gen. polloclc regarding the means of crossing the river, m d givil1g
him a list of the places and their resources which conid be made
available by the evening, i\!ayne, who will make a good officer in the
Qiinrteimnsler-6c~c1,al'sDe~~artment,
tclls me thnt, 011 his telling
Macgregor tho boat conld only make two trips a day, he mas ansmcrecl that ho had Icnown it innlte ten, and carry over the Sappers
ill one clay. This is vory gross ignorance, yct not surprising in a
111:m whoso business does not require him to ltnow about these
matters ; but the 'political system ' 1na1ie.sall depend on I~im,m ~ d
alrcndy d l of us me, I fear, l o o l d on as making clificulties. The
fact is, just now the boat cannot go at all from the high nind.
When t h i ~is more moderate she crosses once, and when calm twice,
a day. This lnst for a few weeks only. By good management in
hauling up and loading, an extra trip a say may be gained.
E ~ e r yday shows more plainly the ill consequences of the
supersession of the Military by the Political Department. Thelatter do the vork imperfectly or erroneously ; they know 110 details.
Thc former, seeing themselves set asidc, ncglcct toleam duties they
aye not to perform, or to acquire the requisite local inforination ;
hence p l u s ou false data, misctwhge, nlld recrimination.
All this is as true now as it was then; Lord E l l d ~ o r o u g h
clicl his best to reform the evil, and for a time with complete
success; bni it is one to which the Indian Government
appears to be peculiarly liablc, and which shoulcl be guercled
against wilh the most jealous care.
Unless the circumstances conilected with a n expedition
are peculiar and unusual, no politi~n~l
oAicer is requised.
There i s n o syccid political (i.e. cliplomatie) :)vork t o be done,
and t h e work in con~~cctiou
with supplies sl~oulclbe ns well, if
llot behter, donc by officers of the Commissariat Department.
w h e r e the special knowledge possessed by a political officer
makes it desirable thnt he should accompany a n army, he
shonlcl be l~laceclill every respect, including his cliplomntic
f ~ ~ n c t i o nullder
s,
the generd commanding, who should pos~ess
completc control.
J t is hardly too much to say, that unless a general can be
so trusted, he is not fit to command an army in the field.
Broaclfoot's dctachnmnt took three drtys to cross the river,
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on rnfts floated by infl,zted skins, and thrce days t o recross.
The inhitbitants of Besucl had fled, but strict discipline brought
nil back ; men, women, and children. Some revenue and
grain mere collectecl.
The next letter, adclreesed to Mrs. Baylcy, but u a i n l y
for the benefit of U r . Prinsep, who had the rep~ztationof
being the ablest member of t h e Governor-Gencrd's Council,
mill repay attentive perusal.
The incapncity of Lord Ancltlancl's Government to face n,
crisifi ~vhichtheir measnrcs had created, to quell n, fitorm
which they had rnisecl, is pointed out; the militnry errors,
such a s collecting soldiers at Peshawar, a t the month of the
dreaded Rhilibar, instead of asseinbling the troops in our own
territory and marching them through Peshawar, and thc disgraceful state of equipment in which Pollock's force mas
sent up, are plainly denounced.
Eegun 2 3 ~ 1written
,
in the intervals of work ; no time to read it
over, being sent for by the General, so you nlust excuse all niistakes.
Jellnlnbnd : J a n e 24, 1812.

My dear Mrs. Bnyley,-Some days ago, while in Bcsood, I llac1
t1lQ pleasure of receiving your letler of the 2Srd of last month as nrcu
ns that of the 17th, forwarding letters to Colin. The day beforo
~esterdnyI wrote to Mrs. Cameron, telIing l l ~ all
r we know of the
prisoners, and no fresh intdigeiice llns since boon received. Whether
i\laliomed 6 h l i Khan's offer to negotiate will load to nnything is
doubtful. An advance to tlle capital is our best chance for liborating the captives. But p c d q s as the river fdls and Laghman
becomes more easily assailable, Mahomed 81iali Khan, whose most
productive estates are there, may be moved by the syinptoms of
vigour shown in the operations of Brigadier Montenth's force, to save
his property by surrendering the prisoners for a heavy ransom. All
this is very hnmilinting.
Hnd Lord Auclilsi~d's Government shown any of the energy to
]lave been looked for in the men who undertook so mighty an enterprise ns to advance onr standarrls (which cnnnot wit11 safety recede)
into Ccntrnl Asia, we shodd long ago have had the prisoners ; the
murderers woi~ldhnvc beon in our hands, or in llopcloss osiIe, nnrl
the conntry in quiet subjection. Thoby: you tell mo, says I coml>Iain
of tho insutlicieiicy of Gen. Pollock's force. Rurely I hnvc not done
so. I have complained, perhaps, of tho wny it mas sent u p ; piecemenl, liable to be beaten in detail ; and from being so long i l e l i ~ y ~ ~ l
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till it was concentr;lted, allowing tho cnelny's fenr to clinllge into
aontempt, aud ~naltiilgour own troops exaggerate the difiiculties
beforc thorn ; and I have probably mentioned the wretched way it
was equipped and provided. Not a, thought seems to have been
bestowed on the nature of the couutry or the probable operations of
the force. Swarms of cavalry are sent up among mountaim, and a
grent force of field artillery ngainst nn enemy wlio can hardly be
said to l ~ a r cany. I (lo not find fault vith this : botliare necessary,
if not carricd to excess ; but why neglect the palpable requisite in
a country of which the inhabitants d dwell inforts, vix. the means of
talting those forts ?
But I must not, bccause yon are kind enough to send me Thoby's
message, inflict on yon a professional diqntation ; not, however,
that Ltsha11 altogether rehain from just ~ t o t i c h qhis other incssages.
E e truly says want of carriage is the great difficulty, but the dificulty is not so grent as me suppose. Carriage exists in abunilnnce
enough to have been procured. There is plenty in the Punjnb ;
abovc all, plenty in this country, provided we had only hnd energy
and forethouglit enough to procure it, fertility enough of resource
to devise substitutes for what is uot procurable, nud Iil~owleclgeand
sldll e~iouglito adapt our systems to our new circnmstnnces. To go
farther into Ihe matter would require more of your patience than I
cnn ventnre to demnnd; but tell Thoby that the clificulties liero are
not so great as those we shoulcl have had in a Btwmeae war ; and
he may remember, I hod made preparations from which I hnd Rome
reason to hope they would have been overcome. Say also that my
experiences there and here have deepened the impression that our
nrl~olemilitary system wants revising. In some thiugs wc must
chnuge to meet, our altered circumstrtnces ; in others, we must go
back, revert from Bentinclr to Wellesley. Lord T.Villiam was a.n able
m m , and did much good ; but he also (lid great and lasting hnrm.
He was a general in the army, yet rarely touched military affilirs but
to blunder.
Rhrquis Wellesley, a civilian, saw everything with the eye of
a statesman and great commander. Thoby himself I would rather
see in a cocked liat than most of the genorals I h t w fallon in mith ;
alld this is why I now trouble yon with all this. He is right in thiuking that had Wild's brigade been pushed on in time, ospe~iidlywith
a, due proportion of artillery, cavalry, and sappers, with all requisites,
above all a few heavy gum, he would have succeeded in joining us.
I go farther, and say that, had me had then a single general fit to
colnmancl, no disaster would hare happened in Chbool, :LII~ all wolild
now have been quiet. The dread of Lord A-'s
G o v e r n ~ ~ ~ to
ent
colnrnit ti*oopsbeyond the frontier, was eminently unwise.
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.Def~~nsivd(that is, ~ ~ a s s i vmeasuros
e)
in India nre a s dangerous
us they proved in Cabool, mil for the same reason: tho force to
guard t l ~ i sempire is physicnlly small, and (from financial canscs)
ever must be so. Our strength, to B greater degree tlim in other
wmies, is I ? Z O Y ~; terror of our fortune nnd constant success, as well
as of our dt~ring,must unnerve mld clisnnite our cnemios, or we are
lost. Our army need not, hero or in India, be luge, but it must
be efficient,well equipped. well cornmnnded, and ever rendy to crnsh
t h e f i ~ ssymptoms
t
of opposition. Pi~rtinlrevorses
by n coup cZ'c~?~c.?ucc
eveu t l ~ e nme shall have, h i t we must on their recnrrcnce only reclouble our eR'orts, nnd show the pricc of tcrnpornry victory over 11s
to be utter ruin to the momentnry viotors nnd [to e n t d their] pcrmenent sul?jngatiol Thus only uro wc snfo, and then only C ~ I Iwe
retard the daugerons sprendiug of our frontior ; but nslr Thoby
whether we linve acted t l ~ n ssince October Inst, or whether, for ycars
before, pains wero tnlten to Iteep our nmies $1 to act thus. Ask
him nlso to compare what woulcl have bccn the cost, Iml we t1~11.r
t~cted,rnitliwhnt it willbe, end how nTeplenso the prcscnt bit-by-bit,
operR t'1011s.
Lord Auclrl~nd's fancy for stopping at Pcsl~swurwas worse
thnn if h e had stayed at home nltogelher. It brcd dosponclency
among Lhe troops to see the Government thoy liitl~crtobelieved
cq11al to evcry enterprise, shrink a t the Kliyber ; and i t produced a,
feeling anlong the Afghans which our generntiou will not see
eflaced-that me fetwed lo encounter Lhern, except hi far superior
numbers, and that me dreaded hills. The dread of the Pulljab is
childisli while we cwc victorious here ; but if the Afghans, whom
thoy have benten, can drivo us out, the difieronce betmco~~
the Silrll
troops m d onrs is lessened. In nll that Thoby says on that subject, I entirely agree. As to the down-hcsrtedness of tho native
troops after Wild's foolish defeat, it happens in sll armies ; no110
more subject to i t than our Europenn troops. I have seen i t to a
distressing extent ; and when Colin comes, he mill tell what h e has
seen. Troops of every nation depend upon their ofliccrs ; and these,
much upon their leadcr. Victory sets all right in this respect, and
that depends on the gencral nad the Government. No fear of lhe
nntivos if tho E~iwopemzslioep right ; above d l , the officers ; and
Lord Ellenborough seems liltely to infuse the propor spirit into them,
or rat11er to revivo it, aftor two depressing ad~ninistrations.
TTrhat Tho1)y says of the inqortnnce of surveying the routes, is
most just, Our npatl~gin this rospect i s ilisgracefd to onr nntional
ohnracter, rind so is our ignorance of tlle institntions and manners
of Lhe country. Whon a country is invaclod, its resonrccs nre
always uacd by the conqucring amy, the lcncler of wl~icllnssumos
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the government. Lord Wellington ndministered the civil governm e n t i n t h e South of fiance, collecting the reveuucs, and naming
overy functiouary. After four years of occupation we are a s little
propnreil to do that effectually here ns in 1888 ; less so, for t l ~ e
desire to l ~ a r i lis diminishod. All now think me ;Lro soon to quit
t h e country ; hence the whole burden of the wnr falls on India,.
My recent studies in Resood comprehended the collection of
p a r t of the revenues, and our ignorance of the way we are deluded
altogother ainnxecl mo. The fanlt is not with individuals, hut with
our system of politicd management. Thoby is wrong in thinking
t h i s vnlley cnnnot support the army ; it llns done it, is doing it, and
hns given us, I believe, three months' grain in store besides. And
nll this might have been done at one-third of the cost, and quicker,
but for ouy wretched system. Poor Nacnaghten should never have
left the secretary's office. H e was ignorsnt of men, even to simplicity, aucl utterly incapable of forming or guiding nrlnii~cistrativc
measures. Indeed, he had dofects that mnlie me wonder at his
success in the secretariat. The judicial line would probnbly have
best suited him, and even that only in a court of appenl, judging
only of writiclh evidence.
I-Ie w a s by treaty forbidden to administer c7iwctly the governm e n t ; yet lie sent a n oofcer to represent himself in every district.
T h e state of the finances, the amount nnd collection of the revenue,
were constnnt subjects of discussion Letmeen him and the Shah ; in
truth, he mas Shah, and his political subordintites weye linltin~sa
whenever they chose to interfere, rind it was the perpetnal object
of native intrigue to get them to interfere. Yet to acquire mc16rnte
information of the real resources of the country, the inodes of collection, a n d the rights of the various clusses in relation to the State
qnd to each other, never seems to have been thought necessary, to
those who decided i n the last resort every case they chose. Conseqnently, when we t r y now to tnnl the resources of the country to
our owl1 use, me fail from our ignorance.
I bolieve I have already said my say as to what Thoby says of
Colin not getting all the public hononrs he deserves, because ha
figured only i n disasters. But me have all figured in disasters, and
t h e baltuice is still against the English arms. Colin's defence of
his fort, m d subsequent saving of the garrison and all the women
a n d children of t h e Sappers (who were absent with Sale), is a
s c p m t o exploit, and it was brilliantly snccessful. His conduct i n
t l ~ eIil~oorclCabool pass, under me, mus most distinguished ; and
he ulld Lieut. Dawes of the artillery mcre the only officers with me
Llikim, n governor.
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mhcn n7e drove tlie enemy from the position [to carry which] all
Sale's preparations for tlle whole force wcre directed. That wr~sa
success, nnd lie commanded all the Snppers on one side
of the d l e y . I reported his conclnct oflicially to Capt. Seaton, who
RrRs in con~mai~cl
of the advance gunrd ; but Capt. Seatoa's report
was never forwnrded or even publishecl. I n fact, it would liave flatly
contradicted Col. Dennie's ; still, herc are Licut. Dawes and myself
ready to testify to Colin's most g d l a n t coadlicl on a trying occasion
and in a signrtl success. So he must not lose his reward.
As to the honours (not the jocnlar ones) Thoby mould intimate
Lord E. (though, by the way, I only infer his Lordship's agency)
may procure for me, I will not an'ect to vicw them with philosophic indifference ; yet what I shonld most prize would be brevet promotion,
and that is of little uso till the lieutenant-colonelcycy comcs. That
step (for the brevet follo~rsQneen's r d e s ) now, or soon, wonld nmlre
me a major-general before tlie grand climacteric. The majority
will secure it for me about the vigorous age of seveuty, for, by Queen's
rdes, the liez6te~zt~7tt-coloneIc-y
d o n e is a line step. With neither
step I must livc to a patriarchal age to hope for the command of a n
army, or even a division. This is the increasing cvil of the service,
Qucen's and C'ompnny's. This applies also to Colin ; for would yon
believe that boyish-loolting fellow is my senior in age?
Yon see the kind of answers yon bring on yonrself by giving
your pel1 to Thoby. I wish I codcl find time to write once ngaiu
the lost letters, ns he might find the recollections useful in filling
gaps in better ~lourcesof information about our late doings ; but I
have little hope, being thrown into sad arrears of all my propcr
duty by the extra worlr I liave h a d to do. I mt~yperhaps send him
a few notes of the first outbrenk. I sent him also, what I do~tbtif
I could now recall to mcmory with tolerable accnrncy, a s u n ~ n l a ~ y
of nly discussions with poor 13unles, who mas better than Macnngllten, yet only inasmuch as he mould have better ndininistcred
a faulty system. Burnes and I were intimate friends, but our views
cliffered widely; and my poor brother IVilliam, though his destined
mihtnry secretary, was in his opinions regarding the country quite
opposed to him. But Burnes's views were, except in details, those
of Mncnaghtcn, and he was nearly as blind to what was passing
round him.
Do you correspond with Mrs. Hillier? If you do, oblige me
by offering my ltindest rememhranccs. She was always exceedingly
kind to nie wlicn I was on her poor husband's statl'.
As to the motives lending to the assassinatiou of poor Bnrnes,
thcy were : the teiuptation of his mprotected situation, i n which,
n,gainst every rcnlonslrance of ray brotlier and myself, he persisted
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i u relnnining ; the wish, by such a blow, to encourage the natives
t o rebel ; and hatred of him as the mnn universally believed t o have
guided the Knfirs to the country, His ability was also thought
enough of to mahe it desirable to get rid of him. These alone were
tlie motives : tho leaders in the attack, poor Buriles nbsurdly believed
attached to him, because lie had befriended them mith Mi~cnagllten
and the Icing, particularly Ameenoollah X h m of Logur. Some
of the snbordinnte assailants, again, consirlered that Bumes's advice
liad wcighed ngninst them mith the Icing. The Moolnli~~
too, and
tlie nlob they led, detested Burnes from his mctldng light of all
religions, which he was imprudent enough to thinlt they relished,
Because t l ~ laughed
y
nt his joltes. On the other Iiancl, they hated
Macnaghten because h e hail, with impure hands, touched the koran,
and rend the glorions book, without being thereby converted ; wliich
i n my own case, a Moolah, to the dismay of my men for a moment,
pronounced the worst of infidelity. I n this respect there is no
pleasing them, and it is foolish to seek to do so farther tlinn by
abstaining from offence. bIncm~gl~ten
mas a little ang-ry when I
told him about my Koran, saying they never showed that feeling to
him !
Tell Bayley with my l t i d regards I slid1 ansmor his letter very
shortly. I am nlmost asha~nedto send you such n Thobyish letter,
but next time I shall try to do better. Give my best regards to all
your circle, and believe me, my dear Mrs. Bayley,
Ever most truly yours,
G . DROADFOOT.
(Prom my den, six feel underground.)

We have d r e n d y mentioned the nbsence of a n y information
as to what first brought Broaclfoot's services aid talents t o
L o r d Ellenboi-ongh's notice ; and fmthcr, a remark in one of
h i s own lettcrsP1shonls that he could not account for the
vcry high opinion of i h e m which the Governor-Qencral had
formed.
T h e first expression of approval is t o bo found i n h i s
letter of April 25, written on the occasion when Broadfoot
was wouncled, and within two months from t h e clate on which
Lorcl Ellenboro~zgllarrived in Cnlcntta. The n e s t mention
of t h e ltincl which has been cliscoverecl is in a lettcr to
Mr. 13. T. Prinsep, o n the snl?jcct of selecting n successor to
Mr. I-Ioclgson as Resident at the Court of Neplil. As usual,
I
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tho Governor-Genernl was most et~rncstin making inquiry as
He mroto on
J L I IliI:~
111 his placc [i.o. 11~.
Hodgson's] I will send somc man nkaid
of notl~ing, I IIWO half 8 m i d to s o d ;\I;~jor Fmsor. I have
been tl~inliingof sending Capt. 13roadfoot, but IIC is too good a n
oficer to spwe. IIe deserves, howevcr, luoro Lhan nnyonc, and
t o tho fitness of rttrious persons for the post.

must be the first object of promotion.

On Jmw 12, I I r . Prinsep repliccl:
With Cnpt. Brondfoot, the othcr olliccr nnmcd by your Lordship,
I 2111 wry intimate, : n d 11avo110 scruple to sny that he has all the
rquisite
of w l h h lie Ilns given proof sunicicnt in his
short nlilitnry career in Afghanistan ; for hc formed the corps he
co~nlna~tds,
which l ~ n sso rlistingaished itself; and though it largo
number of tho mcn nre nntirc Afghnns, not onc, as I hear, deserted
in tllc midst of all the trials thcy were subject to. But I feel with
your Lordship that Clapt. Brondfoot llns displayed such very high
military q d i t i e s that in these times he would be tllrown away in
a post of pure diplonlncy, llomercr important it might be. Unless,
thorcfore, he were disilblcll by his wound, I would rather see him
continaed in some iniportant frontier post of command.

It is, therefore, clear t h a t in little more t h a n threemoilthe
froin the iime whcn Lord Ellenborongh bccame GovernorGeneral, he had formed the highest opiuion of Broaclfoot's
capacity, both as a soldier and a s a candidate for administratiw o r political appointments.
Broadfoot hxcl mrittcn to Government what h e called a
w a r m rernoristrance on the subject of the treatment of t h e
Shah's forces, in reducing their allonwms, retrospectively,
from the date of the Shah's clcath. The ncxt letter refers to
this iucidentally, a n d contains further evidence of t h e GovernorGcncral's appreciation of his services.
Allnhabnd : June 21, 1842.

Sir,-You will sce by the letter addressed to-day to Gen.
Polloclc by Col. Stewart that 1linvc done all I can properly do for
yourself and thc other officers who are attached to the force of tlle
late Shah Slit~jiz.
I am desirous on public grounds of tesjifj.ing the high sense I
e~ttertainof your military services duriug tho blockade of Jellalabnd.
There is no sitnution at present n t my disposal which I can offer
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to you, oxcept that of aide-de-camp,on my personal staff. That
is not n situntion which you should permanently hold, but it may
be r~greei~ble
to you to retain it until1 can find some other appointmont more adapted to you by which I may murk my sense. of your
distingaished services.
In anticipstion of your ncceptance of tho situation of nidc-decamp, I hwc directccl that you should be put into orders to-day.
Of course it is not ncccssary for yon to join me until nw meet
after your return to India, whencver that may be.
I remnin, Sir, yours very faithfully,
ELLENBORO
UGH.
The endorsement is as follows :
My dear RSnlcolmson,-You

mill not wonder when ma meet to

find u e agreeably improved in point of uamity.

YOWSever,

G. BROADFOO~.

On the occasion of one of his visits on parolo to Jalalnbad
to negotiate for the liberation of the prisoners, Capt. Bhclrenxie
brought with him part of the manuscript of Lieut. E y r e ' ~
narrative of the I<abul disasters. I t was shown to three
persons only : the General, the Political Agent, nncl Capt.
Broad foot, who stndicd it closely ancl wrote some notes on it
of consiclerable vmlne. They are too long to be inserted here,
but the concluding remarks mill bc found of interest.
The story of the Iiilml disasters is so well ltnomn that the
s11orLcst possible slretch of Lhem will be snfficient a s an introduction Lo tllese rcmarlrs.
On November 2, 1841, tho insurrection broke out, and in
the early morning of lhat clay Sir Alex. Burnes, his brother,
and Licut. W. Broadfoot were killed.
weak and irresolute measures, resulting in defeat, caused
a cleplornble clemoralisntiol~of officers ancl mcn. i\Intnal
rocriminntion Between Sir W. Mxnagliten nncl the military
comruariclers followed, nnd eventually il was clecicled to try
and secure the sat'cty of the troop by negotiation, inste'zd of
resol\ing to maintain it by the svorcl done. In the course
of these ~iegotiations Sir TV. i\lacnagIlten was murrlered.
His successor, a t the c~cmmdof the llrincipd officers of the
force, corltinued to treat wilh the enoiny ; ailcl under an agreement made, the unfortunate army marchccl forth, without
foocl, lvitl~out sufficient cloll~ing,wilhout discil~li~~e,
a n easy

prey t o their fanatical foes, t o perish in the passes esposcd t o
the full rigour of a n Afghan minter.
The concluding remarks by B ~ ~ o a d f o on
o t that p a r t of Lieut,
Byre's narrntive, from t h e outbreak to November 23, 1841,
are ns follows :
Lieut. Eyre's narrative here closes, h e rest no1 llavii~gbeell
sent in. I t sllows tliat to our o\vn 111ismanngement, in Afghanistnn
ill India, me chiefly owe our misfortunes. There is in the
n,?srative a tone of bitterness towards indivirlnnls which would
rollder its accnracy suspicions but for the fact of its having bee11
compiled under tlie correction of so many survivors, active a g ~ l l t s
ill the events, itnd fellow-prisoners of L i e d . Eyre.
AS to the cowardice of H.M.'s 44th Regt. and other portions
of the troops, it is only what mill always r ~ s u l from
t
feebleness alld
incapacity in the leaders, hi situations SO false, in a military poillt
of view, as was that of the Cabool force. The 44111 more of Llle
snlue class of men as othor British soldiers, and only gave way
somewhat sooner from being in a bad state of discipline origiilally.
The native troops, like other troops, gnve way sooner or later as
thoy l ~ a dgood or indifferent oficers.
Tile ~nilitaryerrors itre plain and numerous ; but iL was the fa~llt
of tlre Govemmcnt that our armies were so circumstm~ced tllat
hicapacity should lcad to annihilation. AS to Gen. Elphinstone,
110 had ~ w m y&sadvantages to contend with, and he mas utterly
bl.olzen by sicliness i n nlind and body ; in fact, he had actually sent
in his resignation on these grounds.
After November 23 our troops cannot be said to have fougllt ;
the enemy insulted and harnssed them with impunity, escept from
occasional efforts of individuals, especially Capt. Colin Mnckel~zio
with a handful of Juzailcliees and Ssppers. The inilitary authorities called on the Envoy to capitulate. The Shah early in
December openly declarcd himself the chief Ghazec, and conferred
honours on the cllnrnpions of the faith. Nagotiations wore opcllcrl
with Mahomed Altbar I(hon, interrupted by lhis cl~iefmurdering
tho Envoy, and were resunled a t the iastanco of the lllilitary leaders
against tho ndvice of tho subordinate political olficers (Major
Pottinger, Cnpt. Mnckenzie, kc.), t ~ u dfindly, on January 6, 1842,
the force marched. The same feebleness and il~capncityof tlla
leaders, and misconduct of the troops, mtlrlted the march, tllld its
disautmls end is know~l.
I had 300 Sappers tl~ore,very fine troops, mhich bad bccu sent
bnck from Tezin. They wero orclercd lo bridge lEle ~vaterconrses
near the cantonment for the ptsssage of our camels, and not c~llowed
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to tnlco theiv arms. These mere left under a guard in the cantonment. The men were kept at the bridges till night, when tlie
enemy ruslled into the cantonment, and seized their a m s . Tlius,
by gross mismnnage~nent,were these men dcli~ereclu p lielldess
to slaughter. Some have made their may t11rongll all : most of
them perished in the passes. They were, according to the custom
there, transferred from one strange officer to a n o t h e ~ ,but clung
together to the Inst ; m d no small number reached Jugdnluk, to
perish in the last fntal lnarcli from that place. I give this to sliow
t h e esteilt mis~uaiingeinentl~nclreached.
At Jugclululi the unfortunate reinilant took u p ,z posiLion i n a
s~nnlltable-lnnd, at one corner of wllich rises a conical liill. T h i s
ti~ble-landmas occnpiecl by a piquet of Sir R. Bale's force 011 i t s
march down, and I had to secure them, as we also mere surronnclecl.
The conicnl hill so completely commands the groiincl that I found
i t necessary to construct a sinall work by digging out tlle peak,
where I put a party of our besL men. I t is a clungerons post to
hold, inasmiuch as it can only be entered or quitted under fire of
many hills around, but safe [mhen] once entered. Tliis post Gen.
Elphinstone neglected, nncl the enemy seized i t , innliing a terrible
slnugliter of our men from it. i\lnjor Thaiu proposed to the r e m nmit of the 44th to storm it, and a number cousenteil ; but they
Lac1 to volontcer for qfficers ! and were led by Lieut. Illacnrt,ney,
S.B.P.," CapL. Mathcws commaucling the Bappers S.S.P., and Cnpt.
= ~ y , nlso of 8.S.P. Two of these oficers mere moo~idecl,but tlie
hill was talien. Tile troops, however, could not be kept in it, nnd
the enemy again soixed it. I n hopes of stopping this slnuglitcr,
&a. Elpliiastone, Brigadier Shelton, and Capt. Jolinson were
illdnced to visit Mnhomed Altbar to negotiate. They foui~dthemselves prisoners, n ~ t dthe poor General vainly demanded to be s e n t
baclc to perish with his men. I-Ie was already wouixfied. H e contrived to send the troops illformatioil of the treachery, and t h e y
; bnt a n abntlis ncross the road caused irretrievable confusion. Had they been in hnnd Lhey might still have forced t h e
pass, llot a very dificult one; but tlie above incidents mill Imye
sl~owndisorganisation could go little fnrtlier. Brigadier Aaquetil's
death completed it, and the force then utterly perished nnder t h e
knives of the neiglibouring peasantry, for the Cabool troops h a d
gone baclt.
w e long had no accounts of these matters but from L a d y
Sale's letters, which, naturally, carried too great weight here. S l ~ e ,
seehlg tlie pursuit by the enemy's cavalry in the Cabool txtiolls,
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the may our troops, horse and foot, shmnk from meating t h e m ,
forrued all estraordinnry opinion of them, and communicnteri i t t o
tllC nllthorities here, where it did US ~ n c h11arm. An i n j u r i o u s
tilui&ty mas shown that gave estraordinary confidence t o t h e
enemy, and tended to produce despondency among ourselves. T h e i r
ca\q,lry is, like their infantry, composed of mcn severally b r a v e ,
~ e
coliectivcly worthless. The men are ill mounted, and, ~ b o all,
mutual confidcnce, which cliscipline ancl regular o r g a a i s a tion alone can give. It was not till ~epeaCel7osarnples, chiefly w i t h
our horse in foraging parties, and the sappers in working p a r t i e s ,
had sl1on.n thitt the mcrest handful of disciplined troops m o d e r s t c l y
supported could act in the face of any number of them, and d e f e a t
great odds, that their true d u e began to be felt.
But tliis spread farther, and the Afghan cavalry and i n f a n t r y
mere, most erroneously, believed to be an enemy more formidnblo
than any we had hitherto met. Nothing could be more unfonnded.
I have scen nothing like military skill among their leaders b u t
once, [viz.] in a chief in the Jugduluk pass, who mas killed at t h o
time, rtnd his efforts failed. Their troops me mere peasantry as f a r
as the infantry soldiers are concerned; Lhe cavalry soldieis arc an
ill-momted mob, not to be conlpared to the Mahratlas, a n d still
lcss to the troops of Hyder Mi and Tippoo. As to coping with
disciplined troops, European or native, it is absurd, unlcsu in cases
of mislnm~ll~geinent
so gross that it matters not who thc e n e m y
are. 811 we want arc efficient lenders, and above all an efficient
commissariat, and qstem of equipment adapted to the c o u n t r y .
Would to Heaven, Gen. Cullen mere here as Commissnry-Genera,l
with unlimited power from the Government, and all would go we]].
We have failed from ignorance, want of forethougl~t,ancl t h e gross
neglect of every rule of war and policy, in our governors alld
oommandcrs. The dificultics of the force under Gen. E l p h i n stone, either with a view to suppressiug the rebellion, or r c t i r i l q 10
India, or rather the dificulty of invading and subcluing Lhe c o r m t r y
throng11 the Punjab, which is open to us, is not equal to tllat of Llle
enterprise accomplished by the Ddte of Wellington, whell he
inarched from Mysore to destroy the Mahamtta confederacy. Do,
also, had a long line of opcrtttion, poor and difficult countries lo
tra~lerse,rapid rivers to cross, find mountains not merely to p a s s , b u t ,
as nt Gawilgurh, to carry his siege train across. But scc his foresight, timely preparation, and profound laowledge, and then see t h e
results in his uninterrupted and then unp~rallcledr n ~ . ~ cfYom
]~
victory to victory. Pet he had, besides natural obstacles, to conThcy used to I m e no covering pnrties. H J f worked, and were protcctctl
by the rcst.
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tend with armies that could fight a battle like Assaye, which t l ~ e
Afghans could no more do than the American Indians.
Set the Duke down at Perozpore with cavte blnnclza ; both contempt of the enemy and timidity would disappear, and Afgllanistan
would soon be our own to keep or abandon.
I ltnow not what is to be tlie future policy ; but this I know, that
however great (and it is enormous) is the evilof a poor dependency,
or espensive war pressing on our finances, scanty at the best, it is
but an inconvenience that time and prudence may remedy, compared with the evil of our superiority in a r m being doubted in
h d i a ; above all, if those before whom we nre constrained to go
back, are an Asiatic and Indian nation like the Afghans. 8llalre
the belief in our invincibility, in ow imineasurable military superiority rendering opposition hopeless, and you shalte the foundation
of our power.
Whilst Pollock's army mas being got ready to advance towards Kabul, Broadfoot was sent out mith a small force, on
July 25, towards Fatchabad and Gandamak. He considered
that his detachment v a s too weak to withstand an attaclr
from the Afghans ; and thereforc h e at once assumed the
offensive. By making sudden and rapid marches hc defeaterl
his foes in detail mith such effect as to cause the submission
of all in the neighbourhoocl. These movements, though unrloubteilly the wisest under thc circumstances, nlarmed Pollock,
a cautious rather than a dashing commander. Broaclfoot was
forbidden to act on the oflensive, which the General considered to be dangerous for so small ,z force far froin support :
at the same lime reinforcements were promised. Of Broaclfoot's
doings, Capt. Henry Lawrence in a letter to Mr. George Clerk,
dated August 7, 1842, wrote thus:
Broadfoot is out here, doing good service in coll~ctii~g
grain and
fkightening the scoundrels. He went np the vdley towards Rfijar
four days ago, where the inhabitants were all in revolt ; but to-day
the 3Iallilts of the whole country round for ten miles have come in.
He took his Sappers and 200 irregular horse, and has, I think, done
great good ; but he has got a damper from the General.

In the same letter reference is made to thc destruction of
Patehabad by Broaclfoot, as a grateful sight and a most just
punishment. Two clays later Lawrence contrasted Broaclfoot's
energy in commnnd of a smdl detachment, with Sale's inactivity a t the head of a large brigade.
K

CHAPTER TTI.
Advnnce on Kabul-MId~nb Rhel dcspntches-13rondfoot's-report-Col. Tnylor's
Ictter-Extrnct from the ' Englishmnn '-13rondfoot1s reply to Col. TaylorSnppcrs ordcred to Nnmu Khel-Instroctions from Gen. Polloclz-Description of the ground-Broadfoot nttnclted nnd cnrried the villugc-Pursued
the cnemy to ICidi IChel--Partially clonred the hills beyond-Advnnce
nrrested by the srrivnl of n senior oficcr-Unfortunntc resnlt-Troops retired
t o Mnmn Rhol-Afghans filrilful in monntain war-Letter to Nr. LochGen. Elphiustone-Letter to Mrs. BaYlq-Post of honour given to B r o d foot's Bnppers-Affair nt Jngdnlnk-Aotion s t Teain-Arrival nt RnbulRecovory of tlie prisoners-Gen.Xott-Cspture of IstLlif : Broadfootwounded
-Retorn of tlie nrmy to Pirozpur-Letters
to Mrs. Bnyley nnd Nr.
Loch, nnd from Lord Ellenborough-Brondfoot gazetted brevet-mnjor nnd
C.B.

BYthe strenuous exertions of all concerned, fkom the GovernoyGeneral clommards, supplies and cnrringe were so far provided
that a forward movement on the part of Pollock's axmy became
possible. Baggage wes reduced, the sick mere left behind, and
Broadfoot volunteered lo take his Sappers without tents at all.
Pollock marched horn Jaldabacl on August 20, and arrived
a t Gandamak on the 23rd, where Be intended to halt to collect
f ~ ~ r t h esupplies
r
and to await news from Gen. Nott. Ganda,rnalr wa,B within the region in which disaster, destruction,
ailel plnncler had proved to the satisfaction of the Afghan his
finperiority to Brilish troops. Consequently small delached
bodies did not fear to approach Polloclr'~army, and endeavour
by invnlt and provocation to bring on a fight.
Seeing that there mna hard work to be done, and the importance of having it well done, Pollock sent that night for
Broadfoot and his Sappers, and a squadron of 13.M.'~3rd
Dragoons who were behind with Sale d Nimla. So promptly
dieL they rcspond Chat they were wilh the General before smrise. With Pollock, aa with Salc on former occ;tsions, thera
wad no dauger of Broaclfooot a$nd his men bcing forgolten in
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the hour 01 peril, however fan1ty the Generals' memories might
be when that was over and when tho time came for mentioning their services in despatches. Gen. Polloclc's despatch of
August 25, 1842, is a remarkable instanceof this. It records
how, as above mentioned, Brondfoot was sent for in the night,
and arrived before daylight ; how at 4 MI. he with his corps
joined the right column, vhich he for a time commanded ; how
he cleared the hills of the enemy in one place, and in another
captured lheir camp equipage, with its carriage cattle. And
yet in the next paragraph, where the ofEcers who specially distingnished themselves are thanltecl, Broaclfoot's name is loolred
for in vain. Gen. Pollock pul~lishedBroaclfoot's report, and
in thc mention made in the body of the despatch of his services
there is nothing to indicate an unworthy motive, or a wish to
conceal their vadue. The omission of his name among the officers ' mentioned in lhe despatch ' must therefore be put clown
to a n oversight ; but it is one deserving of severe censure. If
therc ~vel.eany reasons why Broadfoot's name should not have
bee11 mentionecl as one to whom the General was specially indebted on that occasion, they should, considering the tenor of
the rest of the despatch, have been explnined.
Broadfool's report, or rather a review of ihe events of 1842
in Afghanistan by the ' Delhi Gazette,' based on that report,
the accuracy of which was questioned by Col. Taylor of the
9th Fool;, led to a corresponclence which elicited from Brondfoot an acconnt of the ercnts of the day so complete and
SO accur~~te,
that Col. Taylor was desired by high military
authority to make no reply.
The report is as follows :

Csinp, Manloo Rhel : Angost 26, 1042.

Sir,-Agreeably to orders, I have the honour to report the proceedings of the column entrusted to me by the llajor-Gencrnl commanding in the action yesterday.
I nzoved, as directed, with the Sappers (about 220 men) and the
3rd Irregnlnr Cnvdry (250) across the revine on the right of the
force. IVe found the eneiny strongly posted in an orchnrd with some
inclosures, and the usual iioldworlts of loosc stones in their front
K
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mere also occupied. This position flanlied the approach of the main
body.
IItwing formed an attacking pnrty ill front, I sent the rest of the
Snppers in column, under Lieut. Orr, to turn the eliemy's left flank,
~ l l dCapt. Tait's horse still more to the right and in advance, to cut
off their retreat. While we waited in this order the advance of the
fol-ce, the enemy reinforced the orchard and moved out to attack 11s.
I was therefore obliged to advance beforc the force arrived. The
enemy's positions were quicltly carried in succession. One party
was driven towards the 3rd Irregular Cavalry, who pursued, and the
remainder fled to the village of Mamoo Khel, into which the main
body of the enemy were at this monlent driven by the fire of our
artillery. They opened a fire on us, ill directed, but so heavy that
we nlere obliged to attack the village ; they fled when we reached it,
and the soppers p~irsuedto the fort, but mere so eshausted by the
march from Futehnhad and the previous opemtions that the enemy
mas able to enter and bn~ricndethe gate ; their fire wns kept down
by one party of Snpperu, whilc the rest climbed on encl~other's
shoulders over R half-repaired bastion about cight feet high and
covered with thorns ; the e~ienlyfled over the malls on the other side,
leaving the rear gate barricaded. This, and descending from the
wnlls, lost so much t h e , that pnrsuit was nearly hopeless as far as
our now exhausted men were concerned, We pressed on with the
least fatigued, however, and lceping up to the hills forced the enemy
into level ground ; our cavalry mas npproaching, and 7 ~ 0had the
satisfaction of seeing the cavalry overtake and attack them.
Parties were now directed to destroy the forts abendoned on the
cavalry approaching, while with a few men I pushed on to the last
village near the hills, where we surprised the enemy, whose headquarters were there, driving then1 out of the villcage and adjoining
camp, and obtaining their tents, cattle, and ainmnnition, m d n good
quautity of provisions. The enemy (who were evidently the Jueailchees from Cahool) fled to the hills, tho fire from which swept the
village.
Iwas now directed to take apa~+,yof I-l.hI.'sDtl~Foot, the Sappers
being now worn ont, except %boutsis men, and attaclc the hills; the
first and second heights were carried nt the point of the bayonet,
nild flanlting parties having tnrned the shoulders of the high rango,
we were advancing up it when tho main force arrived, end our
farther progress was stayed. My separate command now ce~sed,
elid I wes soon after ordered with the Sappers to headquarters.
The conduct of the troops, officers m d men, Enropcan and
native, was admirable, and it is due to the 26th 3.1. to mention
that in storming the second height with a party of H.M.'s 9th Foot,
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a party of the former corps joined us, and behaved with the same
spirit as the rest.
I have kc.
G. BROADFOOT,
Captain,
Con~nmnd,ingRigkt Colz~n,?b.
P r o m t h i s report t h e ' Delhi ~ a z e t t 'e compiled the follow-

ing sentence, mhich formed p a r t of t h c h review of t h e evei1l;s of
1842 :
The S q p e r s being co~npletelyknocked U P except about six men,
Capt. Broadfoot toolc a party of l 3 . M . ' ~9th Foot, carried sollle of
t11~hills a t the point of the bayomt, and mould have drive11o n a]]
the enemy, had not Gen. Pollock thonght it prudent to recall all the
detached parties, some of whom 11ad gone more than two miles in
advance of Mamoo Khel.
W i t h reference t o this, Col. Taylor aclclressed t h e editor of

the ' D e l l ~ Gazette
i
' as folloms :
Camp, Mobar&kpore : February 20,1843.

Sir,-Observing in your 'Gazette ' of the 16th inst., in iconti~luation of a revicw of the past y e u , ' a narrative of the afl'air at &Inmoo
I h l between the troops of Major-Gen. Pollock and the Afgllt~~ls
011
Angust 24 last, in ml~ichyon state that capt. (now Major) Broadfoot ' toolc a party of the 9th Foot, carried some hills at t l ~ epoint of
the bayonet,' kc. ; in correction 1have to observe that 011 that day
no party of the 9th Foot was placed under Capt. 13roadfoot's cornmand either by m e or Gen. h I ' C i ~ s l d ,uor did any soldiers of that
corps act under llis orders to my linowledge. Injustice to two gallant
officers, I have further t o add Llmt on the occasiou alluded to by ~011,
I ordered Major H u i s l ~ ,26th N.I., and Capt. Oglo, EI.hI.'s 9th Foot
(both scnior to Capt. Broadfoot), to talio two companies from each of
those regiments, and ilislodge the emmyfrom the heights over Koolcey
K i d , which they effectually did in a fern minutcs, and to those officers
is dne the crediL of that gallant action. Gapt. Broadfoot, I understood, accompanied them with t h e e or four of his Sappers, but he
have no cornrnaud of a superior oficer, Major Ilnish.
I Imvc the honour &c.
A. B. TAYLOR,
Lieul.-Col. 9th Fool.

This called forth from Broadfoot a lottor mhich appeared in
t h e ' E n g l i s h m a n mcl Military Chronicle ' of March 23, 1843,
o n which thut newspaper remarliccl :
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TVe have mnch pleasure in giving publicity to the following communication from Rl;~jor13roadfoot, c o ~ i c e r n h gtlic carrying of certain
hills at hlamoo ITliel, in wl~ichthe gallant Major incontcstnbly proves
that the whole work was done by himself, prior to his supersession
by Lieut-Col. Huish ; and that Col. Taylor's version of the affair
does not iilvaliclate his (Major Bronclfoot's) claim to the chief creclit
dne for the conspicuous part h e bore in the transaction. The cornmmication is written in the frank, manly, solclierlilte tone, we should
have espected from one of the most clistii~gui~l~cd
oficcrs engaged
in that memorable campaign, and as a mere persolla1 ~larrativeof a
veiy gallant, brillimt action, we are quite sure will be pernsed with
much interest; by all our military readers. We have neither time
nor space a t the present lnoment to cominent more fully upon the
subject.
Sir,-With reference to Lieut.-Col. Taylor's letter and my own,
in your paper of the 12th and 13th instant, you will oblige me by
giving a place to the following :
About the miclde of August l i ~ s t Rhjor-Gen.
,
Pollock advanced
from Jellnlabad to Gundumok, Sir Robert Sale being left at Futteh%bad. A small Afghan force had come from Gabool to garrison
Tatang, n, fort of Mahomed Akbar near Qunduinnlc, but it was
Sale's troops.
destroyed befora their arrival by n detachment of Sir 3'.
The intended garrison, being joined by some neighbonring chiefs,
took post a t Mninoo Khel, abont two miles from Gen. Pollocli's
camp at Gundumidc : they rtttaclced his piqnets, followed back small
parties sent to loolc a t them, and ilot being chnstisecl, increased in
nnnibers honvly. At length Gen. Pollock resolved to attack them
and cuptme 3lamoo Khel, t h e seat of one of the great oEcers of Shah
Shoojo's G o u t , nud it leader in the movements against the English.
On August 29, Sir R. Sale was directed to send a squadron
of H.31'~ 3rd Dmgoons, and Broadfoot's Sapper corps, on to
Gnndunlulc; the latter mere at t h e moment some miles from
camp bringing in supplies, but by evening they had retulmed, and
aftcr ci~rlrrnnrched with the Dragoons wider Major Bond, leaving
stores and baggnge with the usual g ~ w r d s(besides abont a company
in garrison a t a fort a few miles off) to follow nest day. They were
thus only about 300 strong.
The nlarch was only fifteen miles, but included a n ascent of
about 8,000 feet, and a descent of perhaps 500.
Rlujor Pond arrived before dawn on the 24tl1, and found Gen.
Pollock's force nncler arms to move on Mnmoo IThel. The Sappars
were ordered to join. They had now been four-and-twenty h o u at
~
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work or under arms with no food save dry pulse, eaten a s tIley
marched ; and when at daylight a few minutes' halt wns made, tlley
sat clown and nearly all slept from weariness. On Cupt. (now
M i o r ) Havdocli, however, summoning them to the frollt of t h e
column, they received him with loud cheers. Gen. Pollock now told
m e to furnish such sliirmishing pnrties as would be clemaudetl by
officers whom h e named ; I think (bnt am not certain) they were
Brigadier Tulloch and Lieut.-Col. Taylor. The forco nloved 011,
but no sliirmishers were nslted for. Gen. Pollock after a tinle came
up ngnin, nnd with m.my ldnd expressions informed rile h e wished
t h e mcn to shnre in o fight they had come so far for, alld
desired m e to mention any s e p r a t o service for them my ]inowledge
of tlie ground" might suggest ;finally
' I had been mdersir Robert 11, sauctioned another column on the
Sale agninst thc plsoe the year LCright to secure our flmli alld cornfore.
plete our snccess by getting 011 t h e
enemy's best line of retreat ; that, namoly, towards Koodeo .I(liel,
an opening in t h e mountains two miles beyond and to our right of
Mamoo IChel.
The country south of Gundumnk rises rapidly but ulliformly
for four or five miles to the foot of t h e first range of f i e steep a n d
pine-covered hills of the Boofecd Koh. The hill streams flow to
the Soorlihab river in deep channels which divide this tract into
sty@ of irregular form stretching obliquely up to the Ilills.
011
one of these stands Mainoo lihel, an open villnge of flat-roofed
houses of mud and stone, overlooking the stream on our right a s
me came from Gundwnuk ; about three-qnarters of a mile beyond
it, and towards tlie stream on our left, was the fort, a weak place,
without a ditch, and surrounded with broken ground laid out i n
gardens and vineyards. Tho rest of the gronnd mns cultivated i n
terraces for corn, and i t narrowed towards Koodee Kliel. Beyond
the stream on our right was a tract of similm form, hut stony a n d
barren, save near the stream, where there wero orchards. Across
this stream I was directed to take the Sappers and Toit's horse a s
a subsidiary column of attack.
We moved rapidy to our new place, and found the enemy i n
somc force on that side, and posled in the orohnrds ; while on
Gen. Polloclr's side of the stream a considerable body was displayed
in line before the village of n1t~m00Khcl, which, as well as t h e
ground boyold, was occupied by numbers greater than expected.
Their plan appenrcd t o be to draw on onr fome ngainst t h o m c n
before tho village, who would give way and leave our troops ullder
the fire of the village in their front, and of the orchards across the
stream o n their flank.
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Lieut. Cunningham carried information of their numbers and
position to the General, and brought back his sanction to our
attacliing the orchards when h e shonld attack in front. Disposjtions were made accordillgly, but delays in thc main body
brought us on the enemy single-handed. On halting we were
attacliecl, while reinforcements from the villnge prepared to join our
iminecliate opponents, and some of the people in front of Gen.
Pollock threatened our flank ; we were too fcwv for defence on such
ground, and retreat would have brought tho enemy victorious on
the flanli of onr main force ; so the orchards mere cai~icdat once.
While this passed, Gen. Pollock's artillery opened, and the advanced body of the enemy ran back into the village, from which a
fire was opened on us, then in the orchards and ndjoining worlis
w l k h were open to the village. Our main body mas not visible,
a i d we were again obliged to attack; the stream wns recrossed,
and the village carried. We mere now directly in front of Gen.
Polloc1~'sright, and consequently the subsidiary column of attack
had becoine a main one. This was unavoidable, bnt unfortunate
from our feeble ~ ~ u m b e rass, well as from its leaving no infantry in
n, position to cut the enemy's line of retrent from the fort.
&Insket.ry mns now heard in rear on our left as if our troops
mere advancing, and Lieut. k y n e , Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General to Major-Gen. i\lcCasliill, joined us ; h e informed
me that our main force was coining up, though slowly : so, begging
his aid with the cavalry, I moved towards the fort, ~vhichfell iuto
our hands as mentioned in the deepatches.
The enemy was now scattered in flight, with onr cavalry pursuing. Gen. Pollock's objectswerk gained with 1ittIeloss ; and here
the action of i\lamoo Iihel, properly speaking, ended ; the rest was
pursuit or incidents arising from it.
I directed the Sappers to be collected a d to rest at Mamoo
Khel, not men,ning t o go farther ; but seeing some of the 6th
Cavalry follow the enemy among forts, I took out some of the least
esliausted men to support them,b
The officers and
ser- and went towards the hills to intergeants cnme, purhrrps forty men of
rill ranks.
cept fugitives. Lieut. M a p now
joined the cavalry ; the pursuit began afresh and went far, leading us on in snpport : the forts were
abandoned as the cavalry approached, and I put a few sappers in
each to secure what grain &c. there wasaC
This took time, and d t e r it I

.
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ob]igeil to withdraw. I went that
clirection, having with me eight or
ten men; on the way I fell in
mitll Major-Gen. McCasliill and his
st,&, also moving towards the hills.
Koodee Khel is an open villt~geof stone houses with flat roofs,
hnving on t h e e sides gardens
and
a I t hns the low thin wall round
vineyards, and on the f ~ u y t a] ~narit, callcd Gao-bundce by Aighnns,
intended to 1;ccp the cattle from
bare
@Oulld,
strnying at night; but the gntes sloping up to the right into a small
were gone, nnd the \ d l ruined to- but steep and rugged Ilill, the term
wnrds the hill, which, a s well as
the intenlleclinte slope, comlnnndcd mination of the high pine-covered
the plaoc.
range which forms one side of the
~ o o d e Rhel
e
valley. The large and
the small hills are united by a steep ridge, at tlle lower end of
which is a small rocky protuberance which may be considered an
intermediate
The village seemed empty ; but
iLll these really form but one
hill, or rather the end of one long mhell halfway throqrrl it, a sapper
hill or ridge. I shall, however, for
clearness on11 them the small, the entering a courtyar(1 foulld it occuintemnecliatc, and the large hills.
pied by some of the enemy. The
camp, in short, of the Jnzailchees
from Cabool mas i n the village and on the slope adjoining the little
hill, tents being stretched across many courtyards : the Afghans, in
the belief they cherished of our fearing to approach high Iiills, were
quietly resting after their labours. The sapper ran a t them with
his beyonet, followed by myself and
'Neitherlnnn h a ~ ~ ~ ntoe 'avs
cl
the oll]y other man at the spot~g
his musltet loaded.
The Afghans, doubtless supposing a
large force was on them, snatched up their turbans and arms, and
fled over walls and housetops ; the alarm spread, and the camp was
abandoned.
The men at the village followed tho enemy wit11 their fire to the
top of the littlc hill, from which i t was returned in a way that made
it clear the village mas untenable without taking the hill, and that,
being too weak to attempt this, we must go away soon, if we wished
our withdrawal to seem volnntmy.
Two or three men were posted to fire occnsionally, and the rest
made to carry off or destroy all they
h All the enemy's horses were
seized by camp followers or soldiers. could; a work camp followers and
Their alnmunition I would no1 stragglers so011came tollelp tllenl inmh
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At this time Lient. &h,yne csme
np and a s h d how we were getting
011. 1gnve my view of our position,
adding that the hill was the tliing if
we could manage it. He said, ' TVhy don't yo11 take it, then ? ' I
told h i m I had no men. Be aslied wliere the Sappers were, and
mas told they were in Mamoo Kliel ttnd dl the forts tmcl country
between. He asked if they could no"t
be brought np. I said, ' No,' nnd if
I Tlic objection wns the Lime i l
mould 11avc taken ; too long to rc- they could they are Loo much done
main innctive nncler firc. I muy
here re~ncwkthat rcn~uiningnt 1111 up for hills to-day.' After a little
with so fcw men may scem Impru- inore conversation as to our position,
dent, for I did not then lcnow more h e snid, 'Sf I can get yon other
infnnt~ywcre corning up; but i t
wns intended to be but for n very men, will you u~ldertolteto take the
short time, during which we had kill ? ' I said, 'Yes, get me any other
only the enemy's firc to snstnin.
Had h e come down nnd into contaot men, and I go at the hill.' H e said,
wit11 us, the firc f ~ o mthe hill would ' Very good, I'll see whal I can do,'
hnve consed, our cnvalry, who were and rode off,
rnnsters of tlic plain, coi11cl hnve
He returned shortly and said,
approached, aud our rclrcat been
sccured.
' Here you are. I have got you some
m e n of the 9th; they'll do, lsuppose?'
I said, ' Nothing better ; how many ? ' He answerecl, ' A company ,'
or 'About a company,' and asked if it was enougl~. I said it was,
but we must have supl~orli. I-Ie said, ' Oh, therc's lots of support ; tlie
General's up, the 9th aucl 26th are close here, and in fact the whole
fo~ceis co~ningup ; you'll have plenty of support.' I begged him
to see them spread to the right and left, mliicll he promised to do.
I-Ie then obtained me-n sword IL from
' The cxllnnstion from exertion one of his mou~itedorderlies, and we
in that counLry is inconaeivabl~
till felt. Iu thc mornill(: my horse moved ou, I again requesting him
knoclted up bcyol~d pcrsuusion of to look to onr support. I had been
~ p u r or
, even sword point, just ns sitting nt a gap in the village wall,
we were attacking the orchard. I
had to nbruxlon him, the syce being next the enemy. At tlie corner of
Billcd. The subsequent operntions the village we met tlie men of the O L h
wvcrc all ON strong ground, and at o
Foot coming up to the hill. Lieut.
mpid pace, and the hont Loo was
intense. I was obliged to cast nwuy Wayne SR& ' These m e the men.'
successively belts, seabbnrd, nnd ' Very well,' I replied, np me go,'
all clothcs not indispcnsnblo. At
I<oodeo Khel, jnst before Lieut. am1 the ascent immediately comMnyne joincd me, hnving no scnb- menced, for we were undeli a fire
bard, I g a w my sword to a sepoy t o which incraased when the enemy
hold, but the plunder of tho camp
had mudo hiui IL trunnt. To tho saw our object. Capt. IIavelocli mns
credit of our pcople, these t h h ~ g s there, but I am not surewhether lie
were dl brought bnclc to 1110 t h a t
came with the 9th men or joined
day, though scattered ovcr miles.
Liout. Rlnyne and inysclf jusl bewiLh for fcnr of nccidcnt ; Inter in
rccnlltured it,
rlny the
but in thc confusion blew it, and
sonlo of themseIvos, up.
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fore ; I thinlr the latter. At any rate, I spoke to him and asked liis
aid in keeping our men fro111 firing nnd in getting o rapid advance
with the bilyonet. I believe also that I bespoke his aid in getting
s ~ ~ p p o and
r t sencling men round the flitnlts of the hill. He and
Lient. Mayne accompanied me, clieerilig on the men and preventing firing. There mere se~eraloficers of the 9th prcsent, not one
of whom I lutem, and I only rcmciuber spealting to one of them
who during the ascent mnde a renmrk on sorncthing unconnected
with the duty. All of them joiiled in malting tho me11 advance
without llalting to fire or load. Before we reached the summit the
enemy rnn to the intermediate height and ridge beyond. Capt.
Havelock md Lieut. Mayne cam0 as far as their horses could come,
and went down on seeing us up.
A little lcnoll r o c l r ~in the
JJThen 1reilclled the highest poillt I
centre of the summit.
there were with me only two or three
men of the 9th, and as many Sappers.
After talring breath and giving time for more men to come up,
we moved to the intermediate height, which the enemy abandoned.
We were accompanied by a few men of the 26th N.I., who had
come up while we were waiting ; the first I saw of that regiment.
Beyond the intermediate hill rose the Inrge kill ; the enemy
were now in full rctreilt up the connecting ridgo;but as some had

In due time the left flmk of the hill was enveloped by troops,
chiefly of the 26th Regiment; the right flank was not so well
manned, but troops mere going that
" I knew this ollicw would comay,
among whom I perceived Lieut.
operate with vigour and judgnlent
when he saw the assault begin. I Orr n of the Sappers, and the posik n e ~ n l s lle\~"ul(lensil~
o
get troops tiOll Of the lnen 011 the left flallli was
from officers near, and if thcre were
hiin, con~plctolyulldcr the cnemy's fir0 ;
none the men w ~ ~ u llollow
d

,

T h y soldom fail, be they black or so I resolved to attack at once.
\vhite.
I went towards the interme&ate
hil1,o and when near it made n sign to the party there to advance,
and passed the word for the ascent of tlie Inrge hill, moving on myself. Bofore imny paces, some one
' This
from ten to twenty called out, ' Halt I halt ! ' I called
minutes after renching tho summit
of the
hill ; it seemed the out, ' NO I no ! NOllnlt ! Move oil! '
latter or even more, but I had not gild 111ent forward nlore rapidly ; bat
n watch, nnd to a nlnn waiting the
again the cry of I-Idt I ' was raised,
time seems long.
a n d a man of the 9th called ont.
' Sir ! sir ! there is an order to halt.' I asBed, ' Who said so ? And
who gave the order ? ' A very young-looliing officer standing under
a rock called out in answer to the
1' The Major's courtesylnay not
last question,l' ' I, Major Huish, give
seem grent, but I cannot be certain
obey it.' 1exolvn nl,Lnner was very i t j if YOU d100s"o
plained to tho Major my ignorance
blnnd.
of any officer senior to myself being
there, and informed him tllnt I h a d been seut up with orders to take
the hill : h e said h e also had been sent up with orders to occupy the
hill we were on, but not to go higher. I said my orders nere from
tlie General, received through Lieut. Mayne. He said his orders
also mere from the General, I asked if I was to consider l h
in command on tliat hill ; he said,
q I, of course, asked BIajols only of his own moil, but that his
Huish if he had any ooonsion for orders were positive ngaiiist going
my services or
of my men,
higher. On this I called back the
nlld was lold ho hnd not.
fern Sappers, intending to proceed
to headquarters and make my report.9
Seeing the little hill crowded with our men, however, I again
went to Major I-Inish nnd said there mns certainly some mistake in
these contrndictory orders, and urged him to complete the captnre
of the hill, pointing out i t s necessity. He objected its being too
steep to ascend, its being out of shot, and not worth taking, and
that its capture would cost many men. The enemy's bullets showed
its nenrness while we conversed : on other points, I mentioned the
enemy's flight up it just before, and assured him stopping short
would cost more men than tdcing it, as the enemy would ascribe it
to fear, and not only fire on him then, but rally generally, and pursue him when he left. H e seemed incredulous as to the rallying and
pursuit, urging besides thnt if we did go up we must come baclr, and
were just as likely to be pursued then as now. H e said also the
enemy would go to other heights, which we must talce, and then
others in endless succession. I pointed out the form of the whole
hill, that once on the top, we hacl the Afghans comparatively 011
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l e v e l ground, where indiscipline and inferior arms put their standi n g against us out of the question, and they could not go to tlie
o t h e r hills without descending first, no eRsy matter when pursued
b y us from above. I assured him Afghaus never fought llopeless
b a t t l e s , and that when they saw no ground could stop us, they wotdd
d i s p e r s e , and the terror of such a blow a t the opening of the oampaign would prevent all serious opposition in the passes.
H e did not feel justified in malting t h e attempt, and I then
p r e s s e d him to withhaw at once from the hill ; h i s orders preventing this, I advised h i s l t e e p i q very
' T h e l'ushtoo nnme of the few men, a mere gunrd, npon it,
r o u g h field works of loose stonos
by
Ilfgllans,
are and putting them into a ' sungur,'
having the rest i n reserve below;
cluicltly made and useful.
and, above all, I urged h i m to mitlidraw t h e men below on the left flank of the large hill, who, besides
b e i n g now not wanted there, were in a false position.
After some discussion he agreed to diminish the number o n the
s u m m i t , and proceeded to do so, while I went clown the hill. The
e n e m y had, on the Sappers being brought back from their advnnce,
c r o w d e d to the crest of the upper hill. Their fire too had since been
g e t t i n g steadier. I had not gone fifty yards clown before Ikhjor
H u i s h called me back, and, with some excitement, said, ' Cnpt.
Broadfoot, this is all your doing, and I shall hold you responsible.
I shall make it known to Gen. Pollock.'
H e t h e n pointed out
t h e enemy, wllo had come n little may down the hill, a n d planted a
flag. 130 added, ' I sent down the men entirely by your advice, and
t r u s t i n g to your greater experience of hill warfare, and i t h a s b r o u g l ~ l
d o w n the enemy npon us. I shall recall my nlcn, and make ltnown
t o G e n . Pollock this was your doing.'
I said this was just mhst I llnd been telling h i m , t h e Afghans
t h o u g h t us frigl~tened,that flag would rally tlienl over all the
c o u n t r y round, and the longer he stayed the worse i t would be ; t h a t
of course h e must use his own judgment; but I repeated my advice
t o t a k e the hill or get out of its reach ; or if h e must stay where h e
m a s , to l ~ a v ea few meu above snd l l i ~reserves below, and well
p o s t e d to cover his retreilt. But I again suggested the removal of
tile m e n on the left below (his own men the 26th chiefly, if not
altogetller), or they would get into
T h e hope was cxprcssed, 1 trouble. AS 10 Gen. I'ollock, I proi m a g i n e , to @ the Cicneral in- mised to tell llilll all about it myf o r m e d there were doubts ns lo Ll1c
self; lie said h e hoped I woilld ;
goodness of the position.
and for the rest, Col. Taylor wns
at t h e foot of the hill ; and SO with m u t u d good wishes weparted.
I shall not enter into details of Ihe subsequent events.
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At tlie'foot of the hill I mentioned briefly to Lieut.-Col. Taylor
my being prevented by the arrival of Mrtjor Huish froin talring
the liigli hill, of ivhich I advocated tho necessity and feasibility ;
adding that in twenty lninntes from Major Huish stopping me
the whole would have boen aocomplished. 001. Taylor disagreed
with me, his reasons] being similar to those of Major Huisll,
buL t h e discussion was short. Tho Colollel clid not seem to
thinlc I knew much about the matter; so I went away to Gen,
McCoskiII ~t:the~viIlage.
Midway I met Capt. IJaveloclr, who may perhaps recollect my
complaining of the contri~ilictory orders, which sent me up to be
superseded just as we were comMY impression at the time pl&ing the victory of the day, by a
n q s that the conlmdiction arose,
there, lrom dif- 1e8son to the enemy as desirable as
as in otl,or
foymt central ofioers eseroisinn the reverse we were now certain of.
the opening of a campaign. I recounted what had passed between
J4ajor Huish, L i e d - C o l . Taylor, and myself, and urged tile
necessity of yet getting the hill captured, or reverses would follow.
I had tho gratification to find he agreed in the necessity of ta,Iting
the hills cornpletcly, and I believe he tried in vain to get it done.
To Gen. &IaCaslrill I reported my supersession by Major Huish
having prevented the complete occupation of the hill. I believe I
mentioned my iliterview with Lien&." T h e h t h 7 believe* is* Ihe Col. Taylor, uld I certainly stated
Gellcrnl \vnsordercd to hold theposition that I was cnlling unlennble. my opinion of our position, but 110
replyu was given.
Capt. (now Major) Macgregor was at the village on the part, of
Gen. Polloclc, and I thinlr I mentioned the mntter to him. I certaillly did to Lieut. Bfayne, in very plain terms, who said he could
not help it, bnt would IIOTV get the orders as to myself from Qen.
pollo&, ~vbowas a t BIamoo Khel. Mccanwhile the officers and
of Sappermere ordered to collect all men in that quarter
for f e ; ~
of any sudden oliange in ~ f f i ~ i r ~ .
Orders came for me to join the Sappers at 3famoo Kllel; but,, in
the hlterirn, OW troops under Lieut.-Col. Taylor had been driven
jvit]l 105s from some of their positions, and reinforcements sent for.
l\r\rhen tl~osoarrived I tooli leave of Cen. &lcCaslrill and repaired to
Bhrnoo TZllel.
I n reply to Gen. pol lock'^ inhrrogations, I mentioned wliat I had
seen, and stated p l t ~ i d yand fully all the opinions abovc given ; and
ou ] l i ~demanding my opinion as to the befit course in present cirthisto Cnpt. Havelock.
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cumstances, I still advised the capture of the hill, but by a, larger
force than Gen. RlcCasltill had, as it was no longer held Ly a beaten
fragment of the enemy, outmimbered and pursued, but by a fast
increasing body flushed with smcess. This not being ngeed to, I
ndviscd the inlmedinte withdrawal
' Gen. RIoCnsliill wns w r y ill, of Our troops from Rooclee Xllel,
but cnnie out for the notion nncl
troo~s,especiallycfivltlry,being
pushed 011, ns llas been sten, The "Iore
licnt nnd fatigue so rctluced his sent 10 secure their retreat.
strength, tlint I left Roodee Khel
I also lnclltioncd tho
Of
not without approhcnsion rcgnrding him.

Gen. McCnsliill's lieallh."
Captain Macgregor, however,
seemed to think Koodee Rhel tenable &hout tile kholc hill, ma
nothing was decided tlien, save that Gen. McCaskill mas to remain.
I believer it was finally settled
Y Tl~ei-ewere many oonvcrsathat, the day being now advanced,
tions hefore nnd after the retrent of
our troops. I took part in some, Qen. McCasltill should retire, and
but counsels changed, and I forgot the enemy be attacked nest momwhctlisr it n7ns decided to attnok iag. Cavalry ITRR sent out, and tlie
the hill in the morning or not. I
thiulc it was, for I remember dis- troops at Koodee Khel fell back in
cussing the plan of nttnck wiW1 good order to Namoo Khel ; pursued,
Capt. H8vclook, who wns prescnt
nt some of those conversations; however, to that place by the enemy,
l ~ n dI tl~inkit mns a view to this who fired for n time and tlien drew off.
dccision t l ~ n tenabled me to moot
Nest morning the enemy took
Capt. Btrrcgregor's nrg~inients,vir.
'polit,icnl rensons,' and ' morn1 cf- post at Hissaruk, some miles west
feat ' on t,he people and cl~icfs,of from Marno0 Khel, a good position
retrent. Thc former wrl: not detailed. For the latter I suggested for impeding our commissariat opevictory, but thought our chnnces of rations, as well as for guarding both
it were not improved by letting the roads to Cabool. We, however, let
Afghnns b e l a b u r two of our bcst
regiments all night in a bad post. him alone ; but we met him again
No troops, however, were warned the following month a t JugdnluL,
for the attack, and it mny not h w e and then with a cliffcrent fortune as
beon determined on.
to hills.
Such are my recollectioi~sof Lhe affair at Namoo Khel, giving
in grmt detail all that bears on my relations with Col. Taylor, and
merely indicating the other and more important events.
Battles are notoriously t h subjects
~
on which the memories of
tllose engaged, most widely vary, even to contradiction ; and I have
no hope of escaping the common fate. Some mill remember m h ~ t
I have forgotten, and forget wllat I remombar. Others would sea
what I did not, or see the snme things in n different light, while
much that I have seen will be unlinonw to them ; and one man
may be flurried where nnother is
' Add to the list tho O'Rccl.fl
of tlie Sappers, who saw more or not ; but I have named, as far as I
remember, those who mcre present.%
I ~ S Hof what went on. viz. Licut.
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A copy of this number of tlie ' Englishman ' sent to each will be the first,
co~xrnunicationon the subject from
me. I have, as fir as I remember,
kept back nothing, softened nothing,
and,Ihope, aggravated nothing. Let
the gentl~mennarnecl say whether
and horn far the general tenor of
With that of lDelhi Gnzette,' their recollections vn~iesfrom mine.
or m y similar one, I shall not Now for Lieut.-Col. Taylor's contrameddle, either in the way of con- diction of my stateme1kn Here it is,
Lrndiction or confirmntion, hIntorink for nny nccount of the ope- being the end of my reportb to Gen.
rations in Nol.thern Afghanistnn Yolloc1t. ' Iwasnow directed to taltea
appronching to correctness are not party of Il.lL1s9thFoot, the Sappers
before the public.
being now worn out, except about
I, Tnlten from tlie ' Delhi Gnxette,' which I have seen since my six men, and nttnclt the hills. The
former letter. My originnl rcport first and second Ileights were carried
was verbnl, merely stnting that the a t tlie point of the bayonet; and
delay of t h e mnin force brought
the onelny on us, nnd forced us to flanking parties hnving turned the
engage singly, that we bent them, sl~ouldersof the higli rnuge, me mere
but nt the close of the porsuit advancing up it, when the runin force
hInjor H&h cnme up and superseded me. I mentioned nlso getting arrived, and our farther progress mas
solnc men of the 9th nt the end of stayed. My separate commancl now
the pursuit, nnd their good behaviour; but all nbout bInjor Huish ceased, am1 I mas soon after ordered
I delnilcd nl tlint oilicer's request. with Snppers to headquarters.'
Sir llich~nondShakespear (I ll1ink)
First, ' I mas directed to take men
wrrs scnt to me nfterwnrds aL the
Snppers' bivouac for a written re- of the 9th, and attack the hills.'
port, as they could uot get on with Lieut.-Col. Taylor denics this. Ho
n despi~tch for mnnt of it. Dr.
Porsyth will remember its being says, ' No party of the 9th Foot
written in oil hnste and weariness ; was placed under Capt. Brondfoot's
still, recollections were frcsh, and commm~deither by me or by Gen.
i t csnnot be fnr wrong.
NIcCasltill. '
They merc placcd luncler my command by Lieut. Mayne, Deputy
Assistant Quartermaster-General of the Infantry Division, to
wl~icliLicut.-Col. Taylor and I both
Orders l1'lder
were
belonged,
ancl his orders, I presume,
brought, nt leafit when I wes employed, by Copt. H~~vcloclr,
Deputy were, in such circumstances, to be
Assistur~t Ad,i~tnnt-(hncral, rind talien as those of the general
Licut. BInyne, Deputy A ~ s i s t a n l
Qunrtermnster-~cnernl,
by on whose staff he was,O and that
any other staff oficcrs, nnd no wns Gen. McCasltill. I did not
man cver did or could question tho ltnow but what G ~ polloclr
~ . wits
authority of eithor.
up and had snnctionecl the measure,
p e r l q s given the orclor through Lieut. Mayne, for suoh things liappened up there. B u t I felt quite sure of Gen. McCasldll, and could
Orr, Lieut. Cu~lninglinm,and Dr.
Forsy th. Messrs. Kelly snd Broen,
now ndjutnnts of police corps,
s e w co~~spicuouslyeinployed in
the mnin action. The lntter nlso
joined Col. Tnylor'a pnrty, nnd was
severely wounded on his repulse ;
lie was scnt to Irriiq bnclc straggling snppcrs, but fieeing our comr~rdesof Col. Tnylor'a force hard
prcssed, joined tlicm.
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scarcely do otlierwisc. After consulting as to ui enterprise which
one of his principal staff officers wishes me to conduct, the former
goes off ' to see what he can do.' He comes b d t saying h e has
got me men, and aids in the arrangements. What could I supposeLbut that he had suggested to
"ieut. IInync mny remember, his superior the capture of the hill
when I tirst nslccd for n w o r d he
did not llenr; nnd my ~ n y i n g(I and my leading the assnulting party,
fear with n littlc i r r i t n t i o ~ ~')If
, I and that both had becn npproved:
urn to l e d these men, you must
inore cspecially when in nssuring me
get me n flwol'd.'
of support
- - he mentioned the General
as being up, and thc wllole force ns coniiug on ? Nuy, more ; had I
thought I commandecl the whole, or tlist I did more tllall l m d the
parly that mas to crown the hill, I should have been sorry to
~mdertalte the duty. Powerful support mas required, invoking
bodies of troops my rank lmclnded me from cominanc2ing : I toolr
it for granted, and till I learn the contrary from a good source I
shall continue to believe, that the extensive movemc~~ts
agi~insttho
hill mere aL least sanctiolled by the General. And in this belid
it was, I aslted his staff oEcers, one of wliom (Cnpt. Havelocli)
was my senior, to see the necessary steps talten for our support.
They wcrc I;aken, srid wit11 a sliill and readiness strongly indicatilre
of espcrience and zeal like theirs.
But Lieut.-Col. Taylor says Gen. b1cCusltill placed nomen of tlie
9th under my orders. Being near the General, I conclnde he has
asked him the question, nnd that the Geueral did not give the order
it. I heve served under Gen. McCaslrill on
or does not
other occnsions, actively enough, und in all kinds of work, but I
never received an order from lzi~iase4fyet that I con remember ; nor
is such the prscticc of armies; yet the General, I dare say, mill not
disavow my doings. Save in rare cases of emergency, requiring me
to use my own judgment, my orders were from his staff, his AdjljuLantGeaera1,his Quartermaster-General, his aide-de-camp,or, in sappey's
work, his engineer ; and so it was on the present occasion. I received the order from l l i ~Quartennnster-&ueml, his authorised
instrument, disobedience to orders conveyed through mhom is n
military crime. Lieut. Mayne lmows best where ha got tho men,
but he wcnt for men and brought them for me to take up the hill ;
and he assuredly did not tell me that though the attack mas sanctioned, i t was enlrusted to other hands.
The Lieutenant-Colonel contin~es: ' Nor did nny soldiers of that
corps act under his orders, to my lu~owledge.' Who, then, led
them, i.e, the party who first gained the little hill ? The LieutenantColonel tells us : ' In justice,' SRYS he, ' to two gallant officers, I
have further to add that, on the occasion alluded to by you, I ordered
L
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Major Huish, of the BGth N.I., and Capt. Ogle, H.M.'s 9th Foot (both
senior to Capt. Brodfoot), to take two compnnies from each of those
regiments and dislodge the enemy from the heights over Eookcy
&il' (a misprint, I suppose, for Eoodee Rhel).
Major Huish, then, commanded ; but first, it nppenrs I have been
transferring to others some of t h e Lieutenant-Colonel's own laurels.
My orders being through Lieut. Mayne, I considered them as Gen.
McCaskill'a ; but knowing the Lieutenant served all masters, I was
not sure whether Gen. Pollock might not be the author, and merely
reported, ' I was directed,' kc.
This, however, excluded Lieut.-Col. Taylor, under mhose orders
I mas not. Now that officer, I make no doubt, gave the orders he
says, whether in consequence of m application from Lieut. M e p e
or not is immaterial ; they were orders any m m coming there mith
sufficient troops mas liltely to give, and on such occasions the same
orders are often given by various leaders ; but I beg to remind the
reader that what I wanted was t7te whole hill, or none of it ; less, I
thought an error.
Having told us he had ordered Major Huish and Capt. Ogle to
dislodge the enemy from the heights over Koodee Rhel,' Lieut.Col. Taylor continues, ' mhich they effectually did in a few minutes,
and to thoso officers is due the credit of that gdlant action.'
Most undonbtedly it is due to them if they did clear those
heights effect~ally.~They were not cleared by me farther than is
mentioned above. Did Major Huisli
a The heights of Koodco Khel
are R l o n ~n a r r o ~hill with steep go farther, nfter I left, than I had
sides, ly& betwen the narrok been ? Were the heights
at
rnlley of Koodee Khel on one side,
all
?
Did
the
enemy's
fire
cease
for
and the villago of tl,e same name
on tho margin of the open country a moment ? Was he ever off the
on the other. This hill, or these crest of the hill till he came down
heights, were the scene of the contest bettvecn us and the Af~hans: to pursue US from the base ? Would
they on the upper part, we i n the to Bod the credit of effectual clearIdwer.
ing ' on thnt occaiion had been ours
to dispute about I To secure that, I would glndly resign my claim
to share in it.
The Lieutenant-Colonel proceeds : ' Capt. Brondfoot, I understand, accompanied them with three or four of his Sappers ; but he
could have no command of a superior officer, Najor Huish.' As to
my commanding ' e superior officer, Major Huish,' I never imagined
I had done so, for I do not think he mas present. He showed every
proper readiness to assume the command when he did come up, but
that was after the ascent of the little hill. He may, hourever, have
been vith the assaulting party, but he did not then make himself
known to me, nor did he lead it, and will not, I think, say he did.
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Neither do I think he mill cout the honour of commanding an
assault a tergo. If he does, I am satisfied to have accompanied '
it ah tlie other end.
Capt. (now Major) Ogle mas present, as I learn from an officer
Gere who mas in tho affair : the
I have also an impression, claim for him is not of command,
but a n uncertnin one, thnt Lieut.
BInyne recently informod me, Major but of having been second under
Ogle had been there, and spolce of Lied.-Col. Huish instead of me. If
my having commnnded a senior. I
know Calk H I L V ~ I Oinformed
CI~
me that mould have pleased him better,
of n si~uilnroccurrenoe in another I regret it mas not so ; and, in every
notion.
case, I deeply regret not having
known at the time that he mas there ;
6 I do not think Lieut. Maync
mentioned his nnmo, but an1 not or rather, that he mas my seni0r.s
sure, for hearing it would have told Lieut. Mayne could not have lrnown
me nothing, as I knew few or no
officers of the force thnl relieved his presence either, or else thought
Jellalabad. I nlade my first ac- me the senior ; perhaps did not adqutrintanoe with Lieut.-Col. Taylor
and Licut.-001. Huish thnt day. I vert to our relative standing at all :
was in another brigade, nnd had from whatever cause it arose that I
been very donslnntly detnched from led where I ought to have followed,
headquarters during Gen. Pollock's stay a t Jellnlabad. I had, I regret it for the sake of an officer
indeed, dined once at the mess of 80 generally allowed as Major Ogle
the SthRegilucnt with Gen. Pollock,
who lived there; but I knew not to be one of our best. H d I even
the nnnws of the oilicers I then known it before giving in my report,
conversed with. Lieut. BIayne may that document should hnve termihave mentioned Cnpt. Ogle's name,
but did not certainly say he wns nated with the occupation of the vilin command, or my senior, and it lage and the enemy's camp. Luckily
could hardly ocour to me under the
Plajor Ogle has not lost much ; the
oircumstances.
affhir was a trifling one as far as we
carried il;, though I wish it had ended as well a s i t was beginning.
This mholo affair is evidently one of misconception, arising from
causes frequent enough in such cases. Lied,.-Col. Taylor prbbably
saw that at least n, portion of the hill must be held, if only to divert
fire from the village, and ordered four companies under Major
Huish Lo seize the part I have called the little hill; but arrangements he ltnem not of were proviously made for the total dispersion
of the enemv" bv" their pursuit to the summit if they went there, and
before Major Huisil arrived the little
Major Huish is gone or going
llonle, but a n oficer,l think, of his
Was
men procured
own regiment, WIIOHC name I do not by Licut. Mnyne for the greater
know, MI;with him when he firfit scl,eme ; but these men Beel,-, also
addressed me; if lie sees this he
present to have been warned for the little
will yelnember (if lie
nt any of our subsequent conversa- p l ~a , d to have been taken awey
tion) my informing BInjor Huish of
tho Other without
the Afghans running up the ridgo
he thought impmoticable, and of Taylor's Irnomledge ; d l likely things
f

f
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h i s part, in the style of one wVho
lint1 7iol come op at first, and thcrcfore I doubt
presence in tho
nttnclc; but I nlny bc wrong. I
snw only a few of thc very foremost
m e n ; people do not look back on
thoso occasions.

cn.

w1.

, "

minutes'conversation among the
ties conccmcd. Now this Lie&-Col.
Taylormight havehad: GeneralsPollock nnd McCaslrill, Lieut.-Colonels
Taylor and Huish, Mniors Havelock
anh Ogle, Lieut. Mnylle and myself
were all together for nearly five montl~safter that, but not a hint
escaped the Lieutenant-Colonel on tllesuhject. He and I served together, and became acquaintances. but he never inentioned the matter,
nor did anyone else ; yet my report
I t was usnnl there to praise
mas
read at the Adjntant-General's
cntnlogucs of officers. I was in the
early p u t of the nction disst~tisfied Oflice, by vnrious parties, before it
with ccrtain parties, but Ihe ar- was sent a8n7ay,
and even gave cause
rangement for a sepnrnto column
was suddenly mnde and impcrfeotly of con~plaintto myself by some who
understood, Above all, inexperi- thought I miilerrated tlieir serence mninly cnused wltat I disliked ; vices.' The events of the action
i t was the first nction for a good
mnny. I would not praise, nor were much discnssed, my share of
wonld I pointedly except. AIL the it and my opinions especially ; and
rest hnd done well. I wid so, and
nnmed no one; but the oEicers in t h e time my report appeared in
with me will see I was not nn- print; but it mas never noticed till
grateful to them.
nov," and then not by letter, but
I do not, however, m y thnt in a way that colnpels me not only
by lapse of time Lieut.-Col. Tnylor to prove I had reason for what I
forfeits his right to claim whnt 1111
oonsiders due to his officers, his said on the controvertecl points, but
men, or himself, when it has bcen to set myself right with my profesotherwise given in despatches, or sional friends, who otherwise could
pnsscd over in silence. Pnr from
it. Some dnyI inny perhnps follow not but think so great a departure
h i s esample ; hut I complnin of his from courteous usage on the part of
Iinvu~gwithout personal inqniry an oficer of Lieut.401. Taylor's rank
t o r so long n period, nnd without
rcfercnce even by letter for eu- and reputation impossible, save to a
planation, written a s he did to a man notoriously capable of arrogdpublic paper.
tina- to himself thc honour due to his
fellow-soldiers. L e t them read this detail, and apply to it, as far as
their judgment allows, the corrections or co~~trrtdictions
it may call
forth. Then let them read my report to Gen. Pollock, and say if
there be a trace of desire to overstate the services of my own corps
o r myself, or to shine a t otl~ers'cost. I am conscious of having
throughout the war in Afghanistan gone to the opposite extreme,
of having scarcely clone justice to the men and oficers who served
under my orders (nt least a s to affairs where I was myself present),
in suffering without remonstrance their services to be slightly

CB. VI

149

CONTROVERSY REGRETTED

Prom first to last they slipped strnngely out of noticed, or lrept o h mind when despatches \\.ere writing: not a t other
times ; indeed, ns fnr a s Itind words and employment gether out of sight,'
went, they seemed favourites.
or in letting others
I nlnst here acknowledge, howovcr, first, that Sir reap mhero they had
R. 8nIe having by nccident discovercd in Jellnlabnd
some curions things of this kind, mnde the nmende sown. I may sufby referring generally to pnst scrvices in the uoxt fer this, but I will
Inndatory order, which h a s not of course bcen published ; nnd secondly, thnt in Gen. Polloelt's Texeeu not also be openly
despntcl~11e mentions me with s o m dragoons in- treated, and by a
stend of Cnpt. Tritton, \vhom I only accoi~qanied(not m m of some mark,
in Col. Tnylol.'~ sonse) e l l nvznlew nnd as a guide ;
he comnunnded his men, not I ; and right good work as guilty of the oppohe made of it. I spolte not to the Incu except to pass site bnsoness.
Cnpt. Tritton's orders, unlcss that on first renching
I owe an apology
the enemy 1 wnrued thosc ncnr me to be cnutiou~,
thnt these fugitives were ztgl]) czutonrew, and got off so-the officers;whose
their horses to fight, not encapc. I mentioned this names are mentionmistnlre in the proper qunrtcr w h e ~I ~found it out,
nnd m o ~ ~ hnve
l d done so oilicially, but thnt the nccount ed. I deeply regret
rcfntes itself. Snppers could not Itcep up with dm- that they and 1:
goons in n gallop of several milcs, which the j h t
bnsiness wns, and then hnd I ~uoddlcdwith thnt de- should be dragged
into controversy, a
spatch at all, I nlust have noticed other matters.

-

" One

thing which, I feer,

opinion I a m not ccrtnin he Itnew nt the
moment, hut he probnbly hcnrd of it, us it mns pnb- seldom raises our
lioly given. I \VIM present when Lieut.-Col. Taylor profession i n the
roportcd the success of the encnly, first to Gen.
hIuCnsldl at Xhodee IIhcl, and nfterwnrtls to Uen. pnblic e s t i ~ m t i o n;
Pollock at Mamoo Khcl. I t \\.as done publicly; bnt when attacked,
Gcn. Pollock was in a crowd nndcr trees in thc galden one must defend.
nt 3tnmoo IChel. The Lieutennnt-Colonel nscribed his
I regret, too, tbet
misfortme to want of due firmncss on the part of a
portion of his troops. The Mnjor-Gencral spoke to some things menme of it shortly nfterwnrds, nnd I Lold him I thought
there wns no renson to distrust Lhe troops for this tioiled lnny not bo
check, that no troops whutever could have stood agreeable to all. I
their ground in such a position. Those on the left differed from Lieut.a t Xoodoe IChel hnd a steep a11d rocky hill in front
occupied by the enemy, while their flank was in t h e (201. Taylor a t Koonir (to si)enk technicallvl, and berond i t Inv n rockv dee Kliel, and did my
rnvhe nhidst broken & I c o u ~ n ~ & d i nground,
~
tlce best toget othurpla&
rnvine Icading down from the enenly's po~itionto the
country on the left and rcnr : the enenly from above, adopted, as I thought
and from Lhc continuntion of tho hills on the left, had this coulcl only end
only to oecupy Lhis, nnd, thenisclvcs secure, envelop
thisbody of men in fire ; and if troops so posted be ns- in evil ; but thi8
sniled, thcn~oruentmust coma when n vigorous charge was a public mattcr,
will rout thcm, be they mho they mny. That moment publicly conilacted.
Afghnns are qnielt t o discern and resolute to use.
They are mnsters in niountain wnr ; individunlly I gave my opinions
brnve, yet cnutious, and watchlul; sltilful in [choos- freely to the Geneing] ground, nud of a coolness ncvcr to be tlisconcerted; swift to advnnce, timely in retrent, nnd ral, the Lientenantexpert in both; theiv nlnssea wcre seldom shown, Colonel h e w them
hardly evcr uncovered to our lire, yet never fnr a t the ticue,'" and t h e
neay wvhcn n hlon could bc struck. This will
npply to nll Algl~nns, hut pre-crninently to the military reader c a n
eastern Ghihics and Eusofaies. Batter arms, orga- judge whether, hold-
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nisation, and leaders would make them troops of the ing the opinions 1
highest order: the want of nll three rendered thcir
Or Was
largest assemblages unworthy of the name of armies, aid' it
nnd they knew this. I have seen in the field nearly not my dllty to atnll the hhiefs who fought against us in Northern her &,&
in
Afghanistan, but 1 only remember two who showed
I'OPQI
first,
of
avertnnvtliinc like militnrv tnlent. and thev were ot verv
suiordi&te rank 0;e, a brbther (or'housin) of th"e ing the dreaded evils,
petty Ghilzie Khan of Saroobee,' showed some skill and
of
and much courage against Sir It. Male's rear guurd
in the Jugduluk pass in 1841 ; he fell in that fight. remedying thein ;'I
The other, Hnji Ali, the commandant of a corps of for with the latter
Juzailchees in Mahorned Akbnr's service, was nt
Manloo Khel, but did not command, for several
I
to
Barukzye and other Afghan chiefs of high rank were recommend the atpresent. Ho was a Tnjik of Cabool, formerly a shoe- tack of the heights
maker thero, and of diminutive stature, all cireumstances lowering his influence: religious zealotry at I h h e Ehel, and
nnd great valour scnrcely snved him from the open consequent occupnridicule ot the lower Afghans and the good-humoured
the
;
contempt of the Rhnns. He was in the villuge of
Mnn~ooRhel in the n~orning,and a s me crossed the and on its being
stream to assail it, the usual taunts and reproaches foundthe el,emy had
between our Afghan snppers nnd their opponents
tnrned from our sideon the Haji's stature and former left Eoode~Ichel, I
occupntion. The ndvantnge he took of the delay of suggested their inthemain force, to assdl our rightcolumn,wns judicious
attack at
and prompt ; the means employed, too, might have
succeeded l ~ a dtime been given. At Koodee Khol he I-Iiss&ruk.~And b~
comnlnndcd on the heights, but the repulse of our
troops from the ground they were on would have
been effected as quickly by any Afghan pensnntry. The prompt resumption
nflcr his success of a post on the line of operation was, howevcr, due to him.
His influenco rose for tho time, but Jugdullulr destroycd it. Tho grouter Afghan
chiefs wore, ns soldiers, one and all below mediocrity.
These evils, however, must not be overrated. Gen. Polloclt's victory was
still complete a s to its primary object of expulsion of the enemy from Numoo
Khol, where he could not be tolerated by a n army preparing at Gundnmuk to
enter the passes. Had the hill Been tnlton, the enemy's rout would hnve been
total, and we masters of all east of the passes; ns it was, he wns able with
rccovered courage to take up the next injurious position of Hissaruk. In itself,
tho mishap was but very partially absolute revcrse; only in tho first repulse
from the untenable ground : our troops rallied when clear of that, and occupicd
gardens kc., keeping the cncmy at bay, and they finnlly retired in good order ;
but it was unfortunate from pursuing to be put on the delensive, and Enally to
be pursued ; with old troops it would hnve mattered nothing hut the lives lost;
with troops only once (I believe) in action before, it risked loss of eonfidence ;
but so excellent were thoso oorps, that it did little or no harm, or if any the
Jugduluk fight sot all right. This check caused, however, nearly aU the loss
sustnined in the 9th and 26th that day, a loss not crcat,
but to be renetted
as
useless.
Townrds Hissnruk \\.as the line of retreat of an army from Cabool, beaten
a t Mamoo Khel by one from Jcllalabad ; but no Afghan army could retire Before
regular troops across an open country; they therefore retreated on Koodee
Iihel, off the Cabool road, out of tho line of operations altogether, nntl, of course,
leaving it undefended; bnt they found shelter in Koodee Khel valley, which
was too narrow to be safely entered without first seizing the hill between it and
the village. Had we taken that, the valley d s o wns ours with much of the grain
of the neighbouring country thero stored, nnd the enemy h d no further refuge,
r .

Sarubi, a fort sixteen miles Irom Teziu.
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no choico but destruction or utter diapersion. Hence my anxiety for the hill to
be carried. The enemy, however, knew
his true point, and, finding us cheeked,
went to Hissaruk. The country in that
direction is not so open as farther east,
and was irrigated ; but there was nothing
to stop an nrmy.
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it remembered, though junior
two sO1iliers
be
equal) to Lieut.-Col. Taylor, 1
was not
himrn He commanded a regiment, and so
did I ; when we were on the
same duty,& of course, obeyed ;
and he never, I believe, found me reluctant. I n fact, when I have
been under him, it was in most oases voluntary. When the Sappers
were distributed in detachments I might have ridilen in dignity
with a nominal headquarters, but I went where I could be most
useful, though as a subordinate, and always put myself under such
an officer as Lieut.-Col. Taylor with pleasure ; yet I mas in s
position without impropriety to do as I did in recommending the
completion of the work.
After all, the difference between us is one of opinion ; and if he
has made a mistake, all soldiers do the same ; the best alone learn
by them. The general voice,
p This mns, homever, so (listant as to
homever, was with him a t the
be almost a separate rmge, just within
cannon shot of the lower heights. At time. Beyond the Sappersand
Koodee Khel the village was within long some of the Staff, who had
musket range of the top of thc upper Iiill. served in the previous camHad the little hill been in the same line,
the fire directed at it would have mndo paign, I know not if any officer
the villnge a vcry uncomfortable post.
at Mamoo Khel sided with me
then. Even at Jugdulnk the
q Ng artillery comrades of Alghnnistan know how highly I valued them and attach of the upper rangep
their arm ; and at Roodee Khel I longed was only ordered after much
for Major Bnckhouse and his nlountnin delay and a vain q
cantrain; but we used sometimes to forget
that, save in breaching and other excep- nonade, and then Gen. Poltional cases, it is n eo-opomli~tg,not a lock r vent against eminent
main arm, still leas to be used singly.
Indeed, we were too npt to make one aTm advice. I t settled the hill
attempt the work of all, or to usc them question, and Lieut.-Col. Tayeuocessively instead of together.
lor, soon after, at Tezeen, the
On Gen. Pollock telling me his re- day before the action with
solution to attack, and ordering me to Mahomed Akbar, showed, in
join it, I expressed my huppinese thcreat ; a brilliant hill affair of his
when hc mentioned its being opposed by
own, that the lesson had not
tho onicere of rank he had consulted.
been lost.
If anything now written gives pain to Lieutdol. Ruish, I shall
regret i t ; he is not the assailant, but he is the assailant's battle
horse, and the one cannot well be repelled without the other. If
our acquaintance at Roodee Khel began a little roughly, i t soon
became friendly. I n our conversations, he may remember I sought
neither command nor credit for myself, but urged him to take his
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men on to finish the work; and if I presumed to remonstrate or
advise, he will not perhaps forget that I excused and illustrated
what I said by refcrence to our
Major Havelock will bonr witness own errors, and their punishthat in our many conversntions at this
time, I urgcd only tho perforinsnce of ment in Gen. Sale's force the
the service by the oflicers and the troops year before: though ditiernenrest tho plnce, not my being employed ing in opinion, me parted as
or tho Sappcrs. Once only I volunteered
the latter for the main attnclc on the friends. Later in the day I
following dny, on hearing some talk of heard with sorrow of his
' a mero socrilice of men.' Throughout
tho mar I was much employod in separate wound ; and rejoiced when
me met again as comrades in
commands, but I never askod lor them.
Kollistnn, where, and in the
passes conling back from Cabool, I ever found him the active aud
$allant commander of a brave and willing corps.
To Lieut. Mayne I offer no apology for using Iiis nnme. H e
will see it is unavoidable. I have little doubt of his remembering
the nmin facts, but I am going across the sea, and reference would
cause much loss of time ; our conversations are given, therefore, i n
considerable detail, lest any link in the chain of circuiustances
should have escaped his me' This is also the reason of my giving mory, Which these may reso m m y other details,
call.'
R e will, I doubt not,
tell Lied-Col. Taylor where
he got tho men, as v e l l as whether or not he led me to understand
I was to lead them; and I feel perfectly sure it will tnrn out that
he obtained the men in a proper way, and never exceeded the limits
of his duty, whether h e acted by direct orders from his superior, or
by using the discretion left in such circumstances to all staff officers,
and especially to one i n whom all above him justly placed so much
reliance as they did in him.
I cannot ask editors of other papers to insert all Lhis, but I trust
those who copied Lied-Col. Taylor's letterwill inform their readers
Ulat so~nethinghas been said on the other part, and tell them where
to fil~dit,
I am, Sir, your obedient servant,
G. BROADFOOT,
Bnjor,
A.D.C, to the C/ov~?no~-G~nwal,
lute comnaa7~dingSq111ers and ilfin~rs.
Spenoe's Hotel : March 18, 1843.

T h i s letter, besidcs bcing useful as a complete account of
tho operatiom ali Mamu Khel, ~ l l o w st h e high soldierly spirit
which anilnated Broadfoot on all occasions,
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After this affair, Mamu Rhel was occupied for a fen, days,
and t h e troops returned t o Gandamalr on August 30.
Brondfoot wrote many letters during the hi1t at Gnndarnak,
of which two, ncldreesed t o Mr. Loch and Mrs. Bayley, are h e r e

reproduced.
Camp near Gundumuk : September 5,1843.

My dear Sir,-I liave, ns you horn, usually addressed o few
lines each nlonth to the mother of my poor fi.ienc1, Capt, 3 h c lrenxie ; and I puqosed doing so this month, but I can only give
news of him so disheartening, that I think it best to put yon i n
possession of dl we as yet Itnow, with a view to your malting
Mr. Buttcrnrorth Bayley acquainted with it, nncl he, I doubt not,
mill communicate to Mrs. RIaclrenzie so much of it as may be
desirable.
Mahomed &bar has removed the prisoners towards Barneean,
except two, Captoins Troup elld Bygrave, whom h e retains near
liimself; and two laclies, Jlrs. Eyre and Mrs. Anderson, too ill to
be removed. V i t h them he lias left Dr. C~mpbell. TVhether their
husbands are also loft, is not, I believe, linown.
Poor Yackenxie last month had n very sovere illness; from
which, however, he has since recovered. . IllLen the captivity of
these unfortunates will encl, it is now impossible to say.
I t mas my intention to have written you nt some length before
now, but I have been prevented; first, by being sent out in this
direction six weolcs back, with a detachment so small as to be somewhat unsafe. I t could not, however, be reinforced a t the time ; and
I mas consequently obliged to break u p the confoderncy of the surrounding clans by rapid and unexpected lnoverncnts against them
severally, while they believcd we \\we on the defensive, I n this
may me managed to b r i q the ndlole country round us into submission ; but the fatigue to men and officers was escessive, and is
now telliug on us in great siclu~ess.
I was next detached to a place, Tatang (not that of our maps),
abreast of this (about five miles south), to dcstroy a strong fort, belonging to 3Iohomed Acbar.
On Gen. Sole coming out to Futehabad, I joined him ; but
being now known to all the peoplo for many miIes round, I had Lo
act a good deal as interpreter, &c. Nearly a fortnight back Gen.
Pollock camc out here aud sent back to Futehabad for the Sappers,
who arrived just in time to take part in a11 affair with the enemy on
the 24th ultimo.
For tho last few days I have been unwell from fatigue and exposure, which, with very constant work in my commissiuiat capacity
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(for 1 feed my omn people and cattle), has prevented me from writing
any private letters.
Our force is now concentrated here. The troops are abundantly
numerous, and of a quality equal to meet nny enemy; but an
inefficient commissariat cripples us. Tliere is no excuse for it.
Had Gen. Cullen been here, difficulties wodld scarcely have been
heard of.
We march, if possible, to-morrow. Two days ago, I strongly
urged the formation of a dep6t here, and 1 hope it mill be
done. The oficers most about the General to whom I spoke,
agreed; bul the Geuaral l~iinsclfmns natuwlly anxious to carry
as many troops as possible to Cabool. Rut I shall be apprehensive as to our coinmunications if this end of the passes be leit
ungaarded.
I also urged the General to abandon all tents, and put the native
troops on half rations, which are ample for mere subsi~tence. He
had Iscfore reduced the tentnge one hnlf, and has now yielded as far
as three-quarter r:~tioiis. The tents will never be pitched in the
passes; and at Cabool there is nothing to prevent our occupying
the inhsbitants' d ~ e l l i n g sas in Europe. The cai~ingeof the tents
would convey more fiiclc and wounded than we can now nccommodate, m d warm clothing for the cold weather now at hand; two
points of first-rate importance. The General mould do this, but that
h e is perhaps a little too sensitive to the inurmurings, which are
only heard from those who are undeserving of notice or consideration.
There i s no difficulty before u s that a moderate share of foresight
and good management cannot overcome; and I am, therefore, in
hopes, notwithstanding our deficiency in carriage, thet all mill go
well. Wc ought to be getting over what have much injured us
heretofore, a foolish contempt of the enemy, causing rnshness, and
then a miserdle timidity, almost panic, on finding this rashness
producc its inevitable effects.
Yon are perl~apsaware that Lord Ellenborough has paid me the
very flattering compliment of placing me on his personal staff. In
fact he has in every way shown m e the most distinguished Itindness.
I suspect that in this I am indebted not a little to Lord Elphhxtone's
kindness, which has been very great indeed, and unremitting. I
sliall probably never again meet him, but I must ever feel grateful
to him.
Gen. Nott is now well on his way; but any combiliation at
such a distance, mld with a communication so completely closed,
is out of the question. Each force ought to be strong enough to
do the work singly; and then the want of perfect concert is harm-
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less. We are strong in all but heavy artillery, engineers' tools, and
gunpowder.
The enemy, however, is fortunately not a formidable one. Still,
I should have liked greater preparation for every event, and, above
all, a better supply of carriage; in one word, nil efficient commissariat. However, my next mill, I trnst, be from Cabool, and announce amde success.
The Governor-General has provided for young Cuminghnm (a
son of Allan the poet), one of my officers, who, 011 the close of hostilities, goes into the Mysore Commission. I am now ansious to
see something clone for 0rr and for our surgeon, Dr. Porsyth, regarding whom I ventured to writc to yon; and these will doubtless
also be
for, seeing that Lord Ellenborough scerns resolved
to piclr out for promotion those he considers working men.
I was very sorry lately to hear your hedtli had been affected in
the early part of summer. I trust it is now re-established, and that
Miss Loch and the ?nid&j are also well. Givo them both my very
best wishes, and believe me kc.
G. BROADFOOT.
You mill, of course, hear from other channels of Fnteh Jung,
the son of Shnh Shoojah, and lutely nominal king ut C~~bool;
having
escaped to this camp.
Gen. Nott is said to have defeated the enemy at hlookoor, about
five marches south of G.huznoe.
I was pained to see that poor 6en. Elphinstone was accnsed
at home even of personal cowardice. No one could less deserve so
base an impntntion. As a high-spirited, honourable man, his family
need not blush for him. Than his military measures, nothing could
be more feeble and ill judged, but, as he himself said to me, before
the rebellion broke out in Cnbool, he wns gone in body and mind ;
nnd had it been othermise, incapcity as a commander-errors, that
is, in judgment-is scarcely a fit subject of vituperation.
The following may be aclcled as additional testimony in
favonr of the unfortunate General.
Eldred Pottinger, in o letter t o Col. Buller Elphinstone,
zmnouncing Gen. Elphinstone's death, and forwarding a memorandum found among his effects, renlnrked that t h e opinions
of the unprejudiced in the army coincided with those expressed
in the General's memorandum. Further, he continued, t h a t
h e and his compnnions in misfortune were at a loss which morc
to admire, the noble fortitude with which the General bore h i s
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p e a t reverse of fortune ancl excessive bodily pain, o r the constant
he shon;ed during his prolonged illncss in regard to
t h e ~ v a n t sand cases of others in preference to his own.
Next clay Broadfool wrote to Mrs. Bayley :
Camp nenr Gundumulc : September G, 1812.

1 1&ear
~ Mrs. Bayley,-We were to have marched this morning,
illla however much I regret on other accomts our delay till tomorrow, I rejoice that i t gives me an opportunity of thanking you,
before we move into the passes, for two letters ml~icllnothing but
a n unseasonable attack of ilhlcss, conjoined with the bustle of preparation for the journey, lins prevented me from cluly answering.
Not that I have been very unwell, but from having been for the
last six weelts detached, me had fallen into arrears of pay, and these
accounts, with a11 preparations crowded into a few days, nlado a,
very little illness indispose me more than o, much severer attack a t
other times.
I began this letter i n the morning, and have continned almost
word by word amidst incessant interruptions, till il is now dawk
hour, and I must close.
The day's delay has caused an entire change in tlie order of
ndvauce, and has throvn apparently all into Gen. Sale's hnnds,
which has not raised the hopes of the poor Company's men, of fame
a t least in despntches. However, time will show. The poor old
General (gale, I mean) has, I fear, prejudiced advisers around him,
a, thing very mischievous a t all times, and especially now. But
you must redly pardon me for all this mrnp gossip, with which, to
say the truth, I am so stunned, that it runs from my ears to my
pen, almost without my ltnowlcdge. I n fact, you callnot imagine
wlmt barbarians we are in camp, positively all nlen d I M C idbe, or
monsters d mille i d h ; end I do seriously ~,pprelienilthat I shall
never again be able to conlport mysclf decently ill civilisccl society.
You must at any rnte take m e in hand for a time ; tame the bear,
in fact, for such you will doubtless style me.
Again interrupted, but now by a man t h e e days from Cabool,
who says our poor prisoners and the royal filn~iliesmere cnrriecl
offby night ; that the force senl lo succour Glluzriee had relnrned ;
thnt Mahomed Altbar was in vnjn trying to nssemble :I, force to
meet u s in the passes, but that the troops we boat tlie other day,
with Ghilxye reinforcements, were awaitiug us on this side of Jugdulluk. 1 apprehend no opposition we shall not easily overcome ;
for Gen. Pollock, if not a Napoleon, is superior l o any general
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officerI ham yct chanced to meet in those regions. 13ut I nm falling
back to the o m iden, so I must, with promises of fnture amondment, beg you to offer my kindcst regards to all your circle, and to
believo me ever, my dear i h . Bayley, most truly pours,
G. BROADFOOT.
P.S. I used to write to Colin's mother al~onthim, hut could
not lest month or this ; the news was too cheerless. He is. I believe, safo, and will eventually bo restored, but when is uncertain.
The day after this letter was written,PolIoclr's force marched
for Ihbul.
Again, as before mith Sale's brigade, the posts of honour
vere assigned to Bronclfoot's Sappers ; they led the advance
and were the last in the rear gnarcl.
The first half of Broadfoot's Sappers were immediately followed by the 5th company of the Bengal Sappers and Miners,
Baclrhouse's mountain train, nine cornpallies of a Native I n fnntry regiment, four guns of Abbott's battery, aacl three cornpanies of a European regiment. I t is belicvecl that this order
was followecl in the aclvance guard throughout the n ~ a r c hto
Kabul ; except when the disposition had to be varied for pnrposes of attack.
The rnnrch to S~irlihah,i~inemilcs, took over five hours,
though the troops merc ullmolestccl by the enemy. Traces of the
unfortunate Iiabul army were everywhere to be seen, but most
frequcnt new thc conical hill close to Ganclamak, where tlic last
stand nrns made. Snow had fallen after the ICabnl army mas
destroyed, and the sewre frost, together with the snow, had in
instailccs preserved the bodies, so that recognition was possible.
These silent yet eloquent witnesses to the value of a convention
with Afghans, appealed to their comrncles for retribution. Some
of the troops had already sworn, at the request of the wives of
the destroyed men, to avenge their huebands.
Next day, September 8, the force marched for Jngdalnk.
Defective intelligence resulted in Pollock fincling the enemy in
consiclerable strength wherc he was ignorant of their existence.
Broadfoot evidently considered the fighting in the passes on
this occasion so very slight in compnrison with what he had
Been when Sale's brigade fought its way though, that he left
little on record concerning these marches. It is sufficient to
say that on this day there was fighting, and where that was
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thiclcest there mere to be founcl Broadfoot and his men. Briefly,
when Pollock saw t h a t the enemy, mostly on this occasioll
Ghilzis, conld not be disloclged by artillery from their positions
on t h e hills which commanded the road, he resolved o n attacking them by infantry.
For this purpose Capt. Broadfoot was detached to the estreme
left of the enerny's position, and his Sappers commenced ascending
a steep hill on tho lop of which the enemy mere entrenched in a
sungah.' ? . Cnpl. Broaclfoot had conlplotely succeeded in the
lie made, and the enemy mere dispersed in every direction, a,
large body of them rotiring to the sunlmit of a high mountain.
On this apparently inaccessible height they plnnted thcir standards
showed every demonstration of maintaining it. As the achievements of the day would hare been incomplete were they suEerod
to remain, I decided upon dislodging them. The following troops
ndjranced under cover of CapL. Abbott's guns nnd those of Cnpt.
~aclthouse~s
rnountnill trnin : B.M.'s 13th L.I., one company 26th
NJ., one comyany 35th L.I., 5th company Bengal Sappers and
Rroadfoot's S~ppers. Scldom have solcliers had a more arduous
taslr to perform, end never was an undert~~king
of the Itind Elmpassed in csecution : these lofty heights were asseulted in two
columns led by Captains Willcinson and Broa~lfoot.~

.

The discomfited Ghilzis fled, carried off their standards, and
their position was occupied by t h e assailants.
Another event of the day deserves to be recordecl. Backho~zsehas stated t h a t the enemy having opened rather a warm
fire on the left flank, Sale ordered him to draw up his battery
on that flnnlr, not to fire, but t o use them ' a s a parapet or
traverse to intercept the enemy's fire.'
It is probable t h a t t h e molultnin train was unnecessarily
exposed by Sale's order, and its commancler was with reason
indignant. The Afghans had used our dcad soldiers a s a
protecting rampart, but it is by no means to be accepted that;
r
a n English officer deliberately put a living corps t o a ~ i m i l a use.
Sungah,' mtngw, properly saltmade of
stones, or stones and tho trunks and
branches of trees, behind which the
defenders can lira on l~ssailontswith
comparative immunity. In the passes
2
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011 this occnsion, the bodies of our
destroyed army formed no inconsiderable part of the works. See marginal
note, pnge 141.
' ' PolIock's defipatch.'

The next marches, to Kata Sang on September 9, nncl to
Seh Baba on the loth, were made witliout fighting.
On the l l t h , Polloclr ma-rchecl to Tezin; e fern pnrties of
the enemy posted on the heights mere clisloclged by the fire of
the artillery of the advance g~iard.
Here he was joined by the 2nd division of his army under
Gen. IfcCaslrill, and the combined force lialtcd to give the
carriage animals much needed rest. The immediate eflect
of this halt was that niluhammnd Akbar allcl the Afghans,
attributing it to indecision, determinecl on n fiilnl struggle.
He scnt the majority of the prisoners towarcls the Hindu
Kush nnd Turlristan, collected his forces, nnd marched to
Tezin.
On the 12th, towarcls evening, the outposts were assanltecl
by the Afghans with great courage. Backhouse has related
that s piquet of Broadfoot's Sappers was very vigorously
attacked, and its defenders were getting the worst of it, at s
stone's-throm distance from our main body, though on n very
high steep hill, when a company of thcir old comrades, the
13th L.I., came to their assistance, and the Afghans were
dispersed.
Col. Taylor of the 9th, to mllom reference has alrencly
been made, mas sent out to clrivc back another party of the
encmy; he had about 250 men of his regiment, and was
joined by Major Huish and n small party of the 26th N.I. ;
with this little force he attacked and clrove them before h i n ~
up the hills. When the Afghans arrived at the top, they
established themselves there and kept up a heavy fire; but
Col. Taylor, with skill and gallantry, brought up unperceived
a small part of his little force, and then snddenly attacked
the Afghnns in flank, who, surprised, fled incontinently clown
the steep hill, and during their flight suffered severely.
Licut. Elmhirst of the 9th clistinguislied himsclf pently on
this occasion.
Next day, September 13, the force marched to Khurd
Ihbul, through the Tezin pass. A party mas dotached to
turn the hills far to the right of the advancing army.
On the advance guard arriving about the middle of the pass, and
turning a, projecting rock, the enemy were discovered quite close in
front, swarming on the hills right and left of the pass, and brisk
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firing illstnntIy commeilcod on both sides. We had advanced witho,lt due precnution, the heights not having been crowned, and were
in consequence somewhat tnlicn by snrprise, and conside~abledelay
in atbclzing the enemy for time follo~ed.~

.

Gen. Pollock in his despatch dated September 14, 1842,
has recorclecl that on the morning of the 13th ' it was perceived Chat the Afghans hacl occupied in great forcc cvery
height not already crowned by our troops.' The eflect was,
tllcrefore, that the heights to which Backhouse refers, mere
cromned by Afghan instead of by British troops. The former
had been first in tlie ficlcl, aacl lrad occupicd the placc of
vantage. The Afgllan force on that clay is computed to have
amounCecl to 16,000 mcn, led by the principal chicfs, among
~~rhoru
Pollock mentions ~fuhammaclAkbar I<han, Aminnlla
I<han, chief of Logar, and Muhammad Shah Khan, Ghilzai.
When the British troops ascended the hills to drive the
Afghans ofl, a cletermined struggle crisued ; the Afghans came
cloyil to meet them, and in more places tllan onc oil that d:iy
thci-e ma8 a practical exhibition of sword vcmus bayonet.
Eventnally the latter c a l ~ i e dthe day, and thc enemy was
driven from one position to another, till Che Hsft Kotal done
remained in Cheir hands. Here they made n final and rcsolute
stand, but it availed not. ' The fincst sight of the clay was
Capt. Broaclfoot 'md the diminutive Ghoorlcas of his corps of
Snppers pursning the enemy from crag to crag, sncl climbing
heights which appea.rccl inncccssille, till they stood on the
highest point of the Haft Kotal and nrcrc enabled to look
down on the enemy they had chasecl.'"ient.
Cunningham
~ 4 t ha party of sappers o~tptureda 24-pounder howitzer, and
another was taken by a party of dragoons nncler Capt. Tritton,
and horse artillery under Uajor Delafosse.
The rear guard mas under Col. Richmond, who afterwards
held the al3pointment of Governor-General's Agent on the
North-TYcstern Frontier, one of the most important in India.
His arrangements for the protection of the bnggage mere
describccl by Gen. Yolloclr as judicious and aclmirnilc, and
deserving of the greatest credit.

' Bnckllouso's journnl.
Marshman's Life of Ilnvclock, ohnp. iii. p. 128.
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Capt. Broaclfoot on this occasion mas mentioned in despatchos.
I a u r d Kabul mas rcnchccl without furthw opposition, and
shortly after c1al-k the army mas encamped there. The inarch
on the 14th was through the Khnrd Iiabnl pass, across which,
about the miclclle, the encruy had erected two bre~tworlis.
They were found unoccnpiecl.
The sight of the rernains of the unfortnaate Kabul force in this
pass was fearfully heartrending. They lay in heaps of fifties and
llullclreds, our gun-wheels passing over and crushing the sliulls and
other boncs of our latc cornrncles at almost every yard, for thee, four,
or five milcs ; indeed, the whole of the ~nnrcliesfrom Clnndamali to
I(abu1, a distance of about seventy-seven miles, may be said to have
been over the bodics of Lhe massnored army.G

I

Polloclr's force rcached Butlrhalt mmolcsted, save by one
solitary Afghan, who, plnced to his satisf;wtion high among
the rocks, nmused himself and virlclicated his patriotism by
maintaining an unequal combnt. History does not tell
whether he mas ltilled or woundccl ; not improbably, he that
evening, in the capacity of peaceful villager, visitecl the
British camp ancl sold chickens, or such othcr property as lie
l~ossessecl, a t an extravagant pricc.
Capt. T r o q ancl Dr. Campbell, two of the prisoners,
joined the force on this clay.
Next clay, September 15, 1842, Polloc:lc marchecl unmolestecl to Iinbul, and pitchecl his camp three miles to the
east of thc city on the olcl racecourse. The second, or it m y
be callecl the first, instalment of the prisoners arrived, as Capt.
Troup nncl Dr. Cnrnpbcll nl>pear to have returned on thc
riigllt of the 14th to bring in the others. These were Mrs.
Trevor and eight children, ancl Capt, ancl Mrs. Anderson and
three children.
On the 17t11, Gen. Notl ~ r r i v c dfrom Xaaclnliar, and encnmpecl about three miles to thc west of Kabul. On the
sa,me dey the prisoners, who hncl virtually offccted their own
liberation, mainly through the exertions of Eldrecl Pottiuger
and Capt. Jolirison (a favo~lrile01 the Afghans ancl proficient
in their langaage), met Sir Eichmond Shslrespear, who had
gone out in qucst of them. On Soptembor 22, they mere all
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&e in thc British camp, exccpt Capt. Bygrave, nrho did not
come i n till the 27Ch. Thus the objects for which Che Governments of India and England had striven mere accomplislied,
and all that remained was to inflict a rncasure of p~mishrnent.
which should be felt by t h e Afghans, and to withdraw the
army to British India.
Gen. Mott arrived at Kabul on September 17, having
with his well-ccluippecl and efficient little force defeated the
Afghans vherever they could be induced to oppose him. R e
was very angry when he ascertained on rw-rival that Polloclc hacl
only one week's s q p l y of provisions, for that fact maclc delay
nt linbnl probable, ancl snch delay was contrary to the wishes
of Government. He also mm that whilst delayecl, the provisions for his onrn forcc, calculated to last till they arrived at
Jalalabncl, wonld be consnmecl. Pollock, on the contrary, seemcd
in no hurry to move. Inflnencecl apparently by 1\9mcgegor
and Lawrence, he proccedecl to install Fateh Jang on the throne
of Kabul. All t h k was intolerable to Nott, who nnclerstood his
instructions, nncl ostimatecl at their proper vnlne the ceremony
of installation, and Afghan professions of devotion. I-Ic believecl
he could leave a lasting mark of retribution on Kabd, ancl retiro
before the enemy had time to collect, am1 beforc the approaching
winter should arrive to aicl them. 13s feelings on this subject
are e~l)resscclin letters to his (laughters, dated Septcmbcr 26
and October 7, 1842.
Why we are remaining here I Imow not. I11fact, I luiow nothing,
end am not admitted into the State secrets of a set of boys, by whorl1
Gen. Pollock seems to be surroundcd. . . . I do not think that m y
disaster can possibly occur to such an army ; but this I do lmow,
that if it mero possible the people in power here would nccomplish
it ; whether their n7ant of energy and decisionwill bring it upon us,
a fcw days mill shorn.
What wo are staying for I am utterly at a loss to Iri-~ow,unless
it be to be laughed at by the Afghans and the whole world. . . .
Had I commanded,I would have blown up the famed Bala Rissar, and
at this moment shonld have had my little veteran army at Pesha~va~.
Fortunately, the season as yet has been nnusunlly ~nild,or our lncn
woald have snEerecl greatly ; but what man of sense would have run
d
atteiidn~~ce
the risk, for the sake of following at the heels ~ , n dnncing
on a set of Afgl~ans,whose hands are still red with tho blood of our
murdered couiltrymen ?
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DESCRIPTION OF ISTALIF

The chicf of Logar, Aminalla IClian, had, during thc fortnight aftcr tho bi~ttleof Teain 011 September 13, collected ,z
number of chiefs and their followers in the neighbourhood of
Isthlif, o town on the road boin Ihbul northwards to Chdriltdr,
in that pnrt of the country called Koh dimiin. He mas one of
the most inveterate foes of the British, and it was consiclered
advisable to despatch n force to tnlre Istalif, and to disperse his
adherents. Gen. RIcCaskill was selected to command, and a suitable force, includhg Broadfool's Sappers, the 9th Foot, the 26th
N.I., anil Bnclihouse's mountain train, mas placed at his disposal.
IInvelocB sccoml)nnied the force os Dcputy Assistant AcljutnntGeneral, and in his Life7it is claimed that he not only designed
the operations, bul directed and exclusively controlled them.
Vithout concccling this in the full meaning of the words, it is
probable that Gen. McCasltill mas greatly indelhecl to I-Iaveloclt's
high soldierlyqualities for lhe brilliant victorywhich mas gaiued.
Eldred Pottinger, who was presenl;, and whose serviccs on that
occasion mere of great valne, recognising Baveloclr's worth,
said to him that his presence a1 Icabul during the time of trial
there mould have nltered the aspect of affairs. To him Hawlock replied, < I will not unclertalte to say that I could have
saved Cnbul, but I feel confident that George Broadfoot mould
have done it.'
The t o m of Istalif is beanlifully situated on the slopes of
the hill to the west of the Kabul road. I t has a somewhat
pyl.,zmidal form; thc larger tarraces being at the foot wilh
others above, as the different ledges of ground permit, ,nl.ndually
diminishing in ~vicllh. I n front are orchards, vineyards, and
p i l e n s , ndled anil affording excellent cover for defence.
Oen. McCaslrill's force encamped in the plain three or
four miles from the town. Major Snndcrs, an able officer of
engineers, afterwards killed at the battle of Maharajpur, rcconrloitrecl the position the evening before the nttaclr. He
was fired on from Ihe gardens, but condnctcd his reconnaissance
\yitll perfect coolness till ordered to retire.
The night mas intcnsely cold; a strong bitter wind was
followocl in the vcry early morning by l~arclhost. The attack
commcnced soon afler daylight; Brigndicr Tulloch on the left,
I
i\Inrsh~~lnn's
Lijc o j Hr~veluck,p. 133,
2
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and Brigadier Stncey on the right. Of the former or left nttnclt
the General w o t e :
I cannot express in nilequate terms my admiration of the style in
which the former colunm, covered by sliirmishers, rushed upon the
gardens filled with bold and sliilfulmarlismen. H.M.'s 9th, the 2Gth
N.I.,and Capt. Brondfoot's 'Sappers \-id
with each other in steady
courage, and their rapid and unhesitating ailvanoe soon left the enemy
no resource but fiigllt.
T h e lower part of the town mas then stormed, and soon the
Afghan belief in the impregnability of the virgin fortress began
to be dissipated. F r o m the top of the pyramid, first a few,
thon more, and lastly d l who could get anray, began to stream
up the hill in flight. One of the first to go was Aminulla, l h e
chief, and after him the crowd mas mainly composed of women
and children. To their flight no opposition was offered ; but
when afterwards pnrtics of the Afghnns occupied the heights,
and fired clown on the lown, now in the hands of tho British,
Backhouse mas deputed, with his mountain guns, to dislodge
them. This he did in gallant stylo.
Lieut. Elmlihst, of the 9th, again distinguished himself by
capturing a gun, and at once opening fire with it on the enemy.
Though most of the women escaped up the hill, yet many
were in the town mhcn it was abandoned to fire and sword.
Of t h e contents of t h e houses, much turned out to bc plunder
from t h e unfortunate Kabul force. The women were respected :
there were many anecdotes concerning them, among others the
following :
Capt. Broadfoot at Istalif saved a young girl from death, in the
midst of a f~uiouscombet in n, narrow street. Shellad the exquisite
beauty of the Iiohisteni women, both of form and feature, and appeared about seventeen.
She clurig to his feet a d poured out her gratitude with all the
fervour of an Oriental, whose blood r u s like fire through their veins ;
she said sho would never leave him, when a sound struck her ear ;
she started up, listened for a n instant, and then cried out, ' Oh, my
child ! Oh, my life ! ' and notwithstanding all Capt. Broaclfoot's
ont~entiesand nssurances that lie would himself seek the infant, the
young mother rnshed backinto the deadly conflict, end there doubtless perished.
Another is, t h a t two men of the 9th, having captured a
Recoived from Nrs. H. C. Mnckenzie.
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very pretty girl, not wisl~ingto fight about hcr, agreed to tom,
it being provided that the \rimer should marry her when they
could find a, priest. No sooner s;~idthan clone : triumphant,
the minner marched off mith his prize, mhen he was disagreeably interrupted by an order to malre the yo~ulgperson over to
the political officer. The man remonstrated, but in vain, and
he parted from the girl exclaiming, 'By Jasns ! it's a hard case,
tmcl I pledged not to offer her any violence till I married her.'
RIcCaslrill's force procecclcd northwards and clestl~ogecl
Chnrikar, where the Shah's Gurkha regiment had been cut to
pieccs, and where William Broaclfoot had ercctcd a s h e to
the memory of James, killed at the Parwan pass. The force
returilcd to I<ubul on October 7.
Broadfoot was wouncled in the hand nt Istalif, vhere his
conduct was again mod clistingnishcd, and added to tl, repntation which was rapidly clistancing all competition.
The business now before Pollock was to leave a signal
mark of British power on the Afghan capital, and to get away
as ffist as possible.
For the former, he selectecl the destruction of the bazaar,
and a mosque in which, it is believed, ;"Iacnaghten's bocly had
been exposccl.
This was carried into ciTect Ly Capt. F. Abbott, the commanding engineer; and Ihe a m y , in three divisions, lest Kabul
on October 12, 1842. By November G they were encamped a t
Chamlranni near Peshawar, having haltecl for a fow clays at;
Jalalabacl, and employecl the time in destroying the fortifications raisecl by Broadfoot during the memorable siege.
Proper precaution having been neglected, the army snffcred
some loss on the march ; amongst those wouncled was Lieut.
Neville Chamberlain, then known as a brave and good officer,
afterwarcls the most conspicuous member of a family of fine
soldiers.
Broadfoot wrote to Dr. AlIalcolmson from Chamlranni on
November G :
BIy first attempt s t writing with a pen : I can as yet only uso
forefinger and tl~umb,and that gives pain to a slight extent.

I believe Nott is now through the pass. The army canw in tlireo
divisions : the first loet some baggnge and a few men ; Lhe second
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suffered a sciious disaster ; the third, as far as I h o w , llns come well
through.
I am much grieved a t seeing the lostre of o w arms thus tarnished
by our own mismanagement, for by this alone can we lose either
baggage or guns. I moan a p i n s t Afgllan enemies. Poor Wild is
ngain the unfortnnnte, but from all I hear tho blnme is neither with
him nor with the troops. I n days of yore, yon and I used to hold
being a good officer cheap enough. I now begin dmost to reverence
one, noL for nny extmodinary difficulty in being able to commmncl
modcrntely well, bnt from the rntity of those who can do it.
Had I been Gen. Polloclc, I would Ilave tnrnecl back with the
whole force and subdued the Khyber, n thing never yet attenlpted
by us, and pnniihed the Khyberees thronghout. Ten days would
easily do it, and this item would but lead to our militmy reputation
being brightened. Nothing of the sort, however, mill be clono.
I prccede the force, I believe, a clay or two, to make ghats
(npproaches to fords) at the rivers.
Thcre is nn incomplete sentence in the letter noting the
varions losses of the three clivisions sincc they left Kabul, nnd
sa,ying that all of them might hnse h e n avoiclecl. Thc copy
of this letter was made by a clerk in Messrs. Forbes & Co.'s
honsa in Bombay, nncl is nccompaniecl by a few hurried lines
t o Ks6: Broadfoot from Dr. Malcolmson.

I have no time to add more, or to correct the copy. I heard horn
Colin McKenzie, George's friend and mine, the day before. He tells
me t r d y that besides George there is none worthy to lead in that
nrrny. If I can I shall send a copy, bat the mail closes in su hour,
and I have yet much to do.

The copy does not appear to have been sent; allowance
will be made for the language of enthusiastic friendship such
'ns Maclrenzie's and B1alcolmson's; but others not by nature
clisposed to exaggeration, among whom mas Hnveloclr, held
much t h e same opinion ; t h a t is, theylookecl on Broadfoot as
the illan among t h e m all best fitted for command, though
there were others with thc force not only fit to lead armies,
but capable of doing it well ; and among the younger men none
more so than H e n r y I-Iaveloclr. His expressed opinions mill
be fo11nc1 fnrther on.
Whilst on the march towards Firozpur, through what mas
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then t h e independent Pmljnb, Broadfoot wrote from Camp,
Jllanjnli,g December 12, 1542 :
Accept my best thanla for your letter: you must jndgc how I
value it, when I Lell you that this is, I believe, the latest day for the
Jnnuary packet from Bombay, and I take from pressing work, time
to thanli you, though I thereby show my ingratitude to wwc!pulrcti'al
correspondents. . .
T h e Jelldabad garrison has been reunited, nnd this day marched
from Gen. Pollock's camp a t the Rttvee in order to enter Peroxpore
separately, and after a few days to be aspersed for over.
Gen. Pollock's force follows, and then Gen. Nott's. There is
alreacly there an army of reserve ; when all are united the force will
be 86,000 or 40,000 men. A Sikh army nearly as numerous will,
it is said, asscmble on the opposite bank of the Sntlej ; and its the
followers, that is men and women of every conceivable description
a n d rank, mill not be less than 200,000,' our canvas city will not be
a small one.
Such a demonstration is by no means nesdless after a measure
so liable to be misrepresented ns our abando~mentof Afghanistan.
S h e r Singh, the son and second successor of old Runjcet, is coming
to m e e t Lord Ellenborough at the Sutlej. There will be nothing but
reviews and entertaini~lenLs, such as perhaps since the Romans,
13uonaparte alone has, ont of India, bcen able to eshibit. Alas I all
this is rendered to me at times painful, and always far other than it
would have been a few years back, by the losses we have since then
suffered.
I shall meet Lord Ellenborough for thc first time at Ferozpore ;
b u t whether I shall become one of his family, as i t is technically
called, at once, or superintonil the dispersion of the corps I have raised
and in such stirring scenes commanded, I know not.
Lord Ellenborough has indeed been a most liind friend, a i d he
is most consichate. I t is ;t rule in genernl, that the pay of a new
situation begins only on joining iL. Rnt an old escoption existed in
fn,vo~u.of the Governor-General's aides-de-amp. Lord E. toolr the
tronble to 11avcthis proved against the oIBces of nccount, and I was
duly apprised of it, withont any 11inL or application from me, direct
or inilircct. So I have now not lost by the abolition of the Shah's
service ; nor sllall I do so till I scparatc from the corps. I shall do
this with sorrow, for nobly indeed have they stood by me. Willinm's
portion of it I broke up s t Peshawur, oscept a few individuals, who,

.

Four marohcs from Piroqmr on
thc rond from Shekhopilm to Rnsiir.
The figure seenls large, but with-

out doubt the numbor of camp lollowcrs was very groat.
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having served under James and William, tuo.lckl not 90. W11et I n,m
to do with then1 I Iinow nota2
To settle (111 the account~lof tho corps gives me no slight labour,
considering that i t must be done on a m a ~ c h .

A few days afterwnrds Ihoadfoot wrote the following letter
t o Mrs. Bayley :
Camp, right bnnk of the SnLIej : December 16, 1842.
My dear Mrs. Bnyley,-Pour kind note of the 3rd came yesterday,
ancl to e n d l e me to aclinowledge it, I have risen at 3 a.i\l.,the day
being sure to be occupied more t h m enough ill preparation for tomorrow's tamasha, and for tlie brcalcing up of the poor Sapper corps,
which is now approaching dissolution. I-Iitherto we linve been distributing medds, which, with the gsg ribbon, have thrown the garrison, m i l above all, the men of the Sa,ppcrs, into a very amusing
state of joy. The latter worthy corps amused themselves till a prctty
lrzto hourlnst night, with periodical cheers, just so tinied as to prevent
each interruption to sleep boingforgotten before another came ; and
as it would have been criel to interrupt thcm, I suffered patiently,
but a m now in consequence so abomi~~sbly
drowsy, that had I the
slightest chance of being alone linlf an hour, for some days, I would
delay snying how glad I was to hear from yoursclf, of your being so
fcw recovered, and thnt the little beauty was well. Master Bayley
is a very fortunate youth, is lie not ? As to Colin, h e left us at the
Rnvee, and has since bcen here with Mr. Clerk. He is better, but
still unwell ; and he has amazed the peoplo here, I: understmld, by n
display of velvet ancl gold almost equal to Shah Shoojali himself
when i n his glory. The ladies say ' he is n love of a man,' kc.-all
mllich Colin tali& meekly. Only fancy his having planned this groat
success even in Calsool, and his hnving always with us worn dresses
a falreer would have pitied. Pray tell him his glory has reached
the capitnl, but do not spread i t nbrond, for he has still mother change
of rainlent wherewith to dazzle your Calcutta bright eyes. Thus far
had I proceeded wllen interruption the first occurs. A gentlernnn,
sceing a light i n this tent, hopes to be forgiven, kc. I cannot forgive,
but I must endnre him, and finish this note in the nest tent.

' Tho following nnrcdote, comnlunicatod by Mrs. H. C. i\lnclieimie, is
illustrutive of tho influcnce, nnionnting nlruost to fnscination, which
Broadfoot had with thoec wild sawges.
Cnpt. Pelly in 18GO told me thnt
in h f g h u n i s h ~h e encountered a inan
who had been Broadfoot's servant,
and asked him d ~ o u t h i s master.

' Do you think,' filiouted tlie mnn, in
tho prcscucc of d l tho Afglianfi, ' t h t
if Broadtoot Snhib were alive, I \vould
be tho servnnt of tlie son of Dost Muh a ~ n y Khnn
l
?' Cnpt. I'elly oft'eretl
him scrvicc. 'No,' lic snicl, ' 1 will
nevcr sowe another sahib ; Broadfoot
Sahib was n father to me; I slldl nevcr
see another like him.'
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We cross the Sntlej to-morrow, and are followed speedily by
Generals Pollock and Nott in snccession. The 13th and 35th mill
look very grand ; bnt alas I for the Sappers, who have never received
their uniform, and must even appear in sable (not fur) as before.
However, we have never been renlarlmble for benoty, tund mud even
endure to be told by ladies fair, as I mas the other day, that we could
only be taken for cool~iss1 I remembered that in Calcutta, charity,
like beanty, would abound, and was consoled.
Believe me, my dear Mrs. Bayley,
Yours very sincerely,
G. Bnoansoo~.
Give my Itindest regards to all your circle ; I have not yet seen
Lord Ellenbo~~ough,
and lmow not whether I join him at oncc or not.
On December 17, 1842, the Jalalabad garrison crossed tho
Sutlej, and were received by thc Governor-Genernl and the
Commancler-in-Chief with the honours clue to their exceptional
scrvices ; and of those thus received, Lord Ellenborough
selected Major Broadfoot as the special object of distinction.
R e rcmarlrecl that as Major Broaclfoot had customarily led the
army i n action, he, a t Ihe head of his Sappers, sl~oulcllead it
on its triumphant return, nnd be the first to cross the river.
Next clay, Gen. Polloclt's force crossed, a,nd on the 23rd
it was followed by the dir~isionunder Gen. Nott; with the
latter arrived the gatcs of the Somnnth temple.
Thcre was m u c h feasting and rejoicing, much marching
about and reviewing, much spcech-mslring, and the firing of
many guns, much joy in wclcolning the return of friends, and
much sorrow for thofie who could return no more.
Broadfoot's letter to Mr. Loch asking for a cadetsbip for
Dr. Forsyth's son will be remembcrecl. Thc following is in
a c k a o w l e d e n of the very kind way in which the rcqncst
was granted :
Cnmp nt Bemzpore : December 20,1842.

Rfy clear Mr. Looh,-I have just learned that an express for the
overland mail is cLosing, and I wail myself of the opportunity
of assuring you of my gratitude for the cadetship you have so
generously conferred on Dr. Poruyth's son. ThoDoctor is now wit11
a cavalry regiment, and received the first intelligence of your goodness from Mrs. Forsyth. The opening sentence of a note announcing it to ~ u will,
e
I am sure, give you pleasure. He says : ' I am a
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happier Inan at this moment t h m I have been for years. Mr. Loch
htbs in the most generous manner given my son a cadetship, and
has written a most Irind letter to Mrs. Forsyth annouucing it.' If
the youth is at a11 like his father, he will do credit to your pntronage.
You will lmow better of all the doings here from other sources
than I can tell you, even if time allowed me to enter on them.
Gen. Polloc1~'sforce is now all here, and Gcn. Nott's is a t hand.
Tho army of reserve was drawn out to meet the Jellalabad garrison,
and a magniliceut body of troops they are. No continental army
could show so large a force of such men. We, of course, made but
a sorry figure beside them. The troops are delighted to enthusiasm
nlith h e ionours conferred on them.
My own corps, for a night or two after getting their medals, I
believe, I~ardlyslept ; and awoke us also Ly their frequent cheers.
Lord Ellonborough certainly linoms how to deal with soldiers. A
measure of retreat, for the first time i r ~our kistory, has bcen made
to produce the fceling of conqnest ; and this was ncedcd, for, notwithstanding our successcs, I a t first npyrelielldcd that our withfrom tlfglm~istanmight injuriously affect the troops.
Lord Ellenborough has been most kind to me : hehas announced
his hitention of sending me to tho Tcnasserim coast as Commissioner. On t k s topic I should elllarge, but have no time. There
mere, I believe, attempts at something like jobbiug the succossion
to Nr. Blm~dell,which partly led to my nppointment. The sitnation is one I may be proud to fill ; yet I look with much anxiety to
taking it np. My experience there leads me to thin11 there is nlucll
reform needed, and that it mill be painful and difficult either to
acco~nplishor leave untried.
Orr is here, and receiving the honours due to his distinguished
gallantry. I n fact he and Lieut. Cunningham are not in h a t respect to be surpassed by any of the younger men of thearmy. Lord
Ellenborough is kindly disposed towards him, and I have made
known to the private secretary his wish to enter the cavalry of the
Nizain's service.
OEer my kind regards to Miss Loch, and believe me, my dear
Mr. Loch,
Very sincerely yours,
G. BROADPOOT.
Allusion is made in tho prececlii~g letter to Bro,zdfootls
appointment a s Comiuissioner. After careful consideration,
Lord Ellenborough had selected him to succeed Mr. Blundell,
and had written t o h i m :
Silnla : October 10, 1842.

Sir,-I

had reason to s q p o s e that Mr. Dlundell, the Commis-,
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sioner in the Tenasseri~nProvinces, intended to resign his appointm e l ~ and
t to go home in the ensuing winter, and I 6 a d intended to
appoint you his successor. I hnve to-day llnd an intimation that
Mr. Blundell hesitates about carrying that intention, which he had
announced, into effect. I hnve written a letter to him, which will,
I think, induce him to adhere to his original pltu1, and in that case
you should tttke possassion of your government by the middle of
February. In any case, I intend t l d you should succeed Mr.
Blundell as Commissioner in the Tenasserim Provinces.
You will not make any change in your movements on account
of this probable event, but return with your corps as you w o d d do
if you had no employment in prospect on your return.
If your men would go over the sen, as I dare say they would
with you, I will try to make an arrangement for your having 100 or
150 of them a t Mmilmdn, where they will be very useful to you.
I congratulate you sincerely on all the honour you hnve acquired.
I remain kc.
~LL~NBOROUGH.

This was a, very handsome dmowledgmenl of Broadfoot's
ability and services, on the part of the Government of Inclia :
t h e higher reward and more valuccl honours came from the
Quccn.
I-Ie receivcd brevet rank of major from October 4, 1842,
and the ' Lonclon Gnzette ' of that date contained his appointm e n t to be a Companion of the Bath.
Broaclfoot had been recomrne~~decl
for t h e w honours with
the other o£ficcrs a t Jalalabacl, by Sale, for his services on the
m a r c h from Kabul, and cluring the defence of Jelalabad.

CHAPTER VII.
Selections from Lord Ellenborough's correspondence-ntnrquis of Welle~lcy
to Lord Ellenborougll-Principles
which gnided Lord Wellesley - All civil
authority to be subjected to the Gcnernl in commnnd-An etticient nrmy
an cKccdual gunrnntee for pence in India-Protest ngninst nuy permanent
occupation of Afghanistan-Education
in India : Lord Broughnm-Lord
Ellenborough's notificntion-Policy
announced gcnernlly approved-But
condcmned by Lord Pulmerston-Real question at insnc.

THEnews of the victories and the liberation of the prisoners
diffused universal joy. The English Government congratulatecl
Lord Ellenborough, and expressed the opinio~lChat his signal
oxeriions mere beyond praise. At the same Ciine the clestruction of the bazaar and mosque i n Kabul was blamed, ancl attention was invited to excesses said to have bccn uommittccl
by oar troops. This imputntion was denied by Pollock and
by Nott with warm inclignation, but the accusation was forgotten in England before the clenials came to hand.
Among many letters received by Lorcl Ellenborough about
thifl time, none surpassed tlmt addressecl to him by the Marquis of Vellesley in interest and value. Lord Ellenborough
woulcl seem to have asked for his advice and opinion on the
state of Inclin, and the principles to be followd in gowrning
the country. The reply arrivecl in two insCalmenta ; the first
mas a.clmowleclgecl on August 16, and the secoiicl on October 5.
The memornnclnm will be read with the respect to which it is
entitled ; whilat the coinciclence bctween Lord Ellenborough's
acts and Lorcl Wellcsley's opinions cannot fail to be observed.'
The letter and the first half of
the memornndum will be found i n
The IncZian Ad~tt&istraticm of Lord

EllenBorougA,pp. 171-176 ; the second
half has not, it is believed, been previously published.
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Kingston House, Knightsbridgc: July 4, 1842.
M y dear Lord,-No less powerful cause than severe and repeatcd
illness would have preventedme fro111 sooner obeying your Lordship's very flattering commands, SO obligingly communicated lo
me, ' to give you my opinion on the present condition of the great
empire,' now-happily committed to your Lordship's chnrge, a i d so
long entrusted to my hands.
Your Lordship is so well acquainted
the general affairs of
India that it would be presomption to suppose that I cilll add anytliing to that linowletlge (so little the study of most 13ritish statesmen). B u t I can esplnin the principles on which I acted, the
causes of my success, or fnilure wherever I kiled, nnd I can thence
derive some rules of conduct which may be fomnd useful for t I ~ e
consideration of m y successors. These statements I now submit to
your Lordship in the inclosed paper, with tlie most sincere good
ivishes for t G prosperity and glory of your Lordship's goven&ent
and with the most confident expectation of your final snd triumphant success. Ever, my dear Lord,
Your faithful hiend and obliged servant,

L

\

M~SLORAXDU~.
(Scmet and c o ~ ~ f i d e ~ ~ t i a l . )
When I tooh leave of Mr. Pitt at a great dinner which he gnve
to all our friends, Lord Cornwallis and Mr. H. Dundas (afterwards
Lord Melvillej were present. I n the month of November 1797,
Lord Cornmallis assured me that I should have no trouble, that 118
71ad sottlatl ~ u ~ ~ y t l ~tlmt
i n gI, had nothing more to do than to send
for R R P ~ O(now
W Sir George, theu Secretary to the Govennnent), and
to follow his advice in everything. I could not resist the tern@tion to ask what I mas to do if Berlow were dead ? or sick ? or gone
to Europe for health? This question produced a general laugh,
which greatly discomposed old Cornwallis, then tottering on the
brink of the gmve. Before I arrived in India, at the Cape of Good
Hope I hnd the good fortune to meet Col. Xirl(patriclz, n, most able
military servant of the Company, who prepared me, by his lrnowledge of the real state of the native powers and of our militnry
sitnation, for what I was to encounter ; and how vein and idle was
poor old Cornwallis's reliance on the good faith of Tippoo I and on
t h e strength to be derived from the treatics with the I\lal~rattrths
and the Nizam ; both being already under the inflnence of France,
with n, French army ruling the state a t Hyderabnd, in the Dekan,
and in Hindostan, Delhi, and Agra, kc. kc.
I lllid not been a fortnight in C d c n t t ~ when
,
I receivcd the
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account of Tippoo's treachery with the French and -all Lhe native
powers, and also with the Affghan power, then in the Lands 'of
Zeruaun Shah.
1 cnlled out the army immediately, with the universal resistance
of every authority in India. I was told horn Madms, that not o,
nlan or a gun could be moved sooner than in sin: or tzoclve months.
But I persevered, and I was nobly supported by the Government at
holne (then in the hands of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas), who, on the
very day I issued my order, signed a clespatch to me directing me
to do what I had actually done ; nmely, to put the army into a
state of preparation for action.
The present condition of our h d i a n Empire is certainly not so
perilous as i t was at that crisis ; treachery and bad faith on the
part of enemies and native allies, combined with nvalrness and imbecility in our own counoils, had exposed 11s to thegreatest dangers
on all sides, without any adequate lneans of lnecting them. Now
we ]lave n, great itnd rtdequatc force at our disposal, and the i l r e d f d
blows which have been inflictcd on the spirit and discipline of that
part of our army enlployed at Cabnl have not been felt in other
quarters to any great estent ; and it may be considered certain, that
the noble army now on its v a y and nrriving from Eugland will
arrive untainted, and fully preparcd with its usual auperiority to
repel any foe thnt may nttempt to meet it."
From what llas been already stated, it is evident that I did not
axive at the Cape on m y mamyto lndin imbued with a spirit of concluest, andanambitious desire of extending our territorial possessions
by violence and war. I arrived in the full hope mid expectation of
finding and of preserving, not merely peace in Inilia, but per~nanenC
security, and with a general disposition to preserve tranquillity and
goodwill among the native powers. What I had begun to fear from
Col. ICirlcpatrick's statements, v a s sadly confirmed by the event,
and no mar ever was more strictly necessary and just than the war
nrit11 Tippoo S ~ ~ l t in
a n1799 !
Although I never viewed a marlilce policy in India as suitable to
our condition, or calculated oitller for our safety or our glory, I was
not ignor,mt that our tenure of India originally rested on a military
basis, and must be preserved by the maintennnce of our military
strength. The condition in which I found our nimy was therefore
a total departnrc from thc first necessary principle of our existence
2 Some slight verbal clifferencos
&st between the letler ns it is here
quoted, nnd as it mas printed by Lord
Oolchester.
The additional words wcre intro-

cluoed by Lord Wollosley in his duplicatc copy, which wns forwarded to
Lord Ellenborough the mnil nftor tho
original lettor was despatched.
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among the powers of India; and I proceeded instantly to correct
that vital defect. This is the first object wbich must be brought
m d e r the consideration of the Governor-General of Inilia.
Your Lordship, however, is under no difliculty in Lhis respect.
I need not to your Lordship observe, that a11 army unequipped with
all the necessaries for its prompt movemcnt is no instrument of
war, bilt ainere use1er;s burden. At all time$ therefore, t h e British
power in India should possess and maintain, in activity and discipline, an adequate army (as it mas termed in my time) ' i n the field.'
The principal station of the army should be on our northern nnd
~vesteinfrontier. My brother Arthur has cominunicatecl to me, with
his usual kindness, some very able papers addressed to your Lordship and to Lord Fitzgerald, in the whole of which I entirely concur.
I n these papers he points out the proper stations and distribution of
o w forces, availing himself, most judiciously, of Lord Lalte's conquests of Agra, Dellii, kc. kc., by which such strength was added to
onr frontier i n that quarter. No further estension of our territory
is ever desirable in India, even if war for conquest could b e justified
or were legal, as the lam most wisely now stands.
Your Lordship, I am satisfied, would rejecl; Affghanistnn and
Cabul, with their roclts, sands, dcserts, ico, and snow, even if S c h a h
Soujnh had bequeathed them as a poace oflcring to England ; although perhaps the ends of criminal justice may require t h e presence
of a British force there for some time. I hope this point will be
I was
lefL entirely to your discretion. I n a cnse s o n ~ e w l ~ asimilar
t
enabled a t Benares to bring the murderers of Mr. Cherry aid of
other officers to justice. If your Lordship can do the same by t h e
murdcrcr of Sir W. i\Iacunglltun, I shall r~,joioe.~
One of the main canscs of my success in the operations of t h e
army, was my entire undivided confidence in the officer plnccd in
the chief command of the troops employed. So f w was I from t h e
enornlous nbsurclity of intermixing the civil and military authorities,
or thc still grcator of pcrinitting the civil authorities to embarrass
the military by iiirect interference and by usurpation of command,
thaL I subjected all civil auLhority to the general officer i n the
chief military command. This will appear fully in my publisl~ed
despatches, in one of which I have used thc phrase, ' T h e General
carrieil with him the full a'uthority of the Governor-Gcnerald t o the
gates of Seringapatam.'
T h e appointment of my brother Arthur to the command of tllc
gaxrison of Seringapatam was censured, as an act of criminal pax"he
first hnlf of tho momornn- vcrnmonl ' wns nscd ; i n tho duplidurn onds here.
cute ' Governor-Gcneral ' was subsli1 I n tho original the word ' Gotutod.

176

NECE.SPTY FOR EFFICIENCY OF THE ARMY

CE. VII

tia1it.y ; but it mas no act of mine ; I never interfered in any of the
Colllmsnder-i~~-Cl~iePs
snbordinate appointments, ns hc and all his
family and friends well Imew, and must now romen~ber. But tho
appointment of Arthur 011 that occnsion was most inclicious and correct. Baird, though a very brave fellow, mas an officer of no temper
nor judgmonl.
Your Lordship's snperior knowledge renders nny advice on such
subject superfhons and allnost inlpertinent ; but the colnplaii~ts
agaillst Sir TVilliau~Macntlgl~teu'sinfluence and exercise of direct
colllmand, both by himself and even by his inferior civil agents, over
every branell of the army in Afi'ghanistnn, have been so loud and so
jnst, tllttt it i s as impossible not to regard them as it is (admitting
their truth) not to ascribe to that cause the main source of all our
calanlity and disgrace. I n my brother's letter to yomLordship, I
perceive that h e llas particuIarlypoiiltedont thismost fatal error. I
refer to it as being dinmetrically opposed to my example ; and ns, in
my judglilcnt, viewiug all its collateral consequences, an evil which
leads directly to the clestruction of onr power in the East.
The meintenance of onr army in a constant state of vigonr (and
of active motion, the foundation of all vigour) is no ~ ~ t ~ r l i but
lie,a
truly pficific,policy ill India; for if the British power of active nlilitary
movement should decline, mar of the most terrific aatnre, accompanied by confusion and anarchy, must ensue. The pewe of India
is maintained by the military strength of the British power. Nothing
can telld so directly to impair the vigour and nctivity of our nmies,
as the interference of subordinate civil agents in the detail of their
movements ; it would be strange to see a British army commanded
by cleAs and secretaries from the oficial buroaux ; but still more
strtlnge to see such a body ttppointed and autho~~isocl
by the State to
usurp nnd to exercise the military power of the generals and otl~cr
officers,which the State had regularly confided to their hands. This
evil can be corrected only by the discretion of the Governor-General ;
and as I an1 confidenh that your Lordship's hand mill have correctecl
it before this despatch can reach you, I will not dwell longer on the
subject.
By accident, while I was writing the above paragrapl~,a newspaper entitled ' The Fricnd of India,' published at Berampore, unrler
date March 17, 1842, mas communicated to me. I t contains, in
a letter signed Ve~itns,an extrnct stated to be taken from a letter
of the late Sir W. N.lacnagllten. This estract sufficiently proves the
extreme danger of the practice to which I have requested your Lordship's attention. I t is a violent attack on the character of the British
a n l y serving st C a b d ; and it is stated to proceed from no less
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nnlhority than Sir William liacnagliten. The person nd1o made mo
(within these few minutes) acqunintecl with this document, acquainted
me also with (what I mas ccrtain must follow) your Lordship's immediate censure of tlie person mllo liad been so incautious as to givo
circulation to this most dangerous paper.
This is among the worst consequences of the employment of
civil servants in military commands. I t toads to create and to foment
reciprocal jeelousios, and in place of uniting, to divide the services.
I need not add liow much I admire thc promptitude of your Lordship's
interference.
I always considerecl the honour of the troops acting under me
as my om11 ; and I viewed their interests in tho same light. I think
thosc gallant men, mlioso ineinories I must for ever venerate nnd love,
redly returned my sentiments ; and that a part of their nrdour in
service was to bo ascribed to their confidence in my gratitude and
affection.
I always disapproved the inclination of the Court of Directors
to recluco the allowances of the military to the lowest scale, and I
5ncurredmuch disfavour, but felt no repentance, nor remorse, on that
head. I confess, I loved (that is uot an expression of sunicient
strength), I arlorcd that army, which, in tho execution of my
ordors, 11ad raised illy name to sucli an eminence of glory, and has
so much esteuclecl and strengllieilcd Lhe enipiro of my country.
After this true esposilion of tlie deepest feelings of iny lleart, your
Lordship will fully appreciate the anxiety milh which I have viowed
the whole courso of thc late disastrous and melilnclioly scenes in
AEghanistan.
I n my time two great militnsy failures occurred : the retreat of
Col. Monson, and tho abandomncnt of the siege of Cllurtpore. >Ionson aclvancecl rashly in clisobediencc of alders. He wns n brave ollicer,
who had done good sewice. Pour Lordship will find on record my
reasons for sparing his character. The failure at I3liurtpore was
entirely a question of practicd details of tho scionloo of fortification.
Neither of those failures in the least affectod Ihe spirit or disciplinc of the army. Monson immciliately afterwards clistinguishcd
llimself very highly ; and the troops employed at Clmrtpore, in subscquent operations under Lord Ldie manifestocl the same couragc and
order which had always been the character of 111s whole Urilish
Indian army.
With r c p r d to solno 1.ocont iinputations on tho army, and mil11
cvery indulgoncc to tho menlory of a clever but not wry discreet,
ficcretnry to the Ii~diitnC+ov~ri~meiil,
I rcjcct tllc O V ~ ~ I CofO liiiii
and of all his followers on this mattcr. Wlintcvor of cnlnniity
N

befell us 1nscribo to the first fatal error, ' the empbywm! of cioil
elfirks5 ijt lligh military co~nmnwds.' I have not liearil that either of
those truly British ofiicers, Snle or Polloclr, has complained of this
failure of courage in the troops under their command.
I am ignorant of the intentions of her Majesty's Government
regard to the future policy of the British power in India. Your
first object must of co~irsebe to recover your prisoners, especially
those of the female sex, end of high ranlr (whose detention is a
sliocliing disgrace) ; and to take up the natural stations of your
strength, so ably described by my brother Arthur. Whether, in the
course of this proceeding, you will be able to bring any of the traitors
and mnrderers mho surround all your stations in Affghanistan to
justice, id certi~iillyan important consideration. Perhaps without
sucll a display of power no settlement can promiso security; of this
matter your Lordship will form the best juclgmcnt, bnL at this early
moment I must protest against any notion of a permanent occupation of Cnbnl, or of any permanent settlement in ~Mghmistan. On
tllis matter I trust I am not mistaken in believing that your Lordship
collcurs in my sentiments, and therefore I will not lengthen this
already too long letter. But if I shoulcl find myself mistaken, I &all
feel it to be my duty to urge the reasons which appear to me to domonstrate that any plan of settlement in Affghanistan would l e d to
the greatest calamities, and must (if it ever terminated) end in disgrace and ruin,
I hope your Lordship mill not take the trouble to answer this
letter. I shall not write again unless you desire it, but I shall always
be happy to ansmer any questions you may propose.
Your Lordship, I believe, mill find the Protestant Church respectably established in India. When l arrived there it v n s in a disgraceful and lamentable state; I laid the foundation which has since been
nobly aud greatly improved by the Church of England.
With the most sincere and ardent wishes and expectations of
your Lordship's prosperous government of a country whose interests
and happiness must ever be dear to me, I remain, my dear Lord,
Pour Lordship's obliged and faithful servant,
I<ingston Bouse : August 4, 1842.

WELLZSLZY.

Postscril,t.-Pour Lordship is better acquainted than I am with
the recent intornal administration of our Indinn Empire ; I havo not
therofore writtell anytl~ingon that subject, But I mill here nlalte
0110 observation.
The expression 'civil clerks ' is inaccurate ; Lord l~ellesleyllleans membcrs of the Civil Service.
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EDUCATION IN INDIA

I mas concerned to hear that some inquiry had been commenced
respecting the valiclity of some of the tenures under the peruanwt
settlement of the land revenue. This is a mosli vexatious end surely
not n prudent measure. Here the maxim of sound ancient wisdoru
occurs most forcibly, Q1~ietnlwnmouere. We avcici~tEylish scttle~s
in Tnhznd have felt too severely the hard hnnd of Strafford in asimilar
act of oppression, not to dread any similar proceezng.
W.
Amongst Lorcl Ellcnborough's numerous corresponilents
nmy be mentioned the great Elchi, Sir Stratford Culning,
afterwards Lord Stratford de Bedcliffe, our ambassador a t
Constan tinople ; Baron Brunnow, the Russinn ambassador; ,znd
Lorcl Brougham. The latter took much interest in education
in India, and was so much gratified by the King of Oudh having
translated his trcatise on tlie oQjects, advantages, and pleasures of science, and hnving sent him a copy, that he acknowlcdged its receipt i11 a legible autograph lelter. ' A compliment,' Lord Ellcnborough remarkecl, 'which I did not t l i n k
he wodd have paid to any sovereign iu the world.' Lord
Brongham's handwriting n7asordinarily execrable.
As to edncntion, Lord Ellenborough considered that our
system in India began nl the wrong end of society. Sons of
clerks and baboos in the revenue or jnclicid departments,
and of othcr persons belonging to thc lover classcs, wcre
taught to read Milton, Pope, aud Shakespeare ! In writing to
Lord Brongham hc aclvocatecl a favouritc idci~-th~establishment of a nolde collegc ond a noblc guarcl : thal is, a college
and body guard, in d i c h thc sons of tlic nativc aristocracy
nligllt be educated and cmployecl. H C also wrote in thc samc
letter : Thcre is indeed no limit to the pl.ospcrity of India
generally, whicli the eye of the most sanguine stotcsmnn cnn
reach, if pcople in Engli~ndwill only have the goodness not to
insist upon govenling India :wording to the latest London
f a l ~ i o . ' I t woulcl be well if it merc more generdly realisccl
that Englisli hshions do not suit the Indim climate ; and that
the pilblic abuseof public rucn and Govern~uent,here apastirue,
is there a clmger.
The views and general policy of lhe Govern~nentof Indin
are expressed 111 Lord Ellenborougl~'~
notification.
N 2
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Secret Dcpartmcnt, Bimln: October 1, 1842.
The Govcrnmcnt of India directed its army to pass the Indus
in ordcr to cspel from Af&anistan a chief believed to bo hostile lo
Eritiuh inlercsts, nncl to rcplace upon his throne a sovereign 1-epresentcd to bc friendly to tlioso interests, and populrrr with his foriner
snbjocts.
The chief bclievcd to bc hostile becnme a prisoner, and the sovereign represented to bo popular was replaced lipon his tlwono ; but
after events which brought into question his fidelity to tho Government by which ho mas restored, h e lost by the hands of a n assassin
t l ~ othrono lie h d only held amidst insurrections, and his death wns
preceded mcl followecl by still existing anarchy.
Uisnstcrs unparalleled in their extent, unless by the errors in
which thoy originated, and by tho treachery By which they mere completcd, have, in 0110 short campaign, been avenged upon every scone
of past misfortune ; m d repeated victories in the field, and tho cnpture of the cities and citadels of Ghnziii and Cabul, havo again
attached the opinion of invillcibility to tho British nrms.
Tlie British army in posscssion of Afgliailistan will now bo witharawn to the Sutlej.
Tho Governor-G enerd mill leavo it to tho Afghans then~selvos
to create a Governinent anlidst the anarcliy mliich is the consequeixx
of tlicir crimes.
To force n sovereign upon a, reluctant people, would be ns inconsistont with tho policy as it is with tho principles of tlie British
Government, tcncling to placo the arim and resources of that peoplo
a t tlio disposal of the first ii~v,zder,and to irnposo tho burdcn of
supporting a sovereign without the prospcct of benefit from his
allini~ce.
Tlie Governor-General will willingly recogniso any Government
approved by tho Afghans themsclvos, wliicli shall appear desirous and
capablc of maintaining friendly relations with neiglibouring states.
Content with tlio limits nature appears to have assigned to its
empire, tho Government of India will devote all its efforts to tllc
establishment and maintenmco of general peace, to tlio protootion
of the sovcmigns nncl chiefs its allies, ma to the prosperity a11d
liappiness of its own hitliful subjects.
The rivers of tho Punjab and Iildus, and tho mountainous passes
and the h r b n r o u s tribes of Afghanistan, will be placed betweell the
British army and an cncmy npproaching from the west, if iudced
such an enemy tlloro can be, and no longer betmeon the erqny mid
its supplies.
Tlie onormous cspenclitum rcquired for tlic support of a large
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force, in a fnlsc military position, at a distarico from its own fionticr
and its resources, will no longcr lurest every measure for the improvement of the country a d of thc pcople.
The combined army of England and of India, superior in equipment, in discipline, in valour, nlld in the oIEcers by which it is cominandcd, to any force which call be opposed to it in Asia, mill sland
in unnssdlable strength upon its own soil, and for ever, under the
blessing of Providence, preserve tlie glorious enlpiro it has won, in
~ccurityand in honour. '
Tho Governor-General cannol fear the misconstructiou of his
motives in thus franltly ianno~mciugto snrrouncling stntes the pacific
and couservalive policy of his government.
Afglianislan and Chim have seen at onco tlio forces s t his &apo~al,and the effect with which they can bo applicd.
Sincerely attaclied to peace for tlic snlte of the benefits it confers
upon the people, the Governor-General is resolved that peaco s l d l
be obs~rved,ancl will put forth tho wholc power of tho Uritish
Governnlenl to cocroe the state by which it hall be iufringed.
By order of thc Right Honourable the Govcnlor-General of
linilia.
'P. II. J L ~ ~ n o c r r ,
Secretary to the Gove~~~mcnt
of I n c h ,
zuitl~the Govcrmr-Gcmral.
Generally spealting, tho policy annouilaced in the proclnmaLion was approvcd both in England and in India. I n both
countries thc rcslorntion of l w c c was nclcomccl ; whilst the
clcfcnce of Jalalalxd, cornbincd with tllc marchcs of l'ollock
and Nott, Iin,cl scomcd to restore the lustre of our arms, mdly
tnrnishecl by the ICabul disasters. The rccovery of the prisoners and the relaxation of the &-ail1 on Indian finance cornpleted tIic gencral satisfactioa.
Tho wisdom ancl propriety of the course adopted by Lord
Ellenborough mere louclly praised by the Conservalive nemepaperfl ; and such was ./he feeling of iriumphant joy, that it
mas proclaimed that all now saw ' the utter absurdity of a n y
fears of a n invasion of Indin through Ahfghnnistm, whether
from Russia, Pcrsia, or indeed a t all.'" It was gravely stated
that such ail invasion could not be made by more thnn 20,000
mcn, who could with case bc disposecl of, evcn if rcinforccd
by as many mom Afg1;llans. I n another nenlspapcr,7 thc satisSfnwclnrd, Mondny cvcning, Noven~bcc28, 1842.
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faction with which the news h a d been received, of the safe
withdraval of the British forces from the inhospitable regions
of Afghanistan, was noticed. I t was stated that the liberation
of the prisoners was the main object of Gen. Pollock's espcclition; and a hope was expressed that the Governor-General
of India ~vould,in future, confine the operations of British
armies within the frontiers of his dominions.
On the subject of the policy of vithclrswal, however, Lord
Palmerston m s explicit ; he spoke of the eternal disgrace the
abal~clonmentof the country would affix on England :
I never mas more convinced of anything in the whole course of
my life, and I may bc believed when I spealr nly earnest convictjon,
that the most important interests of this country, both commercial
and politicnl, would be sacrificed if we were to secrifice the military
possession of the country of Eastern Afghanistan.
Hely on it, if you nbandon llie country, thongh yon may have a
less ;~rcluousduty for the present, and though yonmay relieve yourselves from some little difficulty by a retreal, the day will come
d ~ e you
n mill be colllpellecl to reoccupy that country at an infinitely
grealer espense of money, and at an infinitely greater sacrifice of
human life, than wo~lclenable you to retain it now that it is, as I
trust I may say now, in your possession.
In reply to this Sir R. Peel stated that he would not adopt
the objects of the noble Lord, nor make mar for the sakc of
promoting the study of Adam Smith among the Afgllans.
The ' Times ' condemned Lord Auckland's policy : ' We
believe their policy to have been wholly false. We believc that
the attempt to establish by force a British influence in Afghanistan, mas itself an error.'
I t is curious in studying the newspapers of that time to
notice how precisely reversed are the attitncles of the two
great parties in England. Then the forward policy was nnclertaken and ad.crocatec1bytlleT17higs, and by them were theappeals
mainly made for vindicating our honour, and re-cstablishii~g
our prestige, grievously dnmaged by the Kabul disasters.
The Tories, on the other hancl, vere not ashamed to deny all
necessity for snch vindication, o r that there was dmgcr to India
from the Kabul clisnsters, and to proclaim as ~nonstroust l ~ c
idea that it was necessary to avenge upon the Afghans the result entailed by oui*omn folly, by our own crime.
Times, Jnnunry 7, 18.13.
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The despatch mritteii by Lord Ellenborougli about the gates
of the temple of Som11nt11has Leon generally conclemned. Much
more was made of the matter than it deserved ; and were it
worth while, something might be said in its favour. As far as
is Itnown, the natives werc profoundly indifferent to the gates,
yet Lord Ellenborough's enemies e~~cleavoured
to make out tlnt
their restoration was a n error of the first magnitndc in n ruler.
Though this is not admitted, yet the Somnath notification is
less judicious Lhan most of his Lordship's orders.
Before leaving the subjcct of Afghanistan and our first war
there, it may bc advantageous to glancc at the question which
was at issue.
This \vns not whether An~irDost BInl~amlvador Sllall Shuja
should reign i n Kabul, but whether Afghanistan should be in
the interests of England or of Bussia. Since thcn, Russia has
advancccl with great rapiclity tovnrds Inclin. Britain, too, has
advaiiced to meet her, less rapidly, but it may be hoped lins,
in the Punjab, secured a more valuablc acquisition tlian Russin's
more extensive conquests. The advance will coutiune till tho
boundaries meet ; any idea of a permanent barrier betmecu t l ~ c
two grcat lintions is delusive, and to reckon 011 its existence for
ever, or even for a long period of time, mould be unmise nild
dangerous.
Now these questions may be fnirly asked : How did thc
first Afgl~anwar nflect the interests of England and Russia in
the Enst? Had Russia furnished just cause for the mar?
Let thelatter qnestion be first considered. Russian aclvailces
in Central Asia had caused clisqnietude to English statesmen ;
bnt Russia cannot on that account be held to have @en such
provocation ns to jnstify the war. Even if she had, to make
war on another statc not over friendly to her, was a curious way
ol sethling the dispute. It would secrn less likcly to damnge
Russia, or to deter her advancc, tlmi io make Britain unpopnlar in the attaclcecl country: unless, indeed, that country mcre
concpered and annexed. Such an attack, moreover, could be
pleaded as a jnstification for the next advance which Russia
clesirccl to make. The fact should be rcalisccl that if Russia
ihrcatens India, Englaud must be ready to attack her in
Europe, or elsewhere, as wcll as to clefend the India11frontie13,
or else be prepred to submit to great national I~uruili&tion.
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Lot ns return now to the first quostion : Eom mere the intcrests of Englancl and of Rnssia affected by the mar ? I t can
sc:lrcc?lybe clonbted that the reply must be : Those of England
Myere injnrcd, those of Russia but little affected. In thc h s t
~'lnce,Englancl appeared in the country as an enemy, and unfortujiately, in the instance of the I<nbd army, as n defeated
enemy. All Nott's victories, the defcnce of Jalalabad, and
Tollock's victories, count for little in the Afghan, possibly i n
tllc Indian, iuind, in comparison mith the complete destruction
plundcr of an army of solcliers previously believed to be invincible. h c l further, our ' retiring but victorious ' troops were
l~nrasscdnncl plunclerecl on thcir way out of lhe country. S t
is ilificnlt to say what goocl resulted from the expedition, if we
esccpt lhe cspcricncc which sho~ddbe learnt from failures. The
Rnssinns certainly abandoned thcir advance on I<liivn,mcl gavo
E&~,nd a nnmber of satisfactory assurances, of which t h e
supply is nnd mill be ample until the chnllcngc to fight is procli~imecl. But nll thesc could have been obtainecl diplomatically
mithonl the war.
Two distinct and serious evils resulted: the prestigc of
invincibility, of enormous importnncc anymhcre, bnt specially
in dcidi~lgwith Oricnlals, was losl ; and thc wilhdriinml of onr
troops from Afghanistan mas constrnecl as a proof of woalrness.
Any lnovcinent to the rear, however stralegic, is dangerous in
the Enst.
Thc necessity for the step is not here discussed ; but the objection to locating troops there, mith the Pnnjab possibly Iiostilc,
is obvious. Lord Ellenborough's measures mitigated the evils
as much as was possible, when withclra~valformed the basis
of oar policy. Still these evils hacl their effect on our Indian
fellow-sul?jecLs: the nnlive soldiers of the class lhcn principally
enlisted, seldom fought aftermarcls for us as they Elnil fought
before, and thcre are peoplc of experience who attribnle lho
mutiny greatly to the disasters of the Iiabnl force, If this be
so, it is instructive to oonsicler the efiect of tho nmwzation of
the PnnjnL on lllc same event. The Sikhs renlaillccl fiiithinl t o
us, s h a r d our combats, ancl enablccl us to achieve our victory.
This part of the present work rnay LC appropriately closed
by qnoting l h opinion oxprcssecl in the ' Tilnos' on Lorll Ellenborough's conduct of &'airs to the cnd of the mis.
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We believe Lhat all concorned in tho preservntion of oar Eastern
110 ordinttry debt of thnnlis for
Empire, owe to Lord ELLXN~OROUGII
the energy and skill which f~umishedthe moans of nzovcment, and
therefore of success, to our armies milh tt rapidity and completeness
far beyond what would have been, or in fact mere, anticipated by
any -410 really h e w tho cstent of what was necessary, n d tho
ditliculties of procuring and rendering it svailable. We believo
that, whatever absurdilies hc may have committed, hc has, on tho
whole, performed the part of an able, active, and snccessfnl ruler,
amidst circ~umstenceswcll cnlcnlateil to nppal, paralyse, or disorder
thc judgmant of an infcrior s t a t e ~ m a n . ~
O

!Pinics, March 10, 1813.
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a t Firozpur was broken up early in 1843, and
the Governor-General, with a n eecort furnished by the ' illustrioiis garrison,' marched to Delhi. Major Broaclfoot~sletters
at this time naturally refer chiefly to the important appointment for which h e llnd been selected, and to the marked liinclness shown to h i m by Lord Ellenborough. An extract or Lwo
m a y be of interest ; t h e y show a consicleration for others which
h a s not, it is believed, been generally recognisecl a s n prominent featme in his Lordship's character.
Lord Ellenborough has been kind to me beyond measure ; my
only fear is that one of these days he mill find he has overrated me.
On being appointed to the Tenasserirn Provinces, I waited on him
to resign being aide-de-camp, but he moul4 not hear of it, though
it has put m d still puts him to incoavenience, for I do no duty that
may. He says he iutenclecl it to keep me as far as he could from
loss, and I ninst not resign till I embark from Calcutta. Now the
considerateness of all this makes it more valuable in my eyes than
even the grent appointment.
Lord Ellenborough has given nie Bhnenee medals for William
nncl James. I shall most lilrely send them home for fear I loso
them.

...
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I came down with Lord Ellenborougli to Eurnaul, and preceded
llim thence to Delhi, where I arrived on January 31. Having made
over the r e m a l i t of the Suppers to their new commander, I continued with Lord Ellenborough, who reached DeLhi on the Sth,
till the 15th, receiving every day fresh proofs of kindness from
him. .
Lord Ellenborougli has most lrincily provided for all the officers
with me throughout the war ; except Dr. Forsytl~,who I hope will
not be forgotten. Orr is appointed to the Nizam's cavalry ; and
Cunningliam to the Mysore Coinmission ; both good appointments,
and what they asked. Lord Ellenborough is also going to do something for the two most deserving of my sergetints, Kelly and Bruen.
I n fact he is an extraordillary man with his patronage. Family
interest ~ F Juseless, almost injurious with him ; and so is even party
interest. Ono of his last appointments was to a neplleiv of
O'Connell I He is unceasing in his inquiries ns to fitness for the
&Berent sppointmcnts, in energy and inte@ity. Above all, or at
least above all but integrity, he seems to value a, liilidly feeling towards the natives. This system, however, has suddenly talten
power from the hands of d l who have hitherto held it, and disappointed all who looked up to them ; the unpopularity, therefore,
of the new system is very great.

. .

In due course Broadfoot arrived in Cnlcnttn, v h c r e h e tried
t o learn nll h e could regarding thc provinces he was about to
govern, arid tho policy by which he mas to be guicled. Bcfore
his departure for Maulmain be wrote t o Lord Ellenborough:
Cnlcntta : April 8, 1843.

b1y Lord,-My approaching embarliationfor 31nuln~ainterrninating my appointment on your Lordship's personal staff, I have this
day reported the same to the Military Secretary and requested him
to convey to you my sense of an honour which, conferred as i t was
and when it mas, I must ever feel grateful for.
I am now setting out for the new duties your Lordship's Irindness has called me to ; and I do not enter on them without many
mxieties. Disputcs small in themselves, but irritating, have assumed
s form which, considering local prejudices mid interests, i s not reassuring. To heal these I was desirous of solnewllnt dctailed
instructions from the Government, and my anxiety on this head has
somewhat delayed my departure. If I have not quite succeeded, the
Government is informed of the course I propose to follow if aflairs
are unchanged on my arrival.
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I cannot command success, but I can answer for unwearied
osertion, and tl firm purpose to maintain tranquillity ; and by seekiug the public good in those provinces to justify in some degree t 1 ~
liinthess mliicll has reiscd me to their admillistration.
G . BROADFOOT.
Tho ' &Iaulmain Chronicle ' of April 19, 1843, annonnced
tho arrival of Ihe ' Enterprise ' a t ' Amherst on S~ulilaylast,
hn,ving on board Major Brondfoot, appointed to the Commissionership of them provinccs. H e cnme up to town and Imcled
on Monclny under the usual salute.
. Mr. Bl~ulclell,our
former Commissioner, embnrlred this morning on board thc
" Enterprise," to procccd to Calcutla, nnd from thcnce to his
appointment as Governor of the Straits.'
It is not intended to describe minutely Broadfoot's ailministration of the ~rovinces. The details of eivil government, such
as the nssessment mcl collection of revenue, the trial nud
punisl~mcntof oflenders, the making of roads and considcmiion of finance, though nll most necessary, arc not so picturesque, and cannot be 50 attractive to the general rcaclcr, a8 tllc
moro stirring incidents of war and diplomacy.
It will here suffice to say that thc Government of India
was seriously dissatisfied wiih the state of the provinccs, and
A reformer mas requircil. Broadfoot was selected, and succeeded, in spite. of strenuous opposition, in firneeping n m y
many abuses, and in introducing sound measures of reform.
H e received many letters at this time, some of which will
be quoted. Thc first of these, from Havelock, refers to a
certain injustice done to the Jalalabacl garrison in excluding
them from rcn~ardsfor Polloclr's campaign, and contains an
allusion to memoir writing. This refers to a proposal by
I-Inveloclr to publish an acco~mtof the recent war and the
defence of Jalnlnbad. Brondfoot pointed out to him thnt if hc
told the truth honestly he would hayo to quit the army ; nnd
that if Iio withhelcl the truth, in the case of Sale for cxample,
hia memoir had betier not be published.

..

Rossowlio : May G, 1543.

My dew 13roaclfoot,-I now sit down according to promise to
answer at length your very ltinil lotter of tho 15th ultimo. I om
glad you were pleased with &larsl~man
; for 1 can say with perfoct
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sincerity that it is in tho good opinion and friendship of such men
as you and hc, and a very few other^, that I liave found the best
compensation that this world can ooifer for no small portion of
harassing wrong and ill success ; and the organisod opposition of
knavcs and brutes and ~ciolists.~
I have to thank you for tho interest which you tnlto in the
matter of my professioi~lnladvancement. I mas pretty sure that you
were right wllon you montioned to me your notion of Sir J. N.'s
views regarding tho military rewnrds of those who had served in
AfghanisLan. It wns so like the imbecility of the man, most fully
developed in the pn,pcrs wliich hnve been laid before Parliamcn~,
and of wllicli I see Sir Robert Pccl has availcd hirnself to set up a
plca for Lord Ellenborougli. Be quotes the opinion of the Commandcr-in-Chief against acting promptly and vigorously to reLrievo
our fortunes, to sllow that the Governor-General, from the first,
wcnt as far as his military adviser. Sir J. N. mas doubtless shocked
at tlie prodigious mass of preferment and honour which had been
lieaped in R, moment on the defenders of Jollalabad, and mould never
l i a v ~forgiven himself if in his time they had got moro. The thing,
however, is so irrational m d ~ontraryto preccdent, Illat the weight
of no name can suffice for its justificotion. If exertions after April 7
dcsorved reward, a d Gen. pol lock'^ officers have been promoted
and ribboned for ulterior csertions, Jellalabad men who shared in
theso labours and dangers have a right to look for something for
them. If, however, my bl'otller, now in England, has formed a
cor~ectopinion, the Iron Dnlio has talcen nnothcr view of the matter.
HCseems to havc laid it down that the merits of all the officers
employed from the first outbredi in October 1841 to tho ond of the
campaign in 1842, are worth a step for some, and a stop and an
honour for others, and that it is his duty not to recommend any
for 111oro. I mnst tcll you, Iiomevel~,that whatever I may have been
on formcr occasions, I have not been quiescent on this. Gen.
&IcCasltill wrote very strongly and liauclsomely in my favour from
Feroq,oro; and sincc tho last brcvct nppeared, Gen. Smitli addressed Lord Fitzroy Somerset, I h&l;cno doubt in lengunge w a r n
and energetic enough, in favour of j~illiinsonof the 13tlr, Simmons
of the 41st, and myself; and I forwarded through Gen. 1IcCasltill to
Gen. Pollock a letter which I dcsired might go to Sir J. 8 . with
the recommendation of both, for trnnsmission to the home authorities. Sir \Villoughby Cotton had pre~iouslybeen ende~,vouringto
do me a good turn in his ld~irlof way by breathing some words in
my favour into tlic. car of the Duke of Boanfort, Lord Fiteroy
This word is doubtEd in tho original lotlor.
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Somerset's brother. This the Dulte told my brother, who ltnew
him in Spain and France, ns Marquis of Worcester, and had been
hunting wit11 his ho~mclsthe last season. Now from any one of
these representations I do not form the shadow of a hope, becuusc,
horn all I can learn, the Dulte of Wellington's mind is made up to
the mode of treating the matter of which I havo already spolten.
The best I can espect is, if ever I become a regimental mtjor, to
have my claims considered for employment as deputy i n a departnlent i n India or the colonies. Tho step of major would, homever,
in itself satisfy m e ; for if I obtained it, I would run home with the
battalion, see my few surviving friends in England, loolc to the
interests of my boys, and endeavour, if nothing mas stirring in
Europe, to get back on good terms into a corps in Inclia.
I a m a \lory bad liand indeed at n bargain, but I a m told that
a, majority in Prince Albert's would be wort.h to n young aristocrat
as much as would pay R poor man's passage, with all his imnpdin ~ e ~ ~bnclt
t a , to this first of lands for the escrtions of Phat class of
officers. Flowever, the majority in the 13th is sooner desired than
gained. Old Pnttison, whom you will remember, went honie with
the pnrpose of retiring on his full pay. Rut owing to official
blunders his papers did not reach Horse Guards, and he can now
please himself instead of being tied down to his first resolution, and
may take a fit of obstinacy and defer his military dccease s i w die.
Rnrno~wstrongly asserts that Sir 12. Sale is to be tho colonel of the
44th Regiment ; but then again, perversity on perversity of fate, the
13th being on the eve of returning home, the Iron D~llcemay decide
not to fill up the vacancy of second lieutenant-colonel. Thus you
see my prospects are not very brillinnt. But to sped<seriously, d l
this is in the liands of Providence, and I ought not to disquiet myself about it. There is R faint cliance of a real turn of poetical
justice. You per1la.p~hnvo heard that I have been purchased over
by three driinlcards and two fools. Pour of these h ~ v paid
e
successively, by disease or in the field, the debt of nature ; and the survivor (I mill not say to which class he belongs) liod opportunely
Fvithbamn his name from th6 purchnse list. I1 is just possible t11at
Lord Pitzroy Somerset, being moved to do something in my favour,
might on Taylor's death have brought in an old retired officer to
sell, and thus pnt nie in my original place. This is, I say, just possiblo, but I think will not havo come to pass. Had I too been tho
son of a dulte, it mould inevitably. You may suppose I am very
weary of ell this, and of captaining in time of peace, and often
meditnte the military sniciile of retiring myself on full pay, and
vegetating in a corner in Switzerland tlic remainder of my dnyrj ;
but a sense of my duty to my boys, and the hopo of more stirring
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times, and tho determination not to be driven from my post by any
amolunt of neglect or misadventure, still keep me on the other tnclr.
But now, beforc quitting this subject, on which I liave too much
dilated, let me ask, my good friend, what is it you meen exactly by
21rcjdices against me, the mentiou of wliicI1 yo11 reiterate? Tell
me plainly. I am not aware of any. Old Willoughby Cotton,
indeed, a d olhers used to tell me that it mas believed at Horse
Guards and ia other quarters that I professed to fear God, as well
as honour the Queen, and that Lord Hill and sundry other wise
persons had made up their nlinds that no men could, a t once, be n
s n h t a d a soldier. Now I dare say such grent authorities must
be right, notwitlistancling the exainples of Col. Garcliner, aud
Cromwell, a i d Gustavus Adolphus ( d l that I can think of just now) ;
but if so, dl I can say is, that their bit of red ribbon mas very ill
bestowed upon me ; for I humbly trust that in that grent matter I
should not change my opinions and practice though it rained garters
and coroilets as the remarcls of apostasy. So if these be the grounds
of the projwliccs, they are lilce to be seinpitemal ; but if they be
any others that I know not of, tell me, my good friend, plainly and
rouadly. Qzm Zaps~s,quid $xi I t is well to be upon one's
guard.
As I intimated in my last, I think Taylor brought the sto1.m
upon himself. H e or somo of the 9th must have seen your
report, and if he deemed it erroneous, ought then to have urged
the necessity of coiurection, or afterwards to have written to
you. Yon mill have heard that Sir J. N. has interdicted Iiis rejoinder, and lie is off to England. Huish is certainly the person
most likely to be nettled ; but if ho is a man of sense, he mill soon
gel over it. After all, much of the blame rests on Gen. Polloclr,
who, after the first success, secmecl to think he had nothing more
to do with the matter, but let his troops go where they would in
pursuit, mhich indeed was his custom as far a s my observation
went.. .
I believe your advice is quite sound as to memoir writing, and I
have almost resolved finally to not upon it nnd publish nothing for
the present. I havo nothing, indeed, finished, or nearly so, though
my brother has written me nrgcat letters by every mail to appear
' early in the field,' as it is called. I have a good deal of leisure
now, and i11 the course of a fortnight expect to be at Simla (if my
wife arrives), when I sliall have even more ; and this I mill employ
in n ~ i t i n gdowu my recollections, which I mill send to yon for correction. I shall esteem yours most valuable. Having been at mote
t h n one period a good deal behind the scenes, I might with the aid
of the parliamentary papers, and such documents as Lord Ellen-

.
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borough mo111d pcrhaps on due persuasion permit to be seen, have
the mkerials for a tolerable book, which is bettor than a hasty,
showy thing, to plessc those wlio can digcst nothing beyond a nino
days' wonder.
Beliavo me kc.
H. HAVELOCK.

P.S.-I should like to hove your Sapper proceeding from
Bootlihak to Jellalnbad to begin with.
We have just hoard of tho death of poor Troup at AIlyglmr.

The only officer of Broadfoot's Sappers who had not a s yet
got a n appointment was Dr. Forsyth; but he was not forgotten. On May 14, Lord Ellenborough w o t o on Iiis behalf
t o Mr. B i d , the Deputy-Governor of Bengd, and expressed a
h o p thnt he might bc suitably providcd for.
The next letter from which extracts are quoted is from
Francis Cnnningham, already oftcn mentioned a s quar tcrmaster of Broadfoot's Sappers. H e wrole from Bangalore,
M a y 27, 1843 :

I have for some time post intended writing to you, but have
heard of no ships abont to sail to RSanlmain. I cannot now 11aw
tho conscience to put it off any longer, SO here goes, and it mush lio
waiting in the Madras post office till an opportunity offers to convey
it to your dominions.
You must not forget to send me a copy of your wenlo. regarding the Jellalnbad council. I should p~eferthe one in your own
hand. I am the more amions about it as I hear thnt BLbott hns
been ststing everymhere that it was y07w ~dvicethat me should
have abandoned Jelldabad md made our way lo Peshawar ; desterously availing himself of an opinion you once expressed, that
it wonld have been a good plan for Sale to lleve made his way to
Peshamer when wo first came into tho valley; to have refittcd
there ; and on returning have been in a fit state tb take the field.
It mas from Joe that I heard this, and in mritiag to him I explain~l
the circumstance, but it has only made him the more allxious to
obtain what you promised him about the councils. You lrnow him
well enough to be ablo to place reliance on his discretion,
You hiwe, of course, read a11 about the Khytnl business, d i c ] ~
ought to have cost Greathed his appointment. Clerlr re~ommend~cl
the Governor-General to appoint my brother to the cliarge of
Khytd on 1,200 rs., but Lord Ellenborough's answer was that

...

lIis brother, Josoph Dnvy Cmnningham, of tho Dcngnl Bnginocrs, aolhor
or a Historg of t7ce Sildis.
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Mr. Thomason considered Lawrence better fitted for it (they are
old friends).
The a~rangement,therefore, now is, that Ltlrvrence goes to
Khytul on 1,000 rs., and my brother takes Umballa, keeping his
private secretaryship. This place pleases hiin more than the other,
ns it gives him equal pay, and in tho event of tm officer being called
on for detached employment, he is obviously the one to be sent, ns
he can be best spared.
.
You can have no notion how high your reputation stands in the
RIndras Army. By the bye, I got to high words with Sir EIVabout the I!Iamoo Iihel affair. You l m o he
~ belongs to tho
-th, ancl as I mns in plain clotlies, he took me for a Bengal civilian,
nnd mas not a little astonished when, in rcply to some curious
assertions of his, I said ci la Julius,"It is very unlucky that I mas
t h e ~ eand saw the contrary.' Sir Eis a blustering bully, and
I mas not sorry to raise a lnugh against him.
Pollock
Have yon got hold of a copy of the blue book?
evidently lost hiinself after he got through the Xhyber, and writes
at first as if he had not pice enough to make his way to Cabul.

..

...

The Marqui~of Tweeddale is commonly called 'Bumble ; '
110 loolts mnch more Lilte a prizefighter than anobleman. Ho asked
me several questions wilhout looking me in the face, and wrote
down my nnsmers. He did the stme to Webb, and put him into
the Commissariat. Tlie RIarcliioness is what BIayne ~voulilcell ' a
real lady, hat and featl~ers.' She loolis as young as her son, and
has the most pleasing nlanners of any woman I have ever ~pokento.
I cannot tell you anything yet about my prospects in this Commission. I have only yet been employed in reading the records,
and hara not seen Gen. Cubbon, mho is in Coorg.
Some extracts from Lord Ellenborongh's corre~ponclcncc
will now be qnoted. As regards t h e communication of information, officinlly acquired, t o persons other thnn those cntitled to
be made acquainted v i t h it, i t is interesting to rccord t h e
Governor-General's orders :
The rule with respect to official correspondence is, not that all
officer is ~llomedto divulge all that he is riot specially directed to
lieep secret, but that he is not allowed to divulge anything which
he is not specially directed to communicnta.
Beiernncc p08Sibly to Julius B.
Bncklio~~sc.

' A slndl copper coin ;pice is used
hcrc instend of ' money.'
0

T h e enforccmcnt of w c h ,z rule did not tend to nlalte his
Lortluhip popnliir with i h c press.
I n 31i7.y 1849, t h e Governor-Generd contemplated going to
Sind ; in n Ictter t o Mr. &1nddoclr t h e iirst mcntion of t h e
appointmei~tof Col. Richmond, Wnjor Broadfoot's prcdeccssor
on t h e North-Wcut F r o n t i e r , is found.
One ad\rnntage of going to Sinil is, that until thc bcginning of
January, I shall be on thc Sutlej ; and rcnlly things loolc more
sl~aliythan ercr in Iho Punjilb, and Mr. Clcrli's teinporury retiremcnt will be lilra striking away n lcg from the i\1nharajnfs clinir.
He wnnts me to go 111) to the hills no^, and I thiulr I should, if I
conld houso lnyself a t Knsadi or ~libi~tlill. . . 1 h ~ v offered
e
to
Col. Ricl~monclthe ofhinting appointment in Rlr. Clerk's placo. 1
could make no nrrangemeat a t short notice id at this sewon quite
sntisfnctory. I hope this may msmer.

.

111 n letter t o tlic Commander-in-Cliief, dated J n n c 3, 1843,
t h c following scntoncos occur; bhc sentiments thcy contnin
;~pplyt o a g r w t e s t c n t to h i s Lordship's carcer.

Dopeid 11pon it there is no snch thing ns strict jnstice ill tlle
opinioa of conten~po~nries.All is oxnggeration. Men ore rated
too high or too low ; but mherc the cvents are great, ~vlicretlicy are
cardinal points in history, those who come after thein do them
justice, which is in thc lligl~estdegree sntisfiwtory LO ~neriin their
gr;ures.

Tho following extracts "cfw to tlic appointment of &jor
r>ro,ziIfoot'to be Commissioner, and to t h e first results of Iiis
ndministrntion.
A g m : April 20, 1813.

Lord Ellenborough, with hismost humble duty lo your Bhjesty,
llumbly ncqudnts yonr Mi~,jestythat . . somc improper transmtions at Maulmain have apparently placed us in tllc wrong, and
occasioned some risli of Iiostilitics; but Lord Ellenborough hopes
that the new Cornn~issioner,Rfnjor 13roadfoot, mill t~rrivein tinlo to
prevent collision ancl restore peaceful dispositions.

.

Allnhnbnd : June 8,1843.

The np~~elicnsions
.of collision mitl~the Bunnose, which l~acl
out of tllo misconilnct of t l ~ late
c Commissioner, Rlr. Blundoll,
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who llns bcen removed, hovc bcen nearly done nnlay with since the
arrival of his successor, Major Rrondfoot, C.R., the officer who so
much distinguished himsclf a t Jellnlnbacl.
Allnhabnd : June 37, 1818.

The misuntlerstandings with the I3umicse on the Salwcen river,
which havc ariscn out of the misconduct of lhe lnte Com~~iissionor,
do iiot appear to be yet cntircly overcome by the good sensn m d
nbilily of his successor, Major Droadfool ; bnt Lord Ellcihorongl~
still hopcs that e~erylhingwill bc settled ninicably in tlint quarter.

...

Delhi : F e b ~ u n r y18, 18dS.

My denr Duke of Wellington,
h j o r 13rondfoot, whoin I
have ~ e u tto i\iinulmain, secins to be a very sensible inon. IIe
lino\vs tho place and tlre country, and I am happy to tell you that,
while he promises me some civil reforms, he bids me to be n n d e ~
no npprehension of being ovcr obliged to send a large forcc to clcfend
Maulmain,
hgrn : April 28,18-13.

.

. . At Nnulinnin there lms been, and is, a risk of collision, in
conscqucnce of our having put ourselves in the wrong. Tllo whole
thing ariscs ont of encouragcincnl given to a low nlcrcantile spewlntion by a Commissioner in the 11ands of merchnnts and their
press. I am in hopes that Binjor Broadfoot, the new Commissionor,
will be in time to stop the mischicf and bring things riglit. He is
thc best man to prevent hostilities, or, if they cannot be prevented,
lo carry lheln on ; but lie will prevent h n ~ .
Allnhnbad : Junc 9, 1BJ3.

. . . I b v e fortunalely got a bold, able, and, above d l , nn
Iloncst man into tho g o v e ~ ~ ~ mofc nTonwmrim,
t
in the person of
Major Croadfoot. He will, I trnst, nrert the mnr his predecessor
h:~dnearly mal;ured, and 110 has nlreadjr provcntcd on insnrrcctioii
his predecessor liad prorolied. Yet I llave littlc doubt tllnt the
supersession of Mr. I3lmldell by Majo1- Broadfoot will give the
C O ? CZC
~ ~ G C lo
C me with the Court, if thc entire c1mlge of OIKCCFS
in Sangor llos not nlready done so.

I

Similar sentiments a r c repented in other lcttcrs t o the
Duke ; b u t tliasc are suficient t o show how Browdfoot's services
were vducd by the Governor-Cfeaerd.
Lord Fitxgcmld,
I'rcsidcnt ol' Lllc T h r d of Control, t o ml~omLord Ellenborougl~
often sent c q i c s of U r o i ~ c l f ~ ~loltcrs,
l's
rcmi~~liccl
: 'hhjor

Broildfoot's letters show him t o bc n man of senso, and I trust
h c will put all t o rights.'
Referring to o n e of t h e s e letters, Lord Ellcnboroiigl~wrote
to Broadfoot :
Allnhnbnd : Junc 8,1413.

.My dear Major Broadfoot,-I received here to-clay your lelter of
the l O t l ~ult. I have hnd it copied for transmission to Lord Pitxgeralcl. You may depend upon my fill1 support in pntting down
bad government in the prorinccs under your charge. I shall soon
be at Calcutta, myself, ancl nt hand to give you the aid to which you
are entitled.
I have excellent accounts horn Scinde, whcre I hope nll will
remain quiet. At Gwalior there has becn a pt~lnceintrigue, ending
in tllc depodtion of the Regent, who mas wt up with our acquiescence
and q~proval,
This may give trouble. I have made Mr. Clerk LieutenantGovcruor, and Col, Riclimond his successor ns Goveriior-General's
Ageut, on tlio Noistli-West Frontier.
Believe me kc.
ELLENBOROUGH.
On the samc day L o r d Ellenborongli wrote t o t h e President
of the B o d of Control :
Mnjor Broadfoot mnst tell his own tnlc, so I send yon his private
letter to me. Mr. Bird informs me that he tliinlts all will now go
on well in Tenassorim ; i.e. wc shill1 have no war. Mr. Rlundcll's
appointment to Singapore mill be ca~~cellecl.Depend upon it, the
picture hIajor B. gives of t h e province of Teilasseriuz is not
unlilte that which might be given of ell India. Everywliere tho
public is nltogether disregarded. The interests of inclividuals only
are considered. Major Broadfoot will hit rather roughly, but very
honestly, nnd hc is a n ablc m a n as well as an honest one; yet I
think I can anticipate that the displacing of Mr. Blundell and the
nomination of Major Broadfoot mill be very unpopular with the
Court.

A few clays later he wrote ti0 Mr. Bird :
Major Broadfoot seems to have been acting with most useful
energy ancl piwdence. The charge he will prove against Mr. . . . can only be followed by that gentlemn,n's dismissnl. I t is evident t l x ~ tif me wish to have a n honest government in Tenasserim,
or any g & ~ r ~ m e na tt all, we mnst fully fiupport Riajor Broadfoot.

Mr. B i d , who, as Doputy-Governor of Bengnl, was Broadfoot's immediate superior o a c e r , i n writing t o L o r d Ellen-
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borough, for\vardcd n copy of a notiiication by Broadfoot forbidding British subjects to pny tax or duty to anjone for the privilege of rafting timber on the Sdwin river, nnd promising them
tlic lxotcction of the Governmeiit from thc conscquenccs of
relnsnl. I-Ic intimated that lle lind ca,ntioned Major B. to avoid
any step calculated to bri~lgon hostilities. At the same time
h e fornm-decla me~uornndumon the nntive press. IIe said the
first native nenlspapcr \vas the ' Snmaehar Dnrpnn,' published
a t t l ~ cScram11orc Press twenty-five years ago (i.e. in 1918),
contemporary wit11 thc movcment in the causc of public i11structioii which wiis niadc under Lord IIastings. H e further
rcmarlced that at no l~eriodduring thc last twcnty-five years
had native papers acquired 2,000 s~zbsctibcrsin t o ~ wand
country ; and that n newspaper was not reclconcd tmtong Chc
wants of thc peoplc.
Althougli there are now (1989) many native newspapers,
wliich have in the larger towns n considerable circnlation, yet,
:LS regards the largcst and best par1 of the nativc population
of India, the o\wcrs arid cultivators of the land, i t is still
fairly true that a nemspapcr is iwt rcclconed amongst their
wants. And this is not il mi~tlerof regret: it is betler that
thc peoplc sliould be healthily employcd on worlc which they
understand, and from wliicll tlicy can acquire tLn honest
competence and profit, than that they shonld s p i d their
time in the study ol ne\vspal)ers, nnd in thc i~cqnisitionh l n
them of imafiilled grievances, of disco~ilcnt,and of disloyalty,
to the neglect of their more profitable duties.
We now resume hhjor Broadfoot's correspondence.
CnlJt. Durand wrote to him on August 30, on the subject
of the recent Afghan ca~upaign. After allndi~lgto tllc fact
that I-Iaveloclr had decided ilot to publish, he said :
Baclihouso has been, in some may or other, talking of his journal
of events at Jellalabad, or others have for hiin. 11 is spolten of as
containing matlcr curious and surprising. I have soon nothing ns
yet, however, in the sliape of disclosures of whnt went for\ynrcl
C~
during the blocltadc. . . . I shoulcl not be mnch S L I ~ P ~ ~ SatC Unclrhonso startling the community by spealiing out and telling the truth.
Haveloclc too wrote at this time, in bclter spirits t h i l
l~cfore,.having just got his rcgi~ncnt;dmajority.

8imln : August 00, 18;s.

My dear Brondfoot,-Thong11 only purporting to be an excuse
for not writing, your lelter, without dale, but ycstcrday received,
gave me iufinitc! plemurc.
I t has foilild m e with prospects substantially improved, by the
blessing of Providcnce, i n the :~ttninment,in tlic ' Gazette ' of
Jmlc 30 brought by last mail, at length, of a regilnentd majority.
This perhaps was not a great boon after twenty-eig11t years' service,
twenty of them in India, bnt it was conceded with the air of one, it
being mged that the retirements ncre nearlg dl filled np, and tho
applicants for them men of very lo\v standing. Pattison being idlowed
to go 0u1 i n my fi~vonr,mas therefore lnade itn act of grace to me,
cr
with tho innuendo, I espect, that it closed the door to all S ~ ~ r t hclaim
for tlic last Afghan campaign.
To trnrel at once from the Horse Gaards to the Tenasserim
coast, I sincerely rejoicc in the decided part you have talien as o
negotiator a d reformer, nncf tho fruits aiicl promises of such cnergy.
I t is one of onr first duties in India, within mil bcyond tho Gangou,
to render onrsclves respectnble in lhc cyeu of lhe Asialic powers ; and
to compel them to rcspect the treaties tlicy have m ~ d with
e
us.
Even up to the point of a Rcsident at Ava, I wodd say, let it citl~er
be insisted upon, or snrrendcrecl only for a q z ~ pl o p o . I cannot
bear to hew of a snbsisting treaty with one arlicle disregardd.
Bnt 2s regards tho other clnuse of my proposition, what were the
Burmans and Tnlaings to think of us, whilst our ncwly acquired
c o n q ~ ~ e was
s t a den of intrigncrs and speculators, in lcague with
corresponding ncsts of iniquity in 89ortaban and Rulgoon ? Tllerefsrc 1 trust you will persevere in nn unsparing clcor out, ' counling
i t all joy ' when you arc nbnsecl to the echo by the ' 3loolrneiri
Choniclc,' and t l ~ o s emhom it can influence to join i n the cry in
Calcutt:~.
1 h w e been enjoj-ing liere arnongst the ceclnr trees such nrn7u
for throe months ns has scarccly fdlen to my lot for twenty
years. . .
Sir 12. Sale gocs down the Ganges to England, mliich 11e ougllt
to have done (putting Indus for Ganges) last year ; and the lsth,
Lord Ellenborough writea him, nlnrch in Novcmbcr to Sulikur, and
embark nt Curatcllcc ~ O I -England in Mnrcll 1844, or 1845, as circumstances may dictate. I think the latter, for nmch l ~ n sbeen
left undone in Scinde. Thc ' Fricnil of India ' has nclverled more
t11:m once lo our conncil in Jellalnbnd, led to do so by the ' I-Inrliaru,'
; ~ n dfollowcd by tlic ' 1)ollli Gxzette.'

.
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Mrs. Havclock, t l ~ o ~ i gunseen,
h
scnds hcr wgilrds. BIarslirnun
will gladly accept your remembrances ; and I rcmmin, ever (kc.
H. Ha\mdoorr.
P.S.-Toonec,
the little orderly, nnd onc Gurboo, n Goorltl~a
~ ~ o n - c o ~ ~ ~ m i s soficer,
i o ~ ~ eoftcn
c l visit mc lierc, coming in thc rain
from their cantonnicnt at Jitognc. Thc lattcr tllinlrs he h a s still
some letter of rccolll1lle1ld1lti011to get from you regarding pnst
services, which would be uscful to him, and Itccps loolting towards
Moulmein. I fear tlic poor fellows tmnsfcrrcd from the Sappcrs
cnnnot gct pro~uolionin l l ~ eNussecree battnlion, I~avingcome into
tho miclst of oldcr claims in a new corps.
T h c ncxt two l e t t c r ~nrc from Mr. a n d i \ h . Cnmcron.
Mr. Cnnleroll was, it mill bc recollcctccl, lcgal member of
cou~lcil,a n d from h i m 13roadfoot got advicc o n m e t t c r s connectccl with t h e s t u d y of l n v ; a snl?jcct o n \ ~ l i i c h1x2 \ms,
ncccssarily, somewlvllnt ignorant.

..

Cnlautta : September 7, 1843.

My dear Broadfoot,
. You will see in thc ncwspapcrs t l ~ a l
tho Jcllalnbad parliaments arc on tho ttrpis, ~ m dthat somebody wilh
n, fictitious signatorc has given a n account of their proceedings not
very much like yours. I-lavc yon nny notion n.110 this i s ?
Wc go on hcre in an un~etlled~ o r tof way ; tho lime-servers
(n lnrgc class) puzzled and not liuowing how to shape Lhcir coursc.
Cerlainly i t is worth while to be honest snd sinccrc, wurc it only
for thc sake of tranquillity. The Governor-G'enerd is civil l o mc,
and continocs to show thosc good qoalities which we both ngrecd in
thinlting h e possesses ; nevertheless, I wish IIC may not relunin Iicre,
for he is not stendy enough for enterprises which take n long w l d c
in tho concoction and i n the execution.
I had a long letter from Coli~r[i\lacltenzie] by lhe Inst mail. R c
compluins much of his health ; but nppears wcll satisfied with thc
considcrution shown him at home.
Gcn. Bniit117 callcd hero yestorday, and we talltcd of you. I I e
t l l \ ~ i l y(kc.
~
seems to lsnow your value.
C. H. C a ~ r ~ l t o ~ .
Scplcmber 11, 18CX

My dcar Major Broadfoot,--Unfort~~~~~~tely
the ' Sircu ' stole
awny without giving m y noticc o l thc day of licr depsrfurc, so tlmt
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the Governor-Qeneral's despatches were cven, I am told, left behind;
but I hope these letters if despatched per ' Patriot ' will reach you
with equal speed and safety.
In the hurried lines you sent me (in answer to mine per 'Kitty ')
yon did not tell me whether the little sea trip you had talten had
been beneficial to your health. I earnestly hope that i t has been so,
and that nothing now interrupts the success and interest of your
new position. You seem to be an intellectual Hercules, and to
undertake, and successfully to undertake, the load and labour of
the whole governnlent ; and to accomplish in sis days the morli of
aix years. Lord ~ l l e n b o r o u ~ lal very
,
short time ago, spoko of you
to me in the highest possible terms; and I assure you I listened
and answered with enthnsiesm.
I-Ie spoke to me of the devotion of your corps to you ; and said
that you might any day have made yourself a Iring, so devoted was
every sou1 around yon to your order, and so milling to raise every
arm a t your command. I renlarlted (what I have often heard my
hnsbancl remadt of you) how rarc it was to see a man mho could
distinguish himself equally in council and in action, in the cabinet
and i n the field ; but, modest a s yo11 are, I will not tell you more of
what was said, for fear of your accusing me of quizzing yon. All I have
to enforce upon you i s thc entreaty of yowfriends not to sacrifice yomself entirely to your zeal to promote the public good; for I (althougll
a woman) am a lover of public good, and still maintain that useful
goocl men, being mre, ought to bear ill mind horn prccious they are,
and to remember that the ~ultiring,unceasing exertions of a few
years, by wearing out their energies nncl resources of mind and
body, are not in the end so desirable as Ll~eless active but more
steady and lengthened efforts of a long life, throughont which the
same philanthropic, devoted, upright spirit is felt, thong11 subdued
and tempered by the conviction that when there is no rest given to
mind or body, both must suffer an early decay.
I t is amusing to see how things arc going on now. The Council
has a very meagre aspect (not n m g ~ ein the literal acceptation of
the word, for the Deputy-Governor alone, always a, Fnlstaff in appearance, is now so blown out with the dignity of his position, that he
might represent a whole body of men !) ; buL Mr. Mil~ldocIcis, YOU
know, absent ix very precarious health ; and poor Sir William Casement. is seldom spared to attend Council.
Lord Ellenborongh, if it be not trenson to say so, is flighty and
s business ; shrewd enough, but wholly
unmnnagenblo in 211 n ~ a l t e r of
without ballast ; violently entlliisinstic on all military subjects, and
tliey done secm to occupy his interests or his attention. A soldier,
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ns a soldier, is the thing ho worships ; nnd t h e whole snbstanco of every public speech he has made since lie returned to
Calcutta, has been thus versified by my husba.nd, and a literal
versification it is.
Long ns I fill imperial Akbnr's throne,
Long ns the Eastern world my sway shall o\vn.
Him, Him alone, in powcr mill I place,
Him, Him alone, with trnst and honour grace,
Unmoved who listens to the whizzing bull,
And sees serene his slnughtered eomrndcs fall.

His words literally were : Who behaves well under fire.' Now i t
is for this opinion that I qnarrol vith him.
Courage, however admirt~bloin the ficld, however morthy of our
respect, admiration, and gratitude, cannot alone ontitle a man lo promotion and distinction in offices of trust End honour, if b e hns not,
besides conrage, tlie mental nnd m o ~ aqnnlities
l
required to do justice
to that ofice. Agnin, his fwourite public decla~ationi s that we
owe India to, and can preserve Indin through, the n ~ m yand
,
tho
army alone. He does not think that there is more credit clue to a
body who can maintain an l~onowablepeace, than to a body who C~LU
nlways wage wax, though it be a successful war. Bnt so esnggeratcd
is his folly, for I must call it folly on this snbject, that I can best describe its extent to you by telling you of thc speech he made to mo
at the Fancy Ball, when I mas remarlting to him how gay thc Calcutta,
ballrooms mere nlade by the niimbcr of men in uniform. ' Oh, yes,'
he ansnrerecl, military men have so much the nclvantugc ; it is snch
a pity that the civilians have no unifonn. Iwish we could contrive
some sort of uniform for them I ' And this h e literally feels. Tlie
golden bullion of the aide-de-camp's jacket h e desires as much ns u
yoliilg coquette desires pink roses whilst a season of ruoltrning prevents her from wearing them.
Anil now I must mind up thislong letter by saying, God bless you.
You have, you h o w , our best wishes for your henlth and hnppiness ;
and must ever write to and think of me and my husband as vrtrln
friends.
Ever S;c.
JULIA CANERON.

...

The overmork, bad climate, mrl effects of his wounds in
Afghanistan had seriously affected Brosclfoot's health, which
seemed to be never good, at m y rate i n Southern I n d i n or o n
t h e Tenasserim coast. R n m o ~ i r sof war too had reache&him,
a n d he, for these various reasons, addressed L o r d Ellenborough
as folloffs :

202

LEYTBR TO LORD ELLENBOROUGH

CII. VIII

Rlcrgui : Deccnlbor 13, 1843.

fi1y Lord,-For some days I had resolwxl to bring, on public
grouuds, the state of my health to your Lordship's notice; but the
ilenls of your having gone to join the Army of Esercisc, and consequent
rmnonrs of its being employed in the Gold, h v e lcd me to rcsolvo
on soulellling more, vix, of snying how grr~tefulI sl~ouldfecl if in
any way I c o d d be allowed to join that army if it takes the field.
The state in whicll I found these provinces has f o m d mc to
work to a degree that would need much strength in a good climate.
My health has never been restored siilce I was moundcd at Jelldabud, for I m a s ordered out, beforc tho wound lietlleii, on detachment,
and ucvcr again had a day's rest ; then here thcre has been no rest,
nntl now, in December, a coat is a burdcn ; at night every window
is opcn, m d oven o sheet too ~ w r mto bc borne. I h a w had fiolne
sc\rere illnesses of lnle, but rcccntly linvo had slight apoplectic attacks,
which make it almost cerhiiu &at I must for a time, if not permanetitly, quit the coast. Rest, or n change to nditary service with tho
cli~nateofNorthern India, would speedily restore me, and I could thcn
cilher return hero or serve elsowhore as your Lordsl~ipmight dcsiro.
Had illy health not thus given way, I could not have vontured to indre
this request, greatly as your Lordship horns I desire to servo agnin in
the field, especially during pour Lordship's go~enlment; but should
the turn my illness has now t . h n forcc me to leave at any rale, I
sllould LO miscri~blc. I COUIC~
not ~ C C O V O Pif the ilmJrwere in lllc Gcld,
and I an idler clsc~vhere. I h:we eideavonred to do good here, and I
hope have been able to do a, little, nnd, above all, to carry it so far that
anyonc supported by your Lordship may carry it on in my absence.
A letler from the Rovcnuc Bonrd informs me they see the evils
existing, and my reports from this plrwe will show them still nlorc
strongly, and I trust their remedics also. All will thcn depcnd on
tllc Government. I would eaxnestly request, therefore, that if t h e
is nny chance of the army taking the fiold, I may bc allomcd to join
it in any way I can be usofid. Notwithstmidiiig the distance, I
think I could be with your Lordship before any cnmpaign closed.
Bcgging your Lorclsliip to forgive me for thus troubling you,
I rcinain &c.
G. BEOADFOOT.

To this, iw1 onc or two ~ ~ ~ b s e q u cletters
nt
on questiolls
connected with h i s work, the private 8ecretar.y t1.11~1 t l ~ c
Governor-Gcneral replied :
Cnmp, Gwslior : Jtlnunry 11, 1814.

My denr Broaclfoot,-Your letter of Ilie 18th ultimo nnil inclosu~e
I lost no tirue on receipt in comrnunicztting to the Gownlor-General.
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IIis Lorclsliip is sorry that you cnn speak in no better wny of thc
stato of your own health.
Your lettcr only arrived this morning. You will have h c i d of
tlie actions of the 29th at Naharajporc and Puniliar ; on tho 29th
botli took place. That nt Mz~harajpore was a combat of guns
ngx,inst infmtry. The latter did their duty bravely, Lilt our low
was sevcre. I i~iclosethe ' Gazette ' a i d despatch on these actions,
in cesc you should not beforo l~avcrcccivcd thcm. St~ndersfcll in
lcatling a party of the 401h ngninst the guns.
Pours sinccrely,
H. M. DURAND.
Camp, IIirdoon : Fcbronry 1, 18,Il.

My dear Bronafoot,-I only reccived hcro to-day your letter of
December a i d of Juiuary 9. I very much regret the state of your
hcallh ; but I still trust you may be able to renmin and to perfect
tho good morlr you lrave bcgun.
You give a s d picture of tho stato to which mnladministration
has reduced your provinces. I always believed things were goiug
very wrong there, but I had no idca they were so bad.
I am afraid my going to the Teuasserim coast n~oulclbc misconstrued by the Enrmesc and lend tlieiu to cspect nggression, whilo I
could not s;1tisbc1orily do much in n, w r y short time, nncl I could
only bc nbscnt for n very short tinlo uncler m y ciroumstances.
Unrler present circumstauces I canuot vcnturo to loiwc this part of
Indin.
Yon will have heard that our campaign w:~sof one day ; I a m
now on my return to Galcutla, having settled all at Gm.alior. I
havo sustaiucd n great loss in Col. sander^.^
If there should bc at any f11tnre time a prospect of our having
more important operations to carry on, 1 will, if possible, have you
with me.
I have made evcry proper representation with respect to your
1:aving promotjon for your selvices nfter April 7, 1842. I can do
no more thnu I have done.
I shall be very anxious to hear how your health is after your
voyage to Tnvoy.
I have writtcn to Mr. Bird about your having a steamer. I
thought you had one.
Col. Sanders, of the Bengnl
Engineers, hna boon lnorc thnn onco
mentioned in thesc pngcs. He lind
served in hlghnnist;un, visitctl nnil
surveyed l-lcriit, hnil distiiiguishctl

Ilimscli nt tho tolting of Istnlif, nnd
n t tho tiruc of his denth was Deputy
Sccrcttlrg t o tho Governn~ontof l n d i r ~
iu the M i l i t ~ ~ rDcparilncnt.
y
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I hope the arrangeinents I have made mill enable the Madrns
Government to esecnte the origiilal intention of relieving their 44th
Regiment now with you. I have been obliged to place at the disposal of the Madras Govenmlent the regiments I liad brought up,
or mas bringing up, to the Ncrbudcla. One of them mutinied at
Jubbulpore, md I am stronger without mutinous troops than with
them. I t is very iuconvenie~it,howwer, to have to place Bellgal
troops there just now. I want them all, or may do so.
Let me have a good account of your health, and I sl~nllthen feel
satisfied that d l the afTairs of your Clovernulent mill go ou well in
time. Believe me, my dear Broodfoot,
Yours very sincerely,
ELLI~NBOROUC~H.
.
13roaclfoot's fricnd John Malcolmson, to w110m most of the
letters from Jalalnbacl mere aclclresscd, died on &!arch 23,1844.
A few words respecting his scrvices may be permittecl. Hc
ciltcred the Madras k9edic;cl Service in 1823, and Beforc long
clistingnishecl himself i n his profession, and becamc known as
a, mnn of consiclerable scientific attnin~nents.
I n 1833 he won n prim of 500 rs., given by thc Maclrm
Govcriiment for an essay on bc~ibeii,%n obscure but clistressirig and virulent clisease.
As a geologist he mas thus described by the late Hugh
Millcr : ' A man of high scientific atlainmcnts nncl greet gencrd
ki~ovlcdge. Abovc all, I found him to possess, in a remarlcable
cleglw, t h a t spirit of research almost alllounting to n prssion,
mliich invariably marks the superior man.' Darwin proi~ounced
tliat there conlcl not be a higher nnthority on thc geology of
India.
H c left tho army i n 1840, and joined the house of F o r l m
and Co. i n Bombay, his brother being apartuer in the Loi~doii
house Forbes, Forhcs & Co. I n 1842, he became secretary
to the Bombay branch of the Royal Asintic Socicty ; in
Fcbruary 1844, h e wcnt to examine thc valley of the Tapti,
caught jungle fever from over exposure, nncl after nearly a
month's illness died.
The decoration of the O d e r of thc Bath, to which Brondfoot hncl bceu admitted for his services with Salc's brigudc,
m s thus transmitted mcl acknowlcdgcd :

cn,
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Gorepi~ontHouso, Cnlcuttn : March 1, 1848.
My dcar Major Broadfoot,-I send you the decoration of tlie
Order of the TJath, wllich his Royd IIighness Prince Albert, ncting
Grmd Blaster of tlic Order, has tmnsmittcd to me for you.
If you am1 I could remain in India some years, I thinlr I should
have a similar duty to perform more than once. Bornever, I nm a
civil governor, and I ought to wish tho golden age may return, when
there will be no more wars.
Yours 'kc.
ELLEN~OROUGH.
Mnolmnin : April 10, 1814.

My Lord,-I have had the honour of receiving your Lorclship's
letter of the 1st ult. conveying the decoration of the Order of tile
Batli, transmitted to your Lordship for me by his Royd EIigllness
Prince Albert, acting Grand Mnster of the Order ; and I beg tllat
your Lordship will be so good as to convey to the Prince, nnd
tlirough his Royal Highness to her Majesty, my dutiful aclmomhdglllellt~of the honour so graciously conforred on me.
At the same time I request your Lordship to accept my tlinnh
for the kind nnd flattering tcrms of your letter. It adds another
to the many obligations under which you have laid
Your Lordship's &c.
G. BROADBOOT.
I t is nccessarjr to advert briefly to the qnarrcl whicli
existccl between the Governor-Gencral and the Court of
Directors. As in most quarrels, ihere werc faults on both
sides. Lord Ellenborough's reforms, though for the most pmt,
if not entircly, wise nncl honest, werc rendercd unpnlnlablc
to the Directors by Che tone of the letters in which they were
announcecl. He further clicl not exhibit a paternal ~olicitude
for the interests of the Civil Service, and was credited with
a n undue bias in favour of army men. I t is right that the
Governor-General shonld select for the highest appointments
the person best fitted to perform the duties, irrespective of
~ ~ ~ h c t Ihe
i e rbe soldier or civilian. I t is also right that in doing
fio the strictest impartiality between the two services, in all
dealings in which their interests are involved, shoulcl bc maintained.
On the other hand, the Court of Directors exhibited singular
ungraciousness and pettiness in the endeavour to dcpreciatc
the great ~ncritsit was impossible to deny to Lord Ellcnborough's ndministratiori.
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A curions mnomaly csisted at that timc in respect to thc
~ o m e rof
s the Conrt in conilectiorl with the Governor-Gcncml.
The ordinary rule as regards any appointment is, tlmt thc
power compctcnt to appoint is competent to dismiss.
An infcrior power cwmot dismiss a person itppointecl by a
superior authority. I n the case of the Governor-Gencral, the
Court conld make thc appointment, ' subject to the approl)n,tion
of his Majcsty, to bc signified in writing by his royal signmsnnal,' ' and countersigned by the President of the Board of
Control. Orclharily, thercfore, they should have Becn undcr
a similar restriction in the matter of recall or dismissal.
Por some unlmomn rcason it was not SO provided in tlic
Act : his Majcdy was cmpowereil to remow any oficcr of thc
Conqxmy's service i n India ; whilst in the nest section, thc
liberty to removc, recall, and clisiniss thoir servants, was prcservcd to the Court of D i r c ~ t o r s . ~
The qnarrcl having become acute, thc Conrt decided to
i l v d itself of the power mhicli was thus legally its own ; nncl,
contrary to the wish of her i\Iqjestyls Govc~mnent,decidccl
unanimously on recalling tlie Govcnior-Gencrnl.
Thc following extrncts from a large correspondence refcr to
this snl~ject.
The qucstion of recalling Lord l3llenborongh had ariscn on
more occnsions than one ; but for various reasons liad bcen
al~andoncdor postponed. On April 6, 1844, Lord Ripou, who
becmw Piwidelit of the Board of Control in snccession to
Lord Fitzgerdd, who died on May 11, 1843, informod Lord
Ellonborough that the Court was tending to\\lxrds rccall ; I d
tlint the Cabinet did not concur in thcir ~iem-,imcl woi~lrlnot
share the responsibility. The Court complained of the tone
of d c h n c e ~vliiclicharacterisod certain lettcrs, tlic spirit nnd
tcitdency of which were snch ns to necessitate a change in tho
Government of Incli~. I t m s pointed out 11ythc Cabinct to
Lord Ellenborong-h that on more tlmn one occasion hc had
cspressecl l~irnself,i n respect to thc Court and its authol*ity,
in terms which mcre unnecessary, and conld only cscite irritation.
Inclosed in this lctter was n mcmoralldnin from thc DnItc

'
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of Wellington. In it he remn,rlml that though aawre of compla.ints against Lord E l l e i ~ b ~ r ~ ~concluct,
g h ' s policy, nnd clespatchcs, yet he unclerstood that the rensons aga,insl cscrcising
the p o w r of roc,nll were so strong that wen tlic most inccnsed
members of the Court admittecl the impolicy of using it.
The Duke further esprcssccl tlic opinion thnt there was no
British subject more capable, or cvcn a s capnble, a8sLord Ellenborough of go~wningIndin, nncl he considerecl tllc momcnt of
his return from victory at hln,lin,rajpnr ns a most unfortunntc
one to sclect for his recnll.
On h h y 5, 184.4, Lord Ripon announcecl to Lorcl Ellenborough his rccdl, and that Sir Henry Hardinge 11nd been
selected a8 his successor. He also gave nn outline of the v i ~ w
of the Courl, nnd thosc of the Cabinet on tho quastion. Tlie
Court complainocl of thc tonc of Lord Ellenboroagh's lctters,
and of the nnmerons instances in which they hncl fo~u~cl
it their
clnty to disapprore of his proceedings. I11 reply, the opposite
view 11eld by the Cabinet mas expressed ; the difficulties of the
Afghan question, and the success with mliich he hacl trcntod
them, wero mcntiolled ; in Siiicl,,' though the Court condemned
tho policy follon~ecl,her hfa~;je~ty's
Govcrilment clid iiot hold the
same view, and coilfirmed L o ~ dEllenborough's action; the
self-devotion to his mmy 2nd arduous dnties, nncl thc pcrsonfil
disintcreslccli~essexhibited in the exercise of palro~iagc,\yere
columeildcd ; and the opinion was espressed that the rccall
nroulcl be ' inconsistent with justice nncl sound policy.' The
Court replied that the main gronncl of the measure they had
resolved to adopt, was thc habitnd clisregnrrl by Lord Elle~iborough of the natme of the relcttion existing betmeen him
and them, and thnt his conduct was calculated to bring them
into contempt. The various services performecl by Lord Ellenborough mere clispamgcd, and reference was made to the
q p i n t m e n t of military mcn to civil and political employment
as clamnging to the interests of the Civil Service, upon whit]?
the intelmal aclministration, and consequently the welfare of
the pmple of hclia, so csscntially clcpencl.
As soon au Lord Ellenborough I~ca~rd
definitely of his red,he wrote to most of the officers in s high position under
8

1 A cnrrcnt moi n t tho time wns,
lllnt Lord Ellcnborough'fi fricnds

mufit ndmit that h c hut1 sinncd (Sind)
flt h t .
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the fact, a n d informed them that it monlcl
him,
not cause n change of policy i n dealing with important matters;
that his successor, Sir H. Hwrdinge, monld continue the policy
i n force, a n d that the selection of Sir Henry mas in all respects
a, fortunate one.
His letters t o Broaclfoot o n the subjecl; may be appropriately
placed here.
Cnlcutta : June 17, 1844.

$ 1 dear
~ Major Broadfoot,-YOU will liavo heard that the Court
of Directors have thought fit to recall me. 3fy successor will carry
out all my
Re is my most confidential friend, with whom I
llave commui~icatcdupon $11 public sul?jects for t11i1:ty years.
I will not fail to make him acquainted with your merits and
services. Ho will, I h o w , always place the most favourable int;erpretation upon your conduct, and give you full support.
I must not wish you to return to Englnnd sooil ; but lvhcnevcr
you do, you will, I feel assured, let me have tho pleasure of melcoming you home, which I s l d l do most heartily.
Yours ever most sincerely,
ELLENBOROUGH.
Barrnckporo : July 6, 1844.

My deal* Broadfoot,--I have to regret that my sudden (but by
me not nnespected) departure from India mill prevent my seeing
again in this country, and probably for a long time, many excellent
friends I have had the g o d fortune to make here, and I regret this
with respect to none more than yonrself.
You know my successor, Sir I-Ienry I-Inrclinge, only as e good
soldier; but you mill find him a thoroughly straightfo~wardman of
business, doing justice to all, and supporting nll who endeavour
faithfully to serve the State as you do.
I trust, and indeed have no doubt, that he will, on Mr. Bird's
departure in September, take the Govenment of Bengal into his
own hands.
Every success attend you where you are and in the field.
Yours kc.
~LLEN~OROUGH.

P.8.-I lmom you study your profession in books as well as on
service ; and as you may not have the Archdulrs Charles's military
work, I send you the French translation of it, and hope you may
son10 di~y11ave tho opportunity of applying its principles.
Attention is invited to Brondfoot's reply : making every
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fair deduction for t h e influence exercised by L o r d Ellenborough's personal kinclncss, cnough remains, when t h e hon e s t y a n d ability of the writer w e consiclcrecl, t o make it a
s t r o n g testimony in favour of his Lordship's aclministration.
T h e r e a r e letters from many officers i n high appointments
which might be quoted in slipport of what is sdcl by Broaclfoot. Amongst the rest is onc from Henry Lawrence, who was
t h e n Resident nt t h e Court of Nepal, a11c1 another from Sir
George Pollock, whose testimony is of special value a s rega,rcls
the Indian army. I n his letter, dated Juno 22, 1844, thc
following sentence occurs :
Thc nriny of Inclin owe to your Lordship a deep debt of gratitude, which is not likely ever to be etraced from their nlemory ; alid
yet, I believe, only very few are informed of all your Lordship has
done and has desired to do in their behalf.
hInulmnin Rivor, stenlnor ' Enterprise : ' July 3, 1841.
My Lord,-A few days ago I lienrcl the news of the unpreccdentcd step lntely talten by the Court of Directors. I t would be
very presumptnouu in me to give opinions in such a mnttcr to you;
buL one tliing I may be allowed to sny, wliicll is, that no power
whatevei~call recall the glory of your sliorl- but mernoraLle administmtion-meinoi~nblc bcyond d l prccodcnt since JIarquis Wellesley's, cxceeding tlint in glory, for, cliflionlt as WILH his position
on r e d l i n g India, what was it to yours ?
ivy Lord, I urns thcn in n situnlion wliicli innde me weigh well
our chnnces, nncl I know what Indin, aud Britnin owe to you.
There is no treason, nor is there disrespect to the many good
men who doubtless belong to the party opposed to yon, i u saying
that they havc fallen into ball company. Thcrc is not a n idle, a,
corrupt, or incapable man in India who will not rejoice at your
departure ; ancl setting asicle those blinded by corporntion feelings,
thero are few, indeed, who look on a jnst, able, ancl vigorous govemment here, as essential to the l~nppinessof Iudia and the power of
England, who will not grieve over it.
For myself, the lii~ldness1, unlmown, williout connection, or
interest of ally kind, have reccivcd at your liniiils no doubt swnys
mc. Pel, setting that aside, I feel dccply the injury your removal
must cause here. I found here corruptioil clisgrncoful to the
British name ; snpportcd by yon, m d by yon nlone, I grnpplecl will1
a n d overthrow it parti:~lly; i ~ IIOU~,
~ d just as some of tile reports of
this incrcdiblc corruplion arc going up togctlier wit11 reports of
I'
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lowered taxes, incrensed receipts in tho treasury, improved police,
and friendly relntions wit11 our neighbours, I hear thnt the author
nnd sustainer of 1111this good is removed in a m y not only calculated to [nialte], but which alrendy has made, men again hope
f o n~ renewal of their pillage, who latcly did not hope to escape its
punishment.
I feel every confidence in Sir IIenry I-Inrdingc. IIis own cliamcter, nml the Cabinct which scnds him, demand that. Gut how
can he havc the fmdiarity with India, and that inlimate knowledgo
of its administrittion nnd relations, which can mmalre him indepeildcnt
of tliosc who, by long proscription, regard a 6ovenlor-General, who
will be more Lhan their spealting trnmpel and pen, as a, usurper?
I lind announced my belief that in a fern years these provinces
might conse to be a biirdcn to Bengd ; bnt 1 think that time is now
far postponed. Still regretting this, I shall ever looli on it as a
great honoilr to lmve been the instrument, under yon, of arresting
the evils in progress, and showing the officers of Governn~enthere
a system which, for the future, they cannot venture quite to
abandon.
As to yourself, who have raised nn empire in two years from tho
vergo of clcspair to iunequallcd prosperity, every attaclr will but show
your contempo~nriesthe fullness of glory which otliorwise olllyposterity lnigl~thnve liuown. And I hope all this will t e d to malre
still more sure the destiny I have always loolred on as yours, vie.
that of guiding tbe momentous change of 1 8 5 4 . V f that ycar mere
not so near, I shodd predict that tllc East India C o ~ l l ~ i tLhemll~
selvcs would yct vote you statues and rcwards, ;ls they clid to Clive,
Warren IInstings, and Vellesley, whom, also, they first tllwartccl
and persecuted.
I ought to spologise for so long troubling you, but having begun
I could ]lot l~elpexpressing something of my feelings.
Celieve me, my Lord, with gmtitude and rcspect greater tllan over,
Your Lordship's mosl; faithful servmlt,
G. B ~ ~ O A D B O O T .
With referclm to the appointment of military mcn lo
posts previously held by civilians, Lord Xllenborough, in a
letler to Lord Iiipon, rcmnrlted that it was desirable at 3Iaulmain t h a t the 'office of Agent or Commissioner shonlcl bc held
by n mililiwy man of ltnown judgment imd esperiencc,' who
might be trustccl ' to lay before t h e Govornrncl~tn sound ant1
correct view of the actual stale of sfhirs, null m a y tyvoicl
5

Thc rcfcroncc is to tho cvpiry of tho churtcr in tI1:~t ycar.

creating unncccssnry alarm by exaggerated rcports of coming
c k ? m , \\rhilc lie, at thc smnc time, remains free from the
unslqx?c!ting confidence which iuig1:llL product yet morc injurious results.'
Surely if this was trnc of Tenasserim in 1844, it follows
thnt if wc nlish for security and strength in the ncwly ncqiiired
province of Burma, Llic administration sliould 11c in thc hands
of n slilrillccl soldier, who would, on occasion ariaing, clircct thc
n~oveincntof its garrison. 111 aftcr ycars pcrl~nps,wlicn t l ~ c
people are rcconciled to our rule, the appointment may, mith
safety, be pcrmittcd to swell thc list of prizes wvlich arc 11cld
t o be orcli~inlilythc rcnrards of successful civil servanls.
I n adverling to thc instances in whic11 a military officer
hncl been substituted for a ci~rilisn, Lord Ellenborough
wrote:
The honest energy, the fixedness of purpose, and tho untiring
activity with which Major Broadfoot has npplicd himself to tho
investigation, the exposure, and the correction of the flagrant abuses
which hacl grown up nnder civil inn~:llagon:lleiit
in tlic province of
Tcnnsserirn, can surely not have incurroc1 tho disapprovd of the
Court.
That officer's former acquaintance with Tenasserim, and his
position as onc of the most clistinguished officers of thc Maclms
Army, reco~n~nel~dcd
him to me as a very fit person to be placed at
the head of thc administration of thnt provi~ice,garrisoned by
34edras troops. The personal coinm~nicntionI aftewnrds 11nd thc
advantnge of linving with hiin, while he acconq~anietlmy camp
from Ferozpore to Delhi, satisfied me that I was entrusting the
~rovincoto one of the first men in tho public servicc ; and I really
do not horn one civilinn who could, on the pound of personnl qualification, have advanced n specid clnim to the ~clministmtioiiof
n province w h r c nothing resciubles what lie could havc scen in
Indin.
These quotations are rcco~rleilhcrc, not merely to shorn
how well prepared Lord Ellcnborougl~nwasto justify his selection of n military man i n prcfcrcnce to a civilian, but becausc
of thc hip$ testimony to $Ia.jor Broadloot's abilities and character ~-vliichLhey contain.
Thc last lettcr of Lord Ellenborough, before hc left India,
from which quotation will bc innde, was mriLten to Mr. Currie,
1.
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then his Foreign Secretary. It contains the follonling simple
maxims, with which many seem to be unacquainted.
The first is :

...

Do but one thing a t a time.
Hever make a demand you cannot at once support by an adequate
force.
Never take one step without having considered what your second
is to be.
The next letter, from Broadfoot t o Miss Sutherland, exhibits another phnse of his character in contrnsl; wil;h that of
the stern reformer whose part he wns then playing.
Some of 111s remarks about the changes of fashion i n India,
sncl the typical old Indian, will be found intcreshing by thoso
wllo have had more recent experience of life in that country.
Rfaulmain : August 20, 1844.

I came here with little but the clothes on my back ; but a man
lnust eat, and custom requires plates and dishes. Nay, modern
Indian custom, introduced by steam, requires plates and dishes of
china as in London. Having none, I borrowed from my Principal
Assistant, Capt. McLeod, till I could get my own froin Calcutta.
This borrowed ware was sadly claniageil, I fear, by careless servants.
Now I want to make Rfrs. McLeocl a p r e s ~ n tof a nice set of china,
say a dinner set for eighteen or tweiity-four-eighteen, for they
must not give large parties, unless there be a nice set not to be
broken. If I send to Calcutta I shall have no choice ; iaclced, if I
were there, the choice is limited, and I might get c101vi-1some tasteloss enormity at great cost. SOI come as u~lualto you, and leave
the whole to you. I linow you will forgive Lhe trouble, and I know,
too, what I want will be better done than 'myone else wo111d do it,
I seitd by this opportuuity nn order on Forbes 9: Co. for 601,, which
I hope nil1 cover 811. My onm set is as follows: dinner sot for
twenty-four, cost 451. ; breakfast set for twelve, cost 201. Could I
have waited to write home to you, I suspect that money, or less,
mould have given me something far llanilsomer, t11ong-h it is quite
good enough for me, I want to save moncg if I cau.
It is nstonishing how India is chongecl since 1 saw you, and it is
changing more every day. You may, perhaps, remember liewing
of the rongh way we lived. NOWevery mess eats from the fillost
china. illy o\vn is inferior to Illally of' thorn;-hot-wder p l ~ t o still
s
reinnin, however;--but the mnnnfncturers now Imow this and n~alce
them. Ro also private families nre in everything copyiilg Lonclon.
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Ten years back they w o d d as soon have copied Peltin. Old Indians,
such, for example, as Col. Varde, are nom as rnre here as a t home.
h fact, I doubt if in a short time one will be found out of the
Oriental Club, which will become one of the London shows; a n
Asiatic museum of the remains of estinct species.
McLcotl is an old hiend of mine, and almost the only honest
man I found here ; but h e is a very honest and escellent man. A
little too Itind-hearted for the people he has to deal with, and requiring some one witli more-what shall I call it ?-obstinacy in him
to support him ; and that is his only faillng ; a very venial one indeed, yet it has kept me on this coast when I would fain have left
it to seek health. But lie cnunot stand alone, though with good ability
and great zeal ; so now you h o w him. He is the son of a captain
in a I-Iighland regiincnt, but his mother married Col. Sim of the
Madras Engineers, of whom you will perhaps remember having
heard. Excellent people all.
Mrs. McLeod is the (laughter of a very kind old man I lrnem in
Calcutta, Dr. McLeod, the Inspector-General of Hospitals for the
Queen's troops in India. I h e m her as Miss & I c h o d , when her
husband was falling in and out of love witli her, two or three times
a dny, accorcling to an old bad practice of his ; and it would have
come to nothing, had not the poor old doctor suddenly died. . .
Poor Miss McLeod was left clestitute ; but IVillie, a s hcr l ~ u s b ~ nisd
called, forthwith did what I, then a tLousnnd miles of? journeying
to Afgl~nnistan,said hc would do : he found out he was ovcr heacl
and eiGrs in love, and proposed and was accepted, married and a', a s
Kitty's song used to say ; and from all I see, they are likely, a s
Kitty's stories said, to live happy ever after; for, escept that hc is
from six to seven feet high, and she not much above half that
length, they are escellently matched. They have 1,0001. a year
here; bnt he mas in debt, and she l ~ a dnothing, so they are living
very quietly to get clear. So now you lrnow all about them, to
the size of their hands and mouths, and can tell exactly what to
send.
And here is a sheet full of gossip. I must come home, I think,
soon, or we shall not live long ellough to have all Lhe gossip out that
is accumulating.
I close this now without another word, as I hope to write again
by this ship, though it be but a few lines.
Ever LC.

.

G . BROADFOOT.
I really do not know how you are to get it shipped ; perllaps tho
dealers will do that, paying freight and insurance. Address to

214

LETTER FRON HAVELOCK

CII. VIII

Capt. W. C. i\ilclcod, Principd Assistant to the Commissioner, Tenasserim Provinces ; care of Messrs. Line & GO.,Wndr~w. T h y will
of courso send an invoice, and tell them to send a numbor or something by wl~ichthey mill lalorn how to snpply brealtages from timc
to time.

It mas told of Col. Sim, who is mentioned in this letter,
that h e wished t h e permission of thc Marquis of Tweccldnle to
l
was past mending; the Marquis,
pull down an old ~ v d which
homcver, accompanied by his l r i d i private secretary, Dr. Lsnc,
detormincd to test the nccuracy of his professional adviser by
i n s l ~ z t i o n . ' I think it can be rcpeired,' said Chc Marquis ;
' wl~ixtdo you, think, L a n e ? ' ' Ccrtahly, my Lord, I quite
ixgrcc with you,' the doctor replied. ' Perhaps,' said Sim,
' Dr. Lnnc ~vouldprescribe ti p l m t ~for~ i t ! '
The ncst letter, from I-fevelock, is the last of Chat part of
Brondfoot's correspoiiclence which is includccl in tho period
iluriug whieh he governed tho Tennsserini Provinces. A fern
clr~yssfler it was wnitten, and probably some time bcfore it
was rocoi~cd,Capt. D~zranclwrived nncxpectcdly a t nInulmai~l.
IIc ennonnced thaC Brondfoot h a d been appointed by Sir Y.
IIarclingc a s Agent lor t h e North-TVestcnl Frontier, thcn, nest
to t h e Gover~ior-General's, the most importnnt political post i n
Indin,and t h a t h e himself was to s~zcceedto the vacancy thus
crented.
IIcndqunltors, Simla : Scptcmbcr 0, 1844.

My dcar TJroadfooL,-I was much gratified by the receipt of your
letter of July 5, which, however, dld not reach im u t i l higust
23, and 1was d c ~ i ~ i lto
i gmitlte time from t h midst of my nvoantions
to writo you a, long letter, giving you the story of our short but brilli,~ntcnmp~ig~i
beyoud the Chumbul, ~vhenI h e r d from Sir R.
Gong11 news that I hope will render epistolary co~nmu~~ications
nnucoessary between us. I trust ho is not ulisiuformed wlicn 110
tolls mc that lie m~clcrstnndsit is arranged thnt Clol. Ricl~mondis
tm go to L~~chnow,
D11raud to nIo~llrnein,n d thnt you, my frioiicl,
arc to hnvc tllc North-West Frontier. I cannot say Lorn much I
should delight hi such a chnngo both on public nnd privnhe grounds.
Doubtless yon i m s t have commenced upon mnuy tllings on tho
Tamsscrim oonst, the complctioil of which you would rathor carry
on yourself than see it entrusted to any other hand; but I should
hopc Uurnnd woi~lclbo n i l honcst and able successor; nncl, to put
emolument out of thc question, our North-West Frontier is the poiil!,
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of all others the most attractive to a solclier. You are wanted tlicrc;
for not only is our information defective, but Col. Riclimond, though
a very fair regimental oficer, is by no means a man of calibre for
such a charge, and a11 agent onglit to be at Un~ballo,who would
communicate, in accordance with sound military views, with the
Commander-in-Chief (whose task now seems to be to watch tlie
£roiltier) on the state of affairs. So, if the news be true, I hopc
soon to see you in the West, and to have the opportunity of tallring
a t large, instead of writing on a tllousand matters in nrliicli we both
tnlce an interest. You must encleavour to see R1iu.shrnan on your
way up. My wife will be happy to mdce your ncquaintance, especially nfter being disappointed of seeing you in 18-13 at Seramporo,
though I fear she will not accompnny rue to the plains this winter.
I n case of the Sild~scoming across the frontier, it seems to be
intcndecl (betwccn ourselves is this) to concentrate to luect thom at
Sirhi~id,a point, as it appears to me, much too far in dvancc. My
own notion is that there should be nothing at Perozpore or Loocliana
except within walls : that thc force a t Umballa should be increased,
and that the point of coilcentration should be b rear again of
Umbalh.
I consider myself favoured in linving got tho step of lieutcnentcolonel for tlie Chdior business ; and being far too poor to think of
England, I have made up my mind, though with many regrets, to
1c;~vethe old lYth, a d am now major in the 39th.
Belicvc ruc kc.
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BEFOXBaccompailying A l i ~ j ~Bronclfool;
r
to the Punjab, it is
desirable to record brielly the ljrevious services of tho n e w
Gorernor-General, who succeeded Lord Ellenborough on J u l y
23, 1844.
Sir Henry Harclinge was born in 1785, rccoived his first
commission in 1798, and joined his regiment, the Quoen's
Rnngers, a t the early age of fifteen. He served under Sir
A r t h w Welleslcy in 1808, and was prcscnt nt the battles of
Rolcia a n d Vimiera, where he was severely wo~uulecl. H e distinguished himself in the r e w gnnrcl during the retreat o n
Cornnna, and wbs with Sir Johu i\'Iooro when that gnllanl;
general v a s mortally mounded.
The value of his services st Albuera is ackno\~ledged b y
history.
The occnsion is thns described by Nison a n d
Napier :
In this extremity the firmness of one man clm~godthe fate of
the day, and in its ~dtimateeffects, perlinps, determined the issue
of the Peniusular War. While Beresford, under circumstances
which not only justified, but perhaps called for the measure, was
taking steps for e retreat, an officer on his staff, endowed with t h e
eye of a general and the soul of a hero, boldly took upon himself
thc rcsponsibility of venturing oue more throw for victory. Col.,
uow Srli HENRY
~ I I ~ ~ ~ D ordored
I N G E Gen.
,
Colc to ndvancc wit11 his
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division on the right, wliich was still fresh, aid, riding up to Abercrombie on the ostrcmc left, ordered him also to bring his reserve
brigade into nction.'
The carnage urns frightfnl, ' and then was seen with what
a strength nnd majesty thc British soldicr fights.' "The French
a t length gave way, and ' likc a loosened cliff, went headlong
down the ascent. Thc rain flowecl nfter in s t r c a m ~discoloured
with blood ; and fifteenlnmilrecl unwo~uldedmen, the remnant
of sis tliousnnd nnconq~icrableBritish eolcliers, sloocl triumphant on the fatal hill.'
Col. Harclinge was again severely wounded a t Tittoria,
nnd mas prcsent in nearly every battle and siege cluring the
memorable war. For his services he was made K.C.B., RIIC~
was nppointecl to commnnd a company in the Gunrds.
When vtsr broke out again, hc was attached bo lhe Prussian
army ~ u d e rBlncher as Quartermaster-General, and tool< a
disbinguishecl part in lhe batt,le of Ligny. Late in the nftcrnoon his lcft hand was shattered by a bnllet, but he did not
lei~vethc fiold, and it wns miclnigllt before his hancl W~LS~ W I ~ U talecl. Eough trealrncnt in the first instance causecl much
aclclitional suffering, but he was able to rejoin the army in
Pnris. I n nclcno~vledgmentof his great services the Icing of
Prussia, at n rcyiew at, Seclan, decorntecl him with the Orcler of
Merit and of lhe Red Eagle ; nncl Wellington presentccl him
with the sword from his own sicle.
In 1821 Sir I-Ienry married Lady Emily Jane, sixth
daughber of the Marquis of Lonclonderry, and thns became
related by marriage to Lord Elle~lborough. Ile enterccl
Pnrlinment, and held office twice as Secretnry of VTtw,and
twice as Chief Secretnry to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland.
That his scrvices in the latter capacity were lvarltcd by
honesty, abiliby, and devotion, is coufirmecl by his having encluccl the rancorous hostility of the Irish members, and the
foul language of their leader.
Sir EIcnry was the Duke of Wellington'e second in the duel
with Lord Winchilsea.
This brief and imperfect slretch of Sir H. I-Iarclinge's career
is suficient to show that his eqcrience and qualifications as a
Alison, LIislor~ of ~BLTO~U,
vol.
' Nnpier, PoniwsuZnv
viii. p. 321.
to 548.
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soldier wero of n very high order ; as a mcmber of Parliament
and holder of office he has bccn clcscribed as of a tcmpcr warm
but generous : ' Plain, sinccre, straijihtforward, just a i d conunderstanding what he undertakes, and ~uldersiderate; .
taking nothing but what he nnderstnncls.'
Such was the man who, whell fifly-nine years old, undertook the duties and responsibilities of the Govcrnmcnt of Inclia.
A retrospective glance at the history nncl politics of thc
P ~ u ~ j is
a bnow necessary, in order that events which happened
wvhilst Uajor Broaclfoot was nnswcrable for thc conduct of our
rclittions with that country may be correctly appreciated.
Examination of mnch information, collectccl with considerable labour, q p e a r s to justify the division of the subject into
three parts :
I. Prom tlie rise of the Sikh scct to the death of Maharajn
Banjit Singli, say from 1469 to 1839.
11. From the death of l h n j i t Sing11 to the murder of
Mnharaja Shcr Sing11 on September 15, 1843 ; during which
period thc Slilih Government tried to maintain thc: traclitiond
policy of friendship with thc Government of India.
111. From the cleath of Sher Sing11 to the outbreak of the
first Sikh mar.
Thc necessity for keeping a digression of this kind within
snitable limits, prevents more than a vcry cursory allusion to
the events vhich fall under Parts I. ancl 11. Yet they are of
very great interest, and of such a nature as to lend themselves
to pictnre~qnedescription.
The Sikh sect was founded by Gnru Nanali, a true nncl
sincerc reformer of religion. He preached glory to God,
pence and goodwill to man ; and endenvonred to rcconcile
Moslem with Hindu. E'or a time his attempt ~ieemed to
be snccessful; but before long tho incrcasiug importance of
the sect led to thoir persecntion, nnd persecution to reprisal.
The apostle of retaliiztion was Guru Govincl, the tenth spiritual
chief in succession to Nailak. H e preached stecl ancl its application to the Mnsalman, and altered the distinguishing title of
his followers from Silill (learner or clisciple) to sing$ (lion or
warrior).
Aftcr his death thc Siklls wcrc scl):~r,ztcdinto inally parties,

..
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each uildcr n Chief or Swclir; but a11 were united ns cqnal
mcmbers of thc I<h6lsa. The Iihalsa is the comn~onwcnlthof
the Sikhs ; the word has for Lheln a mystical menning, salvation, equality, nnd governmcnt according to the principles of
Gnrn Govind bcing implied.
Thesc parties were united into a nation by the energy and
talent of Rmjit Shgh, abont thc commcilcemenl of the prcscut
ceu tury
For a, timc it mas doublful whclher he mould be content
with conquests to the north and west of the Punjab, or alictlier
he wonld dispulc with the English the sovcrcignty of Indin. I-Ie
decided, however, to ~ w J m i nhis soldiers from aggression in
t l d q~ii~rter
; and once having made up his m i d , he most scrupdonsly ndherecl to a policy of friendship and trust in British
moclerntion and honour.
Tllc position mas a delicate one, for allhongh the Govcrnmcnt of India was perfectly sincerc in iLs desire to uphold
Ranjit Singh's powor, there were complications which under a
less cletermincd and less sagtwions ruler might aL anymomcnL
lead to rupture. Of tliese the principal mm that, altl~ough
ihc SnLlej was the boundary between British Indin nnd the
Punjab, ihe Maharnja lmcl cstensive cstatcs on ihe Critish side
of the river. IIe was tlicrefore an indepenclent chi~fon one
sicle, nnd a protected chief on the other side, of thc SoLlej.
In person Ranjit Singh was of short stature, blind of one
eye, nandn~arkedby smallpox; but evidcnt energy and aldiLy
amply compensated for these defects. Be aflected great
simplicity in chess, whilst he insistecl on his conrtierb: being
gorgeously arrayed. IIe was plain even to coarseness in his
speech, and permitted great freedom in reply. Almost all
Europeans who had iltcrviews will1 him were greatly struck
with his intelligence and talent; but pcrhaps the most remarkable quality he displayed was an insatiable curiosity.
H e questionecl his visitors on every imfiginable subject, mns
clelightccl when they mere confuscd or unable to reply, bnl;
was even more pleased when the reply was apt. If. Victor
JncquemonL, who travelled in India from 1828 to 1832,
Chris ilcscribccl him :
i\Iaharajah IZuujet-Sing cst ull vieus renuril prds do qui le gins
ruse dc nos d~plomntcsu'est rlu'ua innocent. . . . C'est nl? c&ncllc-
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mar que sn, conversation. I1 est h pen prEs lo prcmier Indien
cz~ricusque j'aie vu ; mais il paio de cnriositQ ~ O L Wl'apnthie de

toutc sa nation. I1 m'a fait cent luillc quostions sur llInde, les
Anglais, l'Enrope,Bonaparte, ce monile-ci eng6n6ral ctl'antre,l'enfer
ot le puradis, l'hme, Dieu, lc Diablc, ot mille autres choses encore.'
He mas illiterate, but had great respecl for learning, ancl
was most particular 'in his correspondence, especially with the
Goverilment of India, to weigh with care every important
word or expression used by his secretary, Faltir Aeiznciclin.
He was adclicted to clrink nncl debauchery, ni~dIns to an
estraorclinary clogree in the rule of his zenana. He had, as
far as i s ltnown, only one son, Kharrak Singh, who bore a
strong rcseinblance in face to his father, but the likeness ended
there. There were other reputecl sons, amongst whom may be
mcntionecl Sher Singh, Tarn Singh, I<ashmira Singh, Peshora
Singh, aid Dulecp Singh, of nhorn the Mahnrajn may be said
to have ttdoptecl the first named.
A few of Lhe principal persons about Rsnjit Singh must
be introcluced ; they will appear hereafter morc or lese prominently in Major Broadfoot's letters.
The most able and powerful mcn about; the court nrcre
undoubtedly the Jammii brothers, Gulib Singh, Dhyin Singh,
and Suchot Singh, to whom mny be acldecl I-Iira Singli, son
of D h y m Singh.
Volnmes might be written about these men, so eventful
were their lives; but here the briefest description must
suffice. Gulab Singh was n, soldier, but possessed of much
ability a s a statesman. Dhyan Singli was a stntesman, with
many qualities of a soldier. Suchet Singh was a soldier
only. E r n Sing11 in aftcr times gave proof of both widom
and courage.
Fakir Azizuddin, originally a barber surgeon, latterly in
charge of the correspondence with tho Government of India,
mas a mnn groatly valued and respecled by the &Ialm.rnja.
He nfas simple in clress nncl retiring in manner, a master of
style, conciliatory bnt of grent energy, gifted with a retentive
memory, and always ready with an apt quotntion.
Diwan Din& N&th was a prominent figure during the de-

' Co~raspcdattccclc
Pnris, 1835.
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cline of the Sikh power. H e was employed by Ranjit Singh in
matters of finance, which h e ~nanngerlwith ability tainted with
corruption. He mas rich, hard-vorlting, and accomplished.
The Vakils attached to the officeof the Governor-General's
Agent were persons of much importance. They were all of
one family, and were n d l inclined tomn.rcls the Jammn pn-rty.
Rai Kishen Chancl mas the ablest of them ; lie possessecl great
tact, cunning, snd presence of mind, concealecl under the
clisguisc of a mild, cleferentid, and yielding manner.
There were many other persons who deserve to be termed
conspicuous in thc court of Ranjit Singh, such as Dinran Molram
Charid, Jemnclar Khushhlil Singh, Diwan Silwan Mall, Bhhi
Ram Singh, and Misr Beli Ram; not to mention the principal Sardnrs, such as Sham Singh of Atari; Pittteli Sing11,
hhin; Desa Singh, Majithia, and his sons Lahna Singh and
Ranjur Singh ; the Sindhanmalia chiefs, and others ; but tlie
scope of this sltetch does not admit further description.
Thc principal foreign oBcers were Gen. Ventura, in charge
of the infantry; Gen. Allarcl, who commanclecl the cavalry;
and Gen. Court, who was chiefly employed with the artillery.
Gen. Avitabile was a successful nnd unscrupulous ruler of wild
savages, and is best lrnown as governor of Peshawar and Yusufzai.
Ranjib Singh is said to have dicd on Juno 27, 1839, and
next day his body was burnt outside the gates of the I-Inzuri
bagh, on the spot now occupied by his mausoleum. H e was
succeeded by I<harralr Singh, from wliose weak hnncls his
ambitious and able son, Nho Nihiil Singh, soon encleavoured
to wrest all power. Raja Dhyan Singh was the wazir or prime
minister, and as long as his advice was followed thc business
of the State did not sufler ; but he was distrusted, cspecially
by Nao Nihal Singh. Complications with the Government of
Inclia arose on the question of permission for our convoys to
march vici Peshawar to Kabul. The Court of Lahore mas
disquieted by the reports in English newspapers of the assembling of troops at Pirozpur, and they regarded wit11 apprehension the expected return of the army from Afghnnistan.
They tried to oppose the march of our troops through the
Punjab, and Mr. Clerk was scnt to arrangc the matter. The
instructions givcn to him were explicit : the Govern~nentof
SCC1). 14, note 4.

228

NAO NIIIAL SINGE'S DRATEI

err.

1s

India mnst hare n safe passage for convoys ancl escort when
necessary, but woulcl restrict the number as much as possible.
i\I:bharajn, I<liarrak Singh's health mas in a very menk state :
)]is cloctors lnwcribcd ' ponnclecl emcralds a i d other astringen t s
ancl tonics,' but withont g00c1 effect. He cliecl on Novcmber 5 ,
1840. After the cremation of his corpse, Nao Nilinl Singh, o n
foot, nccompnniecl by Dhynn Singh, and l"iya11 Ucllinrn Siilgh
son of Gulab Singh, nncl followecl hy some ~ e r ~ a n treturned
s,
from performing the usual ablutions tonrards a g n t c ~ ~ niyn
which hc sought shade. AS hc entered, it fell. Uclha~nSinjih
was ltillcd on the spot, Nao Nihal Sing11 mas dcsperatcly
mounded, ancl Dhyan Siilgh was slightly struck by the falling
dEbris. Nao Nilinl Singh ncver spoke ,again, and soon died.
Raja D h y m Singh at once sent for Knnwnr Shcr Singh,
thc repntecl son of Ranjit Singh, and, vith the unanimous
consent of tho I<halsn, plncccl him on the throne, nlhenco h e
m;~sdcsirecl to rulc in concert with the nlinisters and in some
,
Chnnd
lri~~cl
of coiljunction mith Kharralc Siiigli's W ~ C ~ O WRani
Iianrttr." This lady dicl not approve of the arrangement, a n d
succeeclecl for a time in causing Sher Singh to clepart to h i s
estates mcl quit the government. Her administration mas
mcak, and her acts were those of a grasping and indiscrect
won~an. Robbers begm to infest the high roads, ancl insubordination appeared in the army.
In 1841 Shes Sin@ returned to Lahore, obtained t h c
assistance of Venturn ancl some of the troops, nnd besieged
the Rani in the fort or citaclel, which was clefcnciecl by Raja
Gnlab Singh. His assaull;~were unsnccessfnl, but terms of
evacnation were conclnclecl, nncl the garrison, lnclen mith t h e
spoil of the treasuries, marchccl ont unmolestecl. The Bani remained in the fort, and Shcr Singh, after haying been instnlled
a s &haraja, went by advice of the Darlxir to call upon hcr n n d
beg her pxclon. The Rani rose to receive him, and, having
seated him by her side, congrstulatcd him on his succession
to the throne of L A1lore.
Tl~crois some obsourity rognrding thc use of the titlc Rt~wnr,R o w ,
or Roocr, applied to llrdics of 11ccrtnin
ranl;. Knnw~rris tho titlc by which
a bhharnja's sons arc addrosscd, nnd

its fernininc foml is Ron\vi\ri.
Dadxi?.or d f ~ ~ htho
n ~court,
,
or
nsscn~blyof the chicf pcrsons of Lhc
Stnlo.
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Insnbordination Rmong the troops mas malting nlarmiag
progress, and robbcry and mnrder wcre daily comnlittcd in
t h e streets of Lahorc. The army acted under the direction
of their pancliayats or regimental committees. These were
elected by the men, and to them mere referred all importnnl
cluestions, such as what pay they shoulcl demand, where they
mould senrc, and what oficers they mould obcy. Later on
they practicnlly decidcd rlnestions of government and policy,
and appointed or dismissed thoso callcd by courtesy their
rulers. In 16-11 tllc mntiny had spread Lo Pcsht~ma~,
and tho
road to Kabul was no longer safe. It mill be rccollcctcd that
the convoy of the wives and attenclants of the royal fmiilics
of Kabnl, ni-tder an escort comrnan.nded by Capt. Broadfoot,
marclied through the P~injo,bat this time. Tllerc is reason
t o believe that a number of the mutineers who threatened thc
convoy, perished in the c~trao~dinary
flood of May 1841,
cansccl by the bursting of an obstrcictioil or dam in the Inclns,
the rcsnlt of a lanclslip on an cnormons scale. As far as me
have been ablc to disco.rer, the dam lasted for nt least two
months, when thc accumulated waters of the Inclns at length
carried it away. The coilseqncnt flood was of unprccedcnted
magnitndc, and clisnstrons in the estremc. Trees, villages
and their inhabitants, and even the surface soil of a consiclerable tract of country, w r o swept away, and thc desolation
which resulted remains even unto this day."
I n Junc 1842, Rani C h ~ n dICawar mas killcd by hcr slave
girls clnring a temporary ~lbsenceof the Maharaja from Lahoro.
The defence of Jalalabad attracted the attention of the
mom tlioughtfd in the Darbar, and did much towards removing the unfavonrrtble impression cnnsed by the disasters
i n Afghanifitan. On one occasion, when a courtier m d c
some remarks disparaging to British power, Raja, Dhym
Singh replied, calling attention to tllc fact that there mere but
a, thousand of our troops in Jalalabad, yet how 1)ravely did
they oppose M~lliilrnmnclAlibas. They had saved the place
H T h e information regnrding this
flood r e d s greatly hut not entirely on
trn[lition. High-mntcr mnrlrs have
been obserscd. 111 July 1617, Lioot.
l<nlph Young, C.E., saw dislinctly
tho lligli-wiltor mndi of this flood at

the Makpon-i-shagron, n considcmblo
distsnce up-strcnm of Acho, near
which plncc the obstruction hnppcned.
Hc cslimnted the high-wnter ~nnrlito
be forty feet above thc ordinary highlcvcl surfnae of the rivcr.
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sim11Iy by their own courage, and were agnin holding it in
force. Similarly he dlnclcd to Randahar, and told his aningonist that hc did not a t all comprehencl the conmgeons
cllnrncter of the British.
In a n evil day for himself, Maharaja Sher Sing11 listened t o
the advice of the Indian Government, and consented to be reconciled v i t h the Sinclhnundia Sarclers, and to reinstate them
in their possessions. They cvinced their gratitncle by murdering him and his son Partfib Singh, n youth of great promisc,
on September 15, 1845. On the same morning, and by t h e
hand of Ajit Singh, Si~ldhan~valia,
who had ltillecl Sher Singh,
fell Haja Dhgan Singh, thc wise nlnzir of the Punjab. H i r a
Sing11 his son, and Suchet Singh his brother, determined to
revenge his death. The former gained over the troops, t h e
latter led them, and the fort of Lahore, in which Ajit Sin@
lied talcen refuge, \vms captured. Hira Singh was enablecl to
lay the head of Ajit Singh at the feet of Dhyan Singh's
rvidow, Rani Pathani, who hid declined to burn hcrself till
ehe had obtained that satisfaction. TVhcn that was accomplishecl, she said, ' Now I am fully satisfied ; now I am ready
to follow my lord and hnsband ; ' and added, turning to H i r e
Singh, ' I wilL tell your dear father that you have acted the
part of A braye nnd chlif~dson.' Ihving spoben thus, s h e
cdmly mounted the funeral pyre and pcrished in the flames.
Dnleep Singh, tt mcrc child, whose birth hncl been considered of so little consequence a s not to merit report to t h e
Agent till some years after its occurrence, mas proclaimed
Maharaja.
Pnrt 111. of this sltctch of Punjab history must be clescribed at greater lcngth, for Major Broadfoot mas one of t h e
most conspicnons actors in its stirring scenes.
In June 1843, Col. liichmond, C.B., an officer who h a d
servecl with distinction in the war in Afghanis tan, nras selected
by Lord Ellcnborongl~to sncceecl Mr. Clerk, whose reputation
as our Agent and Envoy was tlescrvedly great. The selcctioll
was not entirely fortunate ; the Colollel had no specitblInlowledgc or csperie~lceof the kind of vorlc he was called upon to
perform, and was no re over in bad hci~ltli. I n ltis privntc
rcrnarlrs on the nppointment, Lord Ellmlborough did not exprcw llie ccrtuiilty, nlllich he souzotimcs recorclccl, that hc h a d
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g o t tho best possible man for the place; hc said it was thc
best h e could do nt thc time, and he trusted that the nppointm e n t might turn out mell."e
sent Col. Richmond instrnctions to the effect that the British Governlnent dcsircd to
adhere to the policy which it had all along followed, and to
maintnin the relations of amity which had so long subsisted
between us and the Silt11 nation. He considered thnt the
presence of the Sikhs as a strong and fricndly nation betlvecn
t h e Inclus and the Sntlej ~ v amost
s
beneficial, and greatly to bc
prcfcrrecl to contact with ASghnnistwi. At the same ti~nc,he
pointed out Chnt all the news from the Punjab indicatcd an
cerly clisrncnlbcrmcnt of tlie Silrh Stntc, and that tlrcrefose, in
common l~ruclence,defensive nieasurcs must not be ncglectcd,
a n d infor~untionwhich would be of use if war were forced on
u s must be collected.
I n Lahore affairs were very nnsettled. In October 1843
t h e Jnlnmu party were in the ascendant, Ilira Singh beiag
minisicr. hgninst him were nnoyed the Sikh chicfs as s
body, E L ~ Rnni
C ~
Jind Kamar, or Jindin, as shc as commonly
cnllcd, the mother of Dulccp Singh. But the rctd power had
pawed from the rulers to the army. I-Iira 8ingh mas greatly
under the infiuencc of Panclit Jalln, an able and vigorous man,
clrcndecl and clisliltcd Ly t l ~ cchicfs, whose wealth he tasccl for
t h e bcncfit of the treasury. He wnu d s o the prime mover in
t h c anti-English policy. H e foresaw that thc time must come
when he co~~lcl
no longer raise money to satisfy tllc rapiwit;y of
t h e army, and bclieved t h a i his clirincc of safety t l m was to
incite t h c soldiers to march against the British. At first thc
I<halsa penetrnted his design, but nftcrw~rdsthey were so f n ~
gpidecl by him thnt the troops marched out to Iiiina Kachha,
one of the stages on tlie soad to Firozpur. This was the first
patent departure from the ttaditiond policy of Ranjit Singti.
Sesclar Fattcll Singh, Man, nppcnlcd pntheticelly against tllc
innovation. I-Ie referred to the benefit the Sikhs had derived
from maintaining frienclship with the British, and deprecated
tile adoption of any mcasures which iilclicated suspicion, or
migl~tbe considered provocative of mar. &id hc nslrccl the
J)arbnr to wcigh his wolds wll, and with Che respect to which
h e was entitled on account of his ilfc of sevcnty-iive years,
" P. 194.
9
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end of his scrviccs to tllc Statc. It mas of no uso ; the Sikh
troops wcrc marched still ncarer to the Sntlej, txnd Panilit
Jella urged the generals to send men to Pirozpur to tamper
with the ficlelity of tlic sopoy regiments.
When Lord Ellenborough heard this, hc desired that our
friendly nttitudc shonlcl be rcaflinned, bnt n,ccompanicd by n,
plain warning that if one Sikh soldier crossed the S~ztlojin
hostility, the aggression wonlcl not be forgiven. The Agcnt's
rcports a t this timeexhibited the acts of the Sikhs in tho most
f~vonrabloaspect, and nnduly blaclrened the chamcters of thc
Jammn Rajas, s process which was unnccessary. Thcsc lettors
had the cffect of eliciting from Lord Ellenborongh expressions
of horror at the revolting crimes and atrocities by means of
mhich 13kn Singh ha8draiscil himself to power. That opinion
was based on a misconception of the case. Thc atrocities by
which Hira Singh had riscn to the higlicst position uncler tho
XIaharaja, could not with propricijr be laid to his charge. 13%
fathcr had been mnrdcred by the conspirators, and he, a young
and soucnhtt effeminate man, appenled to the troops, m c l ,
with z remarlcable amount of sltill and determination, avenged
his father's death. T h d Hirn Singh mas much betler than hi^
neigllbours it moulcl be idle to assert, but neither was he worse.
The Silths were superstitions, and there werc evil omem
in the camp of thcir army, which had lnorecl towards tlic
British frontier. Their tallest flngstnff n7nsBrolten in a storm,
and thc tent of Miyan Lhbh Siiigh, one of their commanders,
was literally torn to picces by an iufurialed elephant.
Bhai Gnrmulrh Singh, who had latterly exercised consiclcrablo inflnence over Sher Singh, and who is believecl to have
directly recommendecl Ajit Sing11 to murder Dhynn Singh,
and Misr Beli Ram, who mas generally opposed to the Jammn
party, mysterionsly disappea~wlwhen Raja IIira Singh came
into powcr.'
It is probnhle that they were inclnclecl in the pm~ishmentho
d e d t to his faher's mnrtlerers, and that thc Bhni descrvecl hie
fate : no direct evidence regarding their death has been found.
MisrBoli Ram mas for a long time in charge of tlietosha Irhmm2
Cak~cttnRca.icw, August 1844,
art. v. p. 500.
Tosha Lhhzn, thc repository 01

Government or Statc prescnts givon
or reccivetl.
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HIRA SINGFL AKD PANDlT JALLA

I t has bccn rocorded that attempts to tamper \vith the
ficlolity of the E i ~ India
t
Company's scpoys had been ordered
Ly Pnntlil Jalla; whether resulting in part from these it is
difficult to say with certainty, but scrious insubordination \\Tas
manifested by ccrtain sepoy rcgiments which wero ordered
to proccccl from Firospur to Sincl. Prompt measures were
taken, and the mutiny was arrested.
liajjn, IIira Singh for n, time seemed to bc so sccureIy ~ e a t e d
as minister, as to afYord a reasonable prospect of stability for
the Govcrnment. Sarclw Jawiihir Singh, the drunlren and
clcbnucl~cclbrother of Rani Jind Kawar, hacl tried to supplant
him, but nias scixed by the troops and imprisonecl.
These appeamnces, however, were deceitful ; thc troops,
tho real masters of tho situation, mere cletemlincd to exercisc
their power, and Ri~jjsLSuchet Singh openly encouraged Eashrnira Sing11 and Peshora Singh to revolt.
Pi~ndit Jalla had greatly oflenendecl the chiefs by tfi,lting
every opportunity to fine them and rcsume their estates, in
order to supply thc trensury. IIc now fell under the wrath of
the army, who discoverecl that though he constanlly profcssecl
his dcvotion to them, and though i t did not appear that hc
11nd recommendecl reduction in their pay, yet he had secrelly
advised Hira Singh to save money, and reduce the power of
the troops, by not filling up vacancies as they occurred.
At thc D a r h four clclegates from the panchapis aplwarccl
and said that t h y came on the part of the whole Khalsn, to
him, R?ja Hira Singh, v h o regarded himself as a very Emperor ; that the order of the Khalsa was as follows : Aftcr
recapitulaiing events since Shcr Singh's death, they said that
now Misr Jalla had been made mazir, a man guiliy of conduct
thc most atrocious and dcbased. The Khalsa had pointcd out
these things, but Raja 151-aSingh had closed his ears, therofore were they displeased.
Hira Singh observed that they should put forward their
wishes plainly in the form of a petition.
The delegates replied that they were no petitioners, but Uic
bearers of the message of the I h l s a ; they addressed petitions
to no one escept to the throne. They again directly formulntccl
thcir complaint, and the l h j a cleprecatccl their anger: and confessed himself grievously in error. The delegates said he must
Q

2

surrender Pnndit Jalla, Shelth Imamucldin, ancl La1 Sir~gh;
ancl that if he llesit;$ted or refused, he mould himself bc seized.
Tho Bnja promised compliance, and tho delegates departed.
P,znclit Jalln, a clever fearless m m , seeing this state of
feeling, remnrlted, thnt when they could no longer control the
army, they mnst send it to plunder the English ; to which
Raja Hira Sing11 rcplied, that ~vouldnndoubtcdly be the f i n d
act. Lord Ellcnborough expressed his concurrence with tlic
Raja, that war with the British would probably be the ros~zlt
of the present anarchy, mcl that therefore proparation w a s
llrudent. On i\Iarch 27, Ritja Suchet Singh with a small force
arrived at Lahorc. He had been led to espect that the a r m y
mould join him against; his nephew ; and when hc found o n t
his mistake, with characteristic rmhncss, he and his small
ba11d clctermined to oppose IIirn Sin& vith twenty thousand
Inen am1 nrtillery. First he allomecl all those of his followertl
to go who desired to do so, and then, with the equally brave
Rai Kesri Singh, at the head of some sixty or seventy men,
he charged the Sikh army, and perished.
The ilnrneclinte result was that Hira Singh became still
lnore dcpeudcnt on the will of the soldiers.
The next event of importance, one of the very fcm cascs in
which the Sikh Government had a just cause of complaint
against the British, was that Sarclar Attar Singh, Sindhanwalia, w110 had talren refuge in the cis-Sutlej states, was pernlitted to leaye them with a considerable band of follomcrs,
and join Bliai Bir Siugh, ICashmira Singh, and Peshora Singh,
who werc ellcamped on the north side of thc Sutlej. R a j a
Hira Siugh, r i t h g r e ~ tpromptitude, tunled the mistdrc o f
not restraining Attar Singh to good account. He pointed it
out to the Khdsa as cviclencc thnt Attar Singh had the support of the British : he expressed great rcgrct that the Bhai,
whose religious character and position caufied him to be m ~ l c l ~
vencrnted by the Silths, should medclle with State anairs, allcl
by lenguing himself with the enemies of the Rhalsa forfeit its
protection. IIe also protested formally against the actioll
of the Govern~nentof h d i a in allowing this ltnown cnelny of
thc Lahore Government to leitve their territory in order to
disturb the peace of the Punjab.
P-Iira Singh's appeal to the Iihnlsa was successful. They
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listened to his impeachment of the Sindhanwalia chiefs, to
his clenunciation of them for having involrecl British aid, nncl
said that they mere the servttnts of the hIaharaja, and were
ready to m u c h to Delhi. The Raja replied: 'First punish
Attar Singh.'
Lorel Ellenborough pointed ont tho impropriety of not
having detainccl Snrclar Attar 8ing11, and prevented his crossing
into Punjab territory to stir up strife. For future guidance he
informed the Agent, that if satisfied that a person mas proceeding through our territory wilh hostile clesigns against
Lahorc, he was empowered to use m y degree of compulsion
rccluired to prevent his purpose.
The I ~ d s army
a
marched from Lahore and came up with
t h e rcbels near Sarehfi.li, which is on the road from Amritsar
t o Harike patan.3 An effort was made to detach Bhai Bir
Singh from the others, in order that he might not bc involvcd
in their rnin. I t was nnsnccessful, and the Khalsa troops procccded to do their duty. Their superiority in llumbers wns
so grcat that the issue conlcl not for a moment be in doubt.
Attar Singh, Kashmirn Singh, nnd the Guru were slain ;
Peshora Singh escqecl, it is believed, before the commenccmcnt of tlic slaughter.
The clenth of the Gurn by violcncc maclc n great impression on thc minds of the superstitious S i b s ; the troolw
cngagecl wcre thereafter called GGrhmfir; and when, shortly
aftcrwarcls, they suficred sevcrely from cholcrtt, it mas consirlcrcd to be s Divine punishment for their sacrilege.
Thcrc was another question, regarding the early treatment
of mhich, tlic Government of India mas not as fortunate as
nsnal. Raja Suchet Singh, shortly before his death, fient a
connidernble amount of treasure, said to exceccl fourteen laklls
of rupees in valne, then approximately equal to 140,0001., lo
P i r o ~ p u rfor mfety.
Cnpt. Sn~zndcrsAbbott, who was Assistnnt Agent st Firozpur, on hearing that the treasnre had been cliscove~~ccl,
went
irnmcdiately to ascertain its amount, mil provide for its safe
CL~SLOC~~.
Hc found it buried in three hnge coppcr vessels, one of
V ~ n l n 7 (prbtlwz)
t
is the word used
in the Punjab to denote II fcrry or

lord.

Slayors of the High Priest.

230

SUCHET SIKGY'S TREASURE

cn. IS

which only mas opened. In this mere fonncl 63 brass lotas or
vases, supposed to contain gold, closcd with lend on which the
Raja's seal v a s impressed. Gold mohurs Qvere visiblc through
two defective seds. A p a r d having been plrtced in chargeof
the treasure, next morning Capt. Abbott had it dug up in the
presence of the Lahore Vakil and others. There proved to
be seventy lotae of gold and thirty bage of silver ; the former
were sent to the magazine treasury, and the latter to the old
treasury. So far good; bnt unfortunately, in a commnnication
fiom the Agent, the Darbar mere led to expect that the treasure
woulcl be made over to them on application. This reply woulcl
seem to have been the reenlt of regarding questione between
the two Governments mainly from n Sikh point of view, with
which in reality we had little concern; and neglecting to consider as the primary matter how they were aflectecl by British
law and custom, which must be held to gnirle the action of the
British Governmcnt nnd its agents. Prom a, Sikh point of
view, the reply was
correct ; for they considerccl that
they mere entitled to the property of a subject who had been,
lrilled in a rebellion. They f ~ ~ r t hheld
e r thnt they mere the true
interpreters of their own laws, and could best decide to whom
the treasure belonged ; that as no British subject claimed the
treasure, it unquestionsbly belonged to a ~uhjectof the Lahorc
State; tmcl that such subject could comnlnnicate with thc
British Government, or Agent, only through his own Governmcnii.
Thc Governor-General regretted thnt hopcs had been held
out to the Dnrbar that the trensure would be made over to thcm,
as it seemed to belong to Raja Snchet Singh's heirs. I t is
useful to record that at the time to mhich this sketch of
Punjab history has been brought, via. the encl of July 1844,
Lord Ellenborough hnd been succeeded by Sir Henry Haydinge as Governor-Gcnernl, and the latter was thprefore responfiible for the orders of tho Governmcnt of India hereafter
quoted.
I
1
1 cluc time a letter from the Maharnjn was reccivecl by
the Agent, in mhich his Highness nfilred that the trcasnre might
be inade over to him in order that he might give it to thoso
to whom it bolongcd, Rajw I-Iira Singh and Gulab Siagh.
A coin, vnluc sixteen rupees.

The Agent rccomrnencled compliance, ns a meaus of getling
rid of a troublesome question. The Governor-Gencral considered it necessary to trtke a legal opinion as to the course
he should follow. H e therefore referred the question of law
to Mr. Cameron, saying that he vould be glad to get rid of
the treasure, and asking if he could with propriety follow the
course propo~edby the Agent ; or if he shoulcl not, before he
parted with the treasure, hnve a document from the owners
intimating their acquiescence.
811'. Cameron pronounced in favour of the lattcr proposal,
nnd nn order was sent to the Agent to explain this, and the
vicws of the Government of India ou the subject of the ireasurc,
to the Maharaja. He mns also desirecl to inform the heirs or
owners, Gulab Singh, I f i n Singh, and Sucllet Singh's wiclow,
that unless they at once came forwsrcl and claimed it, ihc
money would be paid over to anyone namccl by RItlhuraja Duleep
Singh. In conclusion, the Agent was dirccted not to part with
thc trcnsure until he had received not merely the reply of the
Lahore Government, but thc ordcrs thereon of the Go\wnment
of India. The foregoing instructions were issuccl on August 10.
Aftcr n considerable lnpse of time the Agent reported that
Suchet Singh's widow had chimed the treasure directly, and
Gnlab Sing11 inclirectly ; nud that in conscqnence he had not
aclclresscd tlle Naharaja, as desired.
This was an unfort~~llate
error cslculnted dill further to
complicate tho qncstion, already unnecessarily involved by the
nclmission previously mentioned.
The Governor-General was naturally surprised and clispleased. Zxplicit orders wcre sent to thc Agcnt to write forthwith to the 81&hsrnja, nncl explain that the delay was caused
by his misapprcllension ; he mas to add that ns the widow
had claimed the treasure, it could not be give11up without her
~;anction or that of hcr ndo1)ted child, Gdab Singh's son.
Fnrthcr, lie was told to express the regret felt by the GovernorGeneral in Council, tlmt obstaclcs had arisen to the immedinto transfcr of the trensurc ; Lnt the British Government was
~lnclerlegal oLligations not to transfer ihc property without
ihe consent of the parties io whom it Lelonged.
I t is necessnry for the eluciclntion of much that will follow
t o explain thus nt Icngth a113 precisely hat took place regarding
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this trea~ure; tho course followed by the Government of Indis
with rcspect to it has been sllcged as one of the canscs of tho
ou tbrcalc of n w .
With the correspondence here referred to, was a despatch
rcporting the arrangement whereby 'the services of Major
Broadfoot, C.B., have been substituted in tllc Agency of the
North-West Frontier for those of Lient.-Col. Iiichmond, whose
s t ~ t of
c health obliged him to apply for leave of nbsence on sick
certificate to proceed to sea.'
Another matter, not in itself very important, muat be csplained, as briefly as possible, because the action and orders
of the Government of Indis regarding il have h e n set Soorth
as Silih grievances against thc British.
This wnfi mhethcr the Rt~jitof Ndbha was justified in rcsurning his part of lhe village of Mowan, which had been
granted through Raqjit Sing11 of Lahore to onc Dhanna Sin&
a subjcct of the Nabha Statc.
It apl)mred that Che Thja of Nsbha had given his part of
l l ~ village
e
to Mtxheraja liaujil Singh ; but the gift was in~alid,
bccanse the Raja, a proiectcd chicf, did not inform the British
Govcs~rnenl,nor obtain tlwir consenl. The Raja becamc displcaseil with cither Dhanna Siugh or his son I-Iulin~Singh,
who m s in the Silrh senice, nnd desired lo resumc the gift.
Mr. Clcrlc recognised his right to his own hdf of the village,
but feared he migl~t,in resuming his own, seize the otl~er
half, which belonged to Patide. Thc Rajn asked the Agcnt if
he might resume the gift, and the latler replied, as he seems
to have considered, cvnsively, to the effect that Momran appeared to belong to Nabhu, and that if thc Rajn pleased he
coulcl taltc it back. The Rajtja did not consider this at all an
evasive answer, and acted accordingly. He collected troops,
took the village by force with some loss of life, and seized such
propcrty as belonged to I-Iukm Singh, who had succecdecl his
father.
Thc Lahoro Darbnr remonstrated ; lhe Govern~nentof
India upheld the right of the Rajn of Nnbha to resume his
villagc, but desired that 11c shonlcl compensate Hulcm Singh
for the loss of pcrsonal property, unless it should nppoar Chat
force w:m not used till peaceful nlcnus lo resume Ihe village
had lailed.
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CHAPTER X.
Sir H. IIsrdinge to Lord Ellenboro~i~h-Frontiernrrnngcments-Letters congratulating Brondfoot on his nppointment-His first intorview with 1110
Lnhorc Vcdcil-l>iplomntic fencing-The frontier-Suchet Singh's trcnsure
-Village of BIownn-Latter to Lord Elleuborough-Ln,l1oro news-Rnjn
Hirn Singh's policy-Rani Jindhn-llangln, the slnve girl-YlighL and
clestrnction of Zlirl~Si~lgh-Anarchy nt Luhore-l3roudfoot's ordcrs to hi6
Assistnnts-Instroctions from the Govcrnor.Genora1-Sir H. Hnrdinge to
Lord Ellenborough: Punjnb affairs-Brondfoot's
~cports-Letters from
8ir H,Gongh and Sir Cl~nrlesNnpier.

Emona proceeding with the private and other correspondence
during RInjor Broit,clfoot's tenure of office as Governor-GonernI's
Agent, nfew extracts from a, 1etl;c;rwritten by Sir Henry Httrilinge
Go Lord Ellenborough will be made; they me intorcsting a s
showiug the mnttcrs mllich al; the time chiefly occupied thc
mltenlion of the Governor-General.
Sir Henry mrotc very fully and wilh grcat regularity, considering Lhe stirring events of the time, to Lord Ellenborough
about the morc importnut mattcrs, civil and military, \vith
which the Government of India mas conccrnecl. The letters
are now of great value and interest, as events are dcscribecl
with grcater freedom than is compatible with offici~lrcserve.
Calcutta : September 17, 1844.

My dear Lord Ellenborough)-We are especting onr English
mail every hour ; and beforc we are in the hurry of despatching om
mswers, I may as well give you the outline of wlmt has passed since
you left us.
I have appointed Col, Richmond to Lucltnow, Broadfoot to the
North-West Frontier, and Duranil to the Tenasselin. The latter
I sent off by steamer, and I expect Broadfoot every day.
On theNorth-West Frontier I am in correspo~ftence~ 4 t G
h oqh

' ' Wo ' may moan

the GovernorGcnornl ~ n his
d Slnn', or tho UovcmorGenernl nnd his Council.

? Sir Hugh Gough, Commsnderin-Chief in Indin.
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to get all our troops of horse artillery m d batteries in conlpletc
order; and me propose to send four companies of Europeans,
picked men, to fill up vacancies, and meed the old and infirm.
The same weeding must take place in the infantry, where we have,
on an average of a, thousand men, two hundred unfit for active
duty.
We are in the greatest want of infantry barracks on that
frontier ; me can only concentrote five and a half battalions, including Meerut, which is eight days, forced marches, from the
frontier.
We must have barracks for another wing at Loodliiana, and an
entire battalion either at Ferozpore or near Sirhind. The first is
somewhat too forward, and I have mitten to Gough to say I am
iletarmined not to build a t Ferozpore, at tlm pmwnt nto~~aemt,
on
account of tho alarm uvliich it mould create, and that I am ansious
to treat the Lahore Government with all the friendly considerntion
mhich good faith and a desire for pcace can require. Agra and
Cawupore can only hold a regiment each, making seven nnd a half
i n f n& regiments of Europeans. In the event of military operations, two of these mould have to march long distances from C a m pore and Agra to tho Sutlej, nnd the remainder could not be brought
up till thc scason for military operations was nenrly over.
Unless yon had built the barraclrs at IIussomlie,3 Subnthu, and
Umbnlla, any concentration of n, Enropecnl force would have becn
impracticable. Another battalion m d a h d f are absolutely necessary
to insure a vigorous use of the force at the clisposol of the Govcmment;
and in. this, as in other cases, I cannot, if I mere so disposed, but
assent to the accuracy of your military j u d p e n t .

...

There are appearances of dissensions, likely to lend to blows,
between the I-Ieerrt Singh party and the hill tribes under Goolab
Singh. 13ut Richmond gives us nothing but the reports from the
newswriters in the Durbar, and me shall have no very open demonstralion until the d ~ s s e h r a .. ~
Scptolrbc~21.
. I expect Broadfoot every day. . Sir George
Pollock arrived yesterday, and was sworn in.5

..

..

..

I will keep this open for tho last hour. Sir G. Polloclr is very
decidedly of opinion thnt Ferozpore is tho true point for a bnrmck
for a thousand Inen ; t)o foundations erc alrendy laid. A wing at,
Knsadi ns uow oficidly spelt.
Dasulwd, the ten days' fcstivnl nt
t h e beginning of Octobor, niter which
lha Sikhs usunlly sot out on t,hcir
O

yearly expodition. See nlso Yulc's
G l o s s n ~p., 256.
he militnry member. of tho
Covcmor-Goncrnl's Council.
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Looclhini~ais absolutely necessary ; thero is grent inconveniellce in
having a Queen's regimont with one wing on the Sutlege nud the other
at Meernt, nine days' march asunder.
As may be supposed, Broudfoot received m a n y letters of
congrntulntion on being nppohted AgentaG The oifice was at
the time one of the most imi~ortantin India after t h a t of the
Governor-General.
Major Lawrence, afterwards so well known as Sir B e n r y
~ a w r e i c e wrote
,
as follows :
Nepal : Oclober 21,1844.
My dear 13roadfoot,-I have more than once thought of writing
to you tit Maulmein, but now that you are again a Ue~~galcc,
I must
givo you a line to congratulate you, which I do heartily, on the
honourable post you have obtained ; it is one that if oEered to me I
should have been proud to accept ; as it 1m mt, I am veryglnd you
have got it, as 1am sure you will do it full justice, and a noble field
it is for ail energetic man.
I hope your henlth is good; give me a line and tcll me about
yourself. Tliis is a delightful placc n8 far a s climate, idle~zess,
sdaly kc. goes ; indeed, if I colllcl be content to do nothing, it would
be preferable to anything in Inclia ; it came very opportnuely to me,
for my health was such that I must hnvo gone home ; I am now
Yours kc,
much better.
13. 31. LA\\TEXCE.
The ncxt is a fragment from Lient. Orr, who h a d bccn, it will
be recollected, ncljutmt of Broadfoot's Sappers. It colnmeilccs
thus in Lhe middle of a sentence :

. ..

on beiug in the finest appointment in all In6a. I look upon
your situation, in regard to impoi%nnceand responsibility, as being the
next only to the Governor-General of Iudia, and I was not a little
proud and gratified to sce my former lendcr ttppointcd to it. I hopo
your health keeps better thnn it used to do, and that I shall see you
somo day Governor of the Punjab.
F~om
MI-. Cmneron to Jf(ior Broadfoot.
Calcuttn : Novomber 2, 1844.
My clem Broadfoot,
Tho Clovernor-Gcnerd said the other
clay that he had at firat supposed you to be rather too pronc to w w ;
but that his intercourse with you hacl con~.lllcedhim that he was

...

Go~ernor.Gcncr~1'sAgcnt on tho North-M'eztcrn Frontier, is tho complole
titlo,
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mistalcen, rind that he had now full confidence in your cliscretion
(or words to that effect) ; 110 said this at the council table in a,
inaiiiier that led me to suppose it wns meant for me to hear and
perhaps to repeat.

F T OT7,iment
~
Byre

to Jfojor

B~oadfoot.

Gwnlior : Novomber 7, 1844.

My dear Broadfoot,-Welcomo to 13eng,zl again ! May your
shadow increase !
You have made a giant's stride from south-east to north-west.
I wonder whitl~erin the world your nest stride will take pu.
I wish our friend Colin ~ ~ c k e n z mero
i e employed in tho same
Agency.
The writer proceeded to bring to notice the services of
Hnsain Khan, who is mentioned in Lient. Eyre'8 'Journal
of Imprisonmcnt in Afghanistan ' as having clisplayecl devoted
Elcroism when Colin Maclrenzie was besieged in the Kila iNishnn Khan a t tho bredzing out of the insurrection, tmcl who
had not bccn adeqnately rewarded.
The ceremonial visit of the Sikh chiefs and other locnl
cclcbrities to Major Broadfoot is mid by Mr. Cust, who as an
Assistant to the Agent was prosent, to have been a, very striking
and picturesque scene.
At any time a crowd of Punjabis is a much brighter sight
than on ordinary crowd of I-Iindustonis ; for, apart from thcir
. ~ ~ l p c r i o r iin
t yphysique, thc colours which thcy aEect, c~pecislly
in their Curbans, contrast most fnvourab1-y with the prevailing
dirty white, with which is mingled occnsiondy the equally
a r t y but more sacrcd shade of terra cotta worn by certnin
pricsts, which is characteristic of a n ordinary crowd south of
the Punjab.
On a n occ~sionof this kind the contrast is cvcn greater.
The chiefs wcro semi-inclel~endcnt,nncl had retainers of their
own, some resplcnclent in nrmour; whilst elephants, camcls,
and l ~ o r ~ cwith
s , highly ornamented howdahs nnd saildles, all
nclclcd to the general effcct.
Broadfoot's lzno~vleclgeof the lang~lngesof India was unusually exact, though of course not eqnally so in each Inngnage
or dialact. Thus ill what is called Urdu and in Persian he was
proficient. H c could speak and ~uiclerstandboth, even to the
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nicelies of the lnngnages, and conlcl rend an ordinarily written
petition, or a letter from tho Lahore Darbar, coochecl in thc
flowery language of the East, without the assistance of' a,
mmishi. H e mas thus cnd~leclto clispense with the presence
of a n interpreter, and Co receive natives alone and listen to
their information, wliich was more readily ,wcl freely giwn in
the nbscnw of ii~conveniei~t
n.itnesses.
mhich
H e considerccl his knowledge of P u i ~ j d ~deficient,
i
cannot be thought remt~rltddeby anyone conversant with
that clidect, when thc short time during which h e had a n
opportunity of 1c;~riiingit is tnltcn into account. Thcre nrc
indications ill his corresponclciice that his familiarity with it
was n~picllyincreasing.
One of thc earliest reports he made to the Government of
India, rvas of his first bnsincsv interview with t110 Lahorc
Vdiil or agent, l h i Itishcn Chand.
It would have been a curious sight to see the rvily Oriental,
guarcled a s he belicvcd on all points, ganging the cllarnctcr
and abilities of the new Agent with nd~omhc would have to
cleal; ,watcliing carefully for thc smallest sign of mcalincss,
whether in ~ ~ l : of
~ nlino~vledge
t
of the language and its rlelicnto
capacity for conveying more to thc mind than what renclicd
thc car; or in n m ~ of
t ability, skill in a r ~ n m e n t or
, courage
resting on thc coml~leteassurance of support horn his Gorcrliment. Tho Vakil also no cloobt recltonecl on coinlmativc
ignorance of Lahore afIt~irson the part of tho new Agent ; he
himsolf llaving for many years held his present post.
The interview is fnlly described in a letter dated November
11, 1844, the substance of which will now be given.
The Vnliil con~mencedbusiness by mentioning some inatters of
routine of small import,mce, which, he said, he concluded mcro
lu~o~vn
to the Agent, as lie l~ndmentioned them to 0110 of the
Assistants. This of itself was a rathcr ingenious and wholly native
mocio of nscertaining the relations which esistcd belween the
Agent und his Assistants, and the amount of power and influence
the latter wcre liltely to enjoy.
The Agent rcpliecl, tlint the mattors referred to had not beon
lnentioned to him ; that he was very busy and had little time to
listen to current rumours even fromhis Assistsnts. Tho Vnkil then
said, tliat 110 presuined ho need not sp~nlrto angonr!but the Agent
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llimself. The lattcr nns~veredthat 110 mas at libcrtg to S~>QRI{to
eVeryonI3 h e pleasod ; but that n o value mas attached to aqrthillg
save what mas cornmnnicatcd i n the proper may from the Lahore
DnrLnr to tho Clovernor-Gennml's Agent. ' In thaL case,' said tllo
v&il, ' I can spoalr freely and ineation everything, n course vllicll
the Dwbar will approve, when i t is directly to yourself.' This
ovcr, the Valtil mentioned that the nnnouncement of
BInjor Eroadfoot's appointment had been received in Lahore,
that a letter would come soon on tho subiect. I& inLimnted thnt
even the appearance of qliarrel between Raja I-Iira Sing11 and Ilis
uncle Raja GuIab Singh had vanished ; vhercnpon the A~eiif, congratulated the Valiil on tho prospect thus opened of firm rule ill
the State, a t which the Governor-Gei~eld,as a vell-wisher, wo,llcl
be pleased.
The Vnltil next mentioned his o w l lonq conncction wit11 t~~~
( h ~ e ~ n r n e of
n th d i a ns the agent of the Lahore SknLe, whicl~hna
pcriod of thirty-five YCUN. Il'e fi~rthcrrofr+rrcrlto
extenrlcd OIW
Rl*ondfoot's howledge of the Punjab, of its chiefs, and especially
of its army, and to the rnnrch of the convoy of Shah Slluja's wives;
bllt said t h t , Lllough his coalidenco in ns m n g as groat a4 ~ s l l j ; ~
&ugh's, still thc Agent odd llot bo surl3rised to lean^ thaL 110
(the Vakil) got a ~ ~ gdemands
ry
for explanation regarding our militnrY
~repnmtiona. ' Bnt,' he said, loolting earnestly nl~danxiously at
Broadfoot, I replied, that from my long Inlowledge of tho ~ ~ ~ g l i s h ,
I mns prepared to say they mould not attack an old ally,' ospecinlly
under present ~ircnmsta~ncos.
Tho Agent replied that he Itncv the circumstances, and
amare of the Valtil's approcintion of tho 13ritish ; that in
latter Ranjit Singh vns pre-elni~~ent,
and see horn lie rose from a
simple Sardar to be Maharaja of Lnhoro; vhilst, on tho o t h r
hand, observe FIollmr, who would not rely on 11s. Whcre was he
now? and what had not RanjiL Singh risen to ? and how stoadfnst
11nd been our friendship I The Governor-General was anxious it
should so continue.
The Vnlril then assured tho Agent that order had been introduced into tho State, nnd tllnt Rqjn IIirn Singh greatly osteomod
the Governor-General, nnd had a groat regard for his Agent : Lo
which the l a t b r replied, that when governmcnts aro friendly, tllojr
lmd the sinservnnts must be friends ; that the Govonior-Ge~~eral
corest friendship for the RIal~nraja,nnd that Lhe Agent rccollectad
with pleasmc his ncquaintnnce with Raja K r a Singh. Tho Vnltil
t11en mentioned his ofioinl intereoiirso with Mr. Clerlt, w110n1 110
C O ~ trust,
I ~ ~ and Jdio nlways spoke withont the intorvention of anyone, ns they were now doing, and who assurcd him of the sincerity
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of our good mislios. 'You,' lie said, ' were intiinate at thaL timo
with Mi*. Clerk, and no doubt felt the same, and can give fiimilnr
assurances.' I told him I could ; N r . Clerk's and my feel~ngs
mere fricnclly, both from inclination and duty; but wo mere only
servants : what mas moro to the purpose, I could nssurc him of the
Governor-General's earnesL wish that friendship might continuo.
I told him tliat he n i g h t , o n my word, seal a cleclarntion to that
eiliect
H e expressed grcat joy and said : ' h t you better than nny
Inan h o w our anny, can rc~ncmbcrcvonts, and 11avo exercised
forbearance.' I said, ' I perfectly ltnow nnd remember, and so do.
yon a n d we ; but all men ltnow, nncl must in no circumstnnces
forgct, Lhnt our bank of the SuLlej is sacred. Those whom we are
bound to protect urc mill protect. I did exercise forbearance, buL
tlicre was a line beyond which it could not go, and nover 11asgone ;
a n d t h a t was tho sncreclaess of tho frontier. Ranjit Siugh novcr
forgot this, and no one m a s t hope to neglect mhat so old n, friend
kept s o scrupulously in mind.'
B e said this was all just, and that all earnestly desired t o
respect the frontier, and n o doubt it would never be violated. I
told h i m tliat its violation \\.as a thing not to be spokcn o f : it was
too absurd to be conternplatod. IIe said it was, and t l ~ omatter
droppcd.
T h e Valril ncxt bronght forwnrd the cases regarding Snchct
Singh's treasure, and thc resumption of Mowran; h e stated tliat
t h e Lahoro Goveriment n7ns dissatisfied with tlic decisions a t which
o u r C+ovemn~ciltl ~ n dnrrivcd i n both citscs ; that with regnrd t o
t h c treas~ire,Col. Riclimond was a wise man, and hacl aclvised liis
own Government well, a i ~ dthe Darbar greatly regretted that wo
h a d nol; followed his advice.
I answered that t l ~ cColonel's ill 11ealLll and speedy departure
h a d prevented me from becoming acquaiiitecl with much of his
opinions ; but in the prosent case this mnttered little, as I had t h e
orders of Govcrnulent, which I mas not only bound but glnd to
obey, for I considered them wise and just ; that it wns the very
knowledge of our uprighlness which had induced Suchet Singh to
p u t his money in British territory, instead of in his own forts ;
t h a t British territory mas, in this way and for this reason, t h e
asylum of those oppressed, or who felt distrust ; that Suchet
Singh Ivas not thc only one who hacl thought justice inviolable in
British territory, and I aslced him to sny where in the Punjab a n d
t h e protected Sikh statos not only suspicion, but utter dismny,
woulcl cease, if for tho first time property was given up by t h e
British to any but those believed to be the rightful owners. I

.

1

23'3

240

INTERVIEW CONCLUDED

CII.

x

nslied him if thc very demanders of thc money mould not feel this,
if gratified; for thcy knew fortune was inconstant, and if th13
British territory gave no refuge, where mere those engaged in the
struggles of life to look ?
' Tho Valtil looked a s if h e agrecd, and said notliing ; but ho
could not conceal his satisfaction. as he has much of his own
property, as neai.ly every man of eminence in the Punjab has,
invested as a resource in case of need.
' I n such a case, I told him, Bnnjit Sing11 mould hnvo made no
such demand, but would have assisted the heirs to get the property
&andbriug i t to Lahore, when ho moulcl have taken his measures.
H e laughed, and snid that i t mns true.'
The Valdl, after a fruitless attempt to get Grondfoot to assist in
meliing a ucm reference to Government on the subject of the
~ ~ ~ ~the
~
tronsure, tried whether he coulrl marc S L I C C C S S ~worlz
Mowmu grievance, Again he proceerlecl to qnotc opinions ullegcd
to have becn those held by Col. Richmond.
' I stopped him by saying whon oncc a matter went to Governmont, s~~bo~clinates'
opinions mere of no conscqucnce ; tlial in the
mntter of lapses on this sido of the Sutlej, the Government of India
mas supreme.'
~ e c o m ~ l a i n etlinh
d compensation had not been paid, and aslted
the Agent to rcad all tho recorcls coiniccted with the cnse, and see
if he did not then conclude that the Governor-General had arrived
a t n, wrong decision.
The Agent; ~ssureclhim that conlpensation would be pnid, and that
h e would carefully study the cum ; but thnt the Governor-General
did not decide till after full and deliberatc inquiry, i~ricl therefore
the Vakil must hold out no hope to his court of a reversal of the
decision.
T h e Valiil said thrct Suchet Singh's treasure was a trifle, bnt
tlint t h e question about Momran mas a, serious ngair.
T o this the Agent replied, that whatever concerned the happiness of subjects, or the intercourse of governments, was serious,
and was always serionsly considered by our Government.
It may be imagined that after this fe~lciilgthe Oriental diplomatist retired somewhat impressed with the slrill of his oppol~cnt.

The following lettor t o L o ~ dEllcn1)orough contaius nn outline of P ~ m j a bn c w at t h e time. The last; pnrogrnpll being
p a r t l y clcstroyetl, restorations a r c shown in bracliets.

' In Brilish territory.
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LETTER TO LORD ELLENBOROUGH

h b n l l n : November 19,1844.

My Lord,-I have foolishly dclnycd writing in orclcr to write at
lcngtll on some matters, until I have now scarcely lime to write
a t all.
' Having an i~upressiontlint objection had boon taken in some
quarters to my n p p o i ~ ~ t ~ uto
e ntllo
t Tcnasseriln coasl, or at ally ride
to its results, Imown only tlirough the local press, which was in thc
liancls of corrupt public servnnts, I wns clesirous of stating those
results to your Lordship ; bul they are now rccordcd bcforc the
Board of Eevenuc, the Sudder A~lawlut,~
ancl tlie Govemmeiit of
13engnl. IVl~alesisted bcforo may be secn in llie proceediitgs of tllc
trii~lsof i\Iessrs. S and Z,and of the various inquiries at T a ~ o y .
I l~avenever been nble yot to tliaalr yonr Lordship for the
Arolldulte's work wllich Capt. Smith brought me down. I feel
deeply the kindness
caused you to sencl it, and clo not the
less value that mark of it because it h ~ been
s so speedily followecl
by nnotlicr of a different Irind. I thank you also for the flatlering
lctter which accompanied the work, thoug11 I fcar oven wore I ~ b l c
to commancl armies as they ought to be cornmancled, the hopo is
nol; to be cherished ; the courso of the service places suficiently high
rank a t too great a distance.
My appointment to this situation I cannot but consider ns being
as much due to your Lordship as if directly madc by you ; for to
Sir I-Icnry Harclinge I mas, of course, uulrnown, save tlirongli your
Lordsl~ip. My only anxiety is, that I may be able Lo do justico to
l l ~ enomination. 1 took charge on the 1st insL. Col. Hichmond,
much brolren in hcaltli, left on tllc 3rd. Heera Singh and Goolab
Singh have become in nppearailce reconciled ; the latter having
submitted and sent his son as a Ilostnge lo Lahore ; but his pic1'lous
'
intrigues wore probably never discontinued, at any rate they h a w
produced a serious revolt in MoozuE~~rabncl
nnd tho othcr hill states
bordering on Cashmeer. I t has taken the form of a religious war,
ancl the insurgent peasantry have ovcrpowercd several Sildi garrisons. In Lhc inean time the Lahorc rulers had begun vigorously to
confiscate the jngcers of the greater chiefs, who are all tlicrcfore
malcoiltcilt ; and tlie restoration of discipline in the army had also
beell atlempted ; the regular troops about tho aapital alw therefore
discoutcnted. I t mill require 110 ordinary ability, mcans, and
fortune for lhe present rulers to escape dangers so vi~rionsand
*A

Sn(lynd&t, lill 1863,in Cnlel~lln Glos,sn~y,p. 653.
in the N.1V.P. thc rhicf court or
" Aiyi?., rr gmnt or nsnijinnlonl of
oppct~ltromtho dislricl courts. Yulc's laud and its r c r c ~ ~ unsc wmuit,y.
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grent. They show, however, much promptitndc and ener,rry, and
these do much. The whole hlahomedan population of tho West
is excited, :md little is mnntiug to make revolt beyond the Jhelum
general, which would at once bring in tho Afghans. The death,
also, of Demnn Snwun Mull, the able ruler of Rlooltan, rcnlovcs
another guarantee of stability, so thet the danger to the Silch
empire was probably never so grent as a t this moment.
Still I think we shall, perhaps, be able to preserve peace for the
present. All rational nlen in the Punjnb fear a quarrel with ns,
anrl mill seek to avoid offence ; anrl on our side, though thero i~ in
general a desire for mar, yet the considerations I find in onc of
your Lorclsliip's letters to nly predecessor are weighty iililoed; for
war here shoulcl be no half measure ; that would but prolong and
double evcry evil. We must go to tho top of the Bimalnyas, or
stop in a falsc position ; but once across the Punjab me enter on
that grent inass of uumised Mnhomednnism which estends from
the h d u s to the hlediterranenn. To this we undoubtedly must
sooner or later come; but whenevcr me do, me cannot stop, and
going on in such conntries is 0 d j r just less ruinous t h m stopping.
[Capltain D ~ w m dI was delighted to [find] my successor in
Tcnnsserim ; the fittcst man in India for [the sitna]tiol~,able, and
benevolent. The brovinces] will, in a few years, [pay their]
expenses, [and] eventually add Lo tho general wealth m d strcng th ;
and this is undoubtedly y o u Lorclsliip's work. [I hlnvc mriLten
this whils[t] tho [camp is setting] out foY Loodceana, whcre wl
present [I remain]. 1address this to the House of [Lords, where ~t
will bc] sure to find your Lordship. [I] shall continue to write occasioually. If your Lordship will, however briefly, [reply and sitd
you have not forgotten me, for whom you have clone so much, you
wiU graLify [me] in the highest clegrce. Prom Sir Henry nardingo
I have received tho greatest and most marlied Itincbess. I t is to
you I owe it, and I felt 011 tlint account the more pleasure in it ;
beillg moro generally than any else but D u a n d known as c~n
Ellcnborough nznv.
Instead of sending mere translntions of t h e newsmriicrs'
letters, which were of littlc value withont confirmation,
Broadfoot fornrarded t o the Government of India a caref~ll
summary of t h e information 11e collected, both from newsletters nnd from o t l ~ c rsources.
I n N o w n b c t 11nd durhg the first half of Dccember 1844,
he reported tlmt Rajn Hirn Singh and Pandit Jalln wcre
following a bolcl conrsc, which if sncccssful a o u l d tend to-
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HIRA SINOH'S POLICY

~
~ stability;
d
s but it was at first enconlpasseil by many and
serious dangers.
The Raja and his adviser mere. trying to destroy the
power and illfluonce of the chiefs, and to restore cliscipline in
t h e army. Thcy had partial success. The Raja managed
t h e army, ancl is said to have brought it more under control
t h a n it had been sincc the reign of BInhizraja Iiharrnk Singh.
The civil administrntion of the Slate was managed Ly the
Pantlit, who, iinding thnt expencliture exceeded income, declared thnt Lhcy must 1)alsnce. By compnlsory offerings, and
b y means of fines, he replenished thc trensury for the momcnl.
B u t to p~cscrvefinnncid cqnililrrium either increased taxatioil
of the people, or a recluction of the cost of the army, was neccssmy. I n the former case there was tlic dangcr of rebellion ;
a n d in thc lattcr the probability was lhal the army would
overthrow any government which did not meet its clemnncls.
Raja Hirn Singh's policy failed at Inst, partly from uncontrollnble ciscmnstances, and parlly because success had
mnde its authors underrate their remaining antagonists.
The Silt11 cliicfs, seeing their destruction imuinenl, wero
slrongly opposed to the Raja's measures. They found a
i ~ ' ~ Jind linwlnrr, compowerful ally in ' the B l ~ l ~ i t r a , jmother,
monly died Rani Jinc1iLi-1, erroneously p~onounceclChnncliiii
by many of our Hinclustanis.' She was very beautifid,
a n d tlien quite young ; d i c had been mmried, it wn.s said,
about 1895 t o the saoril nnd nrrow of Rirnjil; Singh. Whc
mas very fond of Bajit Sucliet Singh, ancl never forgavc Hirn
Singh for his dcnth, and thnt of the brave Rni Kcsri Sing$.
Rn,ja Hira Sing11 secms not to have snf%cicntly nplweciated
h e r power nnd her tdent. She was pcrmittcd to intrigue at
h e r pleasure, and to rail uncheclccd at tlie ministry.
A revolt in Kashmir was suppressed with n rapidity and
vigour which would h a w done credit to any government.
The Raja, secing the financial crisis nt liand, scnt for tlie
officers of the army, a i d , in Darbar, cxplaiiiecl to them the
state of the case. H e either convinced them of thc ncccssity
for retrenclimciit, or intimiclntcd tliem to the estent required
for the admission of such necessity.
But the Rani, with, in this instance, a, clearcr perception of
whcm thc power Iny, mcnl; to the men. Ilor brothers, and the
n 2
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slave girl hltmgla, visitcd t l ~ ctroops openly and gained them,
so that littlc hope remained for the ministry.
Tho Raja and Psndit ' had mado enemics, dangerous a n d
silcnt, who lmew their conilsels and prccipitntc(1 the crisis.
The secretariat of that Government is coruposed of m e n clespised by the ignornnt Surclnrs, but iniluentinl, and able with
the cunning of a clcpressed class. At thc head of t h e m i s
Dcman Dinmath,' who, offended by Pnndit Jalla's retrenclzincnt, secretly joined the other faction.
The crisis mas no1 long dclayed. 011 November 1 7 a n d
18, 15.14,Raja &a, Sin# rcviewecl some of the troops a n d
orderccl thc issue of pay ; but he clisoharged on thc spot aLovo
500 men, and confiscated their pay. The bolclness of this
measure, and its contrast with his former lwnclencc, inspired
n suspicion thal he lnerlilcztecl flight.
During No~cmber19 and 20, nogotintions betwecn i h a
Eaja nnd thc oflicers wcre in progress ; 6hey were clelnyed, it
was Lhought, in thc hope of thc arrival from J a n ~ m uof hill
troops, with whose aid I-Iira Singh might emerge tl-iumphant
from his difficulties.
But the R,mi again nppenled to ihe men; s h e sent h e r
brother and BIangln to the camps to say that her life was i n
danger ; ' and finding the troops still waver, she took the 1)olcI
step of ordcring ont her tents in the nigh1 in order to join the
army. The troops at once cleclnred themselves her proicctors,'
and some moil mere sent into the fort of Lahore.
I t ~ v a sarranged that PIaja Hira, Sing11 nnd Panclit Jnlla
mere to be attacked in their houses on the afternoon of
November 21. On that morning Miyan Jmnlhir Singh, so11
of Rnja Dlijan Singh, at the hcnd of 7,000 mcn, set o u t from
J a m n n for Lahore. But that same monling the R m i with
the y o m g Blaharaja, attcncled by her brother Jamahir Sin&,
Sham Sin& of AtAri, and other chiel's, formally ,zl'pc?alcd to
the troops, and asked whcthor Duleep Singh or l<,zja I-IirLl
Sing11 was to bc their king. The troops, with loncl shouts mcl
wilh bands playing, declarecl for Duleep Singli.
The noise re~caleclto Hira Sing11 and Jnlla thnt thoy h a d
ailnonnced their intention of joi~llllgt h e
no time to lose ; t h c ~
Ndlnraja iutd llix K I O ~ ~ W b111
~,
in hut ~ll~uiitccl
thcir clel~l~tmts,
crossed thc river Eavi to Eilxtlldern, nncl, joillccl by
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s m d l body of their adherents previously sent across, retreated
nt ol~ceon the roncl to Jnmmn.
As soon as thifi was known, salutes mere fired, the Rnni
was congratulntecl, and Sarclar Sham Sing11 of Atari with about
6,000 men started iu pursuit of the fugitives. Some of 1 h j a
Hira Singh's followers deserted him and joined in thc pursuit-.
The Khalsa troops soon came up mith the Raja's small body
of bill men, nttaclied them, and put them to flight. AIiynn
Lhbh Singh, to give I-Iirn Singh nncl Jalln, more chance of escape, clismonntccl and fcll figllting, after having killccl fivc or
six of the pursuers. The flight urns continued for about fourteen miles from Lahore, when, finding their horses exhnnsted,
I-Iira Singh, J d l ; ~ ,and some others, clisrnoumtcd md entcred
n village. When Sham Singh came up he set it on fire ; on
which the pursued ' came out mcl, nfber a clesperatc resistuncc
of abont an hour, nrerc overpowered and slain. Their 11cads
were carried into Lahore and exhibited hung in chains.'
Then nll parties gavc themselves u p to rejoicing; the
prisons were thrown open ; fines were remitted ; incrensccl
taxes mere reduccd ; mcl for two whole clays the l h n i reigned
supreme.
Again t h c scenc changed; dcl~aucherymcl licence mcrc
follo~~lecl
by nnarchy. The ljaui repeated her experiment of a
pcrsonnl visit; and appual to the troops, but with diminished
effect. They told her that Dnlaep Sing11 might reign, providccl he paid them ns rcgulltzrly as Ilira Sing11 l i d donc;
whilst thcy significantly reminded hcr that Peshora Sing11 l ~ ~ d
prior claims to thc throne, and recommcncled her to scilil for
S~rclarLahna Singh, Jhjithia, to be mnzir, a man, ns they
sl~id,who dared not lift his eyes in their presence.
The Surclors all tliis time had to stand mith joined hnncls as
snppliants before the troops, and finnlly, witll tho terrified Rnni,
returncd to Lahorc amidst tho laugliter and hooting of tho drunlien
crowd.
By the latest accounts the disorder of the troops was little sbntecl :
lhey had even plmclered a yoimg womau of coi~clitioa,about to bum
15s o snltee, and already at the pile ; tearing tlie rings witli violciice
from her nosc a d ears. She was burnt prnying for thc rnin of tho
Sildls, who stood by langhing. Sho was the widow of Hecrn Shgh's
clewm, who perished witli him.
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About this time a messenger, bearing ncws for one of the
A p t ' s Assistants, was seized by thc Lahore Government, and
llis i~csl)atches taken from him. The impossibility of convincGlg the Darbar that the man was n pri\mte servanl, and
not an
of the Government of India, and the inconvcllicllce lilrcly to result therefrom, rendered it necessary for
Croaclfoot to issue an order to his Assistants forlklcling them,
Trithont espresS sanction, to employ any agent8 wliatever in
the Punjab, and to recall every agent they might have there
at the time. They mere likewise dcsired not to correspond
with
in the Panjab or Afghanistan without sanction ;
and if they received lctters from chicfs, or other persons of
these countries, they were desired, save in case of emergency,
to rcfcr the writers to the Agent.
In another case it mas rcported at the Lahore Court that
one of the Assistants had expressed to the Lahore Vakil
attitchecl to his oflice, sorrow for the fate of Raja ICira Sin&,
indignation with Jnlla, ancl other scntiments. The Agent, in
nslring vhc~tfounclation there might be for the report, rcpeatcd
llis instructions thal the Vakils with the Assistmts were there
p e l y for local purposes ; that if they spoke on any other
nlattcrs thcy were to be referred to him, and Assistants were
to abstain carefully from all expression of opinion on politicnl subjects. The serious evils which might result werc
pointed out. An ungua~dcclexpression of opinion was nevcr
considcrecl as privnte, but rather to be that of the Agcrlt ; and
when, as must often happen, the language of Ihe Goven~orGeneral nt some future time was found to be very different, a
suspicion of insincerity or bacl faith arose, as clifficult to dispel
ns it was mischievous in its effects. Tlme ordcrs caused some
clissntisl'action in the case of one or two of the Assistants, and
it is not to be greatly wonderccl at ; for when, for any reason,
discipline has been relaxed, and the reins of powel. and influence
11ave dropped into subordinate hands, reform and rectific a t'ion
cannot be cnrried out without readjustment, which entails a
loss of influence ninong subordinates, certain to be lreenly felt
if not resented.
Thc instructions were, however, approved by the Govern~uentof India, and received the special commendation of tho
English Governmen t.
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The Agent f~irther reported that the Sikh soldiers had
extorted fro111the Darbar pny at the rate of 14 rs. n, month,
which was twice as much as the Company's sepoys received.
The probable evil effects of this contrast mere preclicted, as
was also the impending collnpse of the Sikh Government.
&jor Broadfoot was informed that this part of his despatch
hacl received special attention, and it mas ohsorvecl that thc
state of affairs reported might leael to scrions coml>lication
with the Lahore Govcmment.
E e was remineled that the instructions as to the line of
policy to be follo\wd were csplicit ; ancl it was intimntccl that
he was cspcctccl to prove by his concluct that il was tlie desire
of the Government of Inclin to evince the strictest good fizith
nit11 the Lahorc Govornluenl;, al~clthat our ~.ecognitionof the
Maharaja was no empty form, but a measure by which we
were prcparecl to abide.
It wns further remarked that the Agent's proceedings were
in perfect accordance mith these principlcs.
H e was informed of the regret with which the news of the
recent revolution had been received; but it mas pointccl out
that our position towarcls the nominal go~crnmcntof Dalecp
Singh nrns not thcreby changcd, and h a t our course must
be plain and clecisive. As long as the 3Inharttjn rctainccl his
position, n e must continue to act to~mrclshim with friendship
and good faith, and abstain from interference mith theinlernal
aflairs of his state.
The frontier mnst, however, bc lnaintainecl inviolate, and
the measures taken by the Agcl~tfor its protcction, mcl his
corrcsponclcncc with the Commander-in-Chief on the subject,
were considered to be expedient, ancl such as to cleserve eutirc
approvd.
Thc following letter from the private secretary of the
Govcrnor-Gcneral to Major Broaclfoot corroborates: unofficially
the statement that his reports and measures were approved.
My dear Mnjor,-As I believe Wood has answered the letter you
wrote to hiin a short time ago, I mill not take up your time oscept
to let you Irnow, by Sir Henry's dcsire, tliilt he finds your reports
on the state of uflairs in the Prnq'lh kc. most sntisfilctory,nnd quite
refreshing afte~those of Col. Richmond.
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Prom tho last nccounts affairs seem to be still unsettled there,
although tlio pcriod when any outbreak might have been eespccted
hns now pnssed.
We are dl~goingon as usual here. Mayne is merriod this afternoon.
Yours kc.
C. S. HARDINGE.
m7hen the nems of the revolution a t Lahore, and of Raja
IIira Singh's death, was reccired i n England, the condition of
the Punjnb had attracted the attention of the Govcrnrnent, ae
thc most important matter connected with Indin at thai time.
During thc years 184'2, 1843, and 1844, the Kabul clisnstcrs,
and thc victories of the armies under Generds Pollocl{ and Nott,
Sir Charles Nnpier's victories, and t h ~nnncxation of Sind ;
the short G~~liilior
cnrnp;lign, and L o r ~ Ellenborough's
l
recnll ;
hacl occupied the somewhat limitcd atlention clevoted in EngIiznd to Inclian matters.
Early in 1845, when the reports by thc Agcnt, and the
ordcrs on them, of which a bricf summary has been given,
were receivccl in Englmd, thc principles h i d down, t h e Iangnngc used, and the conrsc pursned by the Goverinnent of
India, mere entirely approved. Gratification wns esprcsscci
a t nolicing ' how thoro~~ghly
Major Broadfoot entcrs inlo
the spirit of your instructions, and horn judicionsly he conducts himself in a crisis of mnch delicacy. This h a s been
in no manncr morc slrongly or properly evinced t h a n i n
the observetions made, and thc instrnctions given, i n his
circnlsr letter of December 18, 1844, and in the letter wLlic11
he aildressed to . . his Assistant at Ferozporc on t h e 28111
of the same month.'
Thc following letters from Sir II. Hardingc to Lord Ellenborough are interesting. Part of the first letter is omittccl,
as in i t events already described are recapitulaleci o r preclictcd.

.

Cnloutta : December 23, 1844.

My denr Lord Ellenborough,-I received your letter of &tobey
90 in the bustlc of malting up our despatches for Englalicl.
Rrst, as regards yo~uself. I do not despair of seeing yon in the
Cabinet with Peel and tho Dulro, notwithstanding tho failure of t l l ~
first overture. It is not only in his department that n slales~nu~l
has Ihe power of usefnl distinction, but in tlio generd a f f ~ r sof tllo

-
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Empire which are discnssed and decided upon in Cnbinet. Rcly
upon it, you arc made for public life, nnil will not be linppy in a
private sti~tion. At this distance between us it is useless to discuss
matters of this description.
You will be g l d to hear that Durand sncceecls ~dIlIirf~bly,
ns
well as Broadfoot did; whilst Broadfoot is in his elemenl on tho
hontier.
Calcutta : January 8,1845. G AX.

,

Rly dear Lord Ellenborough,-The affi~irsof tlie Punjab are
more unsettled than ever. I-Ieem Singh and Punclil Jullo liavc lost
'their lives altd nbout 1,000 of their followers in the struggle.
The army sold Heera for 300,0001. and a rise in their pay to
1 4 rs. a month, boing exactly the double of tlie B.' sepoys' pay.
This co~~tltmst,
and the example of ii large army in a successful
stato of mutiny, is the greatest danger we hove to apprehend ; but
I nnticipato no ilninecliate necessity for interfcrenco. I V u li,z\le
20,000 men pretty well up for defensive objects, m d 3G,000 for
offensive ol)eratioi~s. I have sent Sir J. Littler to Ii'ermpoor.
13roadfoot does admirably on the Sutlcge.
Forbcaraim will be pushed to tho utmost limits justified by
safety. The steamer has nnnouncecl an earlier hour of starting;
arid 1must close this hasty note or lose the opportunity.
Ever Ssc.
EI. I-IARDIXGX.
I t was part of Bronclfoot's cluLy Lo keep the Commancler-inChief and Lhe principal military oficers in his neig1il)ourhoocl
ocqnainted with ovcnts o n t h e north sidc of t h e Sutlej which
might lend to a, violation of the fronlier, and consequent collision with our forccs. I-Ie accordingly ncldrcsse~lSir Hugh
Gongh, who mas then in c a m p a1 Ambrila on a tour of inspection, o n December 24,%ilcl reported t h e recent disturbitaces
st Lahore. H e said that for the moment !,he Rani a n d her
brolhers nrcre the ostensible arid active heads of t h e administration ; but, though important events might arisc from
this change of government, yct it did n o t necessarily affect our
relatiom with Lahore, m c l 1hat he did not think there was
more cause for anxiety now about the fronticr thnn there Ilacl
been for the past yew. H e furlhra. informed Sir H u g h t h a t
Capt. Nicolson had bccn desired t o carry o n I i s work at

' 6.:common sbbrc\~iation for
British ; hcre it luay stnnd for t h a t or
for Bcngnl.

This nnd the ncst lcltcr hnvc
bee11 ilecipl~crod with dilliculty from
n nearly illegible rough drl'ufl.
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Firozpur a s usual, giving the customary shelter t o refugces,
but cli~ariuingthem if t h e y came in large bodies ; nnd tlmt
Gen. Gilbert had bcen asked t o assist h i m should t h e necessity
arise.
To Gen. Gilbert h e wrote as follows :
Loodcenna : December 24, 1844.

My dear General,-I know that with you I am writing more for
form's sake than from necessity, in order to say that the conp d'dtnt
which ]ins talien plnce over the water is, as concerns us, a mere
change of ministry effected after the usual Asiatic method.
hero is no ileed for t h e present of more precaotion on this
frontier than is necessary a t all times with sucli neighbours. That
suffices to n~nliesnipise always impossible, and I know, from our
former conversation, that you agree with me in thinking tlmt with
your force, supported as it is, noLhiiig more is wanted; and, indeed,
I must repeat the expression of my gratification that we do agree
on this point, for really the occasional fits of esciteuent or imitation
provoked by any stir at Lahore produce cffects anything but desirable
on cither side of the Sutlej.
We can be perfectly vigilant without either showing or feeling
fear ; and, if I may talcc the liberty of saying so, I rejoice at your
being on this frontier, as i t is n, security for this sort of vigilance.
Capt. Nicolson has been directed to permit fugitives to cross as
usual to onr siclo; and should any large bodies of men como and
refuse to disarm h e may need yonr aid, whicli will, I lmow, be
eticctual; but though its being cnllecl for is possible, it is unlilcely.
Believe me kc.
G.. BI~OADFOOT.
This is Sir 11. Gough's reply to the letter a(1dresscd to him.
Hendqunrters Cnmp, Umbnlln : December 26, 1844.

My dear Crondfoot,-I had last night the pleasure of rewiving
your private letter and note of the 24tl1, and this morning yonr
ollicial letter a n ~ ~ o u c i uthe
g ofticid columunication to you of the
rocont niassncrcs near Loliorc. I t mas jusl wliat niight have been
cspected, wlien an attcmpt wns niade to restrain an unruly soldiery.
I entircly concur in your opillion with regard to any open demonstrati011of military preparation, and consider snch demonstration,
at the present mu~ueiit,would be very prejudicial to the formation
in the Punjeb. On the contrary, I have not made,
of a go'~~erlunclit
nor do I intend to mslte, the slightest movement indicative of distrust on onr part. The only cl~angeI s h d l make is that of rctaiil-

,
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ing the 31st here until the nctua.1 arrivnl of its relieving regiment
(the U2nd).
I have again pressed on the Governor-General the especliency of
placing a European regiment peri~lniientlyat Ferozpoor. These
frequent outbreaks may lend to a state of things requiring our interference, nnd the more European troops we have on tho frontier
the better shall we be prepared to act, especially at so detached a
position as Ferozpoor, where there is no possibility of imrnediata
support.
I shall ~ e m a i nfor some days here longer than I contemplntcd,
to watch events, and shall be happy to lieitr from you as frequently
as you coiiveilieiitly can write; and I shd1 feel obliged for, and
anxious to lcnow, your opinions on pnssing events at it crisis of such
iinportaucc to our future relatiom with the Punjab. . .
Believe me kc.
EI. GOUQH.

.

Sir Chnrlcs Napier, Governor of Sind, who st this time
was about to attack t h e E i ~ g t i to
s punish certain acts for which
they mere responsible, wished to obtnin pcr~ni~ision
t o march
through piwt of the Multan territory, o r to securc i t s closure
ngaiust the Gugtis a s well na against his troops. He accordingly aclilrcssed Major Broadfoot, and a s t h e lettcr is a charnctcristic one it is here reproduced.
(Confidenti~d.)

Sulrltur : Dcocmber 28,1844.

Sir,-Will you allow mc first to explain in a, few words the outline of whnt I am about ? The tribes in the Boogty hills, inclu&ng
the spnce betwccu Poolngee a i d Dcy~nh,have coumittud atrocities
upon our frontier all the past yenr. These lncn I Itm trying to
punish. My plan (it is yel; crude, as certi~incircumstauces may
change my projects) is to enter these hills in two divisions, oue
from Poolngcc, the other from the most northern point of our
frontier (mnrllted Bum on WdIior's map), while by nu alliance with
the M~urees,who have H, blood feud with the Boogties, I shall bring
tl~emdown on the Boogties horn the north, or rather I a m mol-e
likely only to shut the Mmree hills against the Boogties, for there
is no confidence to be placed in thcse bnrbarians, tllough they am
good fellows in their way. Tlius you have my o~tliiie[see next page].
Well, so far is simple ; but there is a dificulty. The A?~recr's
territory runs up to Ovze~cotcon the Indus, as marlred in Wallier's
a . But the late chief of Mooltm toolc from the Amccrs this
grouucl don711 as fm as Xuswtow. Now, I fear that the road to lleyrah
from Kusmore runs through tllis bit of ~Voolta~h
towito~y. Of this
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I am not sure. If I can avoicl touching on tho Governor of Mooltan's territory, I will ; indecd I must, unless he gives me permission ;
bnt I wish you to gain this permission for me if possible ; me shall
iilj~irenothing, pay for everything. If tho Governor will idlow ns,
ask him to send some one to meet u s z~nd attend us through his
territory, and I ~ h o u l dbe glad that you woulcl do this as soon a s
possible.

I h a w been led to form this scheme only a few days ago, but I
ought to have written sooner. However, it is time enough yeL if
you will be quick. I tlliulr I have a right to den~nndthat if Mooltan
refuses me leave to march tlil'ol~gh his territory, he should also
refuse Eejl~Khan and the Boogties, who mould fly horn me in that
direction. If one sicle is refused entrance, so should the other.
This is according to the law of all nations. If lie acts honestly a d
equdly to us both, ho mill do me all the good in the world, for he
would put Simpson's col~ululat my clisposal !
The only rewon why I pnt ' confidential ' at the top of this letler
is, that it is a s well to speak of these things as little as we can. I
was obliged to enter into the o n t h e to enablo you to understancl
why I make this reqnesl mil to iuterest you in my mo~ements. T,y
c help me, and if m y
this if euy clificulties arisc you LIILLY bc d ~ l to
colvplaiuts are lnacle you will easily auswcr them. Excuse this long
story, a d believe mc to be &c.

C. J. NAPIER,
Mc~jor-Gcncml,
Governor.

t
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THEgear 1645 is memorable as being the last of rcal Silt11
independence. Tonards its close the Sikhs illvaclecl British
tcrritory, war was declared, and Iwo b:~Itlesmcrc fought, tho
laltcr of which was the most desperate struggle in whicli onr
troops have evcr bccn engaged in India. The corrcsponcle~~cc
which will be qnotccl or coildcnsccl mill show thc continued
anxiety of the Gomrnor-Gcncral to lweserve rclatioiis of
fricnclsllip with Ihe Lahore State, and thc steps talien in conscqnence ; it mill also shorn how Ihe Darbar, with tho instinct
of self-preservation, and in orclcr to be relieved horn the
intolerable pressure of Ihe insuborclinate nrmy, encoura,gecl
the Iroops to attnclc Ihe British.
As a lcttcr from Sir Clia~lesNapier closed the correspondence of last year, so tlial of 1845 may be commenced by
another from the same pea.
An officer serving in Sincl had addressed one of Broadfoot's
native agents in a somewhat peremptory manner, desiring
him to acl in a luattcr affecting the traffic on the Sntlej in a
mTay neilher cspedicnt nor in conformity with usngc.
Broadfoot, on being referred to by the native, gam him
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suitablc instructions, and t h e n aslrccl S i r C. Napier, who was
Governor of Sindh, whether h i s subortlinate'~ aclion was
approvecl 1)y him, pointing out tho objections. The m a t t e r
is altogether too t r i l ~ i a lto descrve any noticc, b u t it serves
t o introcluce n characterislic letter.
Sukkur : Jnnunry 2, 1546.
(Private.)
Dear Sir,-I cannot lose a moment in replying privately to yonr
oficiill of the 20th nltimo. I have only 11ad time to get the Persinn
letter of Cnpt. - tmm~slatcd,and I really have seldom read a
more impertinent prodnction. I h o w nothing of it, or w l ~ a tit
I is moremcans. I t was nn~uthorisedby, and unknown to, me. L
over perfectly out of rule, contrary to all the principles upon which
1am acting, and to existing treaties, nncl also most ofinsive in its
style. I beg of you to feel assured that such a letter never issued
from my pen.
You must, till you rewive this, thinlc me a s t r ~ n g ebeing. I
have demm~dedan official explanation of his apparently unnmmnta i d it shall be forwarded to you when
able conduct from Capt. -,
ycceived. I11 the inonn time allow me to thanlt yon for Lhe good
i ~ a t u r eand self-command which made yon mrite to me with so mncIi
politenesu ; when the letter of Capt. -warmnted your sending
it on to the Governor-Generid wiLhout further ceremony, as s sawplc
of the Sz'nde co~rcspo~~dence.
May I request of you to sssnTe the nntive agent thnt I never Imem
of the letter, and that I beg of him not to consider me capablo of
writing, unprovolced, in ERIC^^ a style to any gentlemm wlietller
native or European, or to any man, be his rank what iL may, in
style BO ullbecoming and so injnrions to the fiervice ?
Believe me bc.
C. J. NAPIER,1iajo~-Ge~~cval.
Since I wrote to you about asking Mooltaa for tho lenve to
traverse a portion of his territory, I hove heard of the new disturhnncc
and confusion in thc Seilch Government. I have, therefore, t h o u # ,
it T L ~ S C L ~(even
C
with the G.oveinor of Mooltan's pennission) to rislc
any collision with his disorderly gang. I h a w therefore brolten 11p
the camp at Snbznlcote, and ordered the Rundlccund Legion to
continne its march to Snltltur, ant1 I propose to enter the Boogtie
hills fit the [pass] m a r Poohice. These movements will begin in
a1)out a fortnight, I thinlc ; but as yet I have no esnct knowledge of
wherc Bejo Khan is.
1

T h e nnrnc is illegihIe in the originnl.
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If nny complaints reach you I beg you will reply clistinctly that
m y movements are purely those of reprisal on the Boogties, the
Doomldes, and Jnclirannics ; mliicli tribes have, during the wl~oleof
t h e hot nrcather, and withont provocation, entered our territory, and
m~wcleredilumbers of our people, plmlclering and devastating in 1111
directions.
C. N.
The policy of distrust and nnfricnclliness tonrards the
British innnguratccl byRaja, Hira Singh, and the gross insubordination of' tho army of thc Khalsa, macle the violation of
t h c frontier a not improbalde contingency. It IVRS not cspcctcd
t h a t thc SiBh army wonlcl cross, but it was thonghl possi1)lc
t h a t cletachcd bodies of m e n might cross, oithcr for t h e purposc
of plundering, or by degrees aild so as to evadc noticc, of
assc~nblillga, consiclcrable body of Silili troops on thc British
side of t h e river. The Agent therefore addressccl 'Major-Oen.
Gilbert as folloms :
Shonlcl you hear of bodies of troops c~ossing the Sutlej, I
~eqnestyou will, if militmy prudelice allows, take the following
measures :
If they have not my permissiou, they canilot be 100licd on as
the troops of an ullied state ; they cnn only be regrded as robbers
or refugees.
In either case, if thcy attempt to cross into the British territory
. .' they sllonld be disarmed if rcfhgees ; nncl if not refugees, forbidden to cross, and if necessary repnlsed by force.
If they cross into the protected territory, it wilI be better mcrely
to watch their uovelusnts until you hear from me, except in tho
following case. If you think the crossing of the river by such a
body coinpromises the safety of either of the frontier forces, and
that you can by nttnclting such armed body save your ovn force,
thell you nre justified in attaclting them without waiting to cornnlullicate with me. If the Goveimmcnt such men profess to serve
is friendly, they must be rebels ; and if not, they itre enemies ; and
either case their destruction is a duty to omselves and no disservice to any friend.

.

The Acljutant-General pointed out to Gen. Gihert that
nndor less urgent circumstnnces than thosc indicatccl by t h e
Agent, t h e Commnncler-in-Chief clcsired that n o ofl'ensive
operations should be attempted unless success wcre perfectly
certain. If tlircatcnccl h c should icmain on the clefcnsirc kill
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reinforced, and in n position to act with vigour, and to insurc
victory."
The troops nt Lahore showed thcir insuborclinntion in n
variety of ways. Snrclar Attar Singh, of Iinln, hacl succeedecl
Rqja Hirn Singh i n charge of the army. His family wcrc, bcfotc
thcybccame Sikh, by cnste barbcrs. When the mcn of Vc11tur:~'s
regiments brought the nsual reporls, they told him lhat the ad~uinistrationofjusticcby barbers was n no~clty,and lhey recornmencled s s n, prclii~hmrylo hearing tllc reports, lhnl he should
send for razors ancl soissors for t l ~ cbeards of the Nusalman.
This nras followecl by such demonstrations of compelling the
Sarclar toresume the trsdc, that he mounted his llor~xand flcd.
Thcy also completely controllccl thc Darbnr, and are snitl,
cnrly in January, lo lmve procli~imcdPeshora Singh as &haraja, ; but, on promisc of a smnll increasc of pay or a presci~),.
they rcco~mcuclctlhim to rctire for a timc.
The R s n i hacl more spirit than mosl of the chiefs; she
dcclarcd she m n n t to govern like Eegnm Snmru ; and on one
ocmsion, whcn the Darbnr mas terrified by R crowd of drmllcen
nncl disorclerly solcliers, she cnmc out from behind 11cr curtnin,
threw aside her veil, aucl ncldrcsscd lhe people. Thc mc11 wcrc
delighted, for she was young and hnndsome. Bnt thc cffcct
nrns merely temporary.
The Agent reportecl that the army used thc Rmi' and
Peshora Sing11 as two pumps of the treasury, the one in rise,
the other in reserve.
The Rani, with the advicc of some of thc principnl chiefs,
ma& overtures to the British, throng11 the Agcnt, for tllc
rcsto~ationof order by our intervention.
Broadfoot, in ~eudingS L I C ~pngcrs for the orclcrs of the
Government of I n d h , was very carcful to insure c o ~ p l e t c
secrecy ; so that Chosc conccrued or those nrho gave Ilim infor~nntionshould not on that ncconut suffer. I n n leitor to
Mr. Curric, then Foreign Secretary to the Goverl~ment of
Indin, IIC said : ' Yon lnny l,erhaps observc that in most things
you have m y own handwriting or Cust's. I1 i~to this, and to
lily rcncling every paper cxccpt routine myself, and in casts of
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news putting them into the firc mhcn rcad,' that he attributed
the freedom with which nativcs supplied him mith informatioll,
or co~~sultecl
him about delicate dif6cnlties.
Hc mentioned that he wished to write about distrnst
among the chiefs cauaccl, first, by nilrecorcled negotiations in
Mr. Clerk's time or l~revionsly,mith the ohjoct of l~laliingthem
tributary ; second, by the very contrary course taltcn lt~tcly,
of treating thcm ns uufortnnnte sovereigns about to IIC
pl~ulclcred by a greedy Company ; third, by reopening cases
once setLled ; and fourth, by tho publicity of the most sccrct
documents.
On rcceipt of the despatches, containing all this II~\\~S,
the
Governor-General clcsired the Agent to inform tho Darber tlii~b
ia the event of the young l h h n r a j a being deposed, he ( h e
Agent) conlcl in no way recognise a new chicf of thc Stntc
until he had received i~lstructionsfrom thc Goverilment of
Inclia. The Comma11(1cr-in-Chief \w instructed to takc certain stcps to\varcls rendering the force on the fronticr more
efficient; ancl the usual commenclntion of the mensures tdien
by the Agcnt, nit11 nn expression of complete confidence in his
discretion, was repoatecl.
I t will be recollected that Broadfoot had brought to the
notice of tho Cfo\~ernmcllbof Indie tlie clangerons e~aliildcto
our sepoys of the Siltli soldiers, \ ~ h ohad succcssfrilly cstortcd
a rale of pay ncarly cloublc w M was paid I y us ; and Lhal
he was inforinecl that thc subject was occupying the serious
nttcntion of tlic Governor-Gcnc~d.
The fo110~viugmemorandum on the subject mas acldressed
to the Agent :
(Confidentinl.)
Mcmornndnm.

I
I

Jnnunry 12, 1845,

The Governor-Gencrd wishes Mtijor Broodfoot to make the most
accurato inquiries on tlie followi~lgsubject :
What mas the in5uence on the lniiids of our eepoys in January
1844, by the example of the Silth nrny successfully estorting high
rates of pay aud controlling the Government it professed to serve?
The Governor-General's attention has been drawn to this sobjoct on account of the impression which tho lnutiuies in tlie vicinity
of Ferozpore made 011 Lord Ellenl~orougl~'~
mind at t,he titnc; and
altllougl~much of the discoutcnt w11ich was then manifestcd may
be ettributcd to the disliko of t l ~ ctroops to proceed to Scindc, still u
S
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variety of circnmstnnccs nppenr to justify the n1)prehellsion thnt the
esninplc of the power esercisecl by (I large Sikh army had to a certain estent disturbed the minds of our men and predisposed then1 to
lloQefor the snme licence by the same means.
The rccent re\701ution brought about by the Sikh army, ancl its
llresent unmanageable state, render it espediel~tto omit no means
of ascertaining the truth as regnrds tho past, and by tlie most
scrutiny for thofutwe to be at all times well informed as
to the temper and disposition of the sepoys on the frontier.
R.[ajor Uroaclfoot's linowledge of the sepoy, combined with his
meails of using politicnl rcsonrces, render him the person best
quJified to be charged with this important inquiry. H e will, of
course, impart to Sir Jolin Littler his sentimellts as to the & g e e
of caution to be uscd in such an inquiry. The very suspicioii of
sllch a supposed nppreliension would in its effects be most miscl~ievons. I t ought not to transpire, and this communication ought
to be considered strictly confidential.
111 the Governor-General's opinion the mutinies of last January
proceeded more from the panic of marching to Scindc, and the refnsal of the former extra allomances in that country, than from any
seduction effected by Silh emissaries or Sikh example. On the
other hand, in conversation a few days ago with Gen. Ventura, that
officer stated as of his own ltnowledge that the British sepoys were
then in such disafl'ectecl state that they had made proposals to
cross eve? to the riglit bank of the Sntlege, and that he, the General,
had given nil intimation to this effect to Gen. Vincent, then com~nandingat Ferozpore. At the present moment the GovernorGeneral is aware that there are personal considerations now pending which may incline Gen. Ventura to exalt the inlportance of his
own conduct nnd services on thnt occasion.
Capt. Nicolson some modths ago wrote to Mr. Edwards proposing
to obtain a letter, said to be in esistence in the. Lahore oflices.
showing the interference, if not the actual approval, of the Lahore
Government in the allurements then held out to our sepoys. The
esistence of any such letter is very improbable ; but Col. Birch, the
Judge Advocnte-General, who was at Ferozpore for some days during
tlie period in question, states that h e was informed the S i l h emissaries, on pretence of bringing letters to the VdriI, with the Imowledgo
of the latter had meetings with delegates from our sepoy regiments at
night, nnd that it was not deemed prudent to institute any proceedings, the mutinies for3 disobedience then occupying more prominently the attention of the Government.
a Sic in originnl. The mutinous refusal of some nntive regiments to go to
Sind is referred to.
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Tho disbandment of the 3'1th N.I. took plncc almnt the same
pcriocl. 'L'he men wont in consiilcrablc numbers to t l ~ cright bank
of the Sutlege, and were not edistcrl into tlie Sikh army. This
discourngen~entmay have had its elfect ou our sepoys, mid prob~bly
the propondernting came in provoking tllosc miiti~lieswas tlm Sciiide
panic and refusal of pay dready advcrted to.
Be this as it may, it is espcdient to adopt the illcnlis of nccurnle
information ns to any attempts which nxty be n~adeby 8iltli eiuisssries, and the effects slipposed to be produced on the tcmpcr and
feelings of thc British sepoys.
The Governor-General also desires to be infonned of tlie probable number of I-Iinclosta~~ee
troops in the 8ili11 army, also of nlcll
trnined in our army who have risen to raulr in the Sikh army. I l e
d s o wishes to have in detail as much informati011 as can be collcctcd
of the comparative pay, allomnnces, pensions, clotl~ingkc. of the
two armies.
It would also be desirablc to have information as to the systeiu
under which it mould nppear that delegates of Siltli soldiers attcnd
the clecisions of tlie Durbar on matters connected with the pay of
the soldicrs, what prospect any govern~nenthas of controllii~gthese
pretorian bands, bearing in niind that onc of the consequences of
the 8iltll example of extorting higher pny hns recently bccn snccessfully imitated by the hill troops under Jowaliir Singli; their pay,
according to Major Broadfoot's report, having been nearly doubled
to secnre their allcgiancc to Golnb Singh.
These events in a large Eastern army undoubtedly nre calculated
to destroy the preconceived notions of the snperiority of the pny of
the British sepoy. The longer this state of things lasts, the Inore
regulnrly the Silths are paid, the greater their licence and their
impunity, so much the more vigilant must the Britisl~Government
be in matching, mrl if necessary ill co~mteracting,tho coiltagion of
such a state of things, infinitely more inconvenient than a mcllorgnnised ariny of equal strength, rendy to risk a struggle with the
pammount power in tho East.
The Governor-General tllercfore requests that Major Broadfoot
will turn his attention to this subject, and address his answers direct
to the Governor-Gener,zl.
HENRYHARDINGE.
Mr. W. Edmarcls, then U n d c r Secretary t o the Government
of Indin in the Forcigll D e l ~ a r t m o n t ,wrotc to Broadfoot o n
January 15 to complain of irregularity in the receipt of h i s
clespatches, nnd to s a y t h a t some of them arrived open, a n d
therefore a suspicion csistcd t h a t they might have beeu
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tampcrcd with on t h e road. Bftcr intiruating Sir H e n r y
Hnrdinge's orders with a view to prevent this, Mr. E d w a r d s
wrote :
All that you hare done hitherto lias elicited not merely approbation, but acln~iration. I venture to send you a little extract from
a note from Tliomsson .
which shows his opinions. I beg your
nttention to the first few lines, as completely bearing out, though
unintentionally, what I asserted to you in my last letter-the falseness of our position here. If it be useless to speculate down here,
much more is it useless to attempt to issue orders.

..

T h e extrnct from Mr. Thomason's letter is as follows :
Cnmp nenr Suhnrunpoor : J&nunry6,1845.

My clear Edn~ards,--Thanlr you for your letter just received. You
forget that we are a little nearer h e North-West Frontier, and t h a t
tlie events of one month in that m l ~ a p p yco111it1.~
wipe out tho ovents
of the preceding month most completely. I could not help feeling
amused tit your speculations on things at Lahore. I am very glad
that Broadfoot is appreciizted. I hear from him constnntly privatcly,
as well as receive copies of his pnblic despatches. The latter seem
to me most able. I have seeu little of his work in my department
yet, for he lias been too busy with more important events ; but from
what he lets drop in his private letters, I have no clonbt he will do
great good, if lie hns t h e and opportunity. I am just now afraid
that I may not see him at Kliytliul, which I expect to reach a t the
end of this week; for the far more important events passing across
tlie Sutlej will most probably keep him on the frontier. I shall
probably mahe a run over to Umballali if he can meet me there.
T h e Lahore Darbar had newswriters i n most of t h e p r i n cipal stations in British India, in order that they m i g h t b e
informed of what took plnce there. One of these, e i t h e r
stationed at Ambala or attached to t h e Commancler-in-Chief's
camp, wrote that Sir Hugh Gough h a d issued orders f o r t h e
troops t o b e ready for immediate ~ervice,a n d t h a t consequent
~ r e ~ a r a t i o were
n s beiug made. This report caused e x t r e m e
excitement, and t h e Agent, anticipating a demand for e s p l a a s tion, wrote to S i r I h g h to ask wl-lcthcr anything of t h e kind
desc1.ibcc1 h ; d happened, or whether it was not m e r e idle
ruruour. H e further infoi.med his Excellency that, in consequence of thc nppcnrailce of prepnration, ' our position with
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respect to the Darbnr is materially and nnfavourahly changed,'
ancl that the risk of collision was incrensecl.
In spite of this the Agcnt clicl not think that the ruptnre
would thcn occur, and consiclerecl that the usual vigilance on
the frontier mould ~uffice.~On January 16 he reported to the
Government of India, that the troops in the province6: of
I<ashmir, Peshswa~,Muzahrabncl, Hazara, the Derajat, and
Kot Knngra, hacl mutinied, expellecl their officers, ancl committed pent cscesscs. The rejected officers mere received
back after malting due submission to the men.
In dhc hills, it vaa stntecl that Haja Gnlnb Sing11continuecl
to make public in-ofession of nbjcct submission to the Darbar,
of being brolien-heartecl on account of the violent cleaths of
his hrothcr and nephew, and of clesiring nothing more than to
be allowed to clie in p a c e ; but at the same time liis preparation for ~ v a r~ 1 'c~o ns t i i ~ ~ cwith
d unwearied energy.
The Rani hncl sceinecl disposed to trust the English ; but
her coi~iiclcnccwas shaken by the presence of the Commt~nderin-Chief on tthc frontier, nnd mas lost when the mmour,
nll~~clecl
to above, reached Lnhorc.
In spite of the remonstrance of her more cautious nclvisers,
she laid the report before the Darbar. The greatest cxcitement prev:dctl; the matter mas referred to the punclmyats,
and with every expression of reproach, insult, nncl clcfiance
which occurrecl to a clrunlcen soldiery, it was clecided to move
troops towards the Snllej forthwith, and to desire theValiil to
call on tlle Agent for an csplanntion.
Hc accordingly maitecl on Broadfoot, nnd said that he hnd
three messages from the Darbar to deliver.
$%-st.
That, o~vingto the scarcity of fornge near Lahore,
a fe\v troops hacl been sent towards the Sutlej.
Seconcl. That he was clesirecl to express the warm concurrence of the Darbar with respcct to a message which the
Agent h ~ c sent.
l
T h i ~ d . That he was clirected to ask for explanation why
liis Excellency the Commnnder-in-Chief had issued orders
for the troops to be held ready for immediate active service.
The Politicnl Agcnt to tho Commander-in-Chicf, .Januury 15, 1846.

See Papers CEC. printed Pcbrunry 26,
1846, p. 16.

To tlie first I ~nisweredthat it coilld only bc cardry tlint could
require forage. Tho Vnlteel lookccl confused, but readily eiioi~gh
i~sltedif I had not observcd that he hncl aclclod ' fnel ' to the forage ;
hc lind riot done so, but I told him 1had not henrcl it, and aslrcd
what troops were going t o move. He said he did not 1 i n 0 ~ . I s d d
I hoped no evil advisers 11ad recomme~idedthe rnovemenl of m y to
the Sutlej.
To !he second I n~erelyesprcssecl satisfaction.
The third was the subject of n long conversation ; for the Darbnr
had a very millute account, whether accurnte or not, of the lnilitary
proceedings [at headquarters].
IIaving henrd the whole story, and been mnriled that my ouswer
wns for the Darbar, I said that I knew inothi~lgs l all about the
mntter, that the C;ommander-in-Chief was thc liead of the army,
and that it was his business to inspect and esercise the troops in
every wny, and that i t was possible that he might have loolied into
their readiness for movement a t hmballa, seeing t l ~ i to
~ t be so ready
was part of their duty; but whcther he did or not, I1cnc.w not, a d
was not liltely to h o r n or concern mysclf, for, though 1 wtm very
far below liis Excellency in rank, I wnrz lor tho pl.osci~tserving exclusively under tho Governor-Genornl, witli vllom alone, mid with tllc
Govcrnment, I Iiad anytlii~igto do ; and I added tliilt llio Uarlnr d s o
liad only to do with thc same nntliorities.

The Valtil admitted the Crnth of this, Imt snid, as Cl~c
Comult~ncler-in-Cllicfwas a, ' Lord,' "lie Silths could n o t help
ansicty a s to his doings.
I told him to undeceive the Dnrbar ; tlint t l q should no moro
concern themselves nbont tlte Co~umsuder-in-C:llicftlml ahout thc
Lord Bishop; who, also, hnd recently h c n hcre ; or the lord
j d g c s of Calcutta. That each liar1 his owl1 spllerc of dnty, aid
coold in 110 way intcrfcre witli tllc Punjab witllool thc sanction of
C;overnment.
Tllc Agent further pointed out the inconsistcncy of t h e
assurances of conficlencc in tho sincerity of t h e CovcrnorGcncral, nrliich t h c y coutinncd t o csprcr;~,nnd thc :~ction of
dcqxdxhing troops towards the Sntlcj, which inclic,ztcd suspicion ; and ill this way encle~n~ourccl
to a l h y t h e escitcmenl
nrhich t h c ~ ~ c w s ~ v r i t ercport
r's
h a d causcd.
In Indin tho Go\.crnor-Ciencrnl is Jnngi Liit, or lord of m
c
u ; and 111~
onllctl Ll~eNulki L i t , Lhc l o ~ dof Lhc snbordinnlc govornoys or liculcwsntconntry ; the Commnndor-in-Chiof, Ll~c goscrlwrs rlrc cdlcd Liit SSllib.
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On t h e subject of t h e correspondence with Sir Charles
Napier about permission t o mwch some of liiv troops through
Multsn territory, Mr. Currie, Secretary to the Government of
India in t h e Foreign Dcpartnnent, addressed a letter to the
Agent, dated January 13, 1845, from which we give the following estracts :
Althougll tlne aid desired by Sir C. Napier is in reality nncrely
the neutrality of the Dewan of Mooltan in an intended attempt by
the Scincle Governinlent to chastise the Booghtie tribe of Beloochees,
who have coininittecl many acts of atrocity upon tlie inhabitants of
our villages in the neighbourhood of Shiltarpore, still the measure
involves llie application for the free passage of a British force tlirougli
the Sikh territory, and such a proceeding at this time might have a
very miscliievous effect, and might result in circumstances very
embarrassing to the Britisli Government.
The Governor-General in Council therefore entirely approves of
tlie course so jn&ciously taken by you, as described in these papers.
The Governor-General in Comncil desires that you do not proceed
one step beyond what you have already done, which his Escellency
observes will answer snbstantially all Sir C. Napier's objects. According to Sir C. Napier's letter, the passage by Gen. Simpson's
detachment through tlie Mooltan territory i ~ inot required, in the
event of Dewsin Moolraj Mull 6 acting as tlne interests of his own
possessions will dictate, and as the desire which he is known to
profess to propitiate tlie Eritish Government, mill doubtless induce
him. Yon should consequently rather recede than advance in the
matter, and, treating the whole afiair as one of the utmost indiffcrence to us, you should give t h e Dewan to understand that the corn~nunicationwhich you have already made has been merely in the spirit
of friendship, and out of regard to the relations mliick exist between
us and his Government.
You arc acting entirely i n accordance with the spirit of your instructions, and with the wishes of the Governor-General in Coui~cil,
in avoiding m y step by wvliich the Lahore Goveniment, or tlie Sikh
army, which is perhaps t ~ n l ythe Government, may halie alarm.
British interference in the internal affairs of tlie Punjnb must not
only be strictly abstained from, but every act on our part that coolcl
be laid hold of by the Durbnr, or by any faction in the L h o r e
territory, ns a plea for expecting British aid, must be studiously
avoided.
Thc nnnx is so spcll in Lhc copy
of lhc Icttcr : Diwnn M\lulrttj, son 01

IXwan Sirwan Null, was Governor of
bIoltan.
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TO require tho co-operation of the Oovornor of Mooltan in a
n~ilitarymovement of the British army of Scincle, might justly bo
assuincd as giving the Lahore Governluejll a right to expect the
reciprocity of British co-operatiou on some future occasion; nny
such expectation t l ~ eGovernor-General in Council has dcsirecl may
be cntirely discouraged.
Military aid in t l ~ csettlement of the affairs of the Punjt~bis
withheld, not from the existenca of feelings inimical to the l\iaharaja
or the Sil& Government, bnt upon principles of juslice and policy.
If the Governor-General in Council could by advice or the manifestation of any act of friendship assist the Lahore Government in its
diffic~~lties,
he wonlcl gladly clo so ; but he cell on no account sanction any measure which may give to the Lahore Govcrnmcnt tlle
appenrance of a claim to our active intcrferenoc in Ponjab affairs by
the aid of a luilitary force.
A copy of this letter will be sent to Sir C . Nnpier for his information. His E s c e h c y mas doubtless in ignoralice of late events
which have occurrcd in the Punjub wheu he acldrcsscil you on the
subject of his expedition.

,

At the risk of incurring a chnrge of unnecessary repelition. lhc follo\ring lelter from Major Broadfoot to Lord Ellenborough is inscrtod : there is mncli in i t which deserves careful
considerrdion.
Cnmp near Loodeenna : Jnnunry 17, 1845.
My Lord,-Acccpt my 11earty congratulations on Lhe honoure
wl~ichhave atlendecl your rcturn to England. I rejoice at thcm on
p11blic ancl privato grounds. None were ever bettor earned, ancl I
hope to see Lhem still inoreased. Pour Lordship will have heard
of the Ye\-ohtion ilt Lxhorc 011 the 21st ultimo. Pundit Jolla, and
I I e c r ~Sing11 ended their governmen1 and lives fighting despcmtcly.
They had sl~o\vnrenlarltnble ability and courage, but the difliculties nerc insuperable. The grci~tSurclacs on the one hand, ; ~ n d
the disciplined army, or mther the d~~illccl
army, on the other, s~~ffice
scvcrally to swnllow np the revenne. 130th together devour the
country. Pundit Julla tried by rigorous economy and pu~lctuttl
p:1y to lteop t l ~ cGoverninent going, while he raduced both t l m c
fnmiclable bodies, using the one against the other ; but 110 left out
of his ca,lcnlntions the mother of the nominal sosercign, mil she
~vnssnffered in contc~nptto intrigne against him ; or rather thc task
n~~dertnlien
was in~possiblc,and boll1 S n ~ d a r sa d army, sndrlenly
ulliting, overtl~remtlie Pundit m d the Raja, ancl revived anarcl~y.
This still continues. Tho civil officcrs of the Government arc

embezzling d l they can, the soldiers me in a stnto of mutiny, and
are pillaging everywhore. Tlle Surdars arc helplcss nmiclst the
confusion they have raised ; m d Rajah Goolnb Sing11 is pl'ofcssillg
submission m d daily offeriiig terms, but rcally preparing to the
ulmost for war. Fceble hostilities are going 011 in tlie hills itt
Jusrota, and the Government is emptying tho trensury to keep the
troops quiet.
Peshora Singh, a son of Runjeet Singh, mns lately here ag a
f~gitive; he has gone back, and after one ui~successful attempt to
gain the gorerllment is preparing another.
Thc Gover1unent is a caricature ; they have formed a couucil :
the leaders of thc mutinous troops, and a few of the old scrvnnts of
the government there, debate evcry qncstion with the Ranee, a
young and handsome momnn, behind a curtnin, wl~enceshe scolds
them heartily. Her brothcr, Surdar Jomahir Shlgh, was n o n h n t e d
Regent ; but Ihe Ranee acts for herself, nnd is now ncayly at open
issue mith her brotlier. She has lovers and slave girls, who, of
courso, bcar their part ; so also i10 the common soldicrs who attend
th9 Dorbar, and whom on one occasion the Ranee llnd to come
from behind the cnrtain and address.
Thoy have sent for Lena SiugIi, Majeetees, but tho Ranee lms
henrd he is a comard, and spoltcn of him with open contcrnpt. She
s e e m to cousider courage the highest quality ; and ussuredly mithout it a man had better not try public life in thc Puiiji~bat yresont.
There hns bee11 n disturbance a t Cabool, aud names of noted
men arc given as slain ; but though this is believed a t Lahore, I do
not think the dctails are yel to be trusted. This has, however,
prevcnted insurrection at ~ e s h a w u r .
Bcfore ncxt month we shnll lirobably have a change of government. The troops mill, perliaps, set up Pesllora Singh os sovereign
or miuister, and something decisiva as to Goolab Sin& will be
known.
As concerns us, all was confidence in us till a few days ago,
when some reported arrangements of the Commauder-ill-Chief threw
t l ~ eLnhore Ooveniment into a panic, and they called 011 the army
to support them. I regret this ; they will give us somewhat more
insecurity, but will scnrcely attack us ; and uufort~mntelythe movellients of his Excellency do not tally altogether with what I had
said, and gnvc them occasion to demand explanations. I had previously talten the liberty of giving iny opinion to his Escellency ;
and the Goveinor-General, I am delighted to my, npproved of it.
My opinion was that we ought to show no sign of alarm by extra
preparation, seeing thnt, tlmnlts to your Lordship, we have a forcc
cqnippccl in the Sirl~indDivision for service a t an hour's notice.
'

.
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His Excellency the Commander-in-Cliief has, however, made
solne requisitions of a small but alarming Itincl, sucli as not only
detaining lier Majesty's Blst Foot, which mas useful and unnoticed,
but sen&ng for their recruits from Camnpore, and causing baggage
to be meighed.7 (This latter I do not, however, know from his
Excellency, and it may not be'quite coi-rect.)
Tile Siltlis have, in consequence, ordered troops to tlie Sutlege,
mllicli mill produce insecurity and tampering with our native troops,
if it is not put a stop to. Now, in my view, if this division of 1G,000
]:ritisll troops needed reinforcemeuts, it would be by divisions and
brigades, not by a few kundrecl recruits. The former ought not to
be done except with intention of war, and by the Governor-Gencral ;
the latter, I think, 11ad better have been let alone. I t indicates and
cxoites alnrm, and in both ways is objectionalle.
I mention this as the event of the moment, though a small oue ;
but it touches a very delicate past of the Indian Government, a s
your Lordship must how-I
mean the relations between tlie
(;o~~cn~or-General
a d the Commander-in-Chief bofow 7unr Z~~oulcs
0lll.

The Commnnder-in-Chief is d o v e everyone but the GovernorGoneral; yet he is neither the nuthor nor the instrument of the
policy of tho Government with foreign states in time of peace, and
wlien away from Council can h o w nothing of its details ; but his
n~cnsuresmay embm~assthis policy unless regulated so as to accord
wit11 it ; and I do therefore thinlt he ought never, mheu a sepa~nto
onicer, to be absent from the Governor-General, who alone can even
advise him without something of presumption, Certainly I thinlr
he ought not to be on a frontier without the Governor-General,
uiiless indeed tho wliole affairs of it are put into his hands ; for on
frontiers, especinlly near n revolution, reports are innumerable ; and
are not ihlays listened to with the apathy one acquires after hearing mnny of them.
S i r Ilenry H;wclinge has throughout treated me wiLh a lriiidness
and confidence which make it very plensanl to serve uncler him ;
they would indre me vain did I not Itnow I owe them, a s well a s
t l l ~ t1 am here, to your Lordship ; as it is, they only make me
grateful for yom great kindness.
Poor Sir John i\lcCasltill has had a pnralytic strolte at Amballn,
but i s bettcr. Of your other friends you doubtless heax clirectly
from themselves, and nt nny rate I am here out of the world.
Believe me kc.
G. BROADFOOT.
Scc Sir I-lug11 Googh's lctlcr, tlcst pirge.
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The remarks abont the reldions belweon the Commander-.
in-Chief a n d the Governor-Generid, a n d the possible embarmssment c a w e d by the prcsence of the formcr on t h e
frontier, are worthy of attention.
Sir Hugh Gough's rcply to the rigcnt regarding the r u m o u r s
which l~ztdbeen reported i11 Darbnr, is ns follows :
January 18, 1846.

8ir,--I
have the honour to aclrnowledge the receipt of your
letter of the 16th inst. mentioning the extraordinnry escitement
which prevailed at Lahore in consequence of reports horn the ncmswriter at Umballn respecting orders wllich it is said I had issued to
the troops there, to hold themselves in readiness to mare11 at four
hours' noticc ; and you request that I mill say 'whether there llas
been mything of the kind described as having occurred.'
Your knowledge of our military system nnlust have pointed out
to you at once the absnrdity of such reports : a British force, being
always ready to move at ail honr's notice, mould not reqidre si~cll
orders; but as you request a clefinite reply, I will give it. Sucll
reports are totally without foundation. No orders mere ever given
to the troops, nor intended to be given. On the contrnry, l~nving
received distinct instructions froin the Governor-Generill in Council
as to tlie wislies of the Government to abstain from all interference
in the d a i r s of tlie Punjab, a d to preserve 11 line of condnct
exhibiting the wish as well as tlie detmmination on the ptut of the
Go~~emment
to preserve the most perfect good faith tow a1.ds our
ally, I have scrupnlously nvoided the slightest overt h o t towards
any mnnifestation of interference, and discouraged it in others.
The only circumstance that could 11avo given rise or the most
clistnnt countenance to such reports is, thal whilst at Unlbdlit,
wisliing to curtail as much as possible the lrits of the army in India,
~ n c lto ostablish a uniformity of system as to the quantun~of
necessaries a European or n native soldier slionld carry, both in
light and in heavy marelling ordor, I had (as nu experil~lentprevious
to my issuing nny G.O.%n the subject) ordered the Itits, as also
the bedding of a European and a sepoy, to be weighed ; I need
hardly add this rncasure had as mudl reference to the troops now
in Calcutta as it had to hose at Umballa; and so little idea llad I
of any such movement of troops for m y aggressive or oven clofensive purpose, Lhat I left Umbnlla on thc 14t11, accorcling to my provions nrrsngements, to visit Kytl~uland Kumnul, a t neitlicr of which
places is thorc any body of troops.
This \vord i s s o ~ n e \ \ l ~ illcgiblc
nl
in thc original.
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But as tho Lahore troops .have moved towards our frontier, indicating what I feel conscious no act on our part m011ld call for or
j~istify,I shall consider i t my duty to press upon the Government,
without whoso orders you are aware I cannot act, to strengthen our
frontier stations, not for the protection of these stations alone, which
have ample means for Ihat purpose nt present, but to give security
to the states south of the Sutlej, under the protection of tho Supreme
I have kc.
Government of India.
H. GOUGH,Geneml,
Cont~rta~~cle~-inChief ,inIizdia,

I

iI
I

1

1

The following letter from Mr. Currie is interesting because
the writer's official position specially qualified him to express
on opinion on the foreign policy of the Indian Government.
The handwriting is so execrable that i n parts it m a y be doubtfnl whether the precise word used by Mr. Cnrrie is here reproduced. Tho mcaning, however, is generally sufficiently plain
to make this of slight consequcnco.

-

,
f

\

Cnlcutta: January 19, 1845.

My dear Broadfoot,-You have done very well in keeping us so
constantly informed of d l that is passing in the Punjab ; and all
your proceedings have, ns you have been ofGciaUy told, bccn entirely
approved. It is a great pity that we are so far off at the present
time, and it is very lucky that you are on the fiontier, and not your
predecessor.
Sir Henry wrote to you the other any about the example to onr
sipnhees of an army demanding higher and higher rates of pay, nnd
combining to coerce its Government. R e lays more stress on this
nintter than I think it is worth. Our sipahees are, so many of them,
the sons or relatives of retired and pensioned soldiers, thitt they h o w
the real value of our service does not consist in the rate of present
pay so much as in the system of providing for the soldier under all
circumstances and contingencies. They see also the state of confusion to which insubordillstion has reduced the Sikh troops ; and
they have sense enough to appreciate the present state of tllings,
and to Imom that it portends the destruction or dissolution of the
army, which they will shortly witness.
I think the instructions you have received in late letters mill
enable you to ace your way tlirougi any circumstances that may
arise, pending specific orders on any state of things that may turn up.
If a genuine descendnnt of Runjeet n7ere on the throne, with a
capable minister, or even n tolerable aristocracy out of wvllich to
form a governmont, it might be a qnostion with ns \~dvlletller,in

~I
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return for Runjeet's steady friendsliip, and his forbearance from
talting advantage of US at times when he might hnve clone so with
present i~npunityto himself and infinite dnmage to ns, we sliould
aid liis desceudnnl in putting down the opposition of his ow11 army
and destroying hostile factions in his country. But in the present
state of nffairs in the Punjab such a measure is quite out of the
question. I t would be madness in us to think of espending blood
and trensnre to bolster up the puppet Dliuleep Singh, or to set up
such a government as could be formed out of the elemei~tsthat now
exist at Lahore, which must owe its continuance henceforth to our
power alone.
Thong11 I would rather see a strong Sikh or Hincloo Government
in tho Punjnb than that the British donliuions should estend to the
Indns, yet I should indeed grieve to think that such power was of
our crenting and maintaining, so that for all its iniquities we should
in fact be rcsponsiblc.
Armed inlorference, therefore, in the internal setllement of the
aEairs of the Silchs is out of Ihe question, even though the withholdiug tlw aid that may be solicited must bdng about the destruction of tlle Silt11 power.
Again, to tdcc advantage of the weakness or prostration wliick
must follow ille prescnt extraordinary position of agairs, to go in
and seize the country, is what nTenever slionld for n niomenl Lliink
o f ; nnd it is cloublful how far we should bo justified in holding the
nominal Ciovenlment responsible for escesses committed on our
frontier and districts by a lawless soldiery in open r~bellionto its
own Government, and equally their enemies as ours, and snying, If
you can't rule your country with a strong hand, we must.
For tlic present, thereforo, abstinence from all intorfcrence or
aid, by whomsoever solicited, and defensive measures for the protectiorl of onr territory, and the destruction of those who violate it,
mnst be onr only policy.
The protected Silths should be assnrcd that no proceedings on
the other side the Sutlege, or any resultsin which thcymay terminate,
will alter their position with u s as long as they remain faithf~d. ]Be
do not want their tribute, and we will not (at least if I have m y
.influence, and you mnst consider this a private letter) make nny
compromise 1 wilh them of present cnslonis ; least of all mill we
yield to them the miscl~ievousright of adoption, which mill perpetuate the existing anondies in these territories.
The most importanl question which presses a l this moment is,
the ligllt in which we are lo view the Lahore districts on this side
This word is very iilegible in tho original.
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the Sutlege. A1.e t h y mtionccl or f m ~ i l yproperty ? Will they
nttnch to any Silt11 Government me might recogiiiee, or will thcy
belol~gto Dhnleep (wl~oluwe have recogniscd as heir of Rnnjeet)
sllonld he take refuge on this side, or lapse to us in the event of his
death ? I hope to get this question, as far as our rccords throw any
light on it, or on circumstances that can elucidate it, bcforc tho
C~overnincntnest council day. I incline at present to tliinlt it
j a n d y property. I sLiould like to know your view.
I imagine we shdl be forced across the Sntlege sooncr or later,
and you will see that we are sending up troops to be ready fol.whntever may turn 1 9 We mast not liave a &Ial~omn~cdai~
power on
this side the Attock. The liajpoots of the l d l s could not liold the
Punjab ; Z L Iif~ it can't be Silth, it must, I suppose, be British.
I record most of your private notes to mc, and send them to the
secret committee, leaving ont sucli parts ns are of no public interest.
I have had two or three long coliversntions with Gen. Venturn ;
but we can do notliing for him more than to allow our Agent to use
llispolaoianl interest to prevent the seizure of his propcrty. The
Genernl put the notion, I t l h l t , into Sir IIenry's head that our
sipaliccs have on understandiiig with those of Lahore, nnd that
ours are likely to be led away by their example. Tlic old Frencliman wished to give some valuable iiiformntion to Sir Henry to innlte
him friendly to his interests.
Yours kc.

...

...

I?. Cunnm.
The possibility of disaffection i n our native nrnly, induced
by t h e esamplc of t h e Silth troops, and encoumged b y emissaries from that Stnte, was much morc serious t h a n Mr. C n ~ r i e
iningined.
The Governor-General sent a letter from Major Carmichael
Smyth, in which disaffection was said t o be very extensively
spread in thc native army, 2nd remarked that : .
The extensive disdection alluded to is not credited by tlie
Governor-General; but it [the letter] is sent in reference to tlle
preceding communication. If any system of delegates be suspected
to exist, it nlust be traced in all its ramifications.
The a c t i ~ participntion
e
of the Silth Governnient in m y attempts'
to seduce our sepoys would be an unpardonable piece of treachery ;
the cloarest evidence of the fact should be obtained with the greatest
circumspection.
The Governor-General is satisfied no efforls will be spared to
ascertain the real state of the case, and to be prepared at a11 times
to be well informed of wllat is passing between the two armies.

!
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After the last recorded interview with tho Valril, Broadfoot
nrldrcssed him, aslting for forther explanation regarding the
~novc~nent
of Silrh troops towards our frontier. At another
interview, all thc 013 ground was gone over again with variations. The Agent told the R~lril that when alarm wes felt in
conscqnence of anything that hnppcncd on our siclc of t h e
Sutlcj, i f explanation were nslred for, confidence wns ii-tcrensed;
but if, instead, ii-tdiscreet measures were adopted, and t h e
passions of the mob inflamed, conficlence could with difficulty be
maint,zined. He also insisted on gettii~ga nrittcn answer to
his written demand for explamtion, bccause as there mere no
witnesses to tlic conversations, if serious results occurred, t h e
Vdiil would unhesitatingly dcclnre that neither rernonslrance
nor warning hnd been tried.
The Governor-Gencrd's instructions to inquire into the
state of the native regiments on t h e frontier, slready quoted,
were fornwded by the Private Secretary, Mr. C. S. Hsrclinge,
to whom Broadfoot m o t e the following letter :
Camp, Sirhind : Jonun.1.y 20, 1816.

My dear Hardinge,--I am much obliged by your ltind note of the
12th inst.
Will yon kindly say for mo to Ihe Governor-General tlmt tho
subject of l ~ i snieinorandnm has, ever since my arrival on the frontier, occupied my most serious attontion ; that I have lunde and nil1
mdung all the inquiries possible without showing tllnt such a thing
is seriously suspected by us, that I sliall soon write on it as desired,
and that I have for some time considered this point as the most
important in our relations with the Punjab, but scarcely Irnow how
Pours &e.
to write on a matter so delicate ?
G. Bno,m~oo~.
In case of any little delay, you may say that ~ h I shall
t write
will be, in general, only a confirmation of the Governor-General's
opii~ions. Further, that m y views on this have in no small degree
influenced my conduct of late, but I hope before many days to write
fully.
G. B.

The Bani's share in t h e Government was reported a s daily
increasing. She was influencecl consiclcrably by Raja La1 Singh,
and still more by the girl Mangla, who was placecl in Darbar asl;
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tho opening of the curtain behind which the Rnni sat, and
mas the cllnnnel of communicntion for d l buL the great chicfv.
This slnve girl appeared to be in a mensure a recognisecl officer
of the State, ns well as the minister of pleasure and of riol;.
She signed one of the treaties v i t h R i ~ j aG L M I Sing11 ; a,nd
at nlill affixed the scals of the Rnni and her brothcr, which
s]lc carried a t her girdle, to any Government documents csccpt
those connected with the English.
Day by clay the scanclnls cansed by the behaviour of the
Rani and her brother, alike in their love of pleasure if in little
else, became worse a i d worse.
Overtures to the Agent, on behalf of Raja Gulab Singh,
nfere made by Bhai Ram Singh, for nid ; in return for which
it mas proposed to cede the cis-Sntlcj Lahore estates, with some
territory on the north side of the river, and Lo pay 50,00,000 rs.
eqnal a t par to 600,0001. Brondfoot, though he reported the
oflcr, and remnrlced on thc terms as Being similar to thosc
proposed in Mr. Clcrk's time, did not even aclcnowledge its
receipt to the party by whom the proposal was made.
On the arrival in Cnlcnttn of this informntion, the Agent
mas desired to remark to thc Vnkil, that n regard for the difficult circurnsl;nnces in which the Maharaja's Govcrilmeu t was
plnced, had hitherto induced the Governor-General to o1)stnin
from malring a formal remonstrance on .the sul~jectof thc
unruly and ungoverndle condition of the Sildl army.
' We considered it
that this intimation, though caotiously
~lndincidentally, sliould bo distinctly, rlclivered ; for me cnnnot but
feel thnt the state of this army so close upon our frontier may become an intolerable nuisance ; and althougl~it mould be a mockery
to expect that the Lahore Government' in its present state of anarchy and mealmess,
' can regnlate the conduct of an army
which exercises over that Governmeut daily acts of coercion and
tyranny, nevertheless me deem it espcdient that n notice in the most
guarded terms should be given of the grcnt inconvenience to which the
British Government is exposed, and of which, if the Lahore Government were in a stnto of groater strength and responsibility, me should
lmve just cnuse of formal complaint.
' We put I\Injor Broadfoot, in whose judgment and discretion IVO
have the utmost confidence, in possession of copies of corrcspoadence
with his l3rcellency the Commider-in-Chief relntive to strengthening our force on tho North-West Frontier.'

.. .
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I t was left to the Agent t o say whether thc cxtrn troops
should bc a t once posted on the fronlier ; nilless he mas convinced of the necessity, it mas considered to be preferable t h a t
their arrival shonlcl be clcfcrred till April, when tlic periodical
rise in thc river Sntlcj would preveal tlie Sikhs from being
thereby alnrmecl.
When these papers arrived in Englnnd, they mcre prononncecl to be of high interest. They did not remove tho
anxiety fclt, but thc hope mas cherished that ~znder t h e
jnclicions instructions of the Governor-Gcneral, ' carried into
effect with so much propriety and talent by Major Broadfoot,'
the necessity for hostilities might be nvertecl, and order reestablished.
It is one of the drawbnclrs t o a work of this Irincl, that the
tl~reaclof the historical mrrative is constantly broken by t h e
iritroclnction of letters not immediately relevant. This becomes
more obvious in proportion to the strictncss with mhicli tlle
sequence of letters, according t o tlie dates on which they were
n ~ i t t e nis, maintsined. The render m u ~ t therefore,
,
transport
himself now from the presence of the Agent on tho frontier, t o
the camp of Sir Charles Napier, where that General will spcalr
for himself.
Hendqunrters, Oooh : Jnnunry 22, 1945.

39y dear Sir,-Having been fortunate enough to surprise the
robbers and to defeat them, we nre now pursuing Beja I{han along
the southern side of the liills by mhich he flies, instead of by (as I
espeutod) the[pass near P~olajee].~He means to fly to the &loolt;~n
territory to join Shere i\iohomed. Now ho is a robber, a murderer,
a rebel Lo the Xhan of I<helat, and enhered our territories to pillage
and ravage them, though we were a t peace, and in strict nlliance
with his prince. 1% chose, very foolishly, to m d e WRP npon LIS
without the slightest provocntion, but he had a right to do so if 110
chose it, nor could wo, without a want of generosity, complaiiz of
his being received by a aeigl~bouringPower as a private gentleman. But I think Bqja Khan has no right wllntever to be received
)3Y the Governor of Mooltan, and I -wish you would write to him
to beg thnt he mny not be received. If I catch him I nlenn to
hang him nt once. I will quiet the Sindo frontier for a hunclred
years !
My Sinde jaghirdars are behaving very well ; one of them took
Tllc name is illogihle in the
original.

Perso~isto wliorn nn ostntc hns
hccn granted in nnnuity.
T
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Poolajee, nnd to-dny mnrclied upon Tonge, n village on m y left
flnnlc, out of ahicli Beja retreated yesterday morning, and I should
]lfive cut Irim otf, but 1was obliged to wait for provisions.
T h e necessity of Icceping all quiet to surprise t h e enemy prevented my con~missnrintfrom malting the requisite preparntions ;
honlever, we march tomorrow en roate towards Deyrnh, i n nearly
a direct line.
I think tho 13oogkies mill fight u s as me enter the liills nt a
pnss called Gundooee, not nlarlted in Wnlltcr's mnp, but it is ten
nliles due south of the b in tho word Tomb,' which yon will see i n
W\~ullicr'smap on the river ' Illinssee.' If not here, they will s t a
place north-enst of Deymh, called ' Mecrzaltee Ghunsee,' that is to
say, if t l ~ crtrscals mean to fight nt d l , which I hope t h y (lo not,
and I tliinlt I sllnll end this wnr without the loss of a n y more mcn.
Hoping you mill be able to prcvcnt the cutthroat B e j s Ulliul from
being receivcd by IIooltun, I rerna.in Ao.
C. J. NAPIER, IVC~OTGC~CTC~.

Thc follon~ingletter f r o m Sir H e n r y H a r d i n g e t o L o r d
Ellcnborough, which mas shonm t o t h e Duke of Wellington,
coutains a n interesting epitome of the news of t h e clay.
(Private.)

Calcutta : Jnnunry 23, 1845.

My dear Lord Ellenborough,-Afhir~ in tllc Punjab nre in the
saiue stnte of confusion and anarchy a s when I last addressed you.
The Sikh army will neither fight its enemies nor obey i t s
Government
Peshoru Sing11 is used as tlle pump by wllicll the soldiery drain
the treasury. They declare him their sovereign when t h e Ribnee
refuses nny dcmand; and when conceded, put him aside for t h e
nest ocoasion.
The worst feature is the success of mutiny; the infection h a s
spread to the I d 1 troops; they tllreatened lo desert, and did desert
until Colsb Sing11 donl~ledtheir pay. Any visiblc tangiblc dangcr
can be boldly grappled ~ v i t l ~ .DisniTeotion and mutiny a r e dangerous i n proportion to the success and the duration of a bad example.
I need mal;c no conllnents to you 011 this subject.
If, honwcr, the contagion should reach Berozpoor, tlle safest
renledy wonld be active operntions i n self-defence. No such alternative will, in my opinion, hnppen.
W e have reinforced Ferozpoor by one European regiment, two
troops English horse artillery, two Native Infantry regilnents, and
a third regiment if dosirable.

.
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Sir J. Littler to con~inandthis advanced post, whicli consists nf
7,000 men. I t is impossible in the face of tliis force to cross the
river at Perozpoor. Tlie more distant fords mould give us timely
notice of nuy attack ; and with the nrorlcs we now have and some heavy
guns, I consider tliis post perfectly secure.
Tlie defensive force exceeds 20,000 men and 60 guns, including
seven of 13.34 's regiments.
We cnu collect 33,000 infantry, (i,000 cnvdry, nnd 100 guns in
about six n~cclis;all the reinfol.cements have been talren from our
extremities, notliing on the grcat trunlr road, and six of Ihese regiments are troops on which Sir H. Gough did not reckon, snch as a
regiment from Btrraclipore, Midnapoor, Bherampoor, Dinapoor, and
two from tlie Sangor couiltry kc.
Tlie nest three months nil1 bc occupicd in emptying tho treasury
at Lahore, and, if the troops can be prevailed upon to move in 110stilities agninst Golnb Singll, I see no probability of thc latter being
able to do more than defend hiinself in his l~ills. I ~ will
G not undertale the enterprise of seLting up for liimself at Lullore. I-Ie 110s
not the popularity ;"he may bribe tlie Sikh sirders, but Lhe troops
detesl him, and the hill petty rajas whom h e has despoiled equally
detest him. I believe he has recently sent inoney nnd jewels to our
bank of the river.&
We slinll have 500 elephants in the course of the summer betmecn Cttwiipoor and tlie S n t l e p , and 7,000 camels, exclusive of
tattoos and haclre~ies; b a n d if ever we do move across, Ferozpoor
nlill be a most useful point on wliioli to concentrnte our resources,
limiting the baggage, i t i d only moving aCl'08S in light ~nnrohmgorder,
having 25,000 cavnlry against us, between the river and Lahore.
The battering Irttin mould be drawn by elephants, two to encli
24-pounder, occupying n short space on the liue of mnrcll. Two
bntteries of your iron 12-pounders would d s o be drawn by one ele.
phnnt each, and in action Ey bullocks ; donble shafts are provided ;
and a roclcet compmy with tlie proper apparatus for firing and cariying the roclrets.
lJ7itli regard to the 9-potmders to be converted o u t of the
6-ponders ]lorse artillery, the opinioll is adverse to tlie plan, and
Col. G o w n liiinfielf has withdrawn, nnd no longer advocntes the
mensure. I-Iowevcr, I liave insisted on h j o r Abbott taking Capt.
Grnnt's troop of 6-pounders, and with eight horses on the detaclnnoiil;
Sikh ; tlie left bank, Brit,isll.
4 Ncnns, he cnnnot reclcon on thc
Ponies and bullock carts.
support of the peoplc of the Punjnb.
T h e right bonk of Lhe SuLlej \\,us
T 2
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systcm if he liltes, tunling out the most completo 0-pounder troop
tll;~this ing~nnitycan invent. \\re have given him cnrtc bla~zclie,
and the pr~wticnltrial mill be fairly made.
In the midst of this anarchy on the frontier, you will ask nrhy
am I here ?
The longer I can stay here, the better our chance of Irccping tho
Silill Governnlent on its legs. Even if we had a cuso for devouring
our ally in his adversity, v r O are not ready, and could 1101 be rcady
until the hot minds set in, nnd the Sutlege becomes n torrent.
Moderation will do us no Iinnn, if in the interrid the hills and
the plains ~vcalreneach other; but on what plea, could we attack
the Pmljnb, if this mere tho month of Oclobcr, nnd me hail our army
in rencliness ?
Self-preservation may require the dispersion of this Silih army ;
the baneful influence of snch an csmnplc is the evil mosL to bo
dreaded ; but exclusive of this case, how arc vTe to jnstify tho
seizure of our friend's territory, who in our ndvervily assisted us to
retrieve our afff~irs?

H. HARDINGE.

When Brondfoot's letter7 to the Commander-in-Chief,, dated
Jannnry 115,inquiring n h t fonndation esistccl for !he rumours
of military preparations nt headquarters, was rcceivcd by t h c
Government of India, the Sccrelary in t h c Forc)ign Department
was desired to address t h e Agent a n d direct him l o tell t h e
D a r b m the exact t r u t h as f o l l o ~ v: ~ ~
Tllot n barrnclt for n Zuropcan regiment of infantry had for a
length of time been ordered to be constructed at Ferozcpore, of
which the foundations are already h i d ; that the Governor-General
in
in Council, perceiving during the antumn the stnto of ~\~oalrness
which the Government of the hl'nharajnh had bocn for some tin10
~ ~ n d his
e r EIigl~iiess\V.~nxeerRajsh Heera, Sin&, had postponed to
give orders for the conlpletion of this building, in order tliet n o
qi~estionmiglitarise, exciting any doubt or jealousy of our intention,
on the part of the Government of the Rlnl~lrurnjahor of tho Sildl
army.
That the 13ritish force stntioned s t Feroaeporc has remnined of
the snme strmlgtll as before, notmit11sLnnding the reccnt violcnt proceedings of thc Sikh mqr ngainst its own Government, w\.hicll
conduct it is unnecessnry llom to coinn~cntllpon, otller\vise tlli~nto
repeat tlrt~tit 1s conduct utterly repuglnnt to Ei.itish fceling and
British policy ; and that this army has become so notorioilsly beyond
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control, that tho Governor-General in Council, always ansious to
preserve tho tranquillity of tho Sikh states under his protection, nlill,
under existing circunistttnces, now proceed to complete the buildings
at Ferozepore according to his original intention, nlla also to reillforce that post by ail additional Sorco of Nativo Infantry.8
Broadfoot mas further clireclecl t o impress on the Vakil
that the British policy of friendliness had remained unchanged,
in despite of the movement of the Sikh nrrny towards our
frontier, nncl that no desire existed t o interfere in the internal
nfiitirs of the Punjab.
Whilst the Agent was to clo dl h e coulcl to convince the
Silt11 Court of British good faith, he was to take tho opportunity, should i t occur, of giving the Darbar the warning
alrcacly mentioned."
The following letter from Gen. Ventura to Major Broaclfoot
has a certain interest as a genuine relic of one of the best
known of the forcigu officers who served the Sikh Government.
It is printed as i b is written, unaltered and uncorrected. The
General had the revenncs of somc villages in the Lnliore cisGutlej estabes assigned to him. I-Ie Sc~tccl that the Silrh
Goverilment would resunlo the gift, nnd wished to oljtaiu the
fiupportof the Governrncnt of India in resisting the seizurc of
his properly.
Caloulta lo 28 janvr. 18d5.

Mon chor RIajor,-Quelque fnt 111011 desir de voua Bcrire j'ai
diR6r6 de la faire jusqu'a ce jour. Je vouhis nttcndro une solution &
ines aflaires et pouvoir vous en faire part ; si celle que j'ai obtenue
n'est pas tout Afait telle que je l'eusse souhaitbe j'ai lieu i16anmoins
d'htre setisfait et surtout reconnoissnnt,
Aprds plusieurs ontrevues avec S.E. Le Gouverneur-GQnQr;t11
dans lequelles il m'a temoignb le plus veritable interet et la plus
haute bienseillance, j'ai regu de lui l'nssurauce positive que l'honorable gouvernement dont il est 1e chef ne pouvant m'accorder une
protection oilicielle mo la clonnerait cependant de fait ; nous soutiendrons m'n-t-il dit, vos droits avec toute la force cle notrc hfluenco
faisant valoir toute la justice ile votre cause, je ne puis vous garantir
officiellement la propriet0 cle vos villages, mais je vow assure que
vous ne les perilree point A, noi ins, a-t-il ajoutb en riant, qna votre
affaire ne devienne un casus Belli, je vais Qcrireh, cet 6gnrd de ma
propre main au Major Broadfoot. De scmblables peroles do lo
8

Papms kc. printed February 26,1846, pp. 14,15.
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bouclle & S.E. sent faites ponr inspirer pleine collfiance surtout,
mon cher i\Injor, quand c'est vous cjui est chargb d'en assurer les
bons effets.
L'escellent accneil qui m'a 6th fait par le chef, et tous les membres de l'honorable gouverncment d a m mes d~rnarchesnu stljet de
cette afhire a BtB, je ne l'ignore pas. adinirablement pr6parBe per
vos rnpports fworables, ce sont vos Lettres qui ont excitb ces senti~ n e ~ ld'interet
ts
quc j'ai rencontrQs par tout; enfin c'cst un plnisir
bien vnhi pour inon cmur de vous le (lire, c'est h vons qne je dois l e
sncces quc j'ai obtenu; vous avce pratiqu6 A, moll Qgarcl ce bean
principe, proruettre pen, et faire bcaucoup. J e ne saurai vous
espriluer nvec trop de chnlenr toute ma gratitude toute mtl reconnoissance, et je p i s njouter toutc ceUe cle me fnmille ; si elle conserve cctte majeurc pi~rtiede sn fortune c'cst tl vous qu'elle la devra.
8.E. m'a assnrb clue les choses seront rnaintenues telles que
JIr. Clerk les a Btablies, que les Villages sesont administrbs par les
employ& dn C o l d et les revenucs versQes clnns le trbsor et mis
ma disposition, je prends donc la liberth de vous transmettre ci joint
Line petito note pour vous faire connaitre les charges dont sont
grEv6cs ces revenucs, Vcuillez avoir la bontb d'ordonnor quc ce
ohiffre ne soit pas nrbitrsirement depassO c'est Lt dire qne vaus seul
puissiez l'augmenter si vous le jugiez necessuire.
Permettez-moi mon chor l\li~jorde voas prier cle conqdater pour
l'avenir votre bonne convre en reg1:lant mes afl't~irescle telle sorte quo
lorsque vow cpitterex la. place quo vous occupee pour monte^ I\,
m e nourelle et plus h n t e encore position, celui qui vous remplncerrt,
diu~sl'ainiti6 et I'interet dnquel je n'aj pas lieu cl'espcrcr comlno
dnns les rotres, ne puisse pas detrnire vatre ouvrage conme Mr.
Richmond I'avait fnit de celui cle Mr. Clerk,
Ce n'mt pas ici le moment de vous rappoller que yon8 m'avez
promis de Tons aclresser h moi pour ce dont vous po~lqiezavoir
besoin en Vr:lncc, cepcndnnt je tiens h vons re~~ouyeller
QUO ce sere
unc veritnblc jonissnncc pour inoi cle me charger cle yos commigsiopfi
et cle pou~loirvous btre ilgr&hle, ce sera en la faisant une verititblg
prepve c11amiti6qne vous me clonnerez.
Je pattimi le 8 cln mois procl~nin par le Paquebot h Vapellr lo
PrQcnrsenret je nle rendrni en hngleterre avant cle rentrer en frallcc
ou je serui dam lc conrrcnt du rnois d'a~ril,lorsque vous vouclres
bicn m'6ccire mon adresse est
Gen. Ventura, cbez Mr. Prhoteau potaire, rue St. fiIarc FeyCleau,
No. 20.
Adieu, mon cher Major, reuillsz agrber ici la nonvclle assurance
d9 toute mon estimc et do rnon recosnaissa~lt&tachement,
Votre tout di.von6,
VEX~~UXA:
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CHAPTER XII.
Siltlt lroops witlidra\~nfrom North-West PronLier-Intorview between Agent
nnd Vnltil: Sollcj tho limit of aup~~cnliicy
of the two Powcru-hlolln Bli~n:rd
-Sir 1I. Hnrdingc to Lord Ellenborough : Punjab nc\\v+-Lctter front lhe
Privnte Secrclxry: the bonts for a flotilla or bridgc-Silrli cspcdition ngninst
J ~ u i i i ~ i i ~ - D e ~ ~ u l ntol i Gnlnb
on
Siuglt-Letter fro111 Sir C. Nnpier: tho Uuglis
-Letter From I-Invclocli-From Lord Elleiiborough-Sir
I-[. Hardiogc lo
Lord Ellenborongh : l'unjab ncw-Gulab Singh's ncgolirrt~ons with tho
Silths-Troops nvnilnble for frontier defence-Jnmmu : fighting hctwccn
Sikhs and Itill ~neti--NcgoLil~tivii-G111ab Sing11 virloully n plisoncrViolntion of our frontier by Sikh troops-llesolute nnd prompt steps
tnltcn by 13rondfool-His nct~oncoinnionrlod hy the Governmenls nf Intlin
m d England-Lclter to Lord Ellcnborough: C q t . W. SniiLh of t h e ' Sircn '
--His service8 in the fight with lhc ' Clicsnponlce ; ' atid i n Llur~un-Lottcr
from Lord Nllcnborough-Broadfoot in Simla--Lahore news.

EARLYin Pcbrnary thc Vakil mas able to report thnt the
troops which had bcen sent toni~rdsthe Sntlcj 11:~rl been
mithdmwn, and that a co~~sidernblc
number of men hnd
marchcd to Jammu agaiust Rthja Gulab Singh. I n giving
Chis information lie intimetccl that the witl~drnwal of the
Sikh army was owing to his exertions, mcl ~aiclhe hoped that
dissatisfaction wonlcl cease, aid Chat the friendship jvhich
esistcd in Ranjit Singh's time would be preserved.
The Agcnt assured him Chat in the friendly feelings of the
Governor-General to the i\Inharnin, and in his desire for tllc
preservation of the former mutual conficlenlcc, there wtw no
change, and that because of this, and because of the alarm
and injnry which might result at Lal~ore,the necessary rcillforcemcnts for the frontier had not been demanded.
Yet, on a report fro111 Ambala, which on inquiry turned
out to have been grounclless, the Darbar had suspccted the
Goverllrnent of India of trenchcry, and, instead of aslting
for csplanmtion, had adopted steps which nced not Le re-
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cnpitnlated, and htd follon~cdthose stcps by marcl~ingtroops
towards our frontier.
Brondfoot nftcr saying hc was glad that the troops lmd
been recalled, addcd : ' I t would be deceiving the Dnrbnr to
stly that I felt the same conficlence in them as before; and
that in all fntnre arrangements for the frontier, it mnst be my
duty to bear in mind 11111nt had already happened.' The Vnlril
n s l d if he was to comm~~nicatc
this rcply to the Dnrbnr, and
whether it wns to be considercd as an cspression of the views
of our Government, or mercly of those 11cld by the Agci~t.
Tlie reply mas, that every wore1 might be reported, but
that, as the Agent had not yet heard from the GovcrnorGeneral on tile sul~ject,he mnst be personally responsible for
thc rcply.
Tlic Vakil then hinted at the necessity nncler which the
Dnrbnr lnbonred of conciliating the troops ; on which Broaclfoot
remarked that this fact merely ndded strength to what he had
fiaicl, nncl rendercd moro grave thcir recent moven~cnt.
He further took occasion to state what the Vald well
knew, n~lclwhat Ranjit Sing11 never for a moment forgot, that
from and nfter the conclusion of the treaty in 1800, the S ~ ~ t l e j
had limitcd tho supremacy ' of the two Powers, and consequently
the protection of all, high nncl low, south of the river devolvcd
on the Governor-General. That in any government the protection of its subjects ma8 n first duty, and that, therefore, the
Agent's most inlportnnt cluty was ' to provide against every
risk, from whatever quarter arising, of injury to any man on
the south of the Sntlej; nnd I repeated that in cloing so I
mnst bcnr in niind the occurrences showing that Ranjit Singh
was no 101igcr reigning.'
The Vakil assented to d l this, and nftcr some less important
conversntion took hi^ leave.
One of the conseqnenccs of the employment of natives in
certnin negotiationsnlhich were omnhl on in Bfghnnistnn during
tlle Kabul disnsters mas, that the iuen emldoyed had fo~uncl
intrigue so profihblc that they devoted their attention solely
to practising on the credulity of British political ofli'liccrs. Of
these men a certain M~illaAhmad mas an adept, and Bronclfoot;
discoverecl that he was in correspondence with two of his
The words nscd were riylsnt, bukimat, nnd ilthtiyiir.
-
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Assistants. I-Ie pointcd ont the hnrm which resulted in the
Pulljab, and in every otlicr conntry up to Persia, from t h e
bclief that thc Government of India nlas connected ~ 4 t hintrigucmnlld intrigncrs so disrepntnble and unprincipled. H e
cantioned nn Assistnnt to be careful, lest by his modc of receiving such persons he might encourngc this belief, and give
t h e natives renson to snfipecl that there wns founclation for the
falsehoods by nhioh they lived.
O n his own pnrt he determineclly discournget1 all intercourse
with thcm ; unfortualcly the necessity for lhis 11ad not been
so cvidcnt to his predeccssor, who had written letters to lJull,z
Ahmncl, in themsclves, it is bclievecl, absolutely illnocent, but
which i n the hnilds of an unscrupulous mnn could lx used
with evil cffcct. I-Ie i~aturallydid n e k e nse of thorn, and the
nrhole corresponclcnca lmcl to be s~~bmittccl
to tlic Governiuci~t
of India. The iiicidenl neecl not Lo u o r e minutely followed ;
i b is sufficient to record Iliat Ihc entire approvnl of the Govcnlm e n t of India mas conveyed to Mnjor Brotdfoot for bringing
t h e lnnttcr to noticc in the way l ~ did,
c and of the course he
p m s u e d in regard to N u l h Almnd.
T h e following estrnct from a, long letter, clntecl Fcbruary 0,
1845, from Mrs. Cnmeroii is interesting as n record of the
impression Broadfoot's conclnct as a political oficer was lnalting
o n t h e Governor-General, and ns corrobornting opinions somew h a t differently espressecl i11 other letters.

I have not often dined at Government House since yon were
hare, but I never htwe dined there without mention being nlade of
you, and made iu those terms yon mould ]lave most liked to hear;
I will not call them flattering terms, but terms of perfect co,$dcl~cs.
On the last occasion Sir I-Icnry Hardinge told me-I do not know
whether it was a secret-that he mas very anxious to procure for
you your lioutcnant-colol~elcyas soon as possible. I suppose he
llt~stold you as much. He has once or twice said to me, ' I was led
to form a wrong inlpression of Broadfool, and have been told he
a rash and excitable man; on the contmry, 1see that he is
celrn and resolute, and when he displays energy it is not to make,
but to avoid, a war.'
T h e gencral ne~vsof the first half of Pebrnary will be found
i n t h c following estrnct from a lettcr from Sir H e ~ v EIardinge
y
t o L o r d Ellonborough.
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Cnlcutta : Fcbrunry 20, 1845.

My dear Lord Ellenboroug11,-There is no abatement in the
anarcliy aiicl inutiny of the Sikh arniy. They go where they please,
and every military operation depends upon their temper and caprice
at the n~oinent.
Golab Sing11 has agoin written to us, deliglitecl to enter into
terms with us. The first overture was a voluntary offer of his own,
through a confidentid emissary. The letter I now allude to is in
answer to the intrigne of E Frcncliinnn, a Mons. do St. Amand, a
great scnmp, ~ l i otoo11 it into his head to go to Juminoo from
Loodimm, a k l after two days' delay, finding hc could get no employment, preteudecl he canlo on a mission from Capt. Mills to propose a n
alliance with the Raja and tlle conqucst of the Punjab. The Raja's
letter by his own emissary had been previously reccivcd and rejected.
The Brencllmnn impudently wrote to Capt. Biills from Juminoo that
his proposals were accepted, a i d the Raja has now sent us n letter
entrenting us to lose no tinie. Broadfoot mill show up the impostor,
and 31. de St. Amnnd will have his nose cut off or be hanged.
The ailill troops in Jesrota and the neighbourhood have burnt
scvcral villages, and carried off 1,000 wonlen and boys. The hill
tribes arc roused to vengeance, ancl, in spite of their hatred of
Golab Singh, may r d l y round him to gratify their vengeance, and
prevent further horrors from being perpetrated by the Sikhs in tlieir
country.
Evidently Golitb Singh is grenlly alarmed. Lahore is stripped
of troops, a11d we hear they have not 12 lacs in tlle treasury, hilt
rely upon h e i r reserve treasure at Govindgliur. The grand ~ B I L O P L B ment will be postponed until the trensure be eshausted.
Thc Ranee continues her debaucheries in the grossest style.
The arnly threatcn to place Pesl~oraSing11 at tlieir head, ancl 1
believe my threat has savecl Dliuleep Singh's life-that if he were
deposed by violence the Sikhs must not expect us to recopise his
successor.
Our Assistaiits on the frontier will persist in dabbling in tho
and
intrigues of the Punjnb, and I fear I must withdraw -,
perhaps
We receivcrl last night a curious letter from the confidential
secretary of the Raja of Puteala, stating that the Raja of Nabha
was con\lincecl he was tlle eleventh incarnation of Vishnoo, o,nd a t
twenty-four gears of age mas to rise ngainst the Englisll and vanquish
them. Several details of the preparntionu maltiiig are given, and
the letter is renmrkably well got up if, as I cspcct, it is a hoax. I
illerefore do not scncl it home.

-.
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Tl~erehas becn sad bungling in tlie military operntions ngainst
Sawunt Waree.2 I should have withdrawn Gon. Dclamotte had ho
not had some flushes of ability and decision in tlie storming of
Sulninunghur nnd Pnnalltt, for which tlie Bombay Government gave
him their thanks. Col. Outram hns done very :yvell at the head of
his column, marching through the jungle in evcry direction, whilst
tlie other cohmns lime been frittering away their time in sllelling
jungles nnd ravines Before they would permit their troops to enter
them. I have written in strong terms to Doinbuy on this subject.
Napier, with his characteristic energy, is hunting the Uoogtie
tribe, and chastising them for their crnelties during the suinrner in
plundering our vilhges near Shikarpoor.
I expect to lionr the result of a combined movement lie is ma.liing
in the hope of catching them in his net ; I doubt this part of the
enterprise, but it will be a very useful operation, and if he can
capture or destroy two or three liuncbed of these iniscresnts he will
give the preponderance of power to the Murries, a friondly tribe of
robbers, whom the Boogties had conquered.
All yonr friends here are in good l~enltli,and conslantly inquire
after you with the most aflcctionate interest.

H. H N < D I N ~ ,
The following letter from t h e Privnte Secretary to Broaclfoot on thc subject of Boats, which had been ordered in 1843
partly for pmposes of trnflic, nncl also to be nvni1;~ble for
use as a bridge if ncccssary, llas a special importn.ace. Thc
measure has been alleged a s one of the causes of t h c ontbrealt of ~ n r aucl
, ~ it i s well, therefore, that t h e principal
facts concerning them should be plainly recorded.
(Confidential.)

Pobruary 20,1845.

My dear Broadfoot,-The Governor-General Iias desired me to
address you on the following snbject :
2. Sisty boats, built a t Bombay, h a w just been conveyed into
the Illdus to serve as a river flotilla, and also as a bridge of boats.
3. They are of eqnal dimensions, each carrying n gun, two grappling irons with stroiig chains, and 100 men; the sisty boats would
therefore for short distances, such ILS tho passage of a river, carry
8,000 infantry at one trip.
Sinantwiiri.-Nntive
Stnte in
Eombay, under the charge of a politionl superintcndcnt; situated u b o ~ t
200 niiles souLh of Dombny city.
The ad~ni~iislrntion
was made ovcl' to
Lhc DriLish Govor~lmcnLin 1838, nncl

there were rebellions in 1839 nnd 1844.
(Hunter, Impcrud Gazsllucr, vol. xii.
p, 295.)
Cunninghn~n's Sikhs, sccon
cdition, p. 2.86.
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4. Each boat has its separate proporti011 of timber ready for the
flooring of a bridge of boats, aud capable of being laid dowll i n two
or three hours.
5. It is not desirable that the purposes to which these boats can
be applied sliould unnecessarily transpire. The Governor-General
does not desire to create alarm which might be prejudicial t o the
i\Iaharajals Government. These contingent preparations, wllicll
policy aild prudence dictate, are required by the disgraceful state of
turbulence in which tlie Silth army has so long remained, and which
an~plyjustifies t l h a d every other
arrnngement. I
need scarcely observe that in the state of the Indian presB elltire
secrecy is the proper course to pursue.
6. But if nny inquiry should be made hercafter, your answer will
be that tllis Ilotilla of boats is not at present required on t h e lower
Indus, that our commissariat arrangements do require the omploymelit of boats betveen Ferozpore and Suliliur for the supply of the
latter place with grain, and that thcse boats are purposely adnpted
for military as well as trading purposes, and form part of our military
meai~sand estal>lishmenton the Iudus applicalde to any purposes
for which they may be required either on that river or on the Sutlej ;
to which you may add several iron steamers which i t is convenient
to tlie Government to employ on these rivers for f i e conveyance of
troops, stores, and sup~lies;a l ~ dof course availnble for offemive
I ~ wcll
S
us for defensive objects, not unnecessarily entcring into these
explenations, but stuting the truth if esplmmtion be proper.
7. On tlie other hand, yon will distinctly mderstnnd t h ~ our
t
01lly ol?iect in desiring secrecy is at a11 timcs and under all oircnmstanccs to do nothing which con mcdien the Mahamja's Government
by exciting nlurin or raising discnssions in the Indian newspapers.
8, Orders have been givcn for tl~eseboats to move up to S u l i l w ;
nnd further orders may be hereafter givon for their movement
towards Ferozporc later in thc ycar. Twenty days must elapse before an answer can he received from yon to this communication ; but
as SO^ prelin~inarynrrangements ought to be made, the (lovernorGeuernl has desired me to apprisc you of what his intentions are
in this respect.
9. The Commissariat Department have from ecouornicd motives
proposed that the Bengal troops at Sulikur should be supplied with
grain sent down in boats from Ferozpore. The Governmant has approved of this arrangement. The Commissariilt will be enabled advantageoosly and permanently to employ a certnin number of camels
in bringing thc grain to Ferozpore, nnd to have boats and crews a t
all times in their service regnliirly pilid and under tlleir colnmandr
10. The trade on the Sutlej, liowevcr sinall, will tcnd to lieep open
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this communication between tlie North-West Frontier nnd Sind, nncl
afford tlie means of linving a colnlnand of boats ou the river ; and
the Europenn ollicers and troops, by the return of tlie boats employed
by the Colmissariat, mill have all their .cvnnts supplied at tlie
chenpest possible rates.
11. The Governor-Crenaral observes i n a newspaper-'The
Friend of India' of Febrnary 6-that n Mr. Cliarcle is stated to
have established at Feroxpore an h~clnsboat agency.
12. I t appears to the Governor-General lliat tliis speculatiori
shoulcl be encournged, if the individual be of n, respectable chn,~acter,
and that the first step shonld be to givo him the aseistance of Government by building a ghaut or wharf for tho londing and unloading
of goods ; the means of securing the boats a t nll seasons, with a
road lending to the bfinlis of the river. This wl~arfshould be tlie
property of the Government, and be constructed i n reference to
objects of commerce as well ns of military co~lveniencei11 the event
of n, briclge of boats being placed across the Sntlej. I t might have ol
house attached to it, for purposes of tmde, capable of holcling a gnard,
grndually establishing a few honses closo to the banlc of the river.
13. In reference Lo par. 8 the Snperintencling Engiueer monld be
placed in charge of the flooring, timber kc. of each boat, nrranging
them in store accortliug to the most approved method of Itenping d l
the parts of one pontoon together, and a t all times in order ancl
reaclincss.
14. The report of the Dombay Committee will at somo future
time be sent to the oficer in charge, so as to enable him to cnlcnlate with precision the exact time required for laying the bridge
across the river, nflliuliby previous arrangement ought not to cxcccd
k o hours by day or four hours by night, on all which details future
instructions will be furnished.
15, The Governor-General hat4 ascertained by the scanty information hitherto sent to hiin that tlie boats 'kc. are ample in space
and flooring kc. for the object proposed ; but he pnrticularly wishes
yon to turn your attention to the best mode and time of bringing
the boats up to Feroepore. The inclosecl plan and dimensions of
one of tho boats will enable yon to form a n opinion whether it will
be more advisable to bring up the boats gmdnnlly clnring the summer, unloading tlie flooring kc. a t Perozpore, and then himding over
the boats to the Commissitriat Dcpiwtment to be used in carrying
grain don.11 the Indus, nncl thus establishing a nnvigation up and
down the river in our own boats ; or whether it mill be n preferable
decision to lieep the boats and their timbers nt Sukkur, not divulging
their object until the lnst moiuent, if ever the necessily should arise.
In tliis latter case an officer of the Bengal Sappers and IIiners should
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tnBe cllarge of the boats at Sultlrur, a n d be well informed on all points
relating to the constrnction of the bridge.
16. Tlle quieter mode as regards reports of their ullimatc destination, would be to bring up and to store all the timburs at Perozpore, being prepnred with nrtillery maggons belonging to the batteries
nt Fcrozporo to transport them in an hour to the rirerside wlleimever
required.
17. I t mill be desirnblc to ascerti~inthe probable time ~vliichone
of these bottts mould take in coming up from Snltltur to Ferozporo,
sny during the months of J u i ~ oJnly,
,
and August.
18. The Goven~or-Oencraltlierefore wishes you to take all these
matters into your consideration, and to give him your opinion a t
your earliest coiivcnience.
10. Adverting to par. 6 of this lettor, you will cleiwly mmclerstnncl
that this preparation for a movnble bridge is a past of the militiwy
estiiblishlnent of wery nrnmy, nncl is to bo considered in no respeck
n dcpnrture from the policy of meintnining a Sikh power pennenclltly in the Puimjnb by crery possible means cor~sistentwith esisting treaties. I n devising the best mode of proceeding regarding
this bridge, care must be taken to avoid publicity by which the
Ihllarnjn's interests might be damaged, or the confidence of t h e
Silt11 army in his 1Iighness's Government shaken by British preparations, which wl~eim known nce inevitably of a character to
escite suspicion.
Yours kc.
C . S. HARDINGEL
To this lcttcr Brondfoot replied, that h e was glncl that tllc
boats were coming, as thcy were mncli wanted ; ancl thnt nnless they were required at Sultkur, they should be sent nt o i ~ c e
to Firoxpur. If the Darbar nslrecl about tliem, explanation
wonlcl be given as desired ; ancl t h e sooner t h e better, for t h e
Sikhs mcre already a m r e , for rcasons which h a d been explninecl to them, t h a t the Eritish Government was strengthening i t s force on the frontier, and t h a t t h e m e a n s of crossing
rivers formed part of o w equipment.
F o r thc last ten to fonrteerl years t h c Sikhs hntl Itept
nearly all thc boats on t h e n o r t h side of t h e river, thereby
causing incon~~eiiic~lcc
to the villages on t h e south sicle, arid
giving rise to consider;able coiuplnint.
Brondfoot's view r e g d i n g t h e river was, thnt it nras a11
open h i g h m y , and that me, as well as t h e Sikhs, hacl a r i g h t
to use i t ; consequently, t h a t we werc entitled to l l s r e the
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means of using it. This mas more thnn ever necessary since
the annexation of Sind.
The Darbar, as has been mentioned, h i d sent part of the
Sikh army to cocrcc Rajii Gulab Sing11 in his capital, Jnmmu,
to make him part with money which he loved so well, and to
agree to conditions which he dislilted.
His old opponent Sardur Patlch Singh, IIdn,' and Home
others, were clcputed to arrange terms, whilst the army linlted
near Jammu. The Raja received them with great hononr,
and amused thcnl for sevcral days with altornnte professions
of submission nncl liinls of defiance. A del~utittionfrom thc
panclqrnts then nrrived. The Raja treated them as masters
of the State ; placed his sword and shield on the ground a t
thcir feet, ancl stood before them with his hands joined. He
expatiated, more rlsintico, on the bounty of the Sikhs to his
family,~mhosclong-tried loyalty and clevotion were recogniscd,
and during whose tenure of ofice the State hncl clljoyed prosp r i t y . I-le coatrasted this with the present deplorable state
of &i&s ; the wealth and property of tho Xhalsii embezzled
by the present mlcrs, the trensuries exhausted, and thc consequent imminent innhilily to pay tlie troops. Hc cnhnncecl
these nrguments by malting lavish presents to the deputation,
to evince his gmtitode and admiration. At length, aftcr
much argument, 011 February 28, the Raja consented to
certain terms, and, as an earnest of sincerity, agreed to hand
over to Sardnr lhtteh Slingh and TVazir Bachna four lnkhs
of rnpees. The money was duly paid, and they with their
cscort departed. Just outside Jammu a pnrty in ambush
fired on them. Pntteh Singh and tlie Waair were killccl,
many others n7ere wouncled, ancl the treasure was recaptured.
In spite of Gnlab Singh's protestations of innocence and
grief, the army was incensed at the deception practised, and
all his skill mas required to avert the dangers by which he was
snrrouncled. How he managed this will in due course a1)pea.r ;

' The full nntiic and title appcnr
to be Sardar Fnttch Singh, Miin, of
I!Ilinnnw%lii. The villnge d1knanwrTI;I
is said to liavc boen destroyed about
the year 1720. (Grifin's Puxjnb

CAicJs, p. 177.)
S The Silihs had murdered his
brotlicr nnd nephew, and his son was
killed along vrith Kunwar Nao Nilial
Singli.
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mcanwl~ileSir Charles Napier t h u s described the expedition
sgainst tllc Bngtis which h a s already bcen mentioned.
Doyrnll : Pehrunry 24, 1846.

My dear Sir,-I liave yours of the 11th instant. Tho AIooltan
autllorities are behaving apparently very fairly. Tlio hill Mazsrees
are the people I refcrrecl to ; but I have reason to think that his Bigliness Ali llorad did thcm injustice in accusing tliern of honcsty and
liumnnity to~~srcls
brother robbers.
They liave scnt to me all assurances to tlie contrary, and I incline to think that they would take great pleasure in n little pleasant
practice llpon any property he "oolc with him, nnd feel no weakness
or sentimental tcnclerness as to his throat. Where he is I ,2111 unable
to discover. I nearly came upon him on the 20th. We took a quantity
of baggage and grain to the value of some thousand rupees, wliicl~
he 11ad not time to load.
I have now formed t~ cordon from this to the Mnzaree boundary.
The Pl~irreeshave scnt to say t h y arc corning to make their salaam,
and I have offered them this fine country, which is now in our possession. This plain is quite benutifnl, and 118s a fine strcam of pure
water rurming through it. Every part might be a rich garden.
Yet, with the exception of n few patclics round the fortress, there is
no sign of cultivation. [Ilt is] a regular den of rohbers. You cannot enter this superb valley but through such passes as I never saw
before. TYhy they lct ine in I li110~not, but hew I mr, and l ~ o l d
the pnss to get out n p i n too, or I should not feel satisfied, I assure
you.
I tl~inlcyon will ere this l~avereceived my letter to say that I hnd
given up coming to Deyrah fro111 the river, for fear of any collision
or inconrenience to the General Government. Honrever, had I done
so, the total destruction of these tribes would lwve been accornplislied
a full month ago. We have pretty well done for them as i t is !
Beliere me kc.
0.J. NAPIER.
3Ia,jor Bronclfoot had written in February to congrat;ulnte
I-Inveloclr o n the birth of n dnughtcr, and nppenrs to l ~ a v e
npologisecl for not giving him Lahore news boaouse t h a t nrns
trcstecl as confidential. EIareloclc, who was then nrith Sir H.
Gongh, replied ns follomu :
a He' probnbly rcfers to Bcjn
Khan, rtlrcady ~nentionedin Sir 0.N.'s

provious letters ns tho lcndar of the
Bugtis.
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Hendquartors Camp : Mnrch 1, 1845.

My dear Broadfoot,-Yonr ndcome letter of the 13th nlt. mas
long 011 tho r o d , and longcr still has bcen my delny in n.nsmel*iiig
it. Many thanks for your liilld congratulntions on tho birth of my
youngest daughter. .

..

I have ns perfectly apprehended as i f you had before writtell it,
tho inipossibility of your giving m e any details of the result of your
observation of afTi~irsbeyond the Sutlej. I only wish the Government always to be served in the same spirit of hononrable rescrvo
by its political servants, and that all illy friends, when they tllinlt of
me, may be guided by tho same principle of duty in the first place.
But I venture to hope tllnt you mill visit Simln soon, and tl1ti.t we
shall be able to enjoy long chats d e O T ~ I & W S rebus et qtibzudam
a&, without any rub to the consoience of either. This, I tnlst,
is not so dislant a n espectaLion as that of my esoollent m r d e r
when he said to the Chinese mandarin, Sir, if either business
or pleasure shall ever bring you to the county of Limerick, I
hope wo shall renew our acquaintance nt my country seat at Rathronnn.'
I atn glad the fellow Duriya I<liai~has been c3~zyao-ed.7 I recollect my old Mooftee giving me a description of him nt Jellalabd.
He cnlitrged much on his Afghan virtucs of liberality, courage, a i d
hospitality, and wound up with : ' Oh I he is a noble fellow. I have
scen the man. 1-Ie wears nlmour, and is a regular hero ; and lie
plunders everybody.'
The late fettt of a surprise so sudden ancl bold apponrs to jnstify
Lmrence's character of Tej Singh the Governor, who told mc h e
was one of Lhe best of the remaining Sikh Sidars. When I referred
to Ventura, however, for his cliarncter, the Frenchman shrugged
his shonlders, and said, ' C'est u n aninla1 ! ' Lawronoe, I suppose,
was right.
I am pleascd to hem that my old friends of the Snppers remolnber
me. I am writing at the lable which o m of them made for me, alld
which I always regard on that account ns a piece of furnitilre beyond
piice ; and thereon lies tho writing desk, which mas taken out of
Altbnr's tent, on the morning in which they carried 11isencampment
with me. You must care for tllcm certainly ; h t I trnst, my good
friend, that neitl~erthe duties of cliieftninship, nor any other thing,

' Clq~rTo,a suddcn att:lclc, a surprise.
8 Certain Afghans nre referrcd to,
who wero in Brondfoot's Snppors, and
\v11o,on tho incorporntion of that yogi-

ment with the Bengnl Snppcrs 1.1,r1
;\liners, ref~~sod
to Icnvc thcir lcadcrThey wore Iinown as Brondfoot's
bodygnard, and were wilh him to
tho last.

n d l malie you forget the expediency of providing for the f d n r e whilst
you l~olrlyour present good appointlncnt.
8 ' r Rol~ert"came to u s three or four days ago, looliing ns well
ns ever after a fatiguing dBlt journey ; and desires mo to send you h i s
sincere rcgnrds.
I am glad you thinlt well of the Lieutenant-Go\ie~~ior,
or rather
of Tliomnson ; for I ltnew 11im a s a boy in his father's house nt
Cnlcutta in 1823, nnd augured well of 11in1 thcre. A disnppointn~ent
in such cascs is painful ; nncl therefore I t r i n n q h i n his honcst success in i~fterlife, ns I do in that of Talfourd the lawyer, Sir TV. Norris,
I l s r e the archdencon, nnd Connop Thirlwall, now a bishop ; because
I witnessed the first steps of the career of oll nnd each, and thonght
that they were good. Of solcliers whom I knew nrhen young, old
Horry Smith is the only one who has come nearly up to the marl:
of niy" expect
- a t'1011s.
You are quito right ; in public nffairs, as in matters eternal, t h e
path of popularity is the broad way, and that of dnty the stmight
gate, nnd 'few therc be that enter thereby.' I s l d l have bcen llnlf
n century i n the world if I a m spi~redanotller month, and end i n
opinion where I began. Principles nlone are worth living for o r
s t r i v i ~ ~for;
g and of all the animals, the most ill-jnclging, ungrr~tefuI,
nnd opposed to their own true interests, are men, that is maiilii~~d.
Of thnt racc the best portion are the women, as those of the lords of
the ciention will ever confess whose l ~ e a r t sGod has guided to t~ riglit
choice from nmongst them.
I had intenAcd to mention something which Mnrshmnn wrote
m e about your i\loulmiiin Ctovernment, all ft-tvoumble ; but I have
exceeded due limits, nnd must stop. Hoping soon t o write again,
and to hear from you, I remain, over kc.
H. HAVELOCK.

I n t h e next letter, t h e only p a r t t h a t
remnrlr is
t h a t in which L o r d Ellenborough d l a d e s to Mr. Clerk being
rencly to go t o t h e Yunjab u n d e r certain circumstances. It w i l l
b e shown hereafter t h a t some such proposal mas mndc, but
w a s declined b y t h e Governor-General.
London : Mnrch 7, 1646.

M y dcar 13roadfoot,-i%ny

d~ctnltsfor your letter of Jnnuory 17.
I t is a, great comfort to me to Itnow that you nre on tile frontier
a t this critical juncture. Sir Henry expresses his satisfaction wit11
Snlo, nppnrently.
1 The prnctice of writing slmiqht
for ?LO!, eroolzerl, nnd slmit for nnrrow,
rests mainly on the dictum of Ains1

worth, npproved by Johnson. [N.
Fr. e s h i t ; Lnt. strictus.] ' Extract
froln Jol~nson's DicLiorury, by Dr. R.
G.Lnthnm, vol. ii. part ii. p. 1067.
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your proceediiigs in every letter, and his satisfaction is shared by
Lord Ripon. Depend upon it, I aiu not forgetful of your wishes as
to further brevct rank, and 1I;now well how useful eventually to the
service your ad~m~ceinent
wonlcl be.
I hope another year will elapse before you are compelled to cross
the Sutlej. You will be prepared by that time, and the lapse of time
will malre yonr work easier. I wish I could tliink that your advanco
would not ultimately become necessary.
I n any case it is wise to confine ourselves to nttcmptiag 0110
thing at a timc, and we have now a larger force in Sawuntwnree
tlinn we hud at Cnndahar, and the troops at Sultltur u e not disposable for Mooltan.
I am very glnd to hear that my new road from Delhi to Bnliswulpoor was found practicable by thc Bundelcund Lcgion.
I n the event of your going into the Punjab, I know Mr. Clerk
will be ready at once to proceed thitlier. 13c is entirely at Sir Henry's
disposal for that service, notwithstanding his eventual successioil to
the Council, wliicli he would readily throw over, Most of tlie Surdars
he ltnew are, however, gone. I believe all who were at li'erozporo
are now dead, escept the Palieer Azeezoodcen.
I hope you will take care of your liealtli during tlie hot weather,
for you cannot bo spared. My best wishes will ever attend you.
Yours kc.
ELLENDOROUGH.

Thc c~rentsof t h e time are mentioned in the following
lcttcr from Sir Henry I I ~ r d i n g eto Lord Ellenborough : some
of thcm have heen already described ; h u t thougll repetition
mould be avoided by partial omissions, yet on t h e whole it
seems better to quote the letter in substantial integrity.
Calcutta : March 8, 1845.

My doar Lord Ellenborong11,-Abo~lt 55,000 inen of tlie Silt11
army am before J~uumoo,h a ~ i n gleft nbout 15,000 infantry, and
the greater portion of their artillery ancl cavalry, in the plains around
Lahoise and Umritsur.
The generals were ordered by tho punchnyets not to interfero
with the negotiations n-hich they had commenced on the part of
the army with Raja Golab Singh. Tlieee delegates, selected from
the ranks, exceeding 150 in number, mere most humbly received by
Golab Singh. He laic1 his sword and shield at their feet, aiid
declnred them, as the representatives of the army, to bo his
masters.
Both parties agreed in abusing the Ranee ancl her brothor. 110
u2

2 98

SIR IT. HARDIXGE TO LORD ELLENBOROUGII

cir.

SII

(Golab Singh) contrasted the prosperity of the Sikli State n~lienhis
family were employed, with the misgovernment of a debancl~ecl
\ w ~ n ~ aand
n a brutal brother, who 11nd recently mntilatcd s Bmhmin
by cutting off h i s nose, enrs, and llanils for having obcyed Heera
Singll's order to arrest Llim. H e compnrccl his loyt~,lty,his services,
and his gratitudemith t h e wretched system carried on by the present
rnlers, who would shortly not have b r e d for tlie soldiery. He
promised a gold ring 101. in value to each punclx~yet,and a clonation of 260,0001, for thc army.
They nyplaudeil his discourse. Sweetmeats, and drink, n ~ i d
women mere provided, nnd the clelegntes have bcen mith liim for a
wcek. His own troops are kept distinct; a i d llrtti11g him as the hill
tribes do for h i s severity and extortion, they are SO exnsperated by
the rape of their women and tlie scniidaloos excesses now indulged
in by t l ~ eSilt11 nnny, that their loynlty to Golsb Sing11 is for tho
moment secured by their lintred of the Sikhs.
The result of the ilegotiations is reported to have been an offer
to Golnb Sing11 to trike the ofice of Wuzzeer, which of course lie
has declined in favour of Peshorn Singll, ~ 1 1 01 1 t ~consented to
accept i t provided his c1erncm-I of five or six hends be conceded, particularly thtlt of the slave girl hlunglf~.
He would equally have insisted on the hend of the little Maharilja, but some time ago I desired Broadfoot foimally to declare to
tlle Durbar t h a t if be mere deposed by violence we would not recognise his successor, and mith some strong expressions against the
army this declaration mas conveyed to the Durbar, and, Dro~dfoot
reports, has undoubtedly saved the boy's life for tlle present ; tlle
army having more thnn once declared their readiness to depose him
in faxour of Pesliorn Singh.
The latter has also agreed to the terms of giving 15 rs. n nlonth
to every infantry soldier.
T h e punchayets enlist men;'and tlie army, which had bee11
gradually reduced by IIeera Sin&, has been angmented by the
r\snee and the punchayets by about 9,000 men. The finances must
sliortly fail by the profusions and extortioi~sof all parties to drain
the treasury, aiid the
of power iu the Rnnce to resist.' Ljhe
meditates Bight to our side the Sntlege, but is so weak, and htts so
many treacherous confidants, t.11at her design is ltnomn, and, if
intercepted, [she] mill probably lose her life.
This is the state of things by the last nccouilts ; but I think it
not uidiltely t h a t the army, a t the last moment 11nvingmarched up
"he
finnnces must shortly fnil,
becnuse profusion, nna estortion of
high rntcs of pny for thc soldiers, nre

draining the treasury, ancl tho Rani
is powerless to resist.
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into thc mountains, will not consent to marc11 down again without
receiving tlie donation or the plunder of Jnmmoo. They will not
be so stupid as to 1)e satisfied with words, tlnd are so completely
mitliont restraint that I expect to hear they liave captured Jummoo,
wliich is not strong, and therefore in which place the wily Raja
will not trust himself.
Our protected Silt11 territory begins to feel the effects of what is
passing on the other sidc. I llave not been t~bleto ascertain that
uny inlprcssion has been n l d c on our sepoys. 13roadfoot has thia
mi~tterin hancl. Idnre not write on this subject to the Commanderin-Chief. .
We shall now begin to move up the additional regiments to
Ferozpoor, Loodiana, and Umnbnlla, the' bnrraclrs kc. being nearly
really ; and as the fords deepell, and tho lieat increases, these movements will cause no alarm ; but quielly we shall get tho troops iuto
their proper places.
We shall hovc seven European regiments between Meerut and
the river, and the eighth European regiment at Ayra, wit11 about
seventy pieces of horse artillery aud field batteries vithin the same
distauce, and if the necessity shonld arise, full 40,000 men for field
service, and 100 guns. Durilig the nest s i s lnoilth we hope to get
the whole of our affairs with the protected Silths into better order;
a r d we must be quite certnin of Llieir temper bcfore we loave them
in our rcilr. This luilitary dcmocracy of tho punclmyet system is
most dangerous ; the point of endurunce beyold which it ce~inotbe
tolcratecl has not arrived, and the trinl of attempting to ulaintain a
Silth Government in power must run its conrse, I (10 not thinlt that
any ndrninistrntion or any military chief can regnin nscendency over
the army mailaged by the pui~chsy~ts.A stroug Silth Government,
from its position, its resources, and its religion, is a clesicleratum
nrliicli, I fear, is unattainable; and when the firlances fail, this Silik
people, or in other words this Silt11 army, will relapse into the rude
state of their grandfathers, fiom which they only emergcd fifty years
ago, and to which they will have no objection to return.
But as regards the policy of this qnestion, there can be no doubt
thnt it is an easier, a simpler, nncl more decisive mode of denling
with them, to cripple and subdue tllcm us an army rather than to
do tho sanie thing agninsL hordes of Pinilnries kc.
Indian policy and European feeling will become each day more
diflicult to reconcile ; but being pretty well prepared for any event

..

9 Menns appnrently, the Govornmcnt cannot bc strong, becnuse (1) i t
is coutrolloii by pnnohngnts ; (2) fillancinl I~rilurois i n ~ ~ u i n e nnnd
t ; (3) its

religion is democrntio.
This word is Boublful in tho
originnl.

'
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nt this scason of the year, me have only to wait tEe progress of
e ~ e n t sand
, act nccordingly.
Nnpier has, with his chnracteristic energy, clone everything that
co~~lcl
be performed in his late expedition. The capture of their'
floclrs may mahe them more cautious in giving us oficnce. At the
same time it is apparent that these Parthiuns of the desert cannot
be cungllt or their atrocities pnnisl~ed; we shall probably be ablc to
come to terms with them, ancl I am expecting to hear from him daily.
The Samunt Wnrree expedition lins given us more trouble than
it ought. The forts w e very strong, the rnvines steep, a d the
jungles on their sides almost in~pructicablc. Col. Outram vclnntee& his services when recallecl &in Colnpoor : they were accepted.
Hc nws placed a t the hend of 1,000 men, and certainly tlie boldness,
energy, and perseverance with n~liiclilie conclucted his operatioi~s
are 1% ~nerlteclcontrast to the feebleness ancl folly of the other corniilrmclers of the columns ordered to co-operate with him.
Sir G. Arthur has tl~crcforeofl'erecl liini Sattarit ; Col. Owns,
after his exposure nt Punnlla, having rcsignecl. I see Napier is
surprised and annoyed. He was thnnied for storming the breach
at Punnlln. I refused to do so on the ground that, being in a politicnl ollicc, he llad no right to expose his life ; 'mcl the oficers of
tho army, who had had d l the fng of the siege, ought not to haye
rival Uayilrds nrhen there nlns no military necessity for thc display
of his courage. I am a t the end of my sheet.
Pours kc.
H. HARDINGE.
The Silih army, exnsperntecl by the successful treuchcry
of Gnlab Singh, mere encnmpccl in the immediate neighbourhood of Jammu. That city, the cnpitt~lof thc liaja's dominions,
I L I ~still tllc political ciipitnl of the Kashmir and Jnmrnu
state, is beautifully situated on the right bank of the river
Tnvi or Tawi, in the ontermost range of the lower I-Iimnll~yn.
I t milinlg depends on the Tnwi for watcr, and both to\vn and
fort, separated from each other by the rirer, are commanded
by a n adjacent height. Between the little river ancl the plains
is n, belt of thick wood, outside of \vhich is the Tillu innlr.
Tho hill men held t h e town and the belt of wood; the Sikhs
ocunpiecl the stony ploins beyond, which in the month of
h h r c h , and indeed gcnernlly, except during the wet season,
art! dry, and n o t agreeable as a camping ground.
Want of water made the Silths attack the hill men ; after
a stnbbornly contested fight, which lasted eight hours, nncl i n
which thc lci~clcrof tlie I d 1 trool~swas slain, thc clefe~clers
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mere driven from the river, the tanlr, anel the outer jungle.
I t only rcmained to seize a srnall fort which commn~lcledthe
approach to Jammu, to make certain of the capture of the
city. The garrison of this fort sent out men to negotiate its
surrender. But, instead of completing thcir victory, the Sikh
leaders returned to camp, leaving their troops to follow as they
pleased. The latter, after resting from the fiitigue of fighting,
pillaged thc neighbourhoocl, ' committing such atrocities that
many wornen having lost caste threw themselves into wclls,
and othms to avoid dishonour were clestroyed by theh fathers,
husbands, or brothers.'
The hill men in the mean timc 1.eoccupied all the p o u n d
they had lost, except the tanlr nnd lower part of the river.
On the second night they attacked, with grcat vigonr, the
camp of Sart1a.r Shnm Singh, Btariwnla, captured two guns,
and were on thc eve of complcte victory, when that chief
dismounled from his elephant, rallied his men, recovered the
guns, and repnlsecl the hill troops with loss.
By degrees the discomforts of the situntion, and the want
of any material success, spread discouragement amongst the
Silths; ancl made thcrn, in consequence, more disposed to
entertain h j t b Gulab Singh's owrtures for negotiation. The
report of a doubtful battle b e t ~ e e nRatnu, the Raja's waxir,
and Sarclar Rnnjar Singh, corlfirmecl this feeling ; nncl the panchnyats eagerly accepted the Raja's terms. I t is nnneocssiwy to
cor~siderthem, for neither party had any intention of abiding by
them, when inconvenient, or when they could be evacled.
The news of n reconciliation between the Sikh lenders and
Raja Gulab Sing11 ~v,zsvery unwelcome to the Dnrbar at
Lahore. The Rtmi ancl her brother feared the immediate
return of the troops, from whose detestccl presence they had
enjoyed temporary relief. Snrdar Jnwahir Singh a t once sent
to Raja La1 Singh, the commander of the Silt11 nrmy, an
agent, who was entrusted with orders desiring the prompt abrogation of the treaty, the seizure and trnnsmission to Lahore
of Gulab Singh's hoslages, and the capture of Jammu.
The hostages rtppealecl to the panchaynts, who, ~vithout
hcsitation, couductecl them in safety to Jammu. Then the
S a r d a r ' ~message was dcbated. Aftor a stormy discussion the
mcsscnger mn8 clefiircd to retnrn to his master, to inform him
that hu mas unfit to govern, and would be spccdily removcd
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froin office, when he wonld be at liberty and have leisure to
cnpturc Jnmrnu himself. This mcssnge iillecl the Snrilar with
terror. Yhe Sikh8 retired about five miles from the town,
and their lenders met Gulab Singh, halfwny between the two
armies, in a garden near the Tillu tank, to arrange matters.
The Raja, with his hands folded and a sheet thrown over his
neck ils n suppliant, stood before the chiefs and professed sorrow for
his offences, leaving punisllment or fol.givoness in their I~auds.
They assured him that lle had committed no offence, and after
cxchangii~gprosonts and conversing us friends for above an hour,
t h y separated.
By the time the leaders had returned to thc anny, n,
chnnge had come over the spirit of that unruly body. When
told that pence had been concludecl, and that they must return to Lahore, they answcred ' that anyone who chose might
go, but that they would not stir,' R decision which caused a s
great dismny iu Jammu as their reported return had caused
in Lahore.
But if there was disinny in Jnmmu, it was not felt by the
Raja to such nn extent as to pnrnlyse his energy. Thc day
after thc interview he arri\lccl in the Silth camp with but a
slender escort. The bolc1nt.s~of the step commai~cledthe ndmirntion of the troops, who, for a, moment, saw in him the
only possible reformer of thc Lahore Government.
' At t h e Durbm the news caused terror, suspending even
the drunkenness and buffoonery of the Holee," which Sarclar
Jonnhir Sing11 had carried to nil excess unltnown before,'
and offensive to n court not remnrlrkble for decency. Bnt the
army mas very ficltlc, ; the n e w of some slight succcss gniacd
by Siwtlar Rnnjur Singh banidled the favourable imlnxssion
made by Gnlnb Singh, a i d he bccnme ~irtuallya prisoncr in
their hancls. His position was extrenlely critical, :ml snch na
to demand thc exercise of all his skill and resource.
Whilst the Punjnb mns in this disturbed state, Brondfoot
enclcavonred to prevent disorder from scrionsly affecting the
protected states. In a lctter to Lord Ellenborough, dated
Zira, Marc11 19, 1845, he wrote :
I-loli, t h e spring festival or cnrnivnl, in honour of Krishnn rund tho
~ilillmmids,Lhe most uoticenblc! fcutore

being the sprinltling of n red powder
over spectntors, und singing obscone
R O I I ~ S . See Pule's Cilossary, 11. 323.
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I have been for some time trying to restore something like order
in this part of the country, and not, I hope, entirely without success ;
but confusion in tho Punjab will always prevent entire tranquillity
on our side of the river.
Sir Charles Napier is showing tho Relochees how little formidnble they and their hills are to our troops when rightly led. He
has been very successful, a t which I rejoice on every account. I t
will tend greatly to tranquillise upper Sin&
On tliis frontier all youy plans are cnrriod out, and mith perfect
success, hitherto a i d prospectively. If I cannot help wisl~ingyou
had been here to guiclo tho asecution, it is not from m y want of
~iinclnesston~ardsma on tll0 p r t of Sir Henry Hardinge, for that
11~sbeen nlinosl equal to your own, Nor has ho adopted, as far RS
I ci~nsee, yonr policy ill this qunrter by halves: all his measnros
seem to me tllosc which you wo~ilclyourself have adopted under the

.

The follon~ingc s t r a c t i~ from a letter of t h c GovernorGeneral to L o r d Ellenl~orough:
Calonttn : i\Inrch 22. 1845.

Rly deer Lord Ellonborougli,-As I told you in illy last note, so
it has happenecl, thnt tlle negotiations hnving been closed by Golab
Sing11 consenting to make the pay~nents,th8 army sent TTalieelsto
receive tlie money; they received four lacs as an instidinent, and a
short dist<wcefrom Juminoo were wnylaicl ancl deliberntoly murdered
by Golab Singli's orders. The money mas brought back to Jummoo.
The army then closed up, and some fighting has tali011 place,
but mith no important result; and if t h e Sikh army find the mlclertaliil~gmore difficult than they expected, they will probably again
resort to negotiation, each party, by h u c l and crime, trying to betray
the other.
At Ldlore everything goes on as usual. Gross dobrtuchery and
drllnlten brutality, i n which Jovuhir Sing11 liilled one of his servnnts tho other day. No prospect of any successor of Ruiijeet
Singh's energy and mind ; and no hope of ally government ever
regnilling the ascendency over this republicall army, so edmirably
organised for successful mutiny and t h e iildulgeilce of licentious
crimes.
13rondfoot is doing good service. I am sorry to say -was in
-'s
hands ; nncl I hear that my letter clesiriiig it to be unclerstood
~ i l dpointed out to the lit~jas,that your foreign policy was to bc
uilchaiiged, nevcr was communicated, and that tliis lieutennnt h a
bcoil taking a latitude and power whicli, if i t be prove& will induce
irie to renlove liiln ilniuediately. I-le is n perfect Sikh ; but tlic

-
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major will sooil put our nfiairs to rigl~ts; and, in an opposito quarter,
I linve the pleasure to report that Durand continues to give full
setisfu,ction and is very hnppy.
H. .&RDING~~.
ALout the very time that the preceding letter was writLen,
thore occurred the first serious violation of our frontier. It
was serious, not from the strength of the party which crossed
the Stitlej \vithont leave, but from thc fact that it was a
deliberate attempt to ascertain whether me were in earnest a8
regarded recent ~varningsaddressed to the Darbar.
Broadfoot was in camp at Zira, a considerable plnce on
the old road from Luclhiana to Firozpur, ~vhen the news
reached him that a party of Silrh cavalry had crossed the
river and talrcn up a, position nt Talwandi, a village near
I-Inrilre patan "ncl
no1 far from SoLmon, where the great
battle was afternlnrcls fonght.
I-Ie sent ofi at once to ascertain the strength and position
of the party ; summoned the Val~il,who being in total ignornnce of the matter could give no esplanntion ; and informud
the officer commanding H.BI.'s 62nd Regiment, then in camp
at Kot Isa Khan, distant about sixteen miles.
At midnight, having heard that the party consisted of
about 200 horsemen of the Lahore army, ancl two officers,
Broadfoot sent the Valiil to them to cause their return, and told
hiill that unless news of their departure by claybrcalc was received, he mould move his camp to the spot, aud recommended
that all should be settled before he arrived.
In the morning no news came, and the detachment which
formed the Agent's escort marched ; just as Broadfoot WLS
about to join them, one of the Silrh party came ancl showed
him an order from Sarclar Hire Singh,' brother of the Rnni,
directing the keeper of the ferry to pass the party across the
Sutlej.
He said that their destination was Kot Kapoorn ; but he professed
readiness to return if I demanded it.
I directed him to inforin those who had sent him, that warning
Hurike (Hareelre),ferry or ford.
It is situnted where the road from
Amritsar to Zira, Dlmarmkot, and
Ludhiana orosscs the Sutlej a little

below its junction with the Beas.
' Not to be confounded with Rnjn
Hirn Singh, the often mentioned
Wnzir.

CII. XII

BROtlDFOOT'S RESOLUTE ACTION

299

having long since been given that armed parties crossing the river
without permission mould be destroyed, I recoininended thein to
settle with the ~ e m i n d a r s ,and
~ recross boforo the detncliinent errived ; and I ~varnedthem that they would not be allowed to cross
till compcnsation was made for the plunder of the evering.
When Broadfool nrrivcd n t the village, h e found the party
gonc, and no compensation paid. He therefore followecl at
ouce with the irregular horse of t h e escort, nncl at tho rivcr
was met by the Valtil, who was profuse in excuses in order to
givc the parly time to escapc.
I therefore pushed on to the water's edge, where tho sowarsD
wero hastening their embarkation : i t would linve been easy to
destroy or capture the whole party; but on coming near them 1
perceived that they were of the best description of Cihorcharra,l
i ~ n dtherefore in all probability sent, as they said, by tho Darbnr, or
rather by that portion of it which does not favour the Eliglisll
alliance. I t seemed desirable, therefore, to do no more t h m was
necessary to col~vince the Darbar that if t h y sent their troops
across Ll~efrontier without leave, they put them into the position of
criminals whoso releasc was i~ matter of clemency.
I n and near one boat were t h e leaders. This party I desired to
give themselves up, nnd, on their refusal, warned them that they
would be destroyed if they resisted. As they would not surrender,
I ordered o w cavalry to seize and disarm them, without using force
unless resistance w&e made. The order was executed
nnd
with as little confusion a n d violence as can in such cases be expected.
I heard only one shot. which 1believe was fired by mistake, and it
is doubtful whether it took etfect.
Having secured the leaders, I directed the rest of tho party to
be suffered to recross unmolested, and carried tlie prisoners immediately to the neighbouring village.

I n t h e evening t h e villagers attended, a n d t h e damage
clone by t h e horsemcn was assessed a n d paid. T h c horses
mc1 m n s wcre then restored, a n d t h e prisoners were made
over to t h e Vakil, who was instructed to pass t h e m across t h e
river.2
Their leadcr was B a b a Bishan Singh, Bedi, who soon
Z a w i d t ~cultivator
,
holding villnge lands.
Smucir, horsemnn.
I G'I~urcl~a~)a,
irregular cnvalry.

From n memorandum ltindly
furnished by him, it appcnrs thnt Mr.
R. N. Cust, Personnl Assistnnt to tho
Agcnt, was prosent on this occnsion.
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fratcrnised with the Agent, ancl franlily confessecl that he
Irncw their action was contrary to rule; bnt such was the state
of thellarbar, that a man coulcl only save himself from insult "
by doing what he knew to Le wrong. That Diwan Dinanath
was the only wise man left ; but, he saicl, ' amidst ten fools a
single vise man Qecomes idso foolish.' The Bedi repeatedly
saicl, ' The men of this clay clo not Iinow, that without p a c e
and frieuclship with the English we cannot stand. They will
force on n quarrel, mid then what mill they clo? .Others who
are miser, are forcecl to join ancl will perish with them, for nrc
also arc Khdsa.'
The 13edi was right, and tllc noble cleat11 at Sobraon of
S~lrdarSham Siugh, forced by the taunts and jeers of the
R m i to oppose the English, against his better jnclgment, is an
apt illnstmtion.
In reporting thc occurrei~ccjust cletailecl, Broaclfoot remarlied that thc forbearance shown ~voulclprobably be misunclerstood, ancl ascribed to any cause saw the true one.
Thc Governor-General expressed entire approval of the
Agcnl's proceedings. H e was iu somc doubt as to thc object
of sending the party across withont leavc, and thought it
might be in orcler to test our state of preparation to prevent
crossing, or perhaps the result of an intrigue to compromise
some party with tlic Govcnlment.
In reporting the matter for the information of the English
Government, he reunrlred that <Major Bronclfoot behavcd
with great firmness and jitdgrnent in the mntter,' and that
all his proceedings on the occasion, and his letters to the Valcil
and Dsrbar, were approvecl.
The Home Government concurred with the Gover~~ment
of
India 11s to the propriety of the Agent's concluct. The act
nrns llelcl to be, on the part of the Darbar, :ul improper one,
opposed to existing practice, and a striliing esample of the risk
of collision which might at any moment arise on the soullz
side of the river, as long as the Lahore Government was i n
such a, state of anarchy nnd conf~lsion. If the GovernorGenerd consiclcrccl that other incursions were likely t o be
made, he was authorised to notify to the 34ahartija's Government that such acts could not be tolerated ; that the ailarchical
"he

chpicssion he usod I S I L ~ ' ' i ~ z ~b~chillii.'
lt

s t a t e of his Governlncnt llacl long been a, source of inconvenie n c e nnd annoyance ; that i n consequence EL large force hatl
t o be liept on the frontier; that those friendly relations to
~ ~ 1 1 i c SO
l 1 grcnt value was attached, mere endangered ; and that
t o t h e goocl faith of the British Governmcnt and to its ~ ~ l p p o r t ,
it w a s probable that Duleep Sing11 owed his lsosition as &,Ilaif not his life ; but that tllc British Government mere
ljonncl t o protect their own subjects nnd clependmts, and conl(1
=lot w~fllertheir interests to be imperilled l)y tllc incapacity of
t h e Lnllore Government to control its turbulent army.
T h e Governor-General was further nnthorised to administer
t h e Maharaja's cis-Sutlcj estates, and to forbid the Lahore
authorities, civil or military, to cross the river for any purpose of
:~cln~inistration
whatever. I t was consiclered that this mcasnre,
l ~ c i n gnncler the circnlllstances one of strict necessity and sclfclefence, could bc no act of hostility or aggression on our part.
\J%cn Broadfool was nppointecl Agent, he wrote homc for
an estensive outfit, plate, cliim cEc. kc., on a scale vllich
provecl h e was in nccd of the warning addressed to llim in
~1,zvcloclr'slast letter, to pro~iclenom for the luture. Though
strict cconomisl as regardccl Government money, he .nw
cnrclcss, and by nature generous and extravagant, au rcgarclecl
his own. Hc was aware of this, and his time mas fully occnp i e d with Go~rcrnmcntwork, which is to some extent an excuse ;
iiz m a n y of his private letters he alludes to thesnbject, alnrays
g o i n g t o save money, but somehow ncver doing so. His
iclcics nrere large, and may partly be gathered from the followillg letter to his aunt, Miss Sntherland.
Camp, Zeern : April 4 , 1845.

Your lettcr of February 7 and dl tho hills hnva just arrived;
a n d on looking over tho lists of all the fine things I feel like a little
b o y mitll ii. new coat. Seriously I have no doubt tllnt everything
w i l l bc esactly what I wanted, a d I hope yon mill believe how
greatly I nm obliged to yon.
The sun1 is large, and with freight, cnrringc kc. froin Bombay,
allother 1002. mill be added at least. Yet when they reach me they
w i l l be better in cvery way than I codd hive collected in this
conntry for 1,0002. or 1,2002., allld they are not superfluities, but
m a t t e r s of necessity.
1 be]iolrc I haw told you that I roccive here 1,0002. n, year more
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than I did in Mnulmnin ; but here, as there, I nm obliged Lo ltcep open
house for all comers of a certain rauk t h t choose, and all of tho
liighcst mnli hononr me, as a matter of course, with their coinpany
as guests. When tho people are agreeable it is plcasiznt enough, and
in every case it is a s n~ucllwhat I am paid for as the work amidst
wl~icliyour letter finds mo, and from which I talre n momcnt to
nnsmer. There is far more company to be seen here than i n Maulmnin, but i n many respects this is n cheaper country. I n i\laulmain
it would have been difficult to save money ; here, once I am set up,
I hope to save the estra 1,0001. a year.
I vish you could come ont and lreep house for me ; I sliould then
Imve the ndvnntage of n married man, s h J 1 I wiclredly say, nGtliont
being plagued with a wife? Tlmt mould be profane, so I only sny
the admntage, which is that people do not c011sider the house of a
married man a hotel, except iurnre cases of men of the highest rank.
I have been mach amused at seeingfrills ; where arc they worn ?
ronnd the neclr like Qucen Elizabeth, or the wrists lilre Qucen
Anne's courtiers, or on the breast as in the days of the Prince
Regent and dandies ? See n-hnt nil nntediluvian I shnll be reckoned
wl~enI retnrn ; yet it sceme but yesterday since I was among yon.
I nm encamped here waiting for the results of a strugglc at
Lahore for the government, which mils possible yestorday mil nmy
happen to-day; and I believe here is an express from that I m d of
uproar, which must lnnlte me close this. I t is an express, but no
actual fighting as yet.
E a r l y in April the Agent wrote a long and exhaustive report on t h e old trcaties and pnperx which contained information regarding the relations of thc Protecled States t o t h e
Government of India. He considered it to be estnblishecl t h a t
t h e Lahore cis-Sutle,j property was a s much a protected S t a t e
as a n y othcr, a n d t h a t the Sntlej was, and always had Been
since the time of tho I h h r a t t a s , considered as the boundary
between t h e countries under the Sikh and those unclcr t h e
Indian Governments.
It will be recollected that t h e Sikh army was' on its way
t o Lahore from Jammu with Raja Gulab Singh, vir1;ually a
prisoner. H e appears to have employed his time during the
march i n endeavouring by promises and prescnts to crcste a
party favourable to his interests. The solclicrs were divicled
in opinion as to v h c t h c r hc or Sardm Jawahir Sillgh should
be supported. Against l l ~ e16ttcr were his drunlienncss, in-
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cqacity, and the itnprobnbilily of his being able to fulfil his
promises. Against tlie former merc the fear of being reduccd
to obedience, the l~elicf in his implacable hntred of the whole
Silrh sect on account of the murder of his relations, his avarice,
and duplicity.
On April7 t h e n a j a wns brought into Lahore as a prisoner,
seated on a n elephanl, wit11 his face covered with a cloth to
conced him from the soldiers who crowded to sce him. H e was
lodged in Iiunwar Nno Nihnl Singh's house, and a guard was
plncccl to prevent him from escaping or committing suicide.
During April, Bronclfoot marched nbont t h e districts, held
the sessions, and tried locnl cases. In Capt. P. Nicolson's
diary, the Agent's arrival at Firozpur on Saturday, April 12, is
recorded. He is said by Nicolson to have aiclcd him 'in screwing justice out of Manclot,' Fariclltot, ancl other States, and did
much good. H e left again on Friday, the 18th, seemingly
bcttcr satisfied with, and having more confidcncein mc, than he
started nlitli as his stock-in-trade on setting up i n this qnarter.'
The following letter to Lord Ellenborongh shows a trait in
Broaclfoot's character too often m n l i n g where it should be
found ; namely, a, generous appreciation of assistance rendered
to him, and a n endeavour to procure its recognition by higher
authority.
Loodeeana : April 21, 1845.

My Lord,-I am about to take a liberty, ~vhich,even wit11 yonr
Lordship, I almost fear inny be thought too great; yet, as it is done
solely on public grounds, I hope it mill be forgiven.
By a letter from Cnpt. Wm. Smith, lately in command of the
Siren,' I gather that he has not, as he hoped, been promotecl on
linnling clown his pennant ; he does ]lot inenlion it, and hence I
conclnde he has bccn disappointed. Now, 1fool sure I;hat had yonr
Lordship remained with us till he \vent lloiue, some such espressioil
of your opinion of liis services would have bee11 given as mould
linve secured him his posting. This, I Itnow, mas also Capt. Smith's
own fooling, for when he returned from Calcuttn, afler just seeing
your Lordship there, 110 plainly felt, lilco tlie rest of us, that lie
mns at lenglh working under the eyes of a ninster who mould not
leave exertion unnoticed, and he worked accordingly.
You may remember that when I was first sent to Tenasserim,
n river flotilla hnd to be reformed under discouraging circumstmces ;
that it nras reformed with success, and that me mere tlierciil nlucll
f

Pronounced Mnmdbt or bIumdoLo.

indebted to the zenlons ancl active co-operntion of Cnpt. Smith, alioso
loon1 esporience ~nadeliis professiond slzill of double vnlue. As I
mas then in charge of those provinces, it seelns my duty to ineution
this to you, not with n request that yon will adopt nny specific
measure ; I know well that n thousand things may exist to make it
difficult for you to move in such a matter, but I mention i t becnuso
I Iil~ow,if opportunity offers, you will see justice done, for justice it
is. Smith is distinguished in the navy from his many nan~esakos
as ' Ynrdurrn ' Smith, that being the chnnnel by \vliich lie boardoti
tho ' Chesnpealro ' under Cnpt. Urolre. H e took home tho flag and
got his lieutenancy. In the Burmese mar he got his coi~imaiidership for commnndin~the light division of gunbonts which acconipnnied thc army from P e p ; ancl it mas expectcd that at the peace
he would hnvc been posted, but by somo ~zcciclenthc WLS omitted,
nncl lie remnins a commnander. He fully expected his step on retnraing, and I grieve to find he does not sny he has got it. I a m
sure I sllnll be forgiven for mentioning it, maliing no request, nnd
not intimating to Capt. Smith that I have done so.
At Lahore, singular uncertainty prevails as to the future, that is
nmorig the actors tliomselves. Rajah Coolab Singh was, up to
yesterday morning, still a prisoner, though he had been presenled
a t tlle Durbar. Sometimes the troops spoke of making him millister.
sometimes of allowing the Durbar to extract money from him by
torture.
The brother nnd the lover of the Ranee head rival factions of
the chiefs, and attend D u r h in arms. Anywhere else a convulsion must hnve long since happened ; but all are so entirely at the
mercy of the soldiery, that a movement among the latter cnusos all
differences among the chiefs to be forgotten in the common fear.
An attempt was lately mnde to assert by force the right of
sencling troops across the Sutlege from the Punjab without leave.
Foreseeing this, I hnd, with the approbation of the GovernorGenernl, forinallymerned tliein of the consequences, and strengthened
my escort. They seat over 200 horse as m nclvanced party 0110
evening lately, and the following morning they werc turned out
after putting "lie commnndant into confinement, till lie restored
his plnnder. I the11 called on the Durbar for esplanation, and,
after much debating, some bluster, nnd many nrtifices, a full apology
and proniise of good behaviom for the future nre hefore nle for
trs~isinissionto Government.
There are, l~omcvcr,mnny embnrrassin~circumstances attenc1illg
t l ~ o i rcis-Sntlege territory. I have got ovor a good m m y of tllern
"eons

'after I lml put ' &c.
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for the moment, but I see little prospect of any permanent arrangcrr~cutof a mtisfactory kind in tho present state of the court and
nrlny of Lnhorc.
Ilelieve me kc.
0. BXOADSOOT.
I n writing to his sistw," who nppcars t o have seen somc
paragraphs in a paper abusing his Tenasscrim administration,
Brondhot rema,rlrcd :
You mi stool^ me in Iliinlting I n.ns restrnined fro111 ncmspnpcr
writing by being Commissioner ; it is Ly being in the Company's
service ; and mhilc I am so, I must, like other public moll in I~ndin,
bc abused by thoso who choosc to do SO,without power of 3efence.
11 is mlpleosnnt, buL cannol be helpoil.
I hnvo no author brother nt h o ~ l e like
,
my neiglibour Sir C.
Napicr, to clefcnil me nrllen I cannot defonil myself; and if I hncl,
I doubt if I would enter into controversy. My time and temper
moulcl be espended on every unscrnpalous rogue my duty malies Inc
na iinpediment to in his crooltcd progress. 011the whole, I believo
the best p l m is to hold on my may, nncl let tl~elnpelt on.
I11 my present situation I inny nnd probably shall be nbusccl, but
I cannot help it. I t may do me mischief, bnt nothing lilte what I
fear the mere fact of my being a soldier and not a civil ser\wd will
do. So much for the press.

When the Agenl's demnnd for explnnation of t h e recent
violation of the frontier, and h i s conscquent action, weremade
known in Darbar, the generals a n d others present were vcry
angry ; thcy predicted that h e woulcl change his Lonc when t h e
troops returncd from Jammu, a n d recommcncled t h a t t h e
reply be deferred till then. iYlcnntime they referred tho
Agent's letter to Fakir Aaizuddin a n d D h a i R n m Singh, who
declared its contents to be in conformity with justicc and with
existing l r c i ~ t i ~ snnrl
,
they ndviscd nnqunlified mbmission.
This ntlrice was not follomccl, a ~ m~roply
d alyenrs to have been
sent couched i n language very cliflc'crent h o r n tho u s u d style.
1l 1h e increasing probability of ultimatc rupture
wiLL thc
Sikhs, occasioncrl 1)y somc nct of violcncc on their l)nrl, bronght;
the qnostion of our rc!lnl,ions wil11 l h c ])rolcctccl Silili stntcs
into prominence. Thc hgcnt ~~cmnrltccl
t l ~ a from
t
Oclderlol~y's
time to the Kabul clisastcrs t l ~ protcotcd
e
cllicfs mere governed
Lottcr dntcd April 21, 1845.
Nujor-Gon. Sir Uizvid Oohtcr-

lony, Bnrl., G.C.G. A rlarno g r e ~ l l y
rrrsl~calcil ill Lhc Pur~jttb. H C \WS
S
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by;tll fi firm hnnd ; thosc clisnstcrs ~lloolrLhe bclicf in our invincibility, nnrl tho chiefs began t o think that their relative
pO"tio~~with us was changed.
Othcr cvcnts, discnssion
in the press regarding them, nncl a, spirit of concession from
tillliility which they thought lhey saw in our dedings wilh
tllcnlscl\m and with Lahore, strc~~gthencil
the impression.
Disorder nt Lahore removccl all fcnr from Chat qnarter, n11c1
tho British powcr was regarded rntber as an irlisome restraint
than a n&ome prolection. Them were also embnrrnssmeilts
which attended the clonblc allcgiancc of certain chiefs, likely to
become more serious as disorder in lhe Punjnb incrcasccl;
rind the complici~tionwas nol lessened by the posilion of the
IIahnrajn himself-an inilependent sovereign on one side of
tho rivcr, n subject on the other..
In Lahorc, Raja La1 Singh and Sardar Jamahir Singh,
forgetting that Gnlab Singh v a s ,z prisoncr in the hanils of
thc army, and that coi~seqnentlyt h y llail no power over him,
orilcrcd him to appear nt their Dnrbar. Gnlab Bingh, with
great reailiness, tnrileil t l ~ ccircumstmlcc to imrncilintc account ; he told thc messengcr t h a t he couIil givc no answer,
nnd sending for the guard plncccl over him, explnineil whnlhad happened ; ' and begged, as hc n7ss the servant of tho
nrmy and not of tlic Dnrbar, t h n t thc pancl~ayatsof Che troops
wonlil inslrnct him what ansn7er to give.' The pnnc11ayaCs
rcbnltcil thc Darbnr and declared Gnlah Sing11 to bc tllc chicf
personage, after Lhe Unhnrnja, i n thc Statc ; they fnrther said
thnt, as f i ~ as
r Snrdar Jawahir Sing$ \\-as conccrncd, hc nccd
not attend thc Dnrbnr, but lhat hc should wait on thc Mnliarnjn n~idRani nt thcir coi~venieilcc. I t is said thnt on promising to l)ilJ727,00,000 rs. (which at par is 270,0001.) Gnlab
Sing11 mas formally ~ e att libertjr.
nppointcd to thc E.I.C.S. in 1777, ngninst nnnjit Singh i n Ihc cis-Sutlcj
nnd scrvctl iu thc \vnr wit11 Ilnidar All,
stntcs, nnd in MOO occupicd Ludhi611n
1?81. IIc was ~ o ~ ~ n dand
o d tnlccn
ns Political A ~ c n t .
prisoncr nt Cuddalore, 1763, when the
Ilis serviccs in thc Ncpitl wnr
Pronch rcgimcnts wcrc rcpolscd by the
(181-4-16) wcrc vcry cmiucnt, and
2 lth N.I. Hc nost servcd throughout
grerrlly conduacd to i t s successful
tho hInr:tll~nwnr, lSO:I, nnd nn.; nftcrissoc; for thcsc IIC wnn crcntcil n
wnl~lsappoinlcd llcsitlont nt thc Court
buronct, reccivcil n pension of 1,0001.
01 Dclhi. I n 1804 hc dcfcnded that
n ycnr, and wns mnde G.C.D.
city nyainsr Holbnr's nnny, till relicvcd
I n 1893 hc wns Rcsident in nIiil\vil
by Lord Lake. I n 1803 hc c o n ~ ~ n u ~ ~ c l ac nd d lh'ijputicnn, and he died in 1823.
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In the following lettcr from Lord Ellcnborough two 1)oinLs
1\41 be noticed : first, tllnt if war should h e n l r out h e trusted
tlic command of our forces n70uld bc given t o Sir C. N a l ~ i e r;
and second, the advice hc gave Broadfoot nu t o prepnrntion
nnd attention to detail.
London : U s y 7, 1845.

i\ly dear Broadfoot,-A grent many thanks for your letter of
Miarc11 19, ~vhicliI received to-day. Our frionds on Llle othor sido
of the Sutlcj have been doing appnrently d l we could dosire, or
ncnrly so ; but still, I fear, they will bo alarmed by t l ~ ccloso neighbourl~oodof so many of our troops, and l d i e u p tllcir quarrels if
they can. The niove~uentof the body guard is porlentous, and it was
unnecessary.
I do ~ o think
t
your force snfely placed if there were reason to
npprchcnd an attaclc from Lahore mcll directed ; but an attaclc is
become very improbable. I do trust Sir C. Napier will be brougllt
up to you if there should be a forward movement a l any tinlo. Ilow
beautifully lie has managed the c a m p e i p in tho hills !
I conclude you have ascertained what force the several protcctod
Silt11 sthtes can really furnish, and made, in your own mind, arrangemonts for the safety of tho co~~~rnui~ications
of t h c army from tllo
Sutlcj lo the J u u n a , in lhe e ~ e n of
t a forward move~i~eut.Sir Cj.
N;~pieris very anxious to have established a regular baggage tmill.
I had i n l c d e d lo have this. If you do not turn ovcr in yonr ~ l i i l d
all thc dctail, doyend upon it no one will. You are the only person on the fionticr to whom the Governor-Gencral can saMy IooIi ;
and you shoul~lnot hesitate to give him your opinion upon allpoinls
of service. I trnsl your health is ro-ostablisliod.
Yours kc.

ELL~NBOROUGH.

jast b c l o ~ ,nnd n h o both owed to nroadfool thcir seleclion
for civil cmploymcnt. Lilltc h n m c one of his Assistnnts;
Edmnrdcs wt~si ~ o tnppointcd till after thc iirst Silch wnr, a s
lliere mas 110 wcancy bcforc. i\Ir. T1. N. Cust, who nas
Broadfoot's Persoilnl Assistant and lived in the honse ~ v i t h
hiin, has remarked : ' N:~in S111~11,the faithful servnnt, was
iunjor-domo; d l his f r i c d s and guests are dead excel)t
saundcrs Abbot1 and me.'
The news from Lahore townrds the end of May is i n k resting to a student of Asiatic mclhods of intrigue. The
Rani, h n ~ i n g;~,ppnrentlyhegun to tmireof Raja La1 Singh, nppearcd disposed to fnwnr her brother Sardnr Jawnliir Singh's
prctcnsions to guide the policy of the Stata. I h j n Gulab Sing11
siclcd first with one, nnd thcn with t l ~ cother ; on which Lnl
Singh, becoming disconlenled, absented himself from Dnrbizr
for some clays, and held mectings in his own honse with others
who were similtzrly dissntisficd. Gnlnb Sing11 amilecl himself
of this defection with much ndroitness, and t u r i ~ e dthe circumsl:mx to his onn acconnt.
Abo11t the same time there was a sever0 outbreak of
cholera in the Punjab, and it spread by degrees to our pro~linccs. I t is open to question whether we are now much bettcr
inforineil as to the nature of this discase, or more able to treat
it sncccssfnll~,t11an we were then. The Governor-Gcneral,
in expressing his anxiety lest it might spread, bnsecl his hope
for its arrest 011 ' atmospheric influences which seem, uncler
l'rovidence, to affect this mysterious disease.'
One result of the outbreak was to do thnt which thc Dorbnr
couldi~oteffect ; ni~mely,to restrain the turbulence of the army.
As a n:~tivecorrespondent graphically described it to Broadfoot, ' the soldiers have becomc as sheep, and the fcar of God
is before their eyes; on account of tho cholera they now
commit no violence.'
Thc Darbar wished to destroy Peshora Singh, and went
a s a body to the troops to make theproposnl. Thc pnnchaynts
told them that thc rnattcr was one for the Khnlsa to clcnl
with, : ~ n dwholly beyond their province. Janahir Singh,
" i\lcmornnrlurn by l\lr.Cnst. X o \ t
of Lhc c u e s l s uro 11mV (1S87) dcnd, 1x11
not nll; Sir J. C . I3ro1r11, lor cs.unplc.

Col. H. Ynlc, C.B., also was 1111 occasional guest, and thore muy ho
others.
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ansious for t l ~ cmcnsurc, entrestccl, argued, and espostulated ;
Lnt in vain. They snid that thcy would be treatcd as infitmous for the murdcr ; ns Court's I)rignclc, hnowti as tho
Gurumsr, were for shying 13aba Bir Singh, the plnishmcnt
for wliich was now mailifcst iu thc special ~ w e r i t yof their
losses from cliolcra.

CHAPTER XIII.
Sir

II. Hardingo to Lord Ellonborougli : Punjnb ncms-Complimontnry lcttcr
from the Governor-Genernl-CrOvcimor-Gonfrml's prcscncu on Lhe PronlicrLottor to Sir II. Ilnrtlinge: ro~icmof tho siLuaLion-Sir 11,IInrclingc to Lord
Ellenborcu~1~-Disorga~iisationin Lnl~oro-PrecnuLio~lnry a r r i z ~ ~ $ e ~ ~ ~ r ~ ~ t s Sikh wnrliko prrpnrntions-l'eshorn
Sing11 scizos ~ILtocli-Disturba~icc at
A n n n d ~ u r~1nl;howal-Mr. Clerk's memorandum rofcrrcd to Agent-His
reply-Sir 11. IIi~rdinjioto Lord E~cnborong11-17orbeitrnuco carried to thc
verge of dnngcr-Golab Singh's propounls : rcjcctod.

Tnn following extract from Sir H. Harclingc's letter to Lord
Ellcnl~oroughcontains nn cpitomc of Punjab n e w np to thc
end of May. It will be observed tlmt Sir I h r y t l m scemccl
to consider Gnlal:, Sin@ as concerned in the murclcr of his
nepl~cmI-Iira Sing11 ; and his conduct a1 the Darbar appearccl
lo justify this view. Yet it must bc rccollectecl that such a
scene i n nn Oriental Court would 1104 unsupportecl by other
and mnch more trustworthy evidence lhan lcttcrs, bc liclcl
to cstal~lishthc charge.
If it were shown, for csnmplc, that H i m Sin@ l ~ n dbcen
seriously plotting to murder or plunder Qnlab Singh ; or that
he was in any m y more n hinclrnnce thail an ndvnntagc to
his unclc's schemes, and aL nll liltcly to be dnngcrous ; tlicn
Gnlab Singh would have compnssccl his dcstrnctioi~nrithout
rcrtlorse.
I n thc absence of n strong motive of this kind, it may perhaps be safe not to assnlne his participation in the crime.
Amongst the papcrs dcscribing the evcnts of the time, in
nllnsion to Lhc accusation by the Rani, there is a, note by
Broadfoot to the effect that he considered there mas no tmth
in it. The news brought one day might faronr tho prcsllmption of t h e Raja's innocence, whilst that of the next day migl~t
nppear conclnsivc of his guilt.
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Cnlcuttn : June 3, 1843.

My cloar Lord Ellenborough,--At Lallorc, Jowahir Bingll, t l ~ e
drmllrsril, hns been proclaimeil Wuxzeer ; Golnb Sing11 in ullic~nco
with him, ar~dilgti,inslhis rival, Lnl Sin& Tho Ranee has recently
taken n younger lover into favour ; U I I ~the U T ~ Yand the Kl~alsa,
not choosing to bc govcrncd by a Hajpoot whom tlley foar, huvc
prcferrcd the brutal Sirilar lo the ablo Bajpoot ; but he, Golab Bii~gh,
is stecpoil in crime. The other day, in Durbnr, the Raneo told hi111
to his faco that hc hail advised the death of his ncphcw, Hecra Singh.
Ilc wished to qualify the slatement, mhon she slopped liim by saying,
' I ham the correspoailence, and will produco i t if you dony the fact.'
I-Ie at OIICG gave in.
The fords arc impassablc, a l d thcsc intrigacs will bo coniinccl
to tho l'unjnb. The brigades from Pcshawur and Cnslimeer liavc
m:~mhoclon Lahore, stsling that they havo not boon relieved in tlloir
propor turn ; and the troops at Lalioro seem disposed Co adopt two
dif'fcrcnl parties ; tlie majority [support] hIaliarnja Uulccp Singh, and
tllc sruilller portion Pcsliora Singh, against whoin a brigado wns
about to advance, but would not move without money. I t t~pllen~s
by Broadfoot's reports lo bo hue, that at onc rnomont tho plau of
tho Rmeo mas to hmo urged tho troops lo move against tlic English,
to force our interference, to clisl~vomthe not of the C~oops,a1111 to
trust that we should roslorc tlicir Goverlmeul, after ~ c l l a cdestroyed
l
tllcir army, on tho bnsia of Lord Auclilsnil's snbsicli~ryarrange~nont
of 1841.

H. FIAILDIXGE.
Prom Capt. Nicolson's diary i t appears t h a t cholcrn,
crossed tho rivcr, and appcarcd i n the town of Firozpur, on
June 5.
011tllc 7 t h it is recorded thnt Broadfoot had n bad fall
from his horse. Thie would very probably complicate the illness from which he mas snfluring. Yet, though hc docs not
appetr to have writtcn much oficidly a t this time, ha wiW in
c o ~ ~ s t a privntc
nt
corresponclcncc with Mr. Currie, the Foreign
Secretary; cxtracts from his letters havo hcen published ill
thc papers presented to Parlismcnt. They are mainly illustrative of the riot and debauchery which prevailed at t h e
Lahore Darbar, the d e t d s of which are 1111fit for publication.
Wlicn Sir IIenry Hardingo heard of Broadfoot's fall lrom
as
his horse, hc wrote the following lctler. It is ~~111nblo
showing thc ostimation i n ~liie1113roadfoot's S C ~ V ~ C C Swosc
:
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held by t h e pcrson best qualified to jnclge of thcnl ; nnd also
as a record of Sir Hcnry's great kindness. Thc receipt of
such a, letter at such a timc wns probably m o r e likely to contribntc t o recovery, t h a n w r c thc numcrous leeches which
were applied, a,nd which n o doubt performed their duty to
their own sahishction.
(Private.)

Cnlcultn : June 14,1845.

hly dear Brondfoot,-I have just now your note of the 4th, gil~iug
an account of your fall. I shall be on the stretch of ansiety till I
bear ti.0111 you.
The fact is, I could not replace yon. You have shown on every
o ci~sionsince your nppointiucnt great energy and promptitntle of
decisiou ; n, true and steady j~idgment; rcacly ancl eil'ectivc with
your pcn ; and with such singleilcss of p ~ ~ r p o sand
e thorongh sense
of duty, that I feel I can rely upon a m ~ who,
n
corm what may, nl
ally time a d in any position, mttltes his sensc of duty his ruling
pri~lciple.
Tho able manncr in which you liave conducted yourself is
recognised at hornc as well ns here ; nud I am confident yon will
acquire as n~ucllreputation by your success in preventing a rupture, as if you were under more stirriug times on the other side the
Pui~jab.
I wnitcd till your first political campaign mas over to express my
satisfaction ; nncl I now corfially inform you that you have surpassed
my espect:~tion. P r ~ take
y care of yourself.
Every despatch from Englmd incnlcates a pacific policy; and
we must show tl~ittmilitary men iu thc condnct of affairs usually
transacted by civil oEticers, on which pence or war hangs by a
slender thread, can bc trusted for their prudence ns safely as those
wllo, in the event of mar, mould have no military reputation to

A strong Silib Government as our advanced guard, occupying the
fire rivers betmccn the Sutlege nnd the hclus, is a som~clmilitary
ancl political :wangemeut. The advantage is evident, and Brilish
India, :ilreacly overgrown, requires no addition by the nppropriatiofl
of territory so long possessed by an d l y whose iutercsts hove always
bcen opposed to those of the Uritish Government's enemies.
Bu~tif the indispensable condition of our forbearance be n Silth
Government ; and if tliat, after a patient trial, be ttn in~possibility,
then tlie qucstion resolves itself into a very narrow corupnss.
If tlie ruling power in the IJunjnb cannot be Silth, it lnust not
bc hIahommednn-in fact it must be Sikh or Elltish.
Tho more we cscrcisc olur power to n ~ a i i ~ t t 1,eace-if
~in
the last
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n.ltermtive be war-tlio more honourably we shall stand justified in
the judgment of om countrymen, by the proof thatwo have omitted
no pains to prevent our ally's catastrophe.
Currie is unwell from a, bilious nttnclr. Again, pray take core of
yourself.
Tours kc.
H. ITAI~DING~L
The Governor-Generd hnd felt for some timc that the
rapidity with whicli tho scones clianged at Lahore, and the
gravity of the issncs iil~olvccl,rcnclered his prescncc on the
frontier clcsiri~blc. He therefore, on J u n e 16, drew out rt
minnte for the consiclerntion of his Council ; in this, nfter
refcrcncc to thc paciiic policy which had beon followccl in spite
of incoin~micnccand risk, he pointccl out the clangor cnhwcecl
by his ;~Lscncefrom the Sronticr, nnd coi~sequenLincapncily
to issue orders with sufficient promptitude.
It apl~enrecllo him, ' therefore, Lo bc especlicnt, a s a means
of averting risk, nncl of cczrryiag our policy more securely
into effect, that the Govei-nor-General sshonlcl, in the month
of Octol~ornext, proceed to i h c Uppcr Provinces,' l a proposal
in which the Council eonc~wrecl.
I n n lclter homc, cleled June 23, Bromdfoot thus described
thc fill1 from his horse nlrencly mentioned.
In case the newspapers should copy from the Ii~dianpapers any
ncco~ultsof an accidcnt whicli lately befell mc, I may nlontion that
a horse lately fell with and on me. It was n bnd fall, but I an1 recovering, or indeed recovered, from the worst effects of it.
Otherwise I get on well. The work is very Lard, and the responsibility great; but I have the sntisfnction of fillding Sir a.Hardinge's goveimnent as kind as Lord Ellenborough's. Now, as I
write I have received n letter fi-om Sir Henry, so liiild that but for its
bciiig m ~ r l private,
d
1 wouldliavo sent it to you, knowing the pleasure it would give yon. He tolls me the authorities in England nre
nlso pleased.
Broadfoot had ilppai-ently recommended some of his
AssistsnLs for promoLion nncl increase of pay ; it was as much
plzrl; of his nature to recognisc and ospress his obligation for
able nssistnnce ancl good work, as to col~dcnlnunspnringly iillc~\~llich
hc considcrecl to be 'in
ncss or incapncity. Co~~cluct
m y way m c ~ mor conlcmptible, he coulcl scnrccly forgivc.
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Mr. Currie wroto on the subjcct a s follows :
Juno 28, 18-15.

Sir R.IIardingo has every clisposition to incrcaso Mill's ~ ~ I a r y ,
alld I think it will bo cloilc ; but we must try and lteep all nocordi~ig

to rule. I hove written to-ilny to Thomnsoil about Abbo~t,and when
I get his nnswer I will write to you again.
Cust mill have to mnit a littlo while, I suspcct ; I liavc sent to
tho Ihngal Goveri~incntfor a noto of Lho salaries of his coutemporarics. Sir 11. Hilrdinge is porsonnlly very well disposcd to do nnything for Cust, but tho Coimcil did iiot suciu fwournblc yc~terd:~y
to nu immodiato incrcnsc to his allowanoos. IIo will, in Lllc old
-I mean in tho courso of a very few years, which I sincerely hope
will not bc the end of hi3 career-give all his con~ciuporariesllic
go-by,y,2
On thc same date Brondfoot wrotc to Mr. FIarclinge, thc
C%nwnor-Gencrnl'a p ~ i v n l esecrctnry, to sny t h a t h e moulil
rcply to thc very ]rind lctter of Ihc 14th a s soon it3 h e possibly
could ; and aslred 11im to csplain, in cilsc? o l dcliay, thnl it WihS
cnused by tlle necessity for i n ~ ~ e s l i g a t i nand
g remedying disorders of some stnnding, which were now becoming scrious
' nt Anundporc BInlrhonraI, on the 'Upper Sntlegc, a sort of
I-Ioly City, wherc o m relntior~swith Lallorc arc ill eeltled itnil
vcry n n s n t i s f ~ ~ t o r y They
.
nro fighting among tl~ernsclvcs,
and cvcry Silth from the Jnrnna to the Jhelum is becoming
cscitcd al~outit, so i t must bo stoppecl a t once.'

I have nearly recovered from the outwnrd effects of the fall I had ;
tho inward eflects are nlao gone, except the worst, that of the henil;
blr, Robcrt Nccclham Cust, laic
R.C.S., LL.D. &c., son of thc Hou.
and Rev. H. C. Cust, Canon of Wind-

hlugistrato of Donnros, 1852; Commissioner of Lahoro, 1865; Biuanciul
Commissioner, Puujab, 1861; Judicial
sor, wns educntcd at Eton and Hnilcy- Commissioner, 1802; Member of tho
bury. Hc wont out to India in 1813 Viceroy's Legislative Council, 1S64;
nnd rcturucd in 1667, during which Acting Secretary to Government of
poriod 110 hold, lo 1110 public advan- Inclin in tho IIolne Department, 1SG6;
hgo, rnally most importunt appoint- and in thc same year wns nppointcil
mcnts. He first gro~~tly
clisliuyuisLed hlemher of tho Donrd of licvenne,
llin~selfas a linguist in Calcultn ; \vas North-\Vest Provinces. For his scrappointed Assistant Agent to tho Go- vices during the lirst Sikh war h e was
varnor-Genoral, North-Wcst Frontier, twice mentioned by tho Govcrnor1844 ; Undcr-Sccrotary to the Govern- CSonernl; see dcspatch to thc Sccrct
ment of Indin, Foreign Dapurtmer~t, Committue, dnted l)ccemhcr 31, 1615,
18216 ; Dcpuly Commissioner, Hoshi- and Gcrlornl Order, datod E'cbruary 14,
nrpur, 18.46 ; Aublln, 184!) ; Joint 18.16. l'rqers tCz. pp. 29 and 74.
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but that is daily iliininishing, and will, I hope, soon disappear. I
am not, however, quite out of the mood yet.
Cholcrn, I g i k e to say, 11ns reached Loodceana. I t is very bad
in our Malwa." A11 me cnn do is donc, and thc Agra Goveriment i s
liclping mnnfully. I hope the rains mill stop it, for it lii~scomo i11
nnd bcen most violent with the heat, wllicll Ims beell unusuully g r e k

Tlint clay Broadfoot wrote the following lcttcr to t h e
Governor-Goncral :
Rilnln : J u n e 20, 1845.

My clear Sir,--The rnins of thc last weclr nild 1nistnlt.c~
of tho dsmlc
have delnycil the arrival of yonr letter of tho 14th.
For its groat liindncss T mu wholly unnblc to oxpress my g r ~ ~ t i tudc, and I shall not tlicrefore mnlm thc atlempt, trusting yon will
not on that account think that I fecl it tlic lcss deeply. I t will
be nn ndditional iilccntive to exertion on my part, nnd I o111y~ v i s l ~
I could hopc to mslre my future serviccs more worthy than they lmvc
hitherto been, of the indalge~lccnnd ei~cou~agernent
with which you
11nve reccived tlwm.
I have rccoverecl from the worst effccts of the fall more rapidly
and perfectly than the doctors predicted ; and am i n hopes that cvcry
trace of them mill have disappeared by the cold season, espccidly if
tlie slate of aff~irsshould allow me to 'crnrti~i in the hills a month
or two after the rains.
If I inny be excused the presumption of saying so, I entirely concur in your view of our relations with Lahora, A strong Silt11 Govcriin ~ c n such
t
as that of Builjeet Siiigh, truly indepencleilt, yet bound
to us by community of interest nncl mntnnl confiilencc, is the best
of d l frontiers for us, towards tho great ocean of i\Iahomedunisin
between Indis and Europe ; but it must be Silrh and i t lnusl be strong,
or we must bc in the Punjnb ourselves. I cnn see no safo middle
C O O P S ~ . Yet in former clays I have heard two suck middle courscs
iildicnted by inen for whoso opinions I have great respect-a Dogra,
Governnlent, or a subSidiary Government controlled by the GovernorGel~cral'sAgent as Envoy or Resident at Lnhore. But no Dogra
Govcrnnlent could stailclunlesssupported by us or by the Mahomedans
of tlie West and North. In !he former caso i t would be virtually
s~~bsiiliary,
in the latter its sympnthies and interests mould bc opposed
to ours. In a subsidiary Government, again, we should hnvo in
reality ourselves to maintain the frontier now defended by the Sikhs,
with the additional bnrdcn of n Government to uphold against its
subjects, whilo mc sliould not liave the resources of the country to
"Inlwn, lho country botwccn lhc
Butloj and Jumnu. is reforred lo. Tho

term incliiclcd thc uis-Sutloj Protcctcd
States.
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worli with, and abovc all, instead of tho strcngth arising from our good
goverinnont, placed side by side with RIallolneclan anarchy, we should
appear as the authors and supporters of the most degrding and unpopultw of all the forms of Asiatic inisrule.
I do not say thal circumstances may not arise forcing such e
course on us as the lcast cvil at the ~nonlent:what has been, may
be ngnin ; but still it woulcl, I think, be an evil, ancl one to be by
every propcr means avoided.
I wish I could say I see any good prospect of a strong Silt11
Government being fonlled. The despatches, which I hope to forward
this week, will show iinprovemcnt, both in the intcrnal state of the
Punjab a d in their relalions with ns, but it would bc a delusion to
say that I look for nny such cLange as would restore the prosperity
and securi ty of both sirles of thc frontier, and render it si~fclo lay asido
our present stato of armed observation.
I n L ~ L ~ I thcrc
O Y Ois little change worth reporting. A cletachmcnL
sent against the midow of Soochet Sing11 has, it is believed, espelled
her from her fort and property. Shc ment towalds Jummoo on tho
niglit of the 20th inst., but thiswill bo referred to in an oarly official
clcspatch.
Allow me, my dear sir, to repeat that I feel most sensibly all your
Itindncss, and to subscribe myself,
Pour most faithful and obedient servant,
G. ~ ~ Z O A D P O O ~ ~ .

Tho nest lctter from which extracts are mndc, refers, ns is
shown by tho date, to the Lahore n e w of June.

. .

C ~ l c u t t n: July 2, 1846.

bIy clear Lord Ellenborough, . As usual, I have to report;
Ohat aft'airs are as unsettled as cver in the Punjab. Intrigues
and clissensions amongst the chiefs, and amongst the troops the snme
mutinous success in controlling the Government. The pmlchayet
system, by its well-organised power, founded upon the customs of
tho people in their villages, mill endure longer than the Govemment, and ofiers SO complete an obstacle to any nmelioration in the
state of the Governmeut that it is hopeless to espect improvement.
The Rallee is proHigatc ancl promiscuous as ever in her amours,
which in a late instnnoe gnve rise to the scandal of her being robbed
of jewels to the vnluc of s lac,4 wliich the fortunate youth succecdecl
in escaping with. On the occasion of tllc reconciliation of Imr
brother tho hunlmrd with her friend La1 Singh, she lllarlicd Iler
satisbction by sending a, s l ~ girl
c to each, bidding lllein do hononr

'

11

lillil~of

L I I ~ I C Cis,
~

~t per, equal lo 10,0001.

'
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to licr prcscnt ! Tlic \Vnzzecr is frequclltly so drunlc that 110 c l ~ n not nttciid the Durbar, mlrl C701iib Sing11 as a liajpoot is so mistrusted
by the Sililis that his inlluence will nevcr bc equal to I-Ieeca, Singh's,
whose assassination it is now proved hc hail recomnlendcd.
VTcare to be prcsscd to sclinqnisl~the Lrcasnrc at Fcrozpoor ;
b ~ Soocliet
t
Singh's widow will not givc her consent, and no clcmancl
has yct becn madc.
The army under Matub "ingli
was bribed to move to Sealiiote
againsl Peshorn, Singh, who had rcvived his prcLcnsions to tho
Guddee." Aftcr four nssn,ults thcy took the town, Ycshorn Sing11
being shut up in the castle. The pnnchnycts of tho army st Lnhorc
met on June 4 and prohibited the g e n ~ r dor tho trool3s from molesting Peslloora Singll. IIe sliowed great pcrsonal courage, and is a
fwouritc with thc troops, who wish to preserve him to play him oit'
against Duleep Singh. T h e general was obliged to obey, and to
reporl to the punchnyets thal h e had clonc so.
The next day (the 5th) the panchayets proceeded to the Durbnr
to remonstrstc against so incapable a d p~ojiqatca minister a s
Jowahir Singh. H e was too drunk to aplmar, and aftcr threatening
the Ranee to sul~stitutePeshora Sing11 for lior son, they retired.
These are the scenes which are of daily occurrence.
The cliolera has dcstroycd about 5,000 of the Sikh army, and
rather a larger proportion of the town of Ldlore.7 At Feroxpoor
i t 11as subsicled in the t o m , where few cases of death had occurred.
On June 20 it attacked the 62nd Queen's, am1 six men had clicd.
The tlicrmomctcr was then ranging from 98" to 105" in llle oficc~~s'
bungalows. Homewr, the +sins l ~ a dbegun to set in, mlil we trust,
our canto~nnentswill esmpe. The native troops Lad not suil'orcrl.
1]lave made arrangements for going up tho country the laitor
end of Scptember. IIaddoclr delighted to be Presidenl, and resident
in the Goverument House. You linow both A nnd C ~ L ~C,
I Cnncl
I
arc we11 aware, when m y great cmcrgcncy a+ises, of the vnlue
of the aid 1 slmll receive. In liealth 1 &in beltor than lnst yealo,
and tlle business, though very Leavy, lias become more filrniliar.
We llnve horsed O field batteries of 9-pounders milili 130 horses
inslead of 90 ; and by mcm1s of elephants on the line of n ~ s r u h ,
nnd llorscs or b ~ i l l o c lin
~ ~action, we shall be nblc to convcrt tho
iron 12-po~uldersinto ficld guns. Twenty-foulq piece# of heavy
ordnance will be dmwn by elephants, nnd N G shall llnve GOO eleplianls
bcyoud Agra bcfore October, will1 very little nclclitioi~nlcspcnsc ; 60
nt rJarrackporo werc rcally doing nothing, and so on at various
BInhtib Singh.
Warlrli,n.coshion, n scnt,n thronc.
' Amongst othcrs nttncltecl by this

discnsc wcrc S~irclnr Shnm 8ingl1,
Atnriwnla, nnd Ruju, Lnl Singh : both
rccovcrecl.

stntions. Tho n4iolo of tho cnvnlry and nrtillory aro ilow con~plcte
in horscs, wit11 700 spare horses from tho Gulf taken from the
Gombny nild Mndras remounts ; me shn.11have 1,200 from the studs
in rcserve, and 1,000 from Austmlin ; but these 2,200 horses cnn bc
of little nsc till the nutumn of 1S4G. JVc hnvo no diflieulty in procuring supplies of grain, having always twenty days in ndvancc at
tho fiontier stations ; nnd in tllc event of a forward move~~lent,
Lient-Col. Parsoils pledgcs himself that there shall be no deficiency.
Tlio roads h v o bocn repaireil, and as far ns prcparnlions can go
unatteiided wit11 expenso, we nrc in a very good state.
I-I. HARDINGZ.
Tho plots nnd intrigues nt Lahore continned in full force.
Raja Lid Sin@ and Sn,rclnr Janrnhil. Sing11 arranged to
nsssssinate Ra,ja Gnlab Singh; but the Inller, snspicious of
thcir dcsign, discovcrcd it by means of somc of his most trnstccl
follomcrs, wl~o,11y his orders, pretended treadiery nnd obtained
ndmission to tllc plot. Next, Jawahir Singh found out that his
sister the Rani lind d l but consented to his assassint~tioni n
order that her lover, ngnin in fnvonr, might be mnclc Wnzir.
The only gaiim in dl these t~mxnctionswas Gulab Sinfill ;
he lost nothing, and the course of his co~~nterplot,
too long i o
bc hcre detniled, n h r e b y 11c ruined two litter and formidnblc
cncmics by the agcncy of n third, wns considered to raisc his
rcputntion for n+doin and good fortnnc, and to evtitlc hiin i o
llic pnblic confidence.
On tlicir part thc Sikhs verc not idlc regarding nnrlikc
prepamtions. The Agent reporlcd that by thc next cold
wcntlicr their army would bc, ns regarded rnntcrial, more
efficient thnn it liad been for ycars. IIc also stilted i l ~ , t
these l~repxrntionswcrc ' undoubtedly made with reference t o
possilh collision with us ; ' bnt a t the same time the reports
showed that thc Dal-bar's snspicion of thc British was somcwllnt nlliiyed.
Soon, howcver, Jawahir Singh, whose animosity al>l~eared
a disposition to
to be inflnrnecl hy his iiitcmperni-~cc,sho~r~cil
r~uarrcl. HC cilconmgcd thc protected chiel's to oppose t11c
Agcnt's efforts to prcscrw or restore trnnqnillily in c1isturl)ctl
districts. Ho accused thc Tcdtils of trcncllcry, s ~ n do r d c ~ c d
tlic conliscntio~~
of tl~cirjngirs a1111 their rocall, n.ithonl al,l)oil1tiiig successors.

Thc immincnt dnngcr with which this was frm~ghllllndc
cven the Valtils' enemies and rivals join in entreating tho
Snrdnr to suspend the esecntion of his order; bnt before it
could be carried into cffcct, another chnngc occurrccl.
The troops wvhich had recently arrived from Xnsliinir,
Rnxara, and Pcshnwar, combineel to refuse their pay, nnd
decliued to avail themselves of leave to disperse to thcir homes.
I!he Snrdnr, who mas so drunk thnt thc tl~rcntsof tho troops
wore clisrefarcled, was sobercd and plunged into tcrror by
ncws which arrivcd thnt d:ql.
' Peahorn Singh, proccecling t o ~ a r d sthc Sntlcj, and there
depositing his family, went secretly across ille Punjnl-, tn tho
h l n s , m a , on the night of July 14, camc with sewn fol1011:c~s
to tlic gnte of the fort of Attocli.' On the wiclrct bcing opened
hc and his mcn, hnving Idled thc scntry, surpriserl 2nd
dcstroycd thc gate guard, which consisted of thirty-two mcll
undcr two officcr~;he then went stmight to the nppw fort,
and found ' the garrison so panic-stricken that they consentecl
to Iny donm their arms, nnd qnit tlic fort on tlic instant.
' No sooner mcrc they outsiclc than Peshors Singh cnlled
on the people of the town and ncighhourhood to join him ; and
early nest day lie was at tho henel of a tlionsand men.' TIC
incrcased thc nurnbcr of his followers, nnd issued ordcrs to tho
cliiefs and villagc communities from the Jhelum to tlic KhniImr, in which he declnrecl his ncccssion to the throne of Rnnjit
Singh, and requircd their nllcginnce.
Sslrdar J,zn;diir Singh wrote to cvcry ncighl~ominggovernor
to movc nt once aptinst Peshora Singli. IIe wholly chnngcrl
his tonc towards thc Dritish, and abstained from interference
will1 thc nfhirs of the Protcctcd States. Thc troops expreusecl
unbounded nclmiration of Pcshora, Singli's gallant enterprise,
nnd said that he must, in truth, be son 01 Ranjit Sin&
Gulab Singh took adwntnge of tllc terror prevding at the
Dnrbar to obtnin permission to retnnl to Jammn.
When the rcport of thcse eventu mns rcceivccl in England,
thc Governmcnl nnticil~ntcclmnch ndvanlnge from Sir 1IenI-y
Harclinge's co~itemplntcdisi it to tho frontie~,as he monld thcn
bc in ;I position i o act with promptitnclc slioiild the ~~cccssity
nrisc. Tlic~.f~~rtlicr
rcmnrlred tlmt if the 8ilrh C-ovcrniucnt
could talic a sound vicw of mnttcrs onel disccm their truc

interests, they could not fnjl to sec tlmt the bost, if not t l i ~
only, chimce of msintnining tllc nnity of their dornu~ionsw n ~ ~
the ccssntion of their on7n misen~blefends, nnrl n pcrfcrt4
rclinnce npon thc honour, good faith, and power of Llio BriLish
C;overnmcnl.'
Tho disturbmlce nt Anandpur i\Ialthornml llns nlrendy bern
mentioned. An nrrnngcmcnt for the mnnagemcnt of lllc
Sodhis, the proprietors of t h e town, a family of priests wllo
claim descent from Gnrn Rrim DAs, 11ad bcen mndo by Wntlu
in concert v i t h the Dnrbnr. Mr. Clerk had ndliered to this,
and had, in accordance wiih it, settled some disputes as to
illlleritmce. TI& i ~ r ~ p m c11:zd
l ~ bcen
t S C aside
~
inst boforc!
Bro,zdfoot was mnde Agent, with the result that dis turbnnccs
~ o o i nroso.
l
The people were rapidly getting excited, and it
bccilme Ilccessary to act. Broailfool scnt an Amhl or Comulissioner to forbid hostilities, and to desire both partics to
clisnrm Cill the Darbnr, in conccrt with ns, should settle t h ~
matter. Jnvnllir Singh, t h e waxir, bcing drunk and qnerrclsome, sen1 an order to his agents nl Anai~dpnrto expel Ihc
Amin, who, having ~~nfortunntely
become nlarnled, I;oolc r e h g c
in 13iliisp~r.~This conq>licnted matters ; and, owing to the:
unfriendly temper of thc Dnrbnr, mas likely t o be oonsidcrctl
triumph. A some\vhilt similar case having occnrred in
BIT. Clerk's time, Broadfoot follovecl closely Ihe course then
tnlten ; the diflercnce being that IN dccided to act with grcatcr
mildness for two principnl rensons, which he thus ~ccordcd:

1st. Tho season is unhvonrable for moving troops to onforcc
orders. 2nd. The o&ct of acting a8 Clerk used to act, aild ns I
used to act, monld now be clill'erent. Instead of the chances being
that it vould end the busiucss as in tho casc of the Sowms, tllc
chances are it woulcl load to resistimce rind consequent petty 110stilities, ending iu war at a time when we might not be exnctly
llns arisc~l
rcacly. The causes oE this chrwlgo WC,a pcrsnnsion ~vhicl~
nt Lahore, a d here also, i.e. among natives, tlint Sir 1-1.FInrdil~go
ling not thc confidence of the nnthorities at I~oruo; or rrttlior t l , ~ t
he hns it not to tho extent enjoycd by his prodoccssors, and collscquclltly Lhnt he Iias not tlloir powers. As soon ns I begim to sus11ec.t
this was their bdief, I ncled accordingly.

...
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Lettcrs from Venturo h a d ' confirmed their belief t h a t thc
rcid powcr i~ n o longer in Crtluuttn, and that the GovernorGcneral cannot act as to t h e m till the instructions o r Agent
from England shall arrive for his guidance.'
You h o r n natives, and horn they look if possible beyond the
power in ilninediate control with them to a higher, whom they hope
to cnjole; and you will not wonder that I have thus ncted with
double caution in t l ~ i smatter, and that I am far from sanguine tlint
i t may not lend at no distant time to grevo results. For, t l ~ o ~ I~ g l ~
may spin oul time by reference to you, no long period call pass
xvitllont our asserting our ji~risdictiOn: the expulsion of an t h e e n
never occurred before, unless it may have done so in Richmond's
time ; and if the processes of our courts, such as they aro, are not
protected, we must resign the government.
Goolab Siagh and the TTaI~eels,also sharing in the above bclicf,
n~oulclgladly see Jomal~irSing11 ruined by a, collision with us, which
they think cannot involve the Pnnjab. Others, as Deewnn Deemnatli, profiting ouly by the fhvour of the moment, flatter Jowaliir
Siugh's prejudices against ns, seeing that in their opinion lhey caunot lead to anything serious for lhe present. One man alone,
Palmer Azcezooclcleen, and perhaps also 13liai Ram Singh, will see
l l ~ edilnger of not yieldiug at once and completely, and on their
weight will depena the result. A week or ten days will show itsS
During t h e earlier part of August, thc reports by the Agent
to the Foreign Secretary shower1 t h a t t h e Lahore Unrbtlr continued its ciweer of profligacy and dcbauch.
I n reporting to t h e English Government, t h e GovernorGeneral remarlicd t h a t t h e extracts ' cannot fail to impress
upon you t h e almost hopeless expect,ztion of any immediate or
purmanent improvemeiit i n the coliclition of a state whose rulers
abandon themselves to snch open and disgnsting debauchcry,
unrecleerued by a n y of those stntcsmaillike qualities which
distinguisllcd the Government of t h e Maharaja Rnnjeet Singh.'
We deem it to Be essential for e just understanding OF tlie
actual condition of the Lahore Government, that these details
sl~ouldbe reporkd ; they tend to shorn the unsatisfactory nature of
that C+overnmcnt, alicl that our relations with n, court tlins constih~tedand an army solely goverued by punchnyets, must be in a,
very precarious state.
9 E x t s n ~ t from
, ~ u. lclter from Major Broadloot to MI'.
Corrie, datcd Simln,
August 1, 1845,
Y
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We aro determined to maintniil the pncifio oourse of policy which
we have hitherto pursued to tlie utmost extent of conciliation rtnd
f~rbcnrance.~
Thc extwcta referred to are prinbed a s inclosures t o this
letter, nud i t i s unncccsmry to reproduce them. Briefly tlioy
report Snrdar Jnwalih Singh as generally drnnk and quarrelsome, neglectful of business, and clisposcd to scncl the Sikh
a r m y against us, in order to divert its attention from himself. T h c Agent remnrkcd it was essentinl that the Gorernment shonld 1rnow tho exact truth, bnt that in telling i t there
wonld be difficulty in avoiding details unfib for the cleccncy of a
clespatch. The Bani's mind had become seriously nffcctecl by
1icr profligacy ; from being clever and lively, shc l m l become
stupicl and imbecile. One of the Agcnt's letters of remonstrance arrived lscfore thc en'cct~of a, debanch were gone ; its
contents were such as to sober Ihe rioters for the moment, and
a n answer was promisecl. Bub after a, dny's sobriety, i n compensation for so unusunl a restraint, tho Sarclar and his low
fnvourites, cach snppliccl with a bottlc of brandy, set out on
m
, excursion. They rcturncd drunk, and in place of replying
to the letter, sent for clsncing girls ; ancl Jamahir Sin&, cinnlating the worst traditions of Rome in its dccline, drcssecl himself a s a clnacing girl, a n d clar~cetlwith the rest.
Early i n August, Sir H. Hnrdinge referrcd a memorandum
by Mr. Clerk, 011 various mntters connected with our re1a t'1011s
to the Lahore State, to the Agent for remarks. Thc note
forwarding it, from which the following extracts are lnadc,
is clatcd August 14, 1845.
I nm so excessively pressed by quarrels between Ontram and
Napier kc. kc. that 1 have dictated to my son my observations 011
a inelnoranduin of Nr. Clerk's, which Lord Ripon sent to mo. I
send you the il~elnorailclurnconfiddutkdhj, and s h l l be glad to hnvo
your coiumenls upon it addressed to me.
If, unhappily, we ~ ~ l l bolster
~ o f up n Sikh Government, nrc
innst, by tho n o s t fi.nnlr,lopl, nnd intelligible coi~luct,clistinctly
prove that forboarnilce hnd been exhansted.
Let us Be accnsed of erring 011 the side of moderntion, [or eve11 21
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of timid reluctnnce to clrnv the sword ; but if me are forced into war,
let the rupture be caused by solno prominent aggressive act. An
offence to onr clignily ofr'ered by a n ~ & e rPower would not be
ground broad enough to occupy ; nnd in order that our nloderntion
mny not mislead the Durbar, we must speslr and write very plainly.
I n his c o n m e n t s on Mr. Clerlr's memorandum, t h e
Governor-G eneral ilicntioilecl that he nrns disposed to thinlr it
hacl been w i t t e n without recent accurate information.
The statcof nfihirs at Lahore nrns very cliflerent in 11845 from
Sher Singh's time, wlicn Mr.
w h ~ itt Lac1 been in l\l%l~arii~j%
Clerk
intimately ecquainted with it. T h c n t h e asmy was
reasonably obeclicnt, now it n 7 ~wholly
s
insubordinate, a n d the
existing government mas merely nominal. Hence the position
of affairs now was more critical than iu Mr. Clerk's timc.
The Governor-General expresscd a n opinion aclverse to what
appeared to he Mr. Cledi's views of t h e relative rights and
power exercised by t h e Inclian and Sikh G o v c r ~ ~ m e n in
t s thc
cis-Sutlcj estates.
It is unnecessary to rep~~oduce
Ma,jor Brondfoot's notes on
Mr. Clerk's memorancluru, but the follonlillg is t h e reply to
thc Governor-General's letter just quoted :
Simln : August 29, 1845.

$ 1dear
~ Sir,-I Iiave, as directed, answered Ur. Clerk's niemornndum, as far as I could when not scoing clearly the object a i d
drift of the clocumont to bc answered; but I shall uot bo able to
copy out the paper for transmission by this post.
The principles laid down in yonr note for our denlings with
Lahore are entirely those by which I have most anxiously endeayo,u.ed to guidc my course. Thnt in every detail I hsve succeeded,
it would be presumnptuous to hope; nay, I must not be surprised if
you, on reviewing the ~vlvholeundisturbed, as I 11svenecessarily been,
by the bewildering whirl of intrigue and cver varyil~gcabal \vitll
wllicll I am in constant co~ltact,~houldfind my failures far outnumber my successes. Still I am not without hope that you will
see at Lhe bottom of all I have clone, or fo~:borrieto do, the very pG1ciples you lisve laid down, however defeclivc or erroneous judgment
the detnils from conforming to them.
may lla~lc
Tile ncst letter from the Durbnr, wvl~ateverits tenor, mill ellnhle
to report fully 011 all our late discussions and the present stale
the long and dangerof tllo Durbar. If the lettor be ~alisftwLo~'y,
ous deley ~villprevent my nlercly reporting that there hare been
Y 2
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differences now arranged. If unsatisftlctory, 1mean to inform the
Dnrbt~rthat, not being empowerccl to aclinowledge anything short
of the subordination on this side of the Sutlej in forcc tllrougliol~t
Runjeet Singh's reign, and, indeed, up to tlie present 3Ial1araja's
accession, I must submit the tvliole to you.
I had, with this view, roughly slietched a report on our relations,
of which I had latcly resolved to suppress the greater part a s snperfluous. I shall now, however, complete and enlarge it, on the very
ill-nnclerstood points on which 3Ir. Clerli's unprecise language inny
raise doubts, which I cannot conceive he shares, tl~oughI ndrnit
h i s paper has much surprised me; for though DIr. Currie oncc
pointed out to me some strange language in one of Mr. Clerk's
letters to Mr. Tliomi~sJletcalfe, yet I ascribed i t to tlie heat of
controversy between men whose personal interests and feelings had
jostled, and not to the possibility of Mr. Clerk holding a n opinion
I cnnuot but look on as preposterous in anyone conversant with
the facts of our connection with Lahore.
From Mr. Hardinge's letter I gather that a despatch may be
cspectecl from Englnnd on the snbject of our cis-Sutlej relations
wit11 Lahore. I do not thiiilr you will find it difficult to clear np
any obscurity attending them; but I shall in the mean time look
more and moro to the subject, lest I slionld be called on by yon for
an opinion.
In all the existing discussions there is not onc, I think, \vhicli
can be called a case of ofiencc to our dignity. The Durbar would
not answer your letter, though merely complimentary, for a long
time ; nor at all till foolishly solicited, nay entreatcd to do SO,by
our native agent. This indiscretion of his put iuto such jeopardy t l ~ e
quiot settlement of other matters, by confirming their belief in your
being restricted in power, that to remedy the error became intlispensable. At the same time I wished to avoid this matter being
made a subject of contest. I reprimanded our agent, therefore,
for his folly, and gave a copy of the reprimand to the Lalloro
Villteel.
At the same time I told hi171 t h t a11 &USWCr SO given inigllt be
fairly declined, but that, as its terms mero friendly, I would Iieep it
back for a time, to see if the Durbar would explain the imprnpor
condnct of its servants, SO that I might not hare to report bl forn~ardingit that t h acts
~ of t h Durbar
~
contradicted their langungo.
This gave one more nrgument to the moderate party. Tho Durbar
has finally made partial repnratioll in one case, but without abandoning the implication of non-subjection. . .
I took advantage of some innccuracies, r e d or apparent, a1ld
unusual inode of trnnsmission, to submit their letter a sccolld tillle
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for their considcrntion, wnming them thnt I could only nct on t h e
rulcs in force in Runjeet Singli's time ; and I told tho Valieel tliat
reference to you now alone reinnined. Their answer will arrive b y
the first or secoild prosimo if it coines a t all, and then I shall send
down the wliole correspondence.
The acts of wl~ichI have cornp1,zined nro only parts of n system,
and I have dwelt only on one or two glaring cases, where the filnllaraja's orders have eitlier been openly alleged, or are well Inlown to
exist, and where Llie nctors have been inen of some mnrli, though n o t
of tlie liigl~estrank.
The points i n clispnte nre two : l s t , the right to cross the Sutlej
witlioutpcrmission-i.e. the question settled wlien tlie Somarscrossed,
and never cloubted before t h a t ; and 2nd, exemption is claimed, o r
rather assumed, from the jurisdiction of m y court, and consequently
from that of the Government of Iiidia, for tlie Nnharnjn's cis-Sutlej
subjects and estates ; ul exemption wliicli h a s never existed up to t h i s
date, ~ n wliich
d
was never claimed till Punclit Julla, with partial
success, did so i n Col. l k h r n o n d ' s time.
These are points of nenrly tlie highest weight, but they are of
less consequence than others which must either in writing, or when
you conle up, be laid before you. Their frequent avowal in Uurbar,
and their causing such avowal to be inade linonw indirectly to m e ,
is a mennce of their nbility nnd desire to seduce from their alle,'rrlailca
the other Sikh chiefs and our nativearmy. T h e very naming of such
things with impunity for any length of timc is unsafe, seeing the position now held i n tlie State by their army.
On these points, however, I linve thought it most prudent to say
notliing to them ; to appear to treat them with contempt ; nml t h e
refcrence to you mill be solely as to tlie other points, of which
a satisfactory adjustment m o d d go fa^ for the present, and only
for the present, to settle the minds both of the chiefs and of our
soldiery.
The forbearance shown has been carried Lo the verge of danger.
I t so deceived some of tlie petty chiefs, t h a t I have had to take
strong lneasures with them. I need not tell you they nre as a class
dissipated, reckless, and ignorant beyond any olher similar class i n
India.
At the same lime I have warned the Durbar nnd the chiefs n o t
Lo be misled by this forbearance, which proceeds only from your
remembrance of the long friendship of Runjeet Singh, and your
compassion for the tender years of the Maharaja, but cannot g o
on for ever.
I have spoken fully, fieely, and so plainly thnt tlloy are angry
nt it. I nevor laid aside the customnry style to the nlaharnja even
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when speslcing most pluinly ; but I left thcm no excuse of misinformatioil from evil counsels, for I referred thein to Eunjeet Siagll's
d
sent them copies of his letters, causing the Yalieel
timc, ~ , n even
to read the originals, and I carncstly recoinn~cncledabstinonce from
the ilnnger of departing from the ancient rules, to which tlie late
cvents tended.
This course is unusual, and apt to m&c us seem too anxious
for a settlement by pcaccablo mcans ; but I adopted it on mature
reflection, from the very motives you have laid down for my
guidance.
With respcct to Peshawur, the intriguo mhich rvaltes most progress, though slow, is not to give it to Dost Mshomeil, but to his
brother, Sooltan Mahomed Khan, now at Lahore, as a nominal
vtlssd of that state. I t is a dierence in name only ; that is, it i s
open to every objection to whicli possession by Dost Blal~omcdis
opcn ; but in tl~at,as in other cases, a vigorous effort will be made
to iiccomplish it before me invade, or at least b q f o ~ owe conquer, in
order that it may be for us the s t c ~ t w squo. This will give you a
koy to much going on in the Punjab. I agree with you that for us
to snEcr nE~arultxyepowerat P e s h n ~ v nwith
~ , us at Lahore, would Le
most impolitic.
I t is post hoar, and I mnst defer writing on soino othey parts of
Nr. Harclinge's letter till to-morrow.
Believe me LC.
G. BROADFOOT.
Tho nest extracts are from Sir H. Hnrclinge's letter to L o r d
E l l c n b o r o ~ ~ g hin; them news already given is repeated, but
spccinl interest mnst bc attached to any epitomo of news from
the pen of tho Governor-General.
(Extrncts.)

Barraokpore : A u y s t 18,1846.

My dear Lord Ellenborough,--Many thalllrs for the sword and
pistol ; they are both very eflcctive weapons.
Mr. Clerlc has either talked or mrittcn about his coming out to
superintend the Punjnb affairs. I clid not answer yonr messages,
saying ' he wns r e ~ d yto come out whenever I expressed a wish,' bccaoso I did not tliinlc it necessnry that hc shodd snpersede Broadfoot, and plnco liinlself as a provisional member of Council in the
position of superseiliug the Governor-Cenernl liiinself on this tllc
great question of the day.
Peshorn Singh has taken Attoclc, nnd has offered Peshawur to
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the Afghans in considerntion of their snpport. I consider Peshnwur
of vitd importance in n military and political point of view. It is
170 lriiles from Cabul, and wodd give the Afgl~ai~s
a, dep6t for
aggressive operations against the Punjeb, and the possession of
both bnnlts of the Indus by Afghiziis and Mahoin~nednns wonlcl
greatly increase the difficulties of tho deferice of Sincl, the Afgl~tws
stretching llieir recouqncst of territory from Peshawur to Bfooltan,
and tliencc to S~lltltur&c.
In a politicnl point of view the reoccupntion of Peshamnr and
the bmBs of the Inclus by Afgl~nuswould be n disgrncc in the cye
of the natives of the East, nrho recollect tliat Cspt. Burnes left Cabul
because Lord Aucklei~dwo~iIc1liot tnlte a, line ispectillg Peshnwur
adverse to the interests of Xunjeet Singli, and that the ASgl~anwur
was the consequence.
I am convinced the trnest policy for Ludia, is lo hnvo a, strong
Sikh Government iu thc Punjab. If this cauuot be efl'ected, we
cannot tolcrate AfgLml or Mahornmodnu reoccuyotion. The Punjab
must be Silih or British. I go up on September 20. Every effort
will be ~nndcto bolster up a Sikh &ovenment, end not Lo iliaw the
Ever <kc.
sword.
H. HARDINGE.

...

I n the course of a careful esnrnination of correspondence
regarding onr relations with thc Lahore Darl~ar,only two inslances have bcen fouucl in which the Govcrllnicnt of 111cli~~
did not altogether approve of the course followecl by the Agent ;
and a s numerous occlwions on which nnqualiiied tq~provnlwas
esl)ressecl have been recorded, it is p r o p that mention of
thcse should not be olnittccl ; othermisc, they are not of sn&
cicnt importance to deserve record.
One of these is just hinted a t in Sir Henry Hardinge's
letter of August 14, when h e rcmnrked that an olfence to our
dignity monld not constitute a snficicnt eastis bclli.
It appcars that the Darbar in rccenl correspondence h u l
cle~artcclfrom certain forms n s u d on such occasions ; and
though this in itself may appear to Englishmen a very trivial
matter, yet it is not so vhcre Orientals are concerned. I t is
a case of what is k n o w a s ' trying il on.' Completely comprehcncling this, and uonsiclcring that to rescnl it a t O ~ C Owas
likely to be t h e surest mcthocl of preventing its recnrrencc,
m c l of tl~erobyremoving n source of irritation, the Agcnt declillcd to receive tho letters till thc n s u d mode of dclclrcss was
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acloptecl, ancl cxpresscd his sense of the impropriety in p l a i n
tcrms.
Tllc Government of India considered that h e had animadverted rather more strongly t h m the occasion appeared t o
demancl on some points which, liomevcr objectio1la1)le u n d e r
ortlillnry circumstences, had better, in the present state of
l~artiesat Lahore, not have been treated as a matter of s u c h
serious iml,ortance. Thc Agent was accorclingly mnnled n o t
to be too ,sensitive in his communication with the D a r b w and
its oficers.
The other instance referred to was, that nhen reporting
thc nsaal Lahore news, Broaclfoot referrcd h~ciclentdlyin his
Ictter to being occupied with much graver mt~tters, a b o n t
~ ~ l l ilie
c l had
~ not, a t the time, collectecl sufficient informr l t'1011
to ~ ~ a r m his
n t writing an official report. Now, as nearly a l l
mntters affecting our relations with the D s r l a r were then
suficiently serious, or rathcr involved very sel.ious issues, the
Governor-General nnturnlly did nol like to bc told t h ~ tthe
Agent mas concerned with some especially g r m e cases, a n d
at the same time to be kept in iguormcc of their a a t n r o .
The impropricty of this was pointed out; but beforc thc l e t t e r
from tlw Governmcnt of India was received, the desired r c l ~ o r t
11nd Lecn forwarded by the Agent, so that the correspondence
wns close11 by his csprcssion of regret that he had omitted, in
tllc f m t h~stance,to indicate the nature of the cascs to which
h e hnd rcferrecl. He added, ho~vever:
Of one thing I feel considerable confidence, and it is this : that
it will be found that the forbearance lately nnd still exercised w i t h
the llnlinraja's Government is out of d l compnrison beyond wllat
any esan-~plccan be found, or indeed what would Iiave been tllougl~t
possible from tho beginning of our cis-Sutlej relations with llnnjcct
Bingh in 1808 clonv to the denth of Shor Sing11 in 1843, t l l a t .
it has been carriccl to the verge of dnnger, and that this lias beeu
eseroisecl declaredly from tlie motives now laid down i11 your lotter
for my guidance.
TYl~enthe report became current in the Pnnjab and the
Protcctcd States, that the English Government had forbiildcn
the Goreri~n~ent
of lnclia t o clecli~remar ngainsl the Silclls
without permission, the demeanour of the Darbar i m m e d i a t e l y ~
~hi~lged.

Thc quofition of Raja Suchet Singli's treasure, which had
been revived by the Valrils, when threatened by the most violent party in the Dnrbar, was brought forward by Serclar
Jawnhir 8ingl;. Tlicre is reason to believe that he vishecl to
lay before the Agent the original unfortunate order regarding
it, to clenonnce the whole subsequent conduct of the Governmcnt of Iaclia, as a, brcnch of faith, and to threaten war if the
terms in tlint docnmenl mere not fulfillcd.
Thc Valtil "nrgecl the Sarclar to oblain renullciation of
their claims on the treas~lrehorn R ~ j aSuchet Singh's widow,
and from Raji~Gulnb Sin&
The lslter, being in Lithore, was
applied to, bnt rtnswered that thc British Gowrnment was no
respecter of persons, and vould place no value on his renuncialion of a claim, as thc widow was heiress.
She, being absent, sent evasive answers or rcfusnls. This,
however, preeented no insuperable obstaclc ;n forged remncintion of her clainls vns prepared, and Gnlab Sin$ v~vasclesirecl
t o sign it in tolicn of its authenticity. I-Ie delayed, nild asked
permission to go to Jnmmn. EIis signature was inacle a, condition. Hc n q t , signed, ~ n ddeparted. Iie had, however,
provided for this contingency, nncl did not sign the falsc deed
until he had heard of ihe delivery of a letter from the widow
t o the Agent, requesting him on no account to part with ihe
trcaxurs. This he knew mould nentralise tho cffect of tho
forgery. The messenger clolayccl givingthe letter lo the Bgcrit
until Gnlab Singh was safe in Jammn.
A report roached Broadfoot that t l t health of the GovernorGeneral was noi i n n satisfactory state ; for, in writing to Mr.
C. S. Hardinge, after mentioning that Prince TValclemar4 wc~s
fortunately prevented from goiug into Tibet by the pcople 011
t h e frontier, who refused supplies, he expressed great ~nxicty
a s to Sir Henry's health. The bad effect his absence would
have on the Pnnjab was noticed, as nns also 8 rumour about
Mr. Clerk, to Ihe offcct that hc was about to take chwgc of our
rclntioizs with Lahore.
T l ~ creport qrm consiclercd to bc unfounded, buh it had
done, and \\ms doing, much inischicf.
3 On this occn~ion it wn5 Ram
Diill, Valtil nt E'irozpur, not Xishell
Chnnd, who d v i s e d the Snudnr.
' Pril~ue \\'nldemnr ot l'rnssin

trnvollod ns Count Rnvcnsbu~g,nnd
was nccompnnied by Counts Gruebetl
nnd Oriolla, nnd Dr IIoRrnei.;tcr, who
\\ns ltilled ut Firoxshnh.
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Tlie folloming extracts from n lettcr from Mr. Edwards,
Under Sccrctuy in the Foreign I)epartment, refer to these
matters :
Calcuttn : August 28, 1845.

My dear Brondfoot,-I have just received your two letters of tho
14th : and as Cnrrie is out of town aud will not Be back until late
in the evening, 1. at once reply to your inquiry respecting tho
Governor-General's llenlth, altllongll I trnst your anxiety on this
head will have been dissipated long ere this can reach you by Currie's
letters, which, as they contain no ri~entionof the fael;, wonlcl of
course illcline you to disbelieve it.
I am happy to say that Sir Henry is in perfect health, ancl ns
strong es wlien he first arrived. Some time since, before I returlled
from the Btmits, he was, I believe, it little out of sorts, bnt he is
now quite well again. I can easily imagine the miscllief caused by
any roports of the Governor-General's fa.iling llealtl~;but more
especially Ly that of Clerlr's deputation by I-I.RI.'s Governmeilt to
superintend Punjab afhirs; the latter tending, as it so obviously
does, not only to weaken your hands, but to lessen tlle influence of
the Government.
On the samo date as that of this letter, Broadfoot reported the arrival of a mcsscnger on behalf of Xa,ja Gulab
Singh, to reqnest the protection of thc Government of India.
The Raja assertcd that, having recelitly quittcd the Dnrbnr,
he was convinced that war monld be forced on the English,
a i d could not be delayed beyond thc approaching cold season.
The messenger, i n corroboratiori of his master's opinion, said,
' I Imow it for certain, thcre mill surely be war ; I mysclf have
seen it.' "
The Raja's proposals were to raise the idlabitants of the
hills against the Silths, and to transfer his allcgiance to the
13rilish ; or to raise 40,000 or 50,000 men ancl destroy the
Sikh army, and leavc Lahore open to tho British, who conld
tlicn occupy it without firing a shot.
I n return he stipulated for protection in the enjoymont of
his possessions during his life ; whilst Jammu and the neighbouring territories, with an income of 120,0001. a year, werc
to bc guaranteed to himsclf and his heirs for ever. Ancl as a
1woof of sincerity he ofiered hostages.
Broadfoot replicd that the messenger should have ltnown
T h c words used wcrc : 'Ynliin jiinda jwiir jang huncl;; nsi Irhud delthiyii.'
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that as friends or a s enemies the English mere sincere ; that
when forced into war, though they spared those who yielded
and renrarcled those who served them, yet they made
openly and fairly, trnsting to God," and putting down their
enemies by their own strength ; but he onght cqnolly to have
lmomn thclt the English songht pence and justice, ctild never
war till driven to it. Still less would they stoop to intrigue ;
and to the Raja's ovcrtur~sno reply could be given.
One of the rcsults of the hostile feeling of thc Darbar to
the English was m,znifcslecl in the Protected Stntcs ; difdculties
hithorto ~uiltnomnwere rnised a s to forage from waste lands,
and about giving other supplics for onr troops. This mas no
doubt aggravated by n dry season, and by the ii~creaseclimnI~ersof our force. The ilif-ficulty was overcome by the Valtils,
who exerted themselves in a rnaimcr which elicited the Agent's
praise.
With reference to the b o d s and bridge fittings which werc
boing brought up the river, Bronclfoot rccomrucnilecl that no
coilcenlmcnt or mystcry should be maclc about them. They
formcd part of our mi1il;nty equipment, a i d our soldims should
be esercisecl in their use, just as thcy were excrciseil h l clrill
a d in thc use of their arms.
a

' Tawakkal bn Ulludn.'
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Death of Major Leech, 0.13.-Letter to Mr. C. S.Hurdingc: evils from incrcnsccl
coin~nunicntionwit11 Enropc-The cis-Sutlej Stntes-Letter from Sir 11.
liardingo: general policy indicntcd-Sikh complrrints against tho C:o~ern~ n c uof
t Indie-Strrmge sccne in Dnrbnr-Death of Peshora Singh-Xumoors
current in Punjnb: Nolian Llrl-Letter from Sir H. Hnrdinge: rcferencc to
~umoum-Incrensrd IlosLility of Jaw~rhir Siugh-'l'lle Khnlsi~demnnd his
surrender-IIia dcntll-Suttee of his wives-Sikh ntlempls to corrupt our
aopoya-Desertion from native regiments-Notes fronl Cnpt. Nioolson'e
diary-Hopeless stnte of the Punjnb Governmmt-Sir 13. Hnrdinge to Lord
Ellonborougl~: Punjnb news-Boats for bridge.

ON September 3, Rhjor Robert Leech, C.B., Assistant Agent
at Ambnln, died there, nnd Mr. B. N. Cnst was sent clovn
from Sirnla to take temporary cl.inrge of the district.
Brondfoot reportccl to the Government of India, that the
l o s ~of Mnjor Leech nrnB at that moment the hcnviest the
Agency could sustain. Ee ailclcd :
I lament his death as a public and private loss.
Major
Leech's ICtIo~lvledgeof their' languages sacred and colloquid, his
fondncss for the study of their literature, his tolerance of native
customs and prejudices, his easy temper and liindness of manners,
balanced By sufficient firmness, a very dispnssionete judgment,
good sense nnd diligence in business, qualified him in no ordinnry
d o p e for such a post at snch a, time, and malces his loss on public
grounds severe.

...

The following letter to the Private Secretary refers to
Prince Waldemnr of P ~ L I R Uwho
~ R ,with his snite dined with
the Agent about this time :
Simla : September 6, 1846.

My dear EIarclinge,-Poor Major Leech's death has given me so
much to do today, that I have only time to say that Prince Wnldohills.

Refers to the dialects spoken by the inhabitants of tlic country near tho
Mr. Cust's memorandum.
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has come in, nna that Co~ntOriollib lms been here to nsk, on
Lke part of the Prince, whelher he slioula remain here or go on,
his objecl being to see a Pul$d~ mar Wc. My answer was, that I
would be frank with him ; if the British Goveimment could avoid it,
there mould be 110 war ; it was even at this moment doing everything to preserve peace ; its success depended wholly on tlie SiIill
G.overnment, for mhoni 110 mould be n bold mnu who venturcd to
answer one way OY other ; that, therefore, I could tell him uothing,
b11t; if lie thonght it worth while to wait till the Govcnlor-General
came, lie llliglit 108rn more from hiill.
IJe evidciltly tliougllt I was very diplomntic, mllicll is genemlly
tllought by clever continental people when they are frankly del~lt
with.
Leec]lVsplace will be difficult to fill at present ; but I can write
Pours kc.
no marc to-day.
G. BROADFOOT.

111Rr

The Prince is at $110Hotel. 1% refuses nu otiors to do a11lytlli~g
for him.
The Governor-General, whcn reporting the proposals marle
on behalf of Xaja Galab Singh, recorded his entire q,l,rovill
of t h o 1)rnclent nnswer given by Mnjor Broatlfoot, in
hc stntcd that to encourage a subject of an allied prince to
illtrigue against his sovereign wns R procedure rcpngnmt to
the feelings and customs of the British Government.
Tile inexpediency of interference by force of arms in order
eitllor to hold the Pnnjab by tl subsidiary British forcc, or to
establisll a protectorate on the Silrh side of the Sntlej,
pointed out.
~t as staled that in romnd numbers Ltie population of the
pul?j& nl-nounted to 3,000,000, of which tlierc wxe 1,600,000
Hinclns, 1,000,000 Musalmnns, and 500,000 Silths.
The Goverlzor-Ge~lerd considered that, if the British
po\\rcr clispersed the Sikh army, the interest of the people at
large shonlrl no longer be snborclinnCecl to that of a small
wn,I'lilce sect, whose conduct had rendered interference neccssa1.y. Ige also predicted the ultimate failure of an attempt
to g;overlz a country so composed, by means of n Eesident
EiU1)l)~rt~
by subsidiary force. B e wns equally nyerse to
a ~ t c m l ~ t i lto~ ggovern the l'nnjab by nlonns of the Silt11 chiefs.
1 \Vc
Bhonld bc du~xivod of the rcBources of the conntry,
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a n d t h c pcople mould not have British justice, mllich, however repugnant to Ihe natiollal feelings, gradually givcs to
t h c mass of t h e populntion some colxpeiisation for t h c loss of
national inclcpenclencc by t h e prosperity which a n imlxirtial
adrninistrntion confers.'
IJ7hilst it mas repeated that interference in t h e clomestic
nfiairs of thc Siltlls mas deprecatecl as strongly a s ever, it was
clcnrly statcd t h a t if their acts nncl insults should lead t o opcil
ruptnrc, 1-10hdf nieasure woulcl be found t o answer.
There is much interest i n t h e followilig letter t o Mr. C.
S. IInrclingc, Private Secretary to t h e Governor-General, nnd
much t r a t h i n the remarks about t h e dnnger to India of minutc
interfcrcnce by England. T h a t danger is grsatly enhanced
when I n d i m mcnsures are treated as p a r t y questions.
Sirnlu : September 9, 1845.

I I y dear Hardinge,-Many tl~anlrsfor your note of August 20,
just received. I an1 delighted on public and private grounds to fincl
the winours mbont Sir Henry's health so totally unfomdcd. 13ut
cvcn ruinours are mischievous, now that me w e , I think, on the eve
of swing a ncm phase of Indinn politics, arising from the tendency
of the native Powers to look rather to London thnn to the Governnleut of Indin.
I t has been somewhat hastened by the accidents of Mol~unLnll
being at home, his having plnyeil his cards so well, and his connections at Lahore and in our territories ; bnt i t is tlie natural result
of tho incrensed cornrnnnication with Europe, and unless met by
extreme caution and firmness at home. a s well as by care t o
strcngthen the hnnds of tlic Government in India, it may lcnd to
results which even the ablest man, practically unversed in Indian
Lnll not
business, could not anticipnte. I believe that liad RIoll~~n
been in England, had he, when there, been more cautiously received,
and referrca for pension to the Government of India, the prescnt
discussions with the Punjab would eithei- not have arisen or have
b c e ~scttled long ago. And 1believe that claims will now be n~ncle,
never before mnde, became every doubt esisting in London is piclicd
up about the public ofices, or even by ungi~ardedconversntion of
public men, and sent out to the nativc courts and chiefs, well versecl
in the lllethocl of tnldnfi advnntnge of such things. Again, t l ~ c
ICytl~ulquestion, but for tho same cnuse, nrould 1011~since llave
hcen quietly scttled and forgotten: both cases mill now be iliWc~1lt
to adjust satisfactorily. In clue tiuc such agency nt homc will talie
its place among the things imt to be prevented, but ,lever to bo left
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out of our calculations. I t will probably produce somc degrco of
penuancnt nrenlmess in o w Government, and conseqnently of onr
possession of tho h~clianEinpire ; but its dangers will in n few years
per]laps diminish. I saypwkaps, because if once cl~angeiu England
J\l~t~kclxj
our Execntive Govcwment there also, ancl every psrliamentary or popular cllange aflects Indian administmtion, as sac11
cllanges now do that of the colonies, our rolc in h~cliawill not be of
long contiu~ulnce,unless India itself should undergo in one generati011 the change of mnny ccnturios.
Even ns it is, I dread the effects of any possible change of
rainistry in Engltmcl. There aro able ancl patriotic men anlollg tile
Whigs. Thcir naturnl bias wonld be to support nnd strcngtllell t]lo
Governor-General; but they will come ill supported nnd clrivcll by
a, faction, that i s by selfis11 and recklcss inen ; and hopcs for a soason
nfill be excited among intriguers, which. once commmnicated to tllo
Indian courts, may lead to any amount of extravngn~lcc,nnd lllny
produce effects not to be go1 rid of when the fallacy of these ]lopes
is cliscovored. I hnve every day more and more regarch1 the present
Governor-General's Administration as lilrcly, when Indian llistory
slid be rightly written, to Ggnre as one of the most rcmerkable and
lrlost trying to its head, from his haying new clangors nnd obstacles
to meet, amidst difficulties the lnore forinidnble from thcir being ill
undcrstoocl.
That during the chnnges already begun or imminent tllcre
shoalcl be no change of Zlnllcls, must be the wish of cvery lllall
desirons of the public good ; end situated ns I am, and t l ~ = ~ ] t i n ~
above indicated, yon will not wonclcr at my feeling nnxiolls \\'hell
tlle Conlmancler-in-Cllief told m e he had hcnrd Sir Henry was ill
Lscl health. I h w e run into snbjects I did not purpose on beginning
to write. Lot m e only add, after reading over what is written, that
I do not want you to answer m e a word on the above subjects. 1:
am not putting questions in the disguisc of stataments.
1 am quitc vexed at my reports not having gone in, but tile way
my timo is devoured by the trans-S~tlcjrevellers is iuconceivable.
I have been from half-past eight till noon writing this letter ; my
time boing occupied by the V d i c c l ~and others interestcd on our
border. Jomdlir S h g h has c~uissnriesout to corrupt our sopoys ;
he has scnt back to Ananclpoor Rlalthownl t l ~ cman he recalled at
my instancc ; h e has ordered troops to bo in readiness to cross ille
fiutlcj ; he is trying to tamper with lho chiefs. For all t l ~ i sI care
little ; it is mischievous ancl must be stopped, but will keep till the
Govcmor-General conies. The chiefs aud pooplo, howevcr, get fnr
otlicr~isoescitecl. I havc to hear tlicir storics
tdlr to tllclll ;
to write or lnalce prcparations for conlingm~cicsfrom ]lour to Ilonr,
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to prevent some ~ ~ p l o s i oilificult
n
to hnnclle. And so my time is
not my own, not even the Govep~or-General's;it is Jownhir SingI:h's,
who is probably at this monlent in his cups cutting out work for
me, and eventually for the Government.
The ' cis-Sutlej territory ' question mill naturally puzzle everybody who tries to form an opinion from our correspondence. I hnve
touched on the subject in the remarks on Clcrlc's letter to Lord
Ripon. I11 a report on my table, in its rough form, it is more
pnrticularly noticed; but I have not entered into it so fully as if
specially called on, wliicll pcrl~ibpsI may be ou the arrival of the
despatcli you mentioned. But is i t not cnrions that them doubts
llaving sprung up in Lonclon, from some source umlmo\vn, slionlcl
be the same that the Durbar should work on, as if Clerk's letter had
gone to Lahore, instead of to tlie Governor-General? And thnt
some inti~nationof the ltind did go there before I hewd from you, I
liavo no doubt. Nay, tlie very odd selection of Annndpoor MukIio~val,and thc awards of Sir E. Colebrooltc, rmde by Clerk, is tlic
one maclc also by the Uurbar. And the agitation on this subject was
resewed on the ai~ivnlof the mail which I believe to have brought
Clerk's letters a few weelts ngo to Calcutta.
A11 oficial letter of to-day will inclicate the line I have taken :
thnt of pointing ont true relntions, whcn I do so, in the way of
proffered advice, but refnsing to listen t o a qnestion of our existing
rights. They want to throw ou us what we can bear, hut wliicli
belongs more properly to them, a n d which they cannot bai~i*-the
0 1 2 ~ sprobn~tcli.
If it be made a question of words, wl~etherEnglish or Persian,
every cis-Sutlcj chief can bring language of apparently the most
conclusive kind to sl~omthat he is nx complete a sovcrcign us Queen
Victoria, and that consequently the servants of the said Queen and
hor ancestors have, for thirty-seven years, practised t h e most continued, barefaced, nnd unjustifiable oppression, not only on the
Mnharajit of Lahore, but on every other chief, great and small, liaviilg
a Iringdom (not cstnte) or share in n ltillgcloru, whether inenst~rcdby
rides or yards, between Jumna and Hntlej ; but if t h e words bo
compared with institutions and ftxcts, and thercby interpretell, tllo
very contrary of d l this mill be found, nnd whether in tho 81nharaje7g
cis-Sutlej o r anybody else's cis-Sutlej territory, the sovereigllty of
the Queen, the Con~pany,and the Government of India, will be fonnc1
to be as complete n ~ undoubted
~ d
(among natives capable of thi1~liillg
a t all) as over the district of Iloogllly ; and this not by treaty or
co~npnctimposing limits on our power, but with a n estellt of itIrisdiction exercised varying according to necessity in eacll case.
If callcd upon, I am prepared to clcferd tl~esepropositiolls, not
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i n l l ~ eh y e r style, but ns serving a Governmellt clcsirous ollly of
t r u t h and justice, blinking none of the nppn,rently strong :~rynments
mhich call 110 aclclwed, but taking the very strongest of them (for
o n either sitle esarngles abound), and putting it to m ~ ydispassiollato
111~1
wlietl~erthe trntll be with facts which are inexplicable on tile
supposition of cis-Satlej independence, or with words which are
froin tho i m l ~ c r f e c t i oof~ ~lsriguage necessarily ainbiguous, but are
coinpletcly col~~patilde
ill lllost cases with either supposition, tllongll
only on one snpposition compatiblc also with the facts.
Pours kc.
G. I~EOADPOOT.

Tho following letter horn thc Governor-Gcneral t o BIajor
s instructions containotl in
113ronclfoot c o n l n n s i~ldr e l ~ c i ~ lthe
an oficisl lettur,"vhich,
though iullcr and morc preciic, is
not quoted.
(Private.)

Government Hoose : September 11,1845.

My dear B~onclfooL,-I have writlen an ansmer to your oficinl
letter respecting the tcizder of Raja Golab Singh's alle,'rrm~ce011
certain co~~ditions,
end I hnve distinctly inforrncd you tlinL tho
Government will l m ~ enothing to sny to proposals for inter~lel~tion
b y m e m s of e Resident m d a subsidiary force.
Eight mo~zthsago I entered a t some l e ~ ~ g twith
h
tho Hoinc
Government on t h e ilnpolicy of any such system of occup.<It'1011 :
t h a t for the intorests of h d i o I preferred the Sutlege as oar frontier,
wit11 a strong Silrh Qovernlnent as our dvnnced guard ; but Llmt i t
w a s in my mind clear that the Punjab up to Peshawur mu& be
h e l d either by Siltlzs or by British.
I aclllere more firmly than befom to that view of o w r e d policy;
and in the lotlor which Edwards mill send you, I liizvc assumecl
t h a t these proposals of influontin1 inen nL Lnhore, which tlloy tzro
rendy to maltc, if t h y did not fear my powers to accept, are limilocl
t o ~110llire of British army to disperse a mutinous Sikh anny,
tllc Silrll chiefs retaining their property, tl~elrpower, and their
nationality.
Tllon I n,m told I am to be forced to this line of intervention by
vmioue; illdirect n.cts short of nil open rnptnre.
&ly nnswcr will. bc, not only that I will uot interfere on snch
t c r m s , bnt tlmt if by acts of violcnt aggression I am compelled to
c r o s s tho Sullega, I will do so mitboul tcrms, giving them fair
of throwing the first
notic0 tllnt they nlusl; titkc the co~~seqllences
stono. You will perceive by tho tonor of my l~ublicletter that I
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assume they are prcpa~edforn, linziled system of iilte~ventioii. Are
consequences of co~lpellingme to
they prepared for the ~1~1imiteCZ
cross the Sutlege 3
'In your letter to Cnpt. Mills, in p ~ r Q. you state tlinl efforts arc
snpposecl to bc malting to tamper with our sepoys. Bear in mind
thnL on October 7 the Act providing articles of mar foY the thrce
a ~ m i e will
s be promulgated to the troops. The ternpcr in which
they may receive i t is n responsibility which I am prepared to take;
the rislc is so inferior to the nclvantage to be obt~ined,Llint I have
not hesitated to incur it. October 7 may aseist tlie Raja of L,zilwe's
~ichclues; but yon will .in tlie iulerval have bcen able to ascertain
the nntnre of his progress, from which I confess I apprel~endno
serious r e d t.
T&e intention to promulgate the new code on October 7 is confidential, altllougll the Commander-in-Chief has in all probnbility
infoi,med you of the fact.
MI*. Cnrrie left us some days ago; and as I start in ten days,
I am severely tasked in getting through the public busiaess. III
great haste,
Yours &c.
11. Hfiin~rxan.
Menmvhilc the Sikh ~ s r b a was
r
p r e p r i n g a n indictment
against the Government of India, nncl the Tralril v a s clcsircrl
to find out from the Agent Ilow it would bc received. IIe said
that hc hncl heard privately that t h e Dnrbar had caused an
order t o be
t o him, but hacl not a s yet sent iZI The
contents mere as follom: That the Darbar had nt grcat cost
twice invadecl Afghanistan for the benefit of the British. That
English armies hacl traversed the Punjnb to the detriment of
its people and Government, nn injury which hacl been patien tlg
borne by the Darbar. That we had been permitted to occupy
Pirozpnr, which hy right belonged to the Dnrbar, on coldition
of Ireeping no more troops there t h a n were necessary for the
mnnngement of the district, but that, in spite of this, a great
army was collected. Nor mas this tlie only innovntion since
Col. Richmoncl'~time : the pnssage of the Darbm'fi troops across
t h e river liacl bcen forcibly prevented, and La1 Singh, Aclhlnti,
had been prohibitecl from crossing though sent on duty by
the Dnrbnr. The Va-kil continued that h e h ~ c lheard he ~\fss
to bc ordered to demand prompt satisfaction on all tllefie
counts, and t o be threatened with recall in case he did not
succeed in obtnining it. Re v a s further to point out that
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these offences had all occurred since Major Brondfoot had
becn Agent ; if that officer vould a t once withdraw from Firozp u r all troops nol required for police cluty, would allow free
passage to the Darbar's troops, and to La1 Singh, Adahti, it
mould be well; if not, the Dnrbnr nrould decline to deal with
anyone save tho Bovcriior-General in person.
I t is snicl that l h e cornposition of the docrrment which
e m b o d i d these demands allcl threats causcd a curious Rcme
at lhe Darbar. The lone and words used wcrc unusual nnrl
insolent, but thc 1xq)cr mas Iieard by the generals mith greal;
applause. 13hd ]<am Sing11 and Fakir fi~izuddin,~ 1 1 orcproscnterl what rcmaiuecl of the rnotlerate party, would h a w
nothing to do with i t ; whereupon Snrdnr Jawnllir Singh
said p~tbliclythat he would not be s~rpriseclif the troops nncl
f~xithfnlSilihs nrcrc to burn down thcir hon~ics. They mere
summoned to the Darbar to consult on the document. The
B h n i rcfusecl t o attend, and left Lahore ncst dny to avoid the
conscq~~ences.
The Faliir, more at the mercy of the Dnrbnr, attended ; nncl,
after a scene almost comicd, gave a11 ambiguous apl?roval understood by the intelligent, but talten litcrnlly by Jawdiir Singh ,zi~cl
his companions. He dcclarod the style and composition to be
admirable, and calculated to fill the English with terror ; that in
his day such n letter woold not have answered, for Ranjit Singh
]lad to deal with Sir D. Ocl~terlonyand other headstrong men ; but
that he llad no doubt the change was ns great on the south ns on
t h e llorth side of the Sutlej, and if so the pnrwana4 mould producc
t
&sired effect. He flattered them mith so great ability l h ~lie
obtJned 500 rs. as a present, the promise of ajngit, and, what lie
Jued more, the promise of never being sent for again on sac11 R,
,
On taldng leave lie aid, SO strong was habit nt his yenrs,
that, greatly as lie admired the prwana, and the spirit which dictated
it, he could not help advising, as rnosl favourable to trtmqliillity,
adllerence to the old treaty m d to established rules.
The V&il nslied Broadfoot whether h e monld receive such
parwana if it were sent ; and was told that if sent oficiaIIy
i t woul~l
uncloabtedl~rbe received 2nd for\\wdecl to the Govenll-nenl; of India; t f ~ a it
t would speak for itself, and save much
trouble.
superior to nil inferior.
2

2
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The Valril thcn rcnlarlrccl Ihat hc lmcw the Agcizt was secure
in the support of his Government ; nncl h e contrasted this with

the rnin which might any clay befall him at the instance of the
Darbar.
I t d l be recollectccl that Iiunwar Peshorn Sing11 hacl
seized the fort of Attoclr and raised the stanclard of rebellioll.
Sarclar Chnttar Siilgh of Atari and other chiefs, nt tlic head of
n consiclerable forcc, were sent to reduce him to ~ubmission.
IIe soon cliscovcred his inability to oppose them with success ;
and though Attock was s very strong fort, he yielded it on ihe
promise of personal safety. Snrdar Jarwhir Singh senl the
Vnlcil of Sarclar Clmttar Si11gl1 to his mnsCer loadcd with
presents, to incluce him to put Peshora Singh to death. IIc
is also said to have liirecl xss~ssinsto I d 1 the Iimwar before
he could arrive at Lahore.
The Iihalsn troops, on Che other hand, were anxious for his
safe arrival there, as they nleclitatecl deposing Jawahir Singh,
the Rani, and Dnleep Sin& and sctting up Peshora Singh in
their stead. There is some obscurity as to the manner of his
death. The account which seem to be the most probable is,
that Jawahir Singh's bribcs ancl promises inclucecl Sarclar
Chattar Singh, nnd Patteh Ifian, Tinrlina, to break the pleclgcs
they hncl given, and to murclel., or connive a t the murder of,
the unfortunnte Peshora Singh. I t is snirl that when about
twenty miles on their way from Atlock to Lahore, n day's 11nlt
was proposed for hog hunting ; that when, fatigued 114th tho
dny's sport, the Iinnwa8r had gone to rest, he was surprised
in his tent by a band of armed men, put in irons, and talreu
secretly back to the fort of Attoclr. Tliere h e wns murdered,
and his remains were thrown into the Inclus, which flows past
swift mcl decp.
The two leaclers, drcncling the wrath of the Iihnlsn,
separatecl. Fattch K l ~ a nvcnt towards Dcra Ismail Iihan,
and Chattar Singh went into R3jn Chilab Sin@'s territorics.
But Jawahir Singh, the instigator, rcmaincd in Lahore, bliaclecl
with joy nt tho event, to what must inevitably follow.
~
reassembling, to
Day by clay the regular army w : slo\\rly
the enl1)arrassmontof Wle Dnrlm, and to thc tcrror of Jawnhir
Singh when sufficiently sober to renlise his position. In order
to escape Iron1 it, he Lccainc morc thnn cvcr desirous of war
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with the nritish. He continned his efforts to tsmper wit11 the
protected chiefs, and with thc Company's sepoys. Ho proposed
t o withdraw the troops "fom thc i~ilaharnja'scis-Sutlej estates,
in which they had been placed by Raujit Singh, and lrept there
t o carry out the Agent's ordcrs ; and to replace them by Silrh
troops, who lcncw nothing of the work, a~lclwhose insnborclinntion co~dclnot fi~illo produce nn cnrly rupt~ire.
On September 17, the Agent informed his Assistant nt
Pirozpur, Capt. Nicolson, of the rcpori that the Darbar nlns
nbont lo move troops towards our frontier and to station them
tl~erc. This movement bcing contrary io usixge and, beforc
Sher Siiigh's death, ~~i~prcccclentecl,
wo~ilcl prolJably cause
escitement. Thc Assistitiit was requested to use his endenvonrs to allay thiu, and, if the ~novementwere esecutecl, to
tnlre steps to keep himself infor~nedof what pmsed among
t h e Sikh troops, E L ~ to
C Iw t c h carefully the ghats V n their
vicinity. IIe was dcsircd in spcnlting of it to the people to
t r c a t the intention as improbi~ble,nncl when mentioning it to
the Valril :to say it mas coiltrary to establishcd usage, and
tbercfore unlilrcly .
Allusion has been made, in some of thc correspondence
quotetl, to rumonrs which wcro in circulntion in thc Punjitb
a n d Protectecl States, and wliich had n disturbing cfFect on
i,hc Darbar and on the cis-8utlej chiefs. The reports
as L I S U ~ ,vague : it was said tlint the Governor-(+onera1 hncl
been prol~ibiteclfrom dcclitring w r against the Punjab ; and
i t Iyas also rnruourcd that Mohnn Lal, thcn in London, hnd
s~lcccecled in influencing the English Government in its
clccisions on rccommcnck~tionsmade by thc C+overi~mcntof
Inclia. Both rumourfi had a tenclcncy io nialrc the nntivcs
loolr to London rather than to Calcutta for justice, nid for
finnl settlcwent of their cases; and, in consccpence, to
imply a, wcnlcness in the Illdinn Government not hitherto
susl'"ctca.
Subscqncnt events showcd that tlic first rnmonr wns devoid
of fo~~nclation.I t i \ m ~ l dsccnl to havc rci~chedthe PunjnlJ

" T h c troops refcrrcd t o wcrc n
body of Inen rniscd by 1t:rnjil Singll,
I L T I ~ kept
~
in h i s cis-St~llcjostcttos for
1oc:~ll ~ n l 1 o s c sonly. TIic,y \VOIY? IL sort

of policc, onc of whoso dulics \\w Lo
oscc~ltutho ordcrs of Lhc Agcncy Court.
* C;luil in this easc rncnl~s Llw
inl~dsnr icrrics.
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with Gen. Ventura's correspondence. When in ~'onclon,h e
]nay easily havc misunderstood t h e generally expressed wish,
both of the Q o ~ c r n m e n and
t
of the people, that war with t h c
Sikhs might be a ~ o i d e d; and conceived that feeling to bc B O
strong as to prevent the Indinn Governnlent from declaring
a . At any rate his communicatioi~swith thc Darbar were
SO unclerstoocl, and hcnce arose this mischievons rumour,
which encouraged Sardar Janlahir Singh in his coursc of
wnnton insult and aggression to\vnrcls the British ; a coulrsc
nrhich otllcr circumstances seemed to iudicnte as the snfcst for
himself.
With regard to t h e other rumour, there mas undoubtedly
more foundation.
JIohan La], whose name is linown in connection with t h a t
of Sir Alcxandcr Burnes, and who wrote a clescription of h i s
travels with that officer, liad been employcd in ccrtain trailsactions and negotiations connected with the Iiabul disasters.
H e claimed large sums of money as disbnrsed by him o n
secret service. He was nttached to the North-West Frontier
Agency, and harl gonc to England on the plea of business with
Sir Alcxnnder Blurnes's brother. 'A%ilst in London, he \vas
liorlisetl wit11 that ignorant a i d indiscriminate enthusiasm
characteristic of OLW society, and was liberally supplied with
funds by t h e home authorities. H e v a s an unprinciplccl
intriguer ; h a d a brother-in-law, a Mr. Hoclges, in Lndhiana,
and no doubt in his correspondence did not depreciate whataver he may have possessed in the matter of influence w i t h
people in pon er in Englnncl. H e was also suspected of having
assisted to spread t h e first-mentioned rumour.
These remarks will explain the allusions in the following
lettcr from S i r Henry Hardinge :
(Privntc.)

Cnlcuttn : September 19, 1845.

My dear Brondfoot,-With regtLrc1 to hlohnn Lull, tho inconvenience resnlting from the nrrangements mnde in his favo~u.i n
England must Le patiently bori~e. You are, of course, aw&reof t h e
causes which induced the home authorities to concilit~tothat iadividual.
TYl~atevermy opinion may be oE that course, it is my business
to assist tho policy which t h y have thought it espediei~tto adopt ;
at the snlno time, if he or his brother-in-law gives me annoyance,
I slmll not hesitate to stop his pension and removo Hodges.

been desired by the Darbnr to cornmnnicatc! their contents,
They contained statements of the cletcrmincd hostility of
ISardur Joaahir Sing11 to the British ; of his rejection of
strong public rernonutrmce made by Bhni Ram Singh; and
an il~tiinrttionof attempts having bccn made lo corrupt Sodhi
Diwiia Sing11 of h ~ n n c l ~ m
3 Ir a k h 0 ~ a l Broaclfoot answered as follows :
I said tlint I mas somy to hem the ncws j u d read ; that, ns he
Imcw, I had done everything in my power to mailltoin friendsliip,
rind by rcpeated nclvice and nmniug, nccompcmiecl by the fullest
cspliu~ations,to remove every cl~ancoof' misconception on the part
of the Durbar ; that the &lest mcn remaining about Lhe D u r h had
now expostulated in vain ; that it was grievous to see a friendship
of so long durnlion, and so fiilly mnintnined by Iinnjoet Hingh,
thus east nside ;but amidst this regret was the satisfnction of knowing that 110 elfort of any luucl to preservc it 11x1been muntiug on ow
side, aiid that the forbearance shown by 11s was wholly ~mcssmplcd,
having, as he lmew, led almost to seiious evil.
The Vnkil then broached the 8ubject of thc relief of the
troops ernploycd in the Nshnraja's cis-Sutlej estates. The
Agent, in reply, remarked on the inexpediency of introducing
chnnges cis-Sutlej until the arrival of the Go~ernor-General.
I-Ic pointecl out the clmger of clisturbnnce, from the substitution of ins~d~orcliaato
Sikh soldiers for the present men; bnt
aclclecl, that as the Vnld w ~ responsible
s
to him for thc good
order of the estate, he wonld, on receipt of a written guamnteo
for Ihe good behavio~zrof Iho new troops, snnction the proposed
change. This concilintory step of the Agent reccived the entire approval of the Governor-General.
The impression made on Sir Henry I-Iardinge by these and
other reports at that time, wafi that therc n~oulclbe no immediate attack or violation of our frontier. H e foresaw that tlie
anger of the Iil~nlsawould be directed agninst Jawtlhir Sjngh
for having procurer1 the lnnrcler of PeshoTa Singh; a,t tile
same time he considered there was such ~znclenisblce~~idence
of the hostility of tho TVnzir, that it woulrl Le impruclcnt to
relns the ilcfensive operations already commcncecl.7
The Governor-Gencrd was light ; Janrallir Singh made

' Compnre Governor-General to
the Secret Cornmitlce, No. 4 of

Wovcmber 1, 1848. Sec P a p e ~ s&cprinted Februnry 26, 1846,p.6.
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m o r e a n d more frantic offorts to divert the wrath of the
I ~ l i n l s afrom llimself to the Bi.itish, and his violence was the
m e a s u r e of his desperation. Seeing this, tho troops a t Amr i t s a r refi~sedto r e c e i ~ eone of his followers as their general,
rmd threa,tcaed t o l d l him. They p~otcstcdthat they would
destroy Jsmahir Sing11 2iimself, but would innhe no mar with
t h e English, who had given them no came of olTence. I n
concert with t h e rest of the army, they frnrned a, numbcr of
questions ancl p u t thcm t o Jawahir Singh. I-Ic was rcquirccl
t o proclnco Peshora Siilgh ; a n d was directly chnrgccl with
wishing t o send t h e army against thc English, whilst he himself was a,fraid to quit t h e fort of Lahore. The Iihalsa inforined h i m in rough language, t h a t they wcrc not so scnsel e s s a s t o march against the British a t tho biidilcling of a fool;
b n t statecl t h a t they mould not decline to do so after proper
p1.cp,ration, ancl if the assernblcd troops, chiefs, m c l Rajas, so
decided nt the approaching Dasahra.
T ~ l i n tfollo\ved this is graphically tolcl in the nest lettcr ;
i t h a s alreacly been publishccl, with numerous, though pxlmpz
at t h o t i m e ilnavoidd~le,misprints, in the papers on the outb r e d r of t h e first Sikh war wllich were presented to Parliament.

Cnrnp, Siinln : Septcnlbcr 26, 1915.

The t ~ o o p scontinued on the 18th ancl subsequent days to iuainiain the same attitude as before-po~fect ordcr among themselves,
a n d strict discipline towards thc city and its neighbourhood. They
pitched their camp ah the plain of Blliyan Bleer, on the Berozepore
side of Lahore, where the puncheycts held their uightly meetings,
and i n the morning issued the orders determined on, under the designation belol~gingto the Silill sect beforo Runjeet Sing11 became
n, monarch, viz. tho Khalsa Punt11 (Xhnlsa jee da Punth). Tliey
formally assumed the government, mid sent letters bearing their senl,
inscribed merely with tho n n m of God, to all local oficcrs, military
lenders, and rnembcrs of the Durbar, req~~iring
their presence and
obedieilce. Tl~eysent similar letters to the Ranee, requiring her to
join their camp ~ v i t hl ~ c son,
r
and to dcliver up lier brother a d the
murderers of Pcsllora fiingh, if he wcro really ilend. The llanec
P N ~ I CLC.
I . Spp. 8, 0, nnd 10.
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justified his death, whicli ller brother had denicd. The troops
answered that lier ndnlission proved it, and required her to choose
between giving him up or shariug his fate with hcr son.
I u such negotiations mere passed the intermediate days. Sirclar
Jomahir S h g h trusted to holding the fort with his new levies a n d
the arlillery, of which the superior oflicers were much i11 his favour ;
bnt he found tlmt, including the Englishman, or, as lie hi~nselfsays,
the American, Col. Gardener, the troops m d lheir oilicers mere ready
to obey the summons of the troops, and to join their camp ; he [the
Sardm] now begm to tliiuk of escape, and laboured in cvery way to
gain time and couciliate the Icvies, that they might at least connive
at his flight.
On the lOlh he and the Rauee sent Dewan Decna Netli, Falieer
Noor-ood-deen, and Sirclnr Uttur Singh, Ihlcen~ala,to urge the troops
to return to tbcir obedience on account of the danger of English invasion kc. The troops immecliately made them prisonc~s,releasing
Noor-ood-deen, whom they sent to warn the lZnnce that the 20th
wns the lalest day on wllich the option of surrendering her brother
would be left her ; that this dolny was only given to spim the city
the miserics of a siege of the fort ; and that she and her son would
pay mith their hies the pcnelty of such siege, if their obstinacy made
it necessary. At the smle time, under thc scnl of the P u n t l ~ they
,
required the troops i n the fort to taka care that no one esca,pecl, a n d
they posted guards at each gate of the city for the like purpose.
Falceer Noor-ood-dcen, Laving fuffilled his mission, was honourably
dismissed ; the other prisouers were insulted, threatened, and derided
by the soldiery.
On the night of the 20tl1, Sirdar Jownhir Sin& made great presents and greater promises to his troops, giving one general lialf o
Inlch of rupees to facilitate his escape. They nllo-iveri him lo reach
t h e gate of the fort, where the guard peremptorily forbade him to go
farther, saying that s n c l ~were the orders of the K k d s a Punth. T h e
Birclar returned to his house in despnir.
I n 1110afternoon of tho 21st it was annonnced that four bt~ltalions
llid left the csinp to destroy all i n the fort, of which the garrison,
with all the artillery and generals, liad marched to the camp of Miysn
Meer. Inimeilialc clcpmture for the camp was announced to be t h e
ollly cliiuioe of snfety. The Sircler, his sistor, nnci her son, with d l
t h e menll~ersof h r b a r who liad not elrendy gone to the camp, now
mountod 011 the state elepliniits, and proceeded to join the troops,
their tents having been already sent on. The four Lnttaliol~swhich
they met turned b e d < in silence, a i d escorled them to the camp.
I\lhon they nrrived lhe1.e it hnd becomo dark. The Ranee, t h e
i\lnhartqjdi, m c l tlioir i l n n l c ~ h t cattcndl~nts,except the slavci\Iunglil,
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were conducted to theii*tents by the Lroops, which rnn tnmultuousIy
to them from every part.
Sirclar Jowahir Sing11 mas put to death in his howdah by innumerable wounds of swords a i d muskets, and his body thrown
out on the groulld. TWOof his leading nssociates, Bhya Chutter, a
doorkeeper, a d Bawa Rnttuu Singli, Cedee, a clluboolt sonrnr (a
horse-jocltey), were SO put to death, as me11 ns some ordcrly horsemen, much collsulted on State affairs by the Sirdar. Of the rest of
his attendants, ulost escaped in the dark. Rnjah La1 Singh mas
made a prisoner, as also Sirdar Jimun Singh, a mnll of 101v station,
a native of Majeeta, but for some years a, EIindoo Fnlteer, in Roliilcnnd. Ilungla, the slave, was also imprisoned, as well ns a few
others of less note. Sirdar La1 Sin& Morariya, who was cleaig~lnted
to conllnancl the expedition against the English, fled, and is believed
to have crossed the Sutlege. He mas, on Heera Singh's denth, only
a risaldar of orclerly horse, ancl urns raised by Jowallir Sing11 first to
be a general and then a Sirdar, mith a view sometimes of going ns a
special ambassador to the Euglish, and sometimes of cornmnnding,
nn army to invnde them. Gun. Mehtab Sin& Majeetee~, nnd
others of that family lately lenders at tlleDlii-bar, are in concealment,
and orders mere sent to bring La1 Singh, Adnlntee, a prisoner from
the Sutlege bank opposite to Ferozepore. Thus the whole of the
members of the late Government were either aluin, imprisoned, or
fugitives.
On the morning of the 2211~1,tho Ranee, who has still great influence with the troops, reproached them for the death of her brotlier
and tllreateilcd to destroy herself and her son. The punchnyet relcnsed Deewnn D e e m Nuth, and Sirdar U ttur Sirgh, Kaleemala, with
orders to soothe the Ranee. After some time, she and her son, and
their attendants, came out to where t l ~ ebody of Jowahir Singh was
lying almost cut to pieces. The &meo and her momen broke out
into violent lamentations, which moved the soldiers so much that
they permitted her ancl her son to return to the fort, carrying with
her the Sirclar's body. They also allon~eclDeewanUeena Nath, and
Sirdar Uttur Singh, Kdeewala, to accompany her.
The body was ctwried first to the forl, and then to the burning
place, where, amidst a great concourse of people, four of the Sirdnr's
wives more burned with it. The crowd wns so great on the wny
from tho fort, LhaL they broke the order of the procession, nnd
two companies of sepoys on duty with it, cluing the confusion,
plnnclerec2 the Sirdar's wives of all the jewels and ornameuts with
which they mere decltacl for the occasion, and which were intended
for distribution to Brahmins and others at the pile. Suttees are
sacred, and receivc worship ; their last words are considered prophetic,
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thcir blessing engcrly sought for, a n d their cmses dreaded. Deeman
Decnn Nath, thc Ranee, the h4aht~rujahancl others, prostrated
tl~eiusclvesbefore them and obtained thcir blessing. This 1va.g repeated nt the pile by Doewan D e e m Natli, and by the Ranee and
her son by prosy. Tho suttces blessed them, but cnrsed the Silth
Puutli. At the pile they werc asked the fato of the Punjab, arid
declnrcd that dmiug the present year its iuclepeildciicc would ceasc,
that tlie Sikh sect would be conqllered, tho wives of the Silch soldiery be widows, nnd the co~ultrydesolt~te; bnt that the Itiluee and
hcr so11 would live long and happily, ancl the i\Iaharajali continue
to reign. These prophecies made a great impression on the superstitious multitnde, and I mention thein on that account, auil bccnuse they doltbtless express the opinions of persons about the
Durbar.
At noon of tho 2211~1my latest lettem left Lahore ; a company
of infantry 11nd arrived at the forl to demand Deewnn Deem Nath
and Sirdar Uttur Singli, I~nleewda; but n d h what intent was
not Iin0w11. The troops had thnt morning put Raja La1 Singh in
irons, ns having dislioiloured the Ranee, ' the mother of all Sikhs.'
They liad also imde Deewan Deem Nath announce, in their name,
to nll governors and oflicers the dcath of Jowvahir Singli, and had
cousciited to clo the same to the Valteels with me ; but they had
forbidden any commniiication directly to me, saying that in fhtnre
n o letter to the English was to be written till the m n y had delibcrated on its contents. Tliey declared, however, thnt they desired
pcnce, but that if troops marched from our stations to Loodecana
nnd Ferozepore, they would march too ; if not, that each Power
should Iteep its own tcrritory in peace.
They give out that Raja Goolab Singh is to have the Wuzeership,
only on condition of increasing their pay and malting a consiclcrablo
donation ; but till thepwty of chiefs, which is moviug them throng11
t h e punchayets, shall decide on its nest step, little relinnce is to be
pli~cedon what they may say. For the present, however, there
is 110 recognised hcad of the Government, except the puucllayets of
tllc army, which have not for some clays used the nnlne of the
3I:xha~ajahat all; and the voice of the troops n7ns, on the 2211d,
for remaining in this state till the Dussemh, when thcy propose to
noinillate n Goveimment to carry on ordinary busilless under the
puiidinyets. Tliey have named one of the lllillor Sirdars, Miyall
Pirthce Singh, a relntion of the Jummoo family, wlvllo has, withoot
:~ppcaring,been deep in tlic intrigues of the last fern months.
h I c m t i m e the efiorts of the Dnrbnr to corrupt our ~ ~ n t i v e
solcliers were not rclnsecl. C t ~ p t .Nicolson, in n letter to tho
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&elll, dated September 27, npyenrs to have doubted m]let]lcr
t b c attemllls JVere ~nfficicnllyserious to juslify the Agent's
ztnxiely. He snit], ' Ihave no ap~relicnsiontllat (liLgJl~llt:lZi
v d l (10 our sepoya any hasm. La1 Singh'y efforts,jv]lile ]lero,
apllear to have been directed principally towlards raising tlle
~ e m i l l d a r s' to plnnder nild cnt off onr comm~nicatiOns.'
In his next letter hc inentioned having found a Silrll tllnt
morning among his orderlies, n+o had told thc1-n th;tt tilo
LBm nras six miles on this side of Lahore, and tllnt tihe
Silrl~swould Irccp the fcstiwl of the Dasahra in Piroxpr. 11s
h e failed lo give a satisfactory account of himself, 'l\Ticolsol~
clotnilled him, and, on fnrtbcr inquiry, it alymrecl that he
was a gunner of 11nt5mudclin's artillery sent as a sp~r.
By September 29, Nicolson had found out that the Ag~:c!nl
h a d good grounds for his anxiety. I n a letlcr of that date to
t h e Agent, he mentioned that Colonels Courtl~ndlam1 Lnfont,
formerly of the Sikh scrrice, and a Signor Bsrtolozzi, were in
F i ~ o z p m where
,
thch presence mas undesiral~le,as &'ording
a n opportunity for Sikh soldicrs to come over the bordcr on
t h e prctcxt of visiting their old officers. The Agent was aslted
t o sanction an orrlcr for turning these foreigriers ont of
oantonnle~~ls. That morning eigllleen ~ u c nof one of the
Native lnfnntry regiments were reported to havc desertd,
' snpposed to be sednced away by the father of one of thcin
~ 1 1 is
0 a Laliore h a ~ i l d a r and
, ~ l ~ a s it
, scems, lately becn in
tile lines of lhat regimcnt on a visit. Nothing hut tlic utmost vigilance on the part of our commnndanls that m
s t l y j l y e , - s visit their lines, can sccnrc our troops.
I canuot
search, or employ police in the lines of regiments.' It alas
a delicate and difficnlt matter to deal with ; sometimes, if there be only suspicion of nn enemy tampering nit11
the selloys, it 151ay be highly injudicious to cornmu~~ictlte
this
to the officers of the regimcnt, between whom and
their laen
sh0ul~1be mutual.
Broadfoot issllccI some excellent instructions on the subject
both to &pt. Nicolson and to Capt. Mills.
7>

by Pnnjnbis for nn nrnmy. It mny be
O ~ C ~ Q C Y
bc trallslnted the n corruption of the French l'c~.~~rrr'c,
or inllnbitnnts ZaminrlZ~ introduced by t l ~ cforeign o f I i c c ~ ~ .
mcnnt; properly d l i v n t o r .
nlcnning probnbly sergeant in
the Lnllorc ~ r l ~ l y .
r Tl,js is tilo \\rord genernHy used
0

Dnr~7uX~izi,
~ ~
hrny
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The foregoing is snfficient to show that Septembcr 1845
closed in R, manner ominous to the continnnnce of those
friendly relntions vith the Silths, which the Goyenlor-General
strove so earnestly to mainhin. The impression caused by
the report of these events in England mas, that though the
death of the profligate Wazir could not be a matter of regret,
yet 'the frequency of such crimes mncl horrors as have for
some yews disgraced the Punjab, must deprive all who lnay
in succession attain to poyer, of any title to our respect or
confidence.'
Dur;ng October, Bronclfoot visitccl some of the hill shtes.
nr:Ls cold and t l ~ owork nlns somewhat rough, but
TIlc Jyeatl~er
tile tent life (lid his henltli mnc.11good. E e nras accompanied
bSr
Cast. The Governor-General was on his wily frolll
Calcutta town.rcls the frontier. His route lay throng11 Mnttra,
Agra, Delhi, to ICarnAl, : L I ~thence throngh the country
ullder tlic jnrifidiction of the Agent.
On Octobor 2, Cnpt. Nicolson officially reported to tlw
Agent that lie had discovered n diroct ncl of tampering with
our sepoys, by RAID Did, the Lahore Vnlril, and asked for
orders. A sepoy visited the Vnltil, ancl got n pass permitting
llim to cross the river. Next morning thnt man :ml three
others of his regiment were missing. On October G the
Agent wrote to say that he considered the arrest of the Sikh
spy to be very important. IIe desired Cnpt. Nicolson not to
p l ~ c ethe Vnlcil uncler restraint without orders ; but empowered
Ilim to use his own discretion regarding others implicntcd, and
mslied 11im to collect carefully all the proof lie conld obtain.
The desertions showed the officers of native regiments
what was going on, nnd Nicolson complained that they mere
disposed to be somewhat premature in arresting persons suspcctcd to be Silih emissaries.
Reports of all kinds naturally spread abroad ; rct one
timc it was said that n party of fakirs visited the lincs in
broad claylight, ancl, after cnlling out the sepoys by blowing a
shell, clesirecl them in thc nnme of God to leave the British
~ervice. At another, it was reportcd that a9 soon ns the SilJl
army crossed the Sutlej, our s e p y s hnd determined to join
thcm. Commenting on this, Nicolson entcred i n hi8 (limy
the following rcmnrk : ' But still the sooner we put dolvn the
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rnbble army the better. TVe are too near it for the esample
n o t to be detrimental.'
On October 10 the cnt1.y is : ' This is the Dusserah. No
o n e lrnoms mhnt it may yroducc. But Gocl rules the hearts
of all. Granl thnt Hc may give me honour and justice 011my
sicle, however the ball may play.'
On that clay Ram Dial visitcd Capt. Nicolgoll: he spolte
a b o u t Aiiancll~nrI\lalrhonml, ancl snicl that the Dnrbar had reidled Col. Chet Sing11 and Lnl Singh, both of whom were
rebels ; that the TVimir, J n w a l ~ iSingh,
~
hncl ncither cliscret i o n nor sense, but that the Rani was wise and circnmsl~ect.
T h e oflice of minister, h e saicl, hacl been offered to Raja Gulnb
Singh, who hacl cleclinecl it, saying that he wished to live for
n o r e than six months. The Vakil further remarked, t h ~ t
t w o things were miscliiovons when they ran riot : n woinan's
tongue in a house, and the army in a state. He aclmittecl the
necessity for caro and vigilance on both sides ; on the Sikh
side to prevent their troops from giving offence, nncl on ours
t o protect ourselves from injury. He seemed dcsirous to
ascertain whnt movement of troops had been ordered hy us,
a n d also to give the impression that the Dtzrbnr mas disposed
t o be fi.iendly; but a t the same time to convey a c1oul)t
~ v h e t h e rit was able to rcstrnin its own troops, ancl thercby in
case of outbreak to provide an escape.
Immedintcly aftcr Jnwahir Singh's death, the new Governm c n t rcsolvecl to send letters to the Agent nnnouncingthat event,
~pologisingfor his concluct, and in general rectifying all that
hscl been the subject of complaint on our part. This mns no
sooner settled, than the w r y brigaclc which had murdered
Janrahir Singh, partly becnusc of his hostility to us, dcriaenclecl,
as the p i c e of thcir recognition of the existing Go~~ernment,
t h a t they shonld be led against Pirozpar. The suclclen change
frustrated the attempt. nt reconci1i:ztion. The nrmy was diviclecl iu opinion as to the best nrrangcment for carrying on
tile go~ernment. Court's brigade was in favour ofrnnlring Raja
&lab Sing$ ~ninister; the other brigades seemed clisposed to
support t h e Rani, who behnved a t this crisis with great courage.
Sometilnes fig l - a n y as two thon~nl~cl
of thesc rccltlcss nncl
insubordinate soldiers would attei~tlthe Darbar nl one time.
6 T h e Ranee, against tllo remonstrallces of the chicfs, ~ ~ C C ~ V C
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them u ~ ~ ~ c i l with
e d , which they are so charmed that evcn
Court's brigncle agreed to confirm her in the government if sho
woulcl move into their camp, and let them see llcr unvcilctl
mhencvcr they thought proper.' These strsngc clisorclerly
ruffians, even when under the direct influence of her great
bennty am1 personal attractions, reprovecl hcr for her uncoucealcd nlisconduct with Haja L d Singh, :md recornmenclecl
her, as she seemcd to dislike solitucle, to marry ; they told
her she might select wholn she plcased out of thrcc cli%~ses,
namely, chicfs, alcnli~,~
or wise men. She nclopted n bold tonc
with thc troop, anel not only reproschecl them, but abused
them i n the grosseat language, whilst thcy listened v i t h pretcnrled humility.
Contrary to espectation, the festival of the Dasahl.a, ~vcnt
off quietly, ancl hopes mere tl~ereforecntertaiilecl that the
situation might improve. The state of the finances, homcvc?r,
1mcluclecl thc Agent from attaching much importance to tltcw
holm. H e reported that a strong government might with
strict economy mdce the country sulq~ortthe army a t tho
present rnte of pay, and without rudncing its strength. I11
the absence of such a government, tllc moment w,s allproaching vhen the demands of the army must be lomerecl, or
thc country moulcl Be unable to mcct them. It mas, indeecl,
so near, in the Agcnt's opinion, that tlio crisis might a t ally
moment.be precipitateel either by causing the revenue t o bc
mithheld, or by a fresh demand for gratuities, or cven by the
failure of a single crop.
The Governor-Gencrd, in forwnrding these rel,orts, rcmarked : ' The state of affairs, however, cannot hi1 to exhihi1
thc hopelessness of our seeing a permanent go.i~ernmentestablished in the Punjah out of the elements that 1101~csist thcrc,
capable of condncting the aclministration of the country, and
rcclucing the army to a stnte of snbordination and c o n t r ~ l . ' ~
Broaclfoot's lctterv to his family vere now necessarily very
short, his time heing fully occnpiecl. Therc is a letter to his
sister, dated 0ctol)er 19, 1845, in which, after explainillg wily
lie ooulcl not write much, lie saicl :
4 AKall, IL hody of f n n n t i d Sikh,
by nnme devoted to G o d the Illmortnl,
by prnatiae devoted to nlisrnlc nnd

plundor.

Governor-Gcneml to t l ~ eSecret
Committee, Octobcr 23, 1845. pcpcYs
tk, p. 7.
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BROADPOOT'S HEALTH

The Governor-Generalis nt Agra, and I must soon 60 to meet
him at the Juinna, the boundary of my district, so I am more
occupiecl than ~zsual.
Poor Stewart, of Willism's regiment, is in my house in a sad state
from apoplexy, of which ho liss had several attaclts ; mind and body
are shaken. He goes home, and Mrs. Stema~twill see both you
and all our aunts in London if possible.
That is all that appears in Broadfoot's papers ; but ill
esplannlion, and ns s n instance of his natural lrindness, nncl
perhaps estravagnnce, it inay bc mentionccl on the antl~oritp
of Sir J. Campbell Brown, who was then Broadfoot's doctor,
t h i ~ Cnpt.
l
Stewart was very ill in his own house, in one of the
neighbonriug stations on one of the lower hills. Brondfoot,
on hearing of this, scnt ior him rind his wife to stay at Bimla,
in hop~uthat the change might restore the invalid. Soon
after their arrival he saw how ill Stewart was, and spoltc to
Dr. Brown about him, cspressing an opiiiion that thc only
chance he h i ~ dof recovery was to return at once to England.
The doctor concurred ; bnt wllen Broitdfoot mentioned the
subject, i t appearecl that the expense conld not be met.
Brondfoot then said, 'Sell your house and go.' They mere
very willing, but could not find a purchaser. Ire idred what
the price was, was told, nncl bought the house.
Another reminiscence on the same authority may be here
appropriately introclucecl.
I n Sirnln, Broadfoot's health being unsatisfactory, he
sent one clny for Dr. Brown, nnd said he wished to col~sult
him on a scrious matter. He foresaw the storm gathering
over the Punjab, and the possibility that ere long it would
burst. H e therefore aslied the cloctor whelher his state of
health was such as to wanant him in believing that he could
carry 011 his work, a1111 undertake snch serricc ns might become
necessnry. Ile acldccl thal he was in co~~fidentiul
correspondence
with Lhe Governor-General, correspondence not necesmrily
Beon by the Government of India, and tlierefore it was his
duty to warn Sir H. Harclinge if there were any prob,zl,ility
of his brealting down nt the impending crisis, in order that a
co~upetentsuccessor might be rencly.
Dr. Brown said that this was so ~eriousn matter, that he
woulcl like to watch Broi~dfootclosely for s meek before lie
A A
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gave an opinion. TIC did so, and came to the conclnsion that,
as far as h c could tell. l3roaclfoot might reasoi~nblyhope to do
satisfactorily such clnty as might bc required.
In Cnpt. Nicolson's diary therc is an cntry on October 22,
to t h e effect that Gen. Littler had n lctter yesterday from
Agra, in n~liich Sir 13. Hn,rclinge'~arrival on the 16th was
mentioned. Hc was to live with Mr. Thomason till tlie 20t11,
and then go into tents in the forl, taking adwntnge of Che
palace builclings during the bent of lhe clay. Irnnxdi~~tely
after breakfast on t h e first clay, h e said aloud to Mr. Thomason
how well 13roeitfoot hncl Behavcd in prcvci~lingconfidentin1
information honl bccomingpnl~lic. H e also mentioned Broadfoot's fall from his horse, which, h c thought, had made him
a liCtle more riel-vons than mas necessary."
The position of affairs, ELSviewcd by the Gorcrnor-Goncral,
may be gathered from the following letter :
Agrn : October 23, 1845.

My dear Lord Ellenborough,-The ileahh of Jowahir Sing11 11ns
caused the Durbar s t shore to be most nnxioos to mnew fricnillv
relations with us, demonstrated by several ncts, such ns discouraging
our deserters, and malting the necessary atonements for some impertinences of Jomahir Sing11 towards Broadfoot.
The Rnnee now reviews the troops u?medcd, and dressed as a
dancing woman, which displeases tlie old and gratifies the young ;
but her irregularities nre so monstrously indecent that the troops
have held her horse aull dvised her to be rnoro chasle, or they
mould no longer style her the mother of all the Sikhs.
Golnb Sing11 is hanging bi~ck,and prudently clccliilcs the dangerous distillotion of being the Sildl TVuzzeer, bicliug his time, if
ever it should arrive, wvlien an opportunity may occur of restraining
the Silt11 aimy.
On the recent occasion the pu~lclx~yets
formally. required
the
minister to atteud upon them in their camp, and account for his
conduct in having caused Peshora Shgh to be nssassinatcd contrary
to their order, the prince being under their protection ; now they
dictate to the Ranee the course they think proper to ndopt, and the
chiefs, dreading their vengemce &nd Tiolence, apply to us to abate
the nuisance. These chiefs are mostly ndvcnturers, with a few osceptions, and, in their desperate condition, desire the destruction of
the army and their own restoration to power ; but the whole Sikh
L h n s presuulnbly more npprohensive of an outbreak.
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tribe or sect is merely one-sixth of the population ; and to nIIow n,
Britisll anny to be hired to dest~oythe peater portion of the Sikll
nntion, to replace a few chiefs in pomer, is a policy worse than
questionable. The Punjab m x t , honwrer, be Silih or British ; and
I see no elements out of which R, Sikh Goverunlent can by possibility
b e constructed. The delny is merely a postpo~lcmeutof tho sottleinent of the question ; a t the smle lime we must boar in mind tI~nt
a s yet no cause of war has beell given. The lull followi~~g
tl~olate
breeze will last, I thinlr, through this cold season, iud I anticilnte
n o offensive operations.
With regard to my Conncil, ia the miauto proposing to go up
t o the frontier, I stated, as you had done, that it moulcl ho ngreonble
t o me, if the public scrvice would allow of it, that I should bave the
nclvnntage of their advice. The home authorities, wishing this to
b e tlie course because Lord h u c h n d h 6 d got into his Afghnnishu~
scrape when separated from his Council, and you into your Soinclo
conquest, very much wished that I sl~ouldbe protectoil from such
vagaries by - and -! This I gatlior from letters written
from the Lndin House by the directors and others. I treat it ns
Yours kc.
trash. The Taj ininlitably beautif111 1
I-I. H,LRDINGE.
Next dny Sir Henry addressed the Commander-in-Chief on
t h e subject of commissariat prepnrations which mere required.
H e stated t h a t thongh h e did not nnticipate our troops
would have to take t h e field that antumn, yet, ns we had to
den1 with a n irresponsible and mutinous Sikh army, whose
caprice might at a n y time lend to e rupture with our forcea
on t h e frontier, it was necessnry to be prepared for movement
t o a limited extent. If, as ass hoped, the attitude of t h e Darbar sho~zlclbecome more friendly, then by degrees the present
~ c n l cof defensive preparation might be red~~ccd.'
The following letter t o the Private Sccrctary refers to the
boats which h a d been sent to Firoxpnr, nnd mhich mere collected on the river near t h c village of Ghulhn Husainmilli,
i n tt suitable place choscn by Lieut. Goodnrg'n of the Uengal
Engineers. Their custody nlould appear to have been entrusted to the General commmding at Firozpnr ; but it mill
b e recollected that, wilhout the exprcss permission of the
Agent, d l exercise with them wns forbidden. The dual con7

Compare Qovcrnor-Gonoral t o Commaniler-in-Chief, Oetobcr 21, 1845.
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trol would seem to have threatened the usual result-nn
intcrruption to the hnrmony which should exist between the
servants of one Government.
Camp, Puthurnulla : October 27, 1845.

My dear Hardinge,--I have this day had the pleasure of receiving your note of the 20th inst. inclosing copies of corresponiIence
about the bridge of boats. Kindly assure the Governor-C4eneral
that I: have scrupulously abstnined from everything which could
bear the nppeerance of ass~umingcontrol over these boats, nay, even
of taking any interest in them once they reached Ferozepore ; never
syealiing of tlleln but ~vllenspolreri to or willen to, and even then
confining myself to answering questions put, or doing as far ns I
could what was required. My reason mas that I thought there was
from the beginning n, strange touchiness about these boats as well
as the pontoon train, which, if not carefully humonred as far as
dnty allowed, might have interrupted the smooth working of fhe
pihlic service so h r a s I had to do will1 the Commaniler-ill-Chief.
(l 1l m
. misconception, however, as to Edmnrds's letter explains some
references both to me and to my Assistarit at Ferozepore, which I
conld not at the time account for, and had to take a little pahs to
dispose of without offence. The Governor-General's letter will,
however, no doubt set all right agJn.
When your note arrived I w ~ mriting
s
to Currie to ask, what you
tell mo as far as Delhi, vix. the Governor-Genernl's probable movements. The reports you mention circulated here also ; and to contribute to settling them, I moved out in the opposite direction to the
frontier.
Believe me kc.
G. DROADFOOT.

CHAPTER XV.
Lnllore i n ~ o v e m b e r - L e t t e r from P. A. Vans Agnem-Major Nnolcoson-Notes
f r o m Cnpt. Nicolson's diary-Brondfoot warns tho Darbnr-Intimntes the
S i k h nlovements to S i r 11. Gough and Sir J. Littler-Tho Commn~~dcr-inChiof o r d c r s up certain troops-Broadfoot issues orders rognrding wpplics
for them-Instructions to his: A~sistnnts-His view of tho objccts nnd duty
of Lhe frontier force-Sincerity of endeavours to mnintain poaco-Neccssity
f o r taking things coolly-Lettm fronl Sir H. H~rrdingcnnd Nr. CurrieF i n a l offort of the modernte party in Darbar to avert wnr-Brondfoot joins
t h c overn nor-Genernl a t ~ a m d - T l l c Governor-Genernl postpones bringing
UP t h e troops-l'he
Silt11 army moving towcrrds the Sutlej-Vakil ordered to
leave the cninp-Provision for the rapid mnroh of the Neernt t~oops-Capt.
Saundors Abbott's nnrrntive-Tho Sikh troops cross thc Sntlej-Discropanties i n vnrioiis reports-Prool.zmntion by the Governor-Goneral-Advnnco
of t h e B r i t i s h nrmy-Arrival nt LIudld.

TEE s i t u a t i o n n t L a h o r e in November is thus briefly epitomised by 13crbert Eciwardes. After recording tho boldness
and a c t i ~ ~ i tdyi q h y e d by the Rani, who appeared to have
' laid aside h o r clebrtncheries with her veil,' he remnxked :
B u t the time for prudence had gone by. The vessel of State,
too long unrrntchod, llad drifted to the rapids' edge, nnd d l that
sltill and courage could now do was to seize the helm, put the 1)a.rk's
head strnight, and plunge boldly into I;he fonining gulf. Finding
that it was hopelos~tt o oppose the army, the Rnni wisely yielded;
encouraged its escesses; called its machess reason; and urged it
on in the hope of guiding it to destruction. EIistory scaroely records
a, conception more bold and able; and, while reprobating it~tunpiincipled execution, we cannot withl~old our admiration at the
design .2
E a r l y in November, Brondfoot left Simla in order to meet
the G o v e r n o r -General, who wns marching towards the NorthWcst. IIaveloclr dincd with him on the evening before ho left,
' and lrept us up late by clescribii~gthe battle of Mahmajpur at

'

. P q w s ctc. p. 10.
C r t l c ~ l l cRuviclu,
~
No, ix, vol. vi. art. vi. p. 250.
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I romember Brondfoot's comment, that Sir

11. Gong11 lmcl not his troops in hand.'

'

On the road down fvom Siml,z, ono of his Arabs fell over the clifl
and was Billecl. Herbert Edwardes remarkecl prophetically that a
Romm would hnve gone back if such an onlen had bcfallen

It is curious that an evil omen n l ~ obefell Sir Robert Sale,
on t h e same ocmsion which led Eclwmles to remark :
A Greek or Roman general would have been more fortunnte,
though lcss brave ; for he would have acceptod the augury with \vl~ich
Sir Robert entered on tho campaign, and returned in the belief that
the gods mere against the espedition. In coming down the hill
~
from Simla, all the swords Tliich had been presented to h i m f o his
former services were stolen from among his baggage, and never
recovered.'

The following letter from U r . P. A. Vans Agnew, Major
Broadfoot's Bssistmt a t F r i z i l l r n , ~ l ~ o whorn
s
imminent was
t l ~ edanger of nction on t h e part of the Silchs provocative of
a ruptnrc with the Eritish power, evcri at a comparntively
remote part of t h e frontier.
Fezilka : November 6, 1845.

My dear Sir,-I have nlrendy on two or three occasions brongkl
to your notice a dispute about some villages which the Bikhs claim
from this side. I believe the river has come over this yenr, but they
beli;~~-e
with so much insolence to my people that I cannot gct the
water properly measured, and I camlot report olticidly to you until
I do. To-clay my Peish1inr"llas come back stating that hc cannot
get through his
ancl that the Sikh I<nrclnrs7 have sent over
zemindars who l1n17e run away fsom me and are liable to pnnishrnent.
[It is fnrther reportecl] tliat the Sikhs h a w assembled a f o ~ c eto
take possession, and arc beyoud control.
Having already writ,tcn to you on this subject without having
received any iustructions, I cannot take i ~ p o nmyself the responsibility of m y active mensures. I have little doubt but that the
villages will be tnlten before I can get your answer, and m y nttempt
of lninc to prevent this would came bloodshed. The only force
I I!ave is nearly fifty irregular Sowars of the 8th Cavalry, and no
Mr. Cnst's mctnornndum.

' Calczllta Review, No.

1s. vol. vi.

nrt. vi. p. 264, footnotc.
B&zilltn,municipal town in Sirsn
district, Punjnb, nnd h e a d [ ~ u a ~ l c rofs
the lnhsil of the snmo ntlme. (IIunter.

Ii~qxwinlCa-ctfoer.)
PCS~Z~CZY,
nn ngent, deputy, or
fiubordinnte revenue oiliecr. (H, H.
Wilson, Cilossanj.)
' K d r d d ~ , an agent of Governn~ent.
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beets; so I am not in a position to check any insult they may
I am kc.
perpetrate across the nulla.
P. A. VANS A G N E W . ~
?

Mr. Currie wrote on Nov. 9 to i n t i m a t e t h e movements
o f the Governor-General's camp.

H e said :

We a r e to be a t Dellli on the 15tl1, halt lGth, 17th, and 18th,
.
and m a r c h on to~varils Kumal and Umballa 011 the 19t11.
Ji7hen w e meet we will settle about your Assistants; if you still
&sire t o llttve young Cunningh~nlfrom the Blyaore Commission,
I dare s a y it can be manngcd. Tho only objection i s his being a
1U~llnsoficer 11swell as yourself, brought up to our frontier.
Wit11 regard to n snccessor to Leech, i t s e e m to m e h'1aclreson9
i s the b e s t inan. He mill soon be relieved in due course from his
present office by the return of ltobinson from the Cape ; and he has
talent, character, and experience.
Tho Governor-Gonerd, however, wishes you to state exactly
your opinion of him, nlld if you thinlc you can work cordially with
him a n d be sure of his co-operation.
You Itnow, of courae, Ilial Nicolson goes to the Rlysore princes
i n Cslcutta.
The Govcmor-Gonernl is much gratified nt the entire ignorance
i n \ d i i c l ~the pitblic see~uto bc kept as to all your proceedings, and
his ~ i e w sand intentious regarding Punjab aflairs. Yon must take
care and not let your visiting us on our way create needless
alarm.'

..

Cnpt. Nicolson's diary contains evidence that t h e continued strain of maintaining relations of amity with s u c h a
Air. Vans Agnew wns an excellent
olljcer, of whom Brondfoot llnd n high
opinion. I-Ic wad aftenvardci ltilled at
hIultnn.
9 Ynjor
Uackoson's services a s
Politicnl Ollicer nt Peshnww llnve been
incidcntnlly monLioncd, and his u ~ m e
hns on m u n y ooucuhx nppeared in
these pnges. IIc filled with orcdit a
variety of appoiulments, and fell, in
1853, in Peslmwar, by tthc llnnd of a
~nurderous fanutie. His dcnth nrns
thus referred to and lnnlcntcd by Lord
Dnlhonsio, then Governo~-Gcncral of
India: The reputntion of Gout.-Col.
Mnckeson as a soldier is known to and

honoured by dl. His value ns a political servant of the Stato is known to
none better thnu to the GovelmorGeneral himself, who in a clillicult
nnd e ~ e n t f u ltime had cause to murk
his &rent nbility, and the adrnirnblc prudence, discrotion, nnd temper,
which added tenfold value to the high
soldierly qunlities of his public charuater.
'Tho lofis of Col. Maclceson's life
would have dimmed a victory. To lose
him t l ~ n by
s Lhe hand of n foul nssussin
is n n~islorturlcof the hcaviest gloom
for the Cto~ernrnent,which countod
him among its braved and best.'
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power as the Bilihs was becoming so intolcmble, that open
rtlpture would be mclconlecl.
I n a letter to the Agent, in which he complainccl of the incivility of the Lahore Vakil, and promisecl to answer h i m v i t h
quiet civility, he conclnclucl by exl~ressinga wish that ' it mere
all at a n end, and we mere a t the ultimn ratio.' Soon there
followed reports from Lahore that the Rani hncl promisecl, if
the troops nrould swear to be faithful, to lead them against
Firoxpur and the English, nncl to give them rewards ont of
the trcasure to be taltcn on our side of the river. At t h e close
of a letter to Broaclfoot, dntcd No~wnber12, Nicolson snicl:
The Governor-General has promised to give m c the Mysore
princes ; but if the present ilenrsprove correct, I shall request
to be permitted to continue in employ, or to accompany the
force a s a vol~mtcer,if your itrrangcments for relieving me are
complete. Post i1.Ici~tetr~
Y c m s ! ns wc usecl to say nt sd~ool.'
Reports moro or less frequent arrivecl of endeavours to
scduce the sepoys from thcir allegiance. One of t h e agents,
employecl to discover n h t m s going on, expressed grcat
ansicty to lrnonr when the Enropenns were expected to arrive ;
and when Nicolson said tlmt they had plei~ty of European
soldiers, who were not required in such numbers when w p plementecl by natives, the man quietly replicd tlint no reliance was to be placed on the native army.'
O n the 13th, Nicolson mentioned a, report t h a t the Sikh
troops were being persuaded to cross the Sutlaj, mainly on the
plea that their treasuries were esl~austed,and that they must
depend for pnymenlt on British spoil. To clisc~~ss
this, a great
meeting was convened at Ranjit Singh's tomb for November
19 ; t h e party assemblecl was to enrear solemnly to maintain
good faith towarcls each other, nncl to pllrsuo the common
ol?ject, viz. to acquire funds and to punish the Briiish, who
were daily becoming more exncting and oppressive.
Nest clay lie rcportccl to the Agent that h e believed t h e
Silrh troops wonlcl move lo Knna Kachha and EIarike ; but h e
donbtccl if they woulcl advailcc farther.
O n the 17th, Nicolson complainecl that the last letter he
had receivcd from Broadfoot was datecl November 6.
H e conjectured that the Agcnt was moving nbout the disTho \\orcIu hc utlcd were: cIIindust~ni
lashkar par ohandin ittibsr nahin.'
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a l s o wrote, more wit11 spccial reference to whi~tmiglit happen
o n t h a t part of thc frontier. In the letter he said that the
Sikh army had taken the 1)arbnr a t its word, and thre;ttencd
it with destruction uillcss the chief men evinced their sincerity
by leading it ngainsb the English. In thc Pirozpur direction
4,000 horsc and two brigades of infantry, with guns, mere to
go uilcler Sham Singh of Atari, a bull-headed S i b , who hatcd
and feared the Sikh army, but if ho once began to fight,
would fight with courage.
I n the cvent of invasion, tlie Agent considered that the
g r m t object of Sir J. Littler's force would be to hold the two
important stations of Ludhiana and Pirozpur. Not to prot e c t t h e former mould be dishonour to us, and shnlte coiiiidence
throughout India : the latter mns importnnt as a considerable
military dep6t. But he gave these opinions ' with di%dence to
one so much my militnry superior.'
Sir 13. Gonghreplied to Mnjor Broadfoot on November 20,
and intimated the following preparatory arrangements.
Her Majesty's 9th Lancers to move nt once from Neerut to
Umballn.
To be lleld in rei~dillessto move from Meerut to Iiurunl on
t h e shortest notice : two troops of Horse Artillery ; I-1.N.h 16th
Lancers ; the 3rd Regiment of Light Cavalry; H.31.'~10th Foot,
suvc one company ; the corps of Sappers and Miners ; all save 0110
of the regiments of Native Infantry.
The 8th Regilnellt of Irregular Cavalry will likewise be hold
prepared to move from I-Iamee to Kurnal, and the Sirmoor battalion
from Deyreh to Saharunpore, mllere it will be centrically situated,
rind ready to be moved wherever it may most be required ; the 4th
Regiment of Irregular Cavalry will be brought up from 13areilly to
hloernt.
On the margin of the original letter are l3roaclfoot's pencil
notes, inclieating the arrangements for providing supplies on
iihe various lines of march.
He appears to have divided the labour thus : Cud, to see
t o supplies on the road from Meerut to Ambalu, also from
H a u s i to Icarnnl, and on the Sallnranpur r o d ; he was also,
in nddition to the amins7 with each regiment, to appoiut a
permanent amin for certain roads in the district; in all, four

' Avrlrt, nn ngenl, superviaor, or cornmissioner.
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amins. Mills, f o ~ au m h s for the roads in his district. Nicolson,
two amins. Al~bott,two amins. Erslrine, or, in his absence,
Hodgson, orders to comply with the requisitions of the officers
commanding Europem corps for coolies; Hodgson, if necess q , to be giwn full powers to direct chiefs to comply with
his requisitions.
These oficers nTcre informed that the QuartormasterGeneral would be requcsted to furnish detailed routes, and to
cnnse timely indents to be scnt i n ; but i n the moan time
supplies must be liclcl in readiness nt the ordinary halting
plnces and their neigl~bourhoocl. Tlle protectecl chiefs were
called upon to hold their troops in readiness, nnd to furnish
supplies and cwrii~ge.
I11 reporting what he hacl clone, for the information of the
Governor-Chxcral, the Agcnt remarltecl that h e had rcceived
n o complaint from tho Darbnr ; t h a t the w n r n h ~ gh e had
itdclresscd to the Vakil, though mcrely a repetition of what
had previously been given, was SO explicit that nothing C O L
be plainer ; that his Assist,zntsJ reports from t h e frontier
showcd that our posts there were vigilant ; but that now
h e had reccivecl authentic intelligence that the Darbar had
adopted, and ordered in writing, n fixed plan of opcmtions
against thc English, in consequence of which h e hacl ofhially
acldressecl the C o m m a r e r - i n - i f . H e aclcled :
I now only suggest abstinence from movement on account of the
vicinity of the Governor-Geueral,who mill probably tllink the matter
one which has now gone too far to be left unnoticed, whether the
troops actually move from Lahore or not.
lint I presumed to snggest any delay whatever is owing to this.
I t nppenrs to me that the frontier is too long to be defensible in all
points by any force we can move ; tlmt our two posts on the fronticr
are strong enough to maintain themwlves till relieved ; and that to
attempt reinforcements, therefore, in nnticipation of those of the
Sikhs, would be useless as protecting the open country, and might
impede m y operations which the Governor-General may ~esolveon.
Moreover, the delay recommended is only one of two or- lhree d q s ,
till an answer to this letter can be received.8

The instructions to Cnpt. Nicolson \\pill be found in tho
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folloving l e t t e r ; they appear t o be eminently snited to the
occasion, a n d to the nmn to whom thejl were addressed.

My dear Nicolson,-I have to thank you for a good many letters,
and answer all in one.
1st. TVllnt has now occurred has been for some time prepa.ring,
has 11ot been unlmown : how it will end, no n i m here, or in
Lahore, can predict ; bnt whether the Silzli troops coine across
the Sutlcj or not, our line of procedure is the snn~e-watchfulness,
readiness to defend our OWTI posts, a d then quiet forbearnnco, and
this up to the last moment.
In your iiitercourse with thc Valieel, remember yon are not
charged with the reletions between the Government of Lahore mid
that of India, but o d y with the duties of a district of the protected
territory. You cannot, therefore, whatever occum, nssume that there
is hostility between the Covenlments till you hear it from me. I11
opposing aggression or hostile conducl, you vill tbercfore call on the
1,aliore Valtccl to help yon. You nil1 match him, liomever, and
effectually cl~eclrnny hostile practices on his pnrt, withont sI10wing
that you nrfitch or suspect him, if it can be avoided ; and if it cannot
be nvoicled, assnming, till you hear the contrary from me, that in
acting tonlards u s with hoslility he is disobeying his Government.
You are already authorised to go to whatever expense you please to
lteep yonrself informed of all that passes illolig the Sutlej, and yon
may now also cmploy men to obtain information from the other side
of the river ; b u t in this yon mill observe great caution, both in hiring
mea and in relying 011 their reports. Yo17 will, of courso, lteep me
infonllecl of all that passes.
With respect to the movements of the Silths, two things mny
happen : they may march to the Sutloj, and there halt ; for this
they are responsible to the Governor-Gened, no subordinnte can
cfill them to ~lcconiltfor it ; but not a man should be suffered to
pass hhe river a t Ferozepore, and any doing so should be forlhwith
appreliended. You will also inform tho Valzeel that the movement of
troops towards the Sutlej is contrary to ancient practice iind the
Itnown rule8 of frieidship, and that you are certain I will denlalid
a n wcount of i t from the Durbar as soon as I hem of it. You mill
make n o mention of the Government.
Should the Silt11 troops cross llie river at Ferozepore, the MajorGeneral commanding will probably attack them ; but he is the sole
judge of w11at is to be done in such n case. Pour business is simply,
on his requisition, to give all possible aid in information, and in
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placing as completely ns may be the resources of your district at the
Jftjor-General's ~ o i n m ~ n d s .
It will be uscfid, hovever, for YOU to ~ O T What,
V
in my opinion,
are tile objects of the frontier force, SO that yo11 1Xtiy be ready beforellnnd to aid in their attainmelit, remembering, of collwe, that if
the i\lnjor-General should conteinplate othcr objccts, you will still
nid hill1 to the utmost, reporting fully to me. you must on 110
nccount risk the dishonour of our arms, because in your opinion
they are not used exactly as the Govoril~nentmay wish : that is a,
point for the C+oven~meiitto settle a i t h tho Uajor-General. Your
business is hearty co-operntion with the Intter.
In my opinion the frontier posts of Loodeeana rind l?croxepore
nre only for the protcctioil of the frontier generally durinm pence.
I t would be their duty to aid the political oficers in pulting don111
the disturbances or aggressions on a slnnll scale to w h h peace
i s liable; but anything like nn invssion in force they cnnnot be
cspccted to cope with ; t h e i ~duty in that case is to maintain their
posts till relieved, which mould be speedily accon~plished. The
dofence of the frontier against aggression is the power of the Cf.ovornment to punish the aggressive nation ; and towards Llie escrcise of
tliot power the frontier force will contribute best by securing against
all comers these important stations with the stores, bonts kc. they
contain. For the protection of the counlry at largc, and Lhe altinlntc piinislment of the invading nation, the Governor-Genera] will
provide. I t is Lhe business of Lhe fi'ontier forces to nwait his time
for doing so.
The Sikh army marches well, and is strong in cavalry well
adapted for plundering. If resohed on war, they can in spite of us
cross before me know they hnve left Lahore ; and they can ravage
the open conntry and recross before me can reach them. Still more
effectually can they for a time cut off the communications of the
force a t Feroxepore and Loodeeana. This need create no alnrm:
the Corumder-in-Chief is nt this station; the Governor-Genernl
is close a t h a d , and the very stoppnge of the dnwlts moulcl iiifolom
these authorities that the frontier posts required relief; nncl till tllat
comes, I have no uneasiness about either station. I nlention tllis
became you vill be closely watched, and you must treat a11 that
may happen with seeming indulgence. You must moreover be
prepared to allay any alarm which m y arise.
In one of your lctters yon speak as if our Government was not
sincere i n its endeavours to maintain peace, and that you might do
wrong in contributing moro than in nppenrance to tllnt end.
Nothing can be farther from the truth. 1cannot conceive lvhence
such an impression has arisen. Tho Government has striven, and
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still strives, earnestly to maintain pence ; it may not succccd, but
i l h a s Inboureci unceasingly; a d it has borne what, with other
countries, mould long since have been considered intolerable. S o u
rnust, therefore, in all things act on the belicf tllnt though our
Government may be forccd into war, it desires peace, sucl that to
this moment there has not becn from the Lahore Durbar a complaint
or angry word. On the contriwy, its last conlmunications mere
eiuinelltly friendly. TVhatcver bc t h result of what is now going
on, remember that you are to consider Lhe Government itself as
friendly till you hear the contrary from me. I t m y be treacherous,
bnt of that the Governor-General is the best jndge.
Again, you ask for leave to burn and destroy, a 4 speak of chapowii1gVtr00ps north of the river. I can give no such leilve. If the
river is not crossed, yon must only report. If it is crossed, dl
military operations must dopond on thc i\hjor-General commanding.
Moreover, cliapowing Hareelcce i s scarcely within the province of a
frontier post in case of invasion ; nor, if i t were, do I see any eventual gain to compensnte the risk of wealtcning the post by detachm e n t s liable to be cut off.
Agaill, burning and destroying may be vell enough for the Sikhs,
b u t they are not, except in rare ctlses, suited to us ; that is not the
xvay we shall makc mar if forced into it. And finally. yon must romember that it is the Governor-(fencrd who must even tho11 declare
wa,r, and no subordinate; and that i t is for him and the chief
military authorities to prescribe also in what modc it is to be cond~loted,if undertd~cn.
I am obliged by your offcr to remain notwithstnilding your
appointment, and shall make it k n o w to the Government, which
will noL, I hope, 1st you be a loser. You had betLer show this, or
give a copy of i t if you like.
Slloxv no distrust of the chiefs arid people on this side of the
Sutlej ; but leave as little as l~ossibleiu their power. Guard against
fire especially.
Pours Cc.
G. BROADBOOT.

Broadfoot addressed a somewhat similar and equdly good
Ict;ter to Capt. Mills; the variatioiis n7cro snch as suited t h e
different men and t h e clift'erent localities. It elided t h u s :
Finally, remember that me al+o strong ellough to take things
coolly. L e t dl the rascals in L d ~ o r eline the SoLlej, not a bugle
blow in Loodeema. Even if they cross, take it coolly, or
rather improse the necessity for this 011 the militttry authorities. A
9

Attacking by surprise. See note, p. 289.
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frontier force should at all times be vigilant and ready, visibly
ready ; but that is enough ti11 actually attacked. Fluster and perturbation are in this case needless andmischievous ; they cncournge
enemies and dispirit friends. [A] few mcn can cut off your communications ; but mlirtt then ? You are nothing the worse, and here
are the Governor-General and tho Commander-in-Chief, who by
the veyy stoppnge of communic~tionmill h o w you are wrong, and
will soon set you +ight.
I11 the mean time yon can enjoy life nnpestercd by dalis,l and
lick everybody thnt comes to rob your nest. I shall probably nlovo
rapidly np to you if these fellows clo march, and, if possible, give
you notice previously. You must then scnd me out a squadron of
Christie's men to meet me, including, if you can, Mayne's men,
whom I lrnom.
At Lahore the clisorilcrly condition of the troops was apparent. They were impatient to be led against the British,
and furious wvl-~enthe auspicious moment, 11 o'cloclr A X . of
November 18, was permitted to pnss without indication of a n
advance. They forced the astrologers, wilh threals and imprecations, to find another nild an early fortmate moment for
the movement. But n~hilstdisplq-ing this impatiencc, tile
solcliers who had got thcir pay clispers~cldaily to their homes.
Sarclar Sham Singh is said to have cleclarecl, that unless t l h
ncre stopped he woulcl fincl himself on his way to Firozpur
with empty tents. I t was probable that ihe solcliers mrho
absented thomselves clicl not believe i n tho ~ c r i o u snatnre of
the move ; nevertheless preparation for war was being made
nlith nnuenal activity, and virulent abuse of the English n7ss
hcld to be a test of sincerity ancl patriotism.
I t is clear that the crisis was full of danger, ancl such a s
to tax to ihe utmost the resources and ability of the Agent.
On November 23, Capt. Nicolson ~vroteto him :

I aim much obliged by your instruclions of Novem1)er 20, whicll
I mns grcstly in need of. One palt, ho\vevor, requires a rernnrli,
lest yo11 should remain wider an erroneous impression. I t is that
relative to our Government's desire for pence.
Xnoming that tho Durbnr ana our Government were in friendly
relation-at least, that I had never been told the contmry-and in
spite of Lht~trelation finding the head of the Dnrber consentinfi.to
a hostile march agaiust its allies, and those supposed to be friendly

' Dnks may here bc rendered
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to us tho most aclivc in bringing that merch about ; tho doubt did
occur to me (nol ltnowing anythiug of m y causc of cliffcrellce botween the Governments) whether the Durbar might not be consenting
to the march of the army against us with your knowledge, and to
nfford a cl~nllceof snfety to Ithc Naharaja and his mothcr nnd tc
the AhlltsrsI2now threatened with death by tho troops if they co11sent; to any t e r m of accommodation. Your letter, however, removes
that idea.
Meann-hile Sir I-Ienry EInrclinge was npproaching by t h e
usual marches; he vcry wisely declined t o allow himself ILo show
uilclne ~ l l s i o t yon account of tho numerous conflicting reports.
H c addressccl the following private lctter to t h e Agcnt :
Cnmp, three mnrches from Rnrnaul : Noven~her22, 1846.

My dear Brondfoot,-I received your second despatch throe hours
after the first, informing me that the Sikh army had become more
discreet.
Ono day the Government instigates the army to move, and i t
refuses, having received no oflence from llie Znglish.
The next, officers and punchayets are cltunorous to fight, and the
Government withdraws. I will not make any comnents on tho
motives of the chief actors, who from their position ma responsible
to us. I shall patiently wait your further report, and calmly procccd to Knrnanl by the usnal day's mnrches.
I cntirely approva of 811 you have dono. I wish we' may have
as good a case as that nrhicl~your letter i n the firs1 instance otl'eered.
No mnn can calculate on barbarian caprices ; my own convictions
are, however, very decided hhat no oCtcmpt will be made.
Curric has just come in, and is reading tho papers, 6 o'clockr.nr.
liaviug been delayed in the rear by Mrs. Currie's inclisposition.
Yours &a.
H. HAR~INGE.

P.S.-I have just received your letters of the 21st, and mill
rcply to them to-morrow.
This lctter mas f o l l o ~ ~ eby
d two from U r . Currie; t h a t of
November 24 is quoted in eztcnso, whilst an extract is m d o
from the second letter. They a r e of interest as recording t h c
imlwession madc by the events of t h e timo on tllc Porcign
Secretary.
Scc notc 4, 11. 361.
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Cnmp, Paniput : Novembor 24,1846.

My dear Brondfoot,-Sir Henry wrote to yon on the receipt of your
lcttcrs of 19th and 20t11, warning us of an impending invasion by
the Silrhs. He has approveil of all you did. It secmed to me imyossiblo that, without plan or prepqation, such a mad scl~erue
could really be meditatcd; or that, if the folly were perpetrated, it
need, mitkreference to the respective state of prcpnratioll of the two
partics, cause any anxiety to us. I am sorry such urgent orders
were sent to Meerut by the Commnnder-in-Chief. The matter with
many esaggerations mill be in all the papers, m d the slave woman
RIuugla will lmgh nt our beards I
TVe arc moving on stenilily, nncl shall be a t Xurnanl the d g
nfter to-morrow, where, it appears, we shall mcet the Comwnnderin-Chief. I trust we shall meet yon within two clays afterwards;
and then we cnn settle future plans and further movements.
I have your npplication for revised establishment on my tibblc.
Sir Ilellry IIardinge wishes to defcr its consideration till n-e meet;
but you 11nvc full authority to do what you please in the mean time.
Pour plan will be acceded to, I fnncy, and with any retrospective
effect that m y be necessary.
I return yon the Commander-in-Chief's letter, with marginal
~nnotations. Pour other letters I mill give you back when I see
you. Having met, I imagine me shall not separate for some time ;
but for this last nflnir I should have liad to ttllte the GovernorGeneral ncross the Juinna, nlld perhaps the Ganges, before visiting
Fcrozepore and Loodiana. Now, I think, lie mill nish to go down
tliera at oncc.
Of course the facts reported to us by you will be denied by the
Dmbnr. How cnn me cstablish them 3
Pours kc.
F. CURRIE.
Camp, Gnrounda : November 26.

My dear Broadfoot,-Sir I-Ienry Hardingc is very anxious Lo see
you, rind hc has desired mc to write and say that he wishes you to
join the camp with as little delay as possible. V e march Lo Kurnnul
in the morning ; we make no halt, but proceed to the next stage on
Thursday. Perhaps you mill be able to mect n s there. .
I cannot but think that this late nffair at Lahore is part of
Goolab Singh's game, to iudnce the Ranee and Sirdars to urge the
army to this demonstration, with a view to bringing a solemn rcnlonstrnnce at least from us ; this remonstrance and our impencling
anger to be used by the troops as a plea for putting those obnoxious
to Goolab Gingh to death, and thus sruootliing his wny to power.
Yours Wc.
F. CURRIE.
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On November 24 the miser and more moderate pnrty in
the Darbar fieem to have made a final effort to avert the impending invnsion. Bhai Ram Singh, acldressing Baja La1
8ingh, was the spolccsman.
He pointed ont that the English hnd in no may interfered
with the aihirs of the I<hdsn, and t~sltedwhere was the misdorn of making mar nt the bidding of the soldiers. He pointed
out that the Governor-Qcneral's Agent, who was a stcaily
friend, had mrillcn in the plainest terms that the English desirecl friendship with the Sikh Stntc, but wonld not fail to
hold the State responsible for the acts of its army and of its
subjects. He therefore cautioned tllc Rnjn agsinst marching
to thc frontier with tho troops.
The Rnjn replied with much truth, that if he remnincd
behincl, the soliliers woulcl kill him. H e was then advised nt
least to delay his ~lepartnre.~
On Novelnbcr 25, Cnpt. Nicolson reported to the Agent ns
follon?s: 'Your instructions put it all right, nnd I clo what
I can to prevent the General n1~~1'ching
o t ~ too
t soon. B e is not
easily rcstraincd. Wc can beat anything liliely to come against
us in fair fialtl, anclwill clo our best.' I-Ie intin~nteclt h t Raja
La1 Singh mas reported to have gonc alone townrds IIarike,
and that the Sild~troops mere clivided into four c m p s or main
ilivi~ioas,to act ngainsl Firozpnr, Ihrike, Phillrtur, and Rnpnr.
There is an entry i n Cnpt. Nicolson's diary, to the effect
that aftcr this date no trustworthy accounts were rcccived
from Lahore.
Major Broadfoot nnd hie Pcrsonal Assistant, Mr. Cust,
joined the Governor-General's camp on Nowmber 26, at
Kamal. On the 27th they Tere met by Cnpt. Abbott nl
Thanes~var,who, on the clep,zrture of the camp for h b a l n ,
rctwned, for n few c l ~ y sonly ns it proved, to his dulies in the
Icaithal district.
From this time Mi~jorBroaclfoot's dctailed and pict~iresquc
reports of the procceclings of the Lahore Darbar, and thc
greater part of his corrcspondencc, may be said to 11nve ceased.
Being with the Oovcmor-General, conversation and disoussior~
superseded writing. He semainccl rcsponsiblc for
pres~~rnably
slipplying Punjab ncws, and did so; but that news as 8 basis
Conipnrc P L ~ I Wt hS, p. 21.
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for history must be mainly looked for in the various letters
froln Sir Henry IIardinge.
Capt. Nicolson continued to write to the Agent almost
dnily, reporting thc information he gnthcred. The follon1ing
cxtrizcts may be recorded.
Xoucwab~~.
2s.-I received yesterday yollr two letters of the 24th.
We rtre all right hem, aud strong enough for anytl~iugthat can Bo
brought against Firozpur, and your orders touching communications
sot mo at ease. VTemust, if nccessory, act without waiti~~g
for aily
answers, should any point unprovided for arise. But your present
instructions are full enough, I tJii11k.
Great preparations are making of magazine and provision of
grain kc., which, joined to other trifles, l e d s me to think the move
is one moro of a defensive nature ~zozu,than ng~~essive.But you
have more means of forming a11 accurate opinion than I.

On Novenlbcr 29 hc nlcniioned a report t h a t the Sikh
troops, or ratl~cra considerable number of thcm, wcrc mnrcliing with the intention of fighting.
I t is s d that \vhen they arrive at the ferries of Ganda Sin@mala, Tnlli, and Ht~rilrekc. they will pitcl~,'~
a d the soldiers of
the A'in" force who have gone to tnlte their pay home will be on
tho look-ont for thcm nnd help them. Some say thcy will cross i ~ t co~tti,wrlly,and that the Purbias who desertcd say the sepoys will
not figlit against the Klmlsn-ji.

Thc earliest intimntionof a n opinion enlitled to consiclcration that thc Silths h t ~ ddetcrminecl on war wilh the British,
wonld appear to havc bcen conveycd by Raja Gulab Singh's
emissary whose interview nilh lhc Govcrnor-General's Agcnt
has alrendy bceri described. That the lZaja nras convinced of
the trnth of his intelligence, is to some extent confirmed by his
having sent mother messenger to Brigaclier H. M. Vheeler,
who commancled the troops at Luclhiann. This messenger micl
thnt lie wns the bearer of a lcttcr from the Raja, but that,
finding he xas about to be searched a t the Phillaur ferry, he
dropped the letter into the river and swam across to save his
Tlicir tents.

' Tho h'in troops werc the rcgnlar
troops of tho Sikh army. T h y hrrtl
r~!c~l~Lly
baou paid,nnd mrrny of thcm,
natiwu of tho cis-Sutlrj Stnte~,hnd

returned tllcro with their pny.
Pnrbins, lncu from Lhc Bast or
Purnb. Our scpoys who hnd dcsortod
lrro r~fcrrodto.
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life. I-Ie said that the contents mere, that Gnlnb Singll,
having positive information that the Lahore Government
rnenllt to mdie war against the British, wiuhcd to cast his
lot w i t h the latter, as his existence depended on their success.
The Brigaclier said he thought that the man's story was
true.
On Dccembcr 2, the Governor-General sent the more imp o r t a n t of Major Bronclfoot's recent reports to I3ngland, aud
made t h e following remarks on thc situntioii.7
I t ttppe~lreclthat the troops, instigated by the Rani nnrl her
Government acting under a scncie of self-preservation, had
clemnnded to be led against the British, and since Novcmber 23
h a d nloveil out Cnrelve miles from Lahore.
Considcriag that the prccantions already talicn were
fiufficicnt, that it mns ineqeclient to evince anxiety when
none w a s felt, and anxious lo take no step likely to accelerate collision, the Governor-General made no chnnge in the
. arrnngemcnts for his tour.
He further, afler consnltation with the Commnncler-inChiaf, and with the concurrence of that officer, decided to
postpone, 'for f u r h e r coi~sicleretionwith his Excellency, any
change i n the present clisiribution of the troops.' "
M a j o r Bronclfoot's reports of Punjab news were daily
received. If they were to be reliccl on, thcre nTns littlc iloubt
bnt that the Sikh army mas advancing in force towards
tbe Sutlej. The local feeling was wiclespreacl thnt it mould
advance, and mould succeed ; but tlle Governor-General stdl
t h o u g h t that it would not attack our konticr, but mould morc
probably r e t u n after o short time to Lahore.
P e t , though this was his opinion, he mas alive to the contingency, by no means impossible, that we rnigl~t al any
m o m c n t bc forced into war. For this alternative, in cornmunicaiion with the Cominancler-in-Chief, he made mhd \yere
consiclered nppropriate arrangements. At the a n m tirue he
declared his clclermination to avoid hostilities as 10llg ~ L She
conlcl, a n d to show evcry forbearance to the Government
which w a s ~trugglingagoinst its own snccevsfnlly mutinous
army. Thc merc adv,mce of that army to thcir OWI bank of
ihc Sutlej would not be treated as a cause of \\w: the grcnt
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danger was the pernicious csample to our sepoys, of the success
of the Sikh soldiers in estorting from their Government a
higller r a t e of pay than our men received.
The l o y a l t ~of~ the native nrmy was not iinpngnecl ; but it
was pointed out that enclcavours on a considerablc scale to
tanlper with their fidelity had been made ; and that this of
necessity canscd the Governor-General much anxiety.
The cis-Sutlej chiefs received assnrance of protection, subject to the condition of loynlty nncl adherence to our interests;
nlld tile despatch was concluded with ixn ex~ressionof satisfaction with the ability, energy, and som~djudgment displayed
throughout these procecdings by Uajor Broaclfoot.
On the same clay, November 2, Capt. Nicolsonwrote to C q t .
Mills to say that he did not think the Sikh nrmy n~ouldcome
on, but that it was feverish and must be carefully matched.
I t mas ready for a start, with guns and commissariat, bnL
Nicolson considered that it mas talting up a position more with
a viev to defence, in case xre should cross thc river and attack,
than to invnda 13ritish territory.
Nest clay he wrote to the Agent referring to this letter, and
addccl that tho Silt11 force mighl be describocl as in position
in a semicircle on the south side of Lahore, about twelve
miles from tllat city. Reference was made to a rumour that
tllc lntc minister, Jamahir Singll, mns in correspondence with
the chiefs of Patiala and Nabha; and that the Ditrbar had
recently sent to aslt wlint thcir intentions now were. Their
rcply was said to have bccn that they had no promises to malte,
but nfould form their resolution when they saw the Sikh army
on the south side of the river.
Nicolson added, that if the Sikhs did cross the river it
nloulcl be for plunder, but that he did not think they would
cross, though small independent bodies might do so.
A lctter, intercepted by Gen. Littler, contained some
astonishing particulws regarding the strength of thc Sikh
army of in~asion and the estcnt of its operations. The
regulars were to cross at Firoq)ur with 125,000 bullocks for
transport, and the linc nras to extend from Kasur to Annndpur
lIalihowa1. Arrangement nfas said to have been inacle for the
supply of grain all tlie way to Delhi !
I t was reportcd in a newsletter from Lahore, that, in rcply
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t o the Agent's remonstra~lceregardidg recent proceedings, the
Darbar had retorted that thc British had hl four blsttlnccs
broken the treaty of frienrlship. The cases citcd \\.era : that
Halcim Rni n1-d his Sownrs had becn treatcd \ ~ i t hindignity ;
tlint Lid Singh, Ailhlati, had iiot been allowed to cross tllc
Sutlej ; thnt thc Lahore Ahllcnrs had bee11 disresl~ectfull~
used ; and that Suchct Singh's gold had not been handed over
t o t h e Dnrbnr.
On December 4, Capt. Nills infornlcd Cn$ Nieolsoil that
t h e main part of Ihc Silth army m s moving qnictly 011 Hi~riltc
and Piroapm, with the intention of nttaclting tho latlor l h c c
and cutling off cornnnmicntioi~with the stntions to the south
and enst. K c adclcd that all the reports he rcceiwxl tended
t o confirm illis rumour. Two 0 t h ciltries from Cnpt. Nicolson's cliary, datcd December 5, may bc quoted : 'Naclioson
succeeds Lcech,' and n corrcsyondent writes thnt ' I!'akir
Azizudclin is deed.'
Two days aftcr this date Tej Shgh, the Sikh commander,
was reported to hnve said to the Rani, on hcr rcmonstrating
against the delay hl nttncliing thc British, ' Fakir Azizuildiu
was a wise ancl fortunate man to have witllclrnmn from public
business two years ago, and devoted himsclf to lneditating on
God, ancl to have now fonad an hononrnble clenth, leeving an
imperishable reputation here, and obtaining besides a placc in
heaven.'
The Governor-Geueral'~camp reached A r n h ~ hnn Dccember 3 ; nlld nest clay Capt. 8. A. tlbbott, wlio had been sum~ ~ l o n cbyd exprcss from his dislricl, arrived towards evening.
On that clay Sir IIenry roportcd to the Secrct Coiiiluittee the recent steps which he had taken."~ reply having been receivcd
by the Agent to his remonstrance agili11st the recent unusual
proceedings, he was desired to sce the Vnltil, and require reply
%nil explanation. The Vakil assured thc Agcnt that he had
rcccived no answer from the Darbar; the Agent pointed out
ihe c1isconrCesy shown in ignoring Che request for esplnnation,
alld the inovitablo construction wliich must be placed thereon.
IIe addccl that until a reply \YEW received, the V&il conlcl not be
Permitted to rcmnin in attendance, nor be admitted to interview.
I n compliance with these orders thc Vakil left the camp.
"or

grenter dehil sce I'npcrs
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The Governor-Ge~~eral
explained thnl this procedurc w a s
the mildest which he could adopt ' consistently with t h e
dignity, position, and interests of thc British Gove~nment.'
The plain constrnction to be pul on tlie silence of the Darbar
was thal its intentions were hostile ; in which case it was i n cxpeclient to give them morc lcisure for preparation than c o u l d
be hclpccl. On the other hand, Lo prow OUT good faith and
forbearance, full time for a reply from Lahore mas to bc given
bcfore any precnntionary movement was maclc.
Even tlicn the Governor-General did not anticipnte that
the S i l h army would come as far as the Satlej, or commit any
positive act of aggression.; but he saw that the Bani and
chiefs, for their own purposes, vere ' cndcavo~u.ingto raise EL
storm, which, wl~cnraised, they will be pomcrless either to
direct or allay.'
This bcing so, it became necessary to provide for the r a p i d
march of t h e troolm from hleerul, which might a1 any moment be ordered ; and it was in connection with the arrangements for this contingency that ALboll had been summoned.
I-Ic shnll tcll his own story.
I m a s informed by Broadfoot that the Governor-Generalmas mucli
p ~ l out
t b y the Conlmissariat Department. I-Ie had nslted the Deputy
Commissary-General how soon hc could collect supplies for 10,000
men, at intervals of twcaty miles betnreen K~~rnald
and Feroecpore,
wit11 a vicm to thc i\Iccrut reserve forces m;wching up with as l i t t l ~
carriage as possible. Tlint officer infoi~ucdhim that it mi& possibly be done in sis weeks.

Sir Henry's reply was more forcible than parliamentary, a n d
ho added :
I t must be done in five days; ' and, turning to GroacUoot,
said, ' You must do it.' ' Well,' said Eroadfoot, ' i t is rathcr sharp
work, but it shall be done if possible.' And clone it mas. Groadfoot's objcct in sending for me mas, that I shonld unclcrtake two
of the dcpbt stations, ordm being sent to i\filIs,Lalte, and Nicolson
for stntiolis farther in advance.
I had thc honow of dining with Sir Hcnry, nnd ilnnlcdiately
after dinncr set ofY 011 ail clcpbmt, and reached tho first dep6t
stetion at Pehoa in the early morning of December 5 ; nnd having
pnt nlr~ttersin lrsin, and left 1uy tissistilnt to coinplete t l ~ carrangeh ,the Puttcnlali district.
n~cnts,I rodc 011 to h m t i ~ i ~in
I.
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V h c n all was ready there, Abbott rcjoincd khe GorernorGeneral's camp on December 8, one march bcyond Ambide,
having riclden 1 0 0 miles on the fonrth day.
Sir Henry ospresaed himsclf much gratified, and thecommissary- .
General was overjoyed, and allnost embraced me.
Having completed my missiolr, I expected to be scnt back to nly
district, w h ~ r oI had left my wifc in camp, but Broadfoot ruled it
otherwise. He said I must como on with the camp, and 110 would
supply my wardrobe, for I lmd nothing with me but what was on my
baclc.
On the 9th me mado o m march, but during tho night or towards
tlic morning of the 10th Croadfoot rcceivod ncws of thc Sikhs crossing the Sntlcj. I was with liim in his tent, and I can sec liim now,
in greet spirits, hastening on his clothes, nnd saying, ' If wc livo
t l ~ r o u g lthis,
~ Abbott, we are both nmdo men.'
We then went to the Governor-General's camp, and met Sir
Henry wid liis Staff just mounting tomove to tho nest camping ground
nb Sirhind. Broadfoot reported tho nenrs, and after n short confercncc the war oahrecl by tlie Silths was accepted. Broadfoot i~ndmyself wcro tlien and there constituted t~iclo~-de-~ump
on Sir Hoi1ry's
Stnff, a.ud I was ordered o£f iu h s t o to bring down H.hI.'s 29th licgiment and Ihe 1st Xei~gnlPusilicrs from Ihso\\llee and Subnthoo,
to join the camp a t Khanna, or wherever I shodd find it, by forced
marchcs.
With t h e hill well known in these parts ns Tnpp't~Nose,'
j u s t above Iiasanli, for a guide, Abbott scl oB a t oncc, across
conn try.
Thirty-five miles' ride brought him to Iiallrn,
and eight miles bcyond in the hills lic arrived a t I(asnnli,
mhere he f o m d a dinner party being given by the colonel to
the oficers and lttdies of the regiment. Abbott had mitclc
uuch good use of his time, that he had ontstripped a messenger
sent thc previous evening to warn the regiments that they
might be callocl on for service. His nrrivnl at the party was,
iherefore, to use his own language, 'like the bursting of n
shell, for they h a d n o varning of coming evcnls.' They had
at once t o prepme for a stwl nest morning, nncl husbnnds
and wives had t o p a t , in runny instances for ever.
On t h e lllh these two fine regiments e~icampeda t Unni
Col. H. T. Tnpp nppenrs to Imvo unclcr the Resident a t the Court of
been stntioncd nL Snbntllu, rind pro- Delhi fro111 1896 Lo 1S4O.
b ~ b l y escroised politicul fu~lcllons
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Nnjra on their may to the front, officcrs nnd m e n in high
spirits at the prospect of active service. I-Iow nnd where
they found the Governor-General nacl joined his camp, will i n
due course be told.
The foregoing information regarding 3 most iruportnnt service 011 which Capt. Abbott was employed is extracted from,
and based upon, a memorandum f~irnishedby that oficer. The
modcsty and simplicity with which t h e story is told afford tl
strong presumption i11 favour of its g e n e r d accuracy.
Mr. Cust, in describing these events, hns recorcled t h a t on
thc cvening of Decembcr 9 he h a d gone to bed, b u t h i d not
fallen aslecp, when he was sent for and desired to make certain
al~nngementsnl; once for thc supply of the wholc dmbala force.
Alensures had already been talren to collect at certain places
sopplies for several thonsand men ; renewed exertions wero now
to be nlitdo to victual the whole army. Saunclers Abbott mas sent
OR to the Ilills, to bring down the regiments at Snbhatu and RUSsonlie. The Lodeanell forco mas ordered to fall back end meot 11s
at Bnssean. A11 ladies wcre sent back to Ambda. Oapt. Napier
anti his wife were with us : he is now Nnpier of Mngclila.
TVhilst his hssistnnls merc thus employed, Broadfoot was
not idle ; indeed, constant active employment seems to have
in-erentccl his leaving any detailed account of his proceedings ;
they are merged in those of t h c Governor-General.
The
following letter to his sister has n double interest : it was the
Inst cvcr received by his family from him, m d it contains a n
explicit afirmation thnt he was employed to maintain peace,
and that no Government had ever striven harder for t h a t r e s ~ ~ l t .
Cnmp, Ambdln : Dceember 4, 1845.

Yon complain of my not writing, and I have nothing to say in dofence, seeing thnt, hard\vorlied as I am, I onght lo give a few ~uinutes
to it ; but the lasuitudo from u~~ceesing
labonr rnnlics me clefcr i k
till, ns now, it is a11 but too late ; mil even now Sir Henry I-Iardingc's
lottcr bag is waiting to be senlecl till this is closed. Tho l n a i l i ~gone,
nnd this goos by an aftor esprcss.
I am with Sir IIenry, and remain with hiln while hc contill~~es
in this division of the country. Rc treats me with the greatesl
Irinchess. Nevertheless, I mould giro a good cleel for over 80 short
a sojourli among you all, with Jcssie and dlthe London pnrty nsscmblccl. TIint, Iio~evcr,must continue, I fear, for some timo, lz very
distant I1opc.
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Si&lal9 discrepancies, or what appear to bc such, a r e
fo~tlldi n respect to the events between the crossing of t h e
Sntlej by the Sikhs and tho battle of Mitdki, h which the first
actual collision occurred. These are rather ani~oyingtliaii
i~uportant; t h y are just sufficiently evident to malie a close
and detailed csamination nnd tabulation of facts necessary.
It is somewhat difficult to account for these mistakes; in
certain cases a loose ancl carclcvs mode of writing, or even
a slip of the pen, mnst be blamed.
Hespecting the date on which the Silrhs crossed the Sutlej
and thereby provolred the war, some unanimity might havo
bcen cxpectcd from those who Ilnve described the evcnt. Yet
me have ~lreacly noticed the discrepancy between Capt.
A1)bott's date nncl that mcntionecl by Cnpt. Nicolson. In
acldition to these il may be observed that the GovernorGeilerd has recorded that the Sikh army in lasgc ii~unberscommenced crossing the Sutlej on December 11. In an inclosure
to the letter in which this is recorded, the Commander-in-Chief
stated that on December 11 it became known in Ambala, t h a t
the invasion had actually tslron place. Now this information,
in those days before the telegraph was used, conlcl not b y
any possibility refer to the event clescril~eclby the GovernoyGeneral, but manifestly allucled t o the news received by
Bronclfoot in Abbott's presence early on the morning of t h o
10th. But it is more perplesing to find Henry Lawrenee,
from whom accuracy might have been expected, somo time
~ f t e rthose events, state precisely that 'on December 12
thc Commander-in-Chief moved with his headq~znrters from
Umbelln. On the evening of the same clay the Silrhs cornmenced crossing the Sutlej.'
!The fact being almost certain
that the Silihs commenced crossing the river in vio1:ttion
of existing arrangements as early as December S ; that on
the 11th the first crossing of their troops on a large scale
occurred ; ancl that the Governor-General sclecled this serious
brcnch of neutrality as the act which justified the issue of t h c
proclln~nationclatecl 13eceinbcr 13, which was, in fact, a cleclarntion of nral.. Thererorc it would seem to be correct to adhcrc
lo the 11th as the date on which the Sikh firmy commenced
C~~Zcutta
Rcvicw, No,svi. vol. viii. ert, vi. p. 488.
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to cross the Sutlej. Without doubt the operation lasted for
several days.
With reference to the various movements of importance
between the 11th and the 18th, when the battle of BSudki was
fought, it is hoped that the following record is fairly correct.
It is compiled from the despatches of the Governor-General
and the Commander-in-Chief, and from the accounts written
by Herbert Edwardes and Henry Lawrence in the ' Calcutta
Review.'
On December 7 and 8 the Governor-General desired the
Commander-in-Chief to move up the force from h b a l a ,
Meerut, and some other station^.^ He then, being some days'
march in advance of the Commander-in-Chief, rode to Ludhiana, inspected the fort, and, seeing that it could be held by
a draft of the more infirm soldiers from the regiments stationed
there, desired Brigadier Wheeler to be prepared to march at
the shortest notice with the rest of his force.
By tho 12th the Commander-in-Chief, with the headquarters and the Ambala force, marched sixteen miles to
Rajpura. Next day they marched to Sirhind ; eighteen miles
of a sandy and distressing road. On that. day the GovernorGeneral, who was two marches ahead, received the ' precise
information that the Sikh army had crossed the Sutlej, and
mas concentrating in great force on the left bank of the river.'
He then issued a proclamation recapitulating events already
described, announcing the invasion of our territory by the
Sikh troops, and his determination to vindicate tho authority
of the British Government, and to punish the violators of
treaties and the disturbers of public peace.
1% declared the cis-Sutlej estates of the Maharaja to be
confiscated and annexed to the British territoriee, and called
upon the chiefs and inhabitants of the Protected States for
co-operation and fidelity, promising indemnity in case of loss
and threatening punishment in case of disobedience. By
arrangement he met the Commander-in-Chief one march in
. advance of the army. The result of the consultation, as far
as it affected the Ambala, force, was the issue of ' after orders
' at midnight for a forced' march of'twenty miles on Esrri.'4
The object mas to reach Bussean before the Sikhs, and preJ

papers &c. p. 26.
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vent them from seizing the supplies which Broadfoot and his
Assistants had collected.
By the 14th the comparative safety of this important point
was secured ; the Ludhiana force, of 5,000 men and tmelve
guns, having been moved somewhat in front of it.

. ;

On December 16 the Umballa force moved on to Luttala, nearer .
thirty than twenty miles, and orders were issued for a rigid reduction of baggage. On December 16 the force marched thirty miles
to Wuani, overtaking the Governor-General and the Lildiana force
at Bussean."
Regarding the snpplies for the army, Edwardes remarked
that Major Broadfoot might be said to have been the Commissary-General of tho army of the Sutlej.
Even after his death his subordinate oEEcers became and continued till very late in the campaign the real Commissariat of tho
army. The people of the country were now dl snpposed to be hostile; and those who were with the advanced guard that day mill
not easily forget Major Broadfoot and his rough-and-ready troop of
wild-looking Affghans, galloping across the p l a i from village to village, summoning out the greybeards, and, with perfect mastery of
their corrupt and broken dialect, acquired in a short residenci of fifteen "onths
upon the frontier, explaining the terms of the proclamation, and extracting from the most refractory Hufsid supplies
for the advancing army

On December 17 a short mirch of ten miles to Charrak
was made, as the long marches had told most severely on man
and beast. Nest day a march of twenty-one miles brought
the force to Mudki, where the first shot of the first Sikh war
was fired.
Dnring those days the Sikhs appear to have been employed
crossing the river a t various fords : on the 15th Capt. Nicolson has recorded that ' t h e Sikhs crossed, and we stayed
mhere we were.' They pl~mdereclseveral villages situated six
or eight miles north-west of Firozpur, At ten o'clock A.M.
they threatened Firozpur itsolf, a n d Sir J. Littler moved out
Calcutta R ~ d e wNo.
, xi. vol. vi.
art. vi. p. 260.
8 Thirteen months, to be more
oura ate.
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to meet them with two brigades. They did not accept the
challenge, probably preferring to choose their own ground and
to fortify it, so as to make the task of beating them as hard
as possible. They encamped at Langiana, about three or four
miles north of Firozpu. During the next two days a considerable number of the Sikh troops with guns advanced to
F i r o ~ s h a h ,and
~ took up a position, which they immediately
entrenched and fortified. The news of the approach of the
Governor-General towards Mud& reached Pirozpur and probably the Sikh camp on the 16th, and the idea seems to have
occurred to Raja La1 Singh that by a sudden attack he
might be destroyed or captured. The force with the GovernorGeneral mas greatly under-estimated; in all probability the
Silrhs did not reckon on having to deal with more than the
Ludhiana force, and did not think that the Ambala force
could have effected a junction. The plan was perfectly
reasonable, and likely to be, even if not successful, very embarrassing to the English ; for a considerable force, reckoned
at sixteen battalions of infantry, over 3,000 cavalry, and fifty
guns, threatened Firozpur ; a strong force, the numbers of
which were not known, had occupied Firozshah; and, in
advance, Baja La1 Singh, with a considerable body of men
supported by artillery, lay in wait for the Governor-General
between Firozshah and Mudki. Such mas the position on
December 18, but even on that date more Sikhs were crossing
the river.
Firozshah, around which the
well-known battle was fought, has
also been called, with equal error,
Ferozshahr and Pheerooshuhur. The
correct name is probably Phoni Shhh,
called after Bhhi Pher6, a devotea or
mnn of religious repute; Shhh being e

not unusual title by which auch people
are addressed. A Punjabi speaking of
the battle generally calls it Pheru
da lami.' Shahr (' city ') is avery unusual termination of a village name
in that distriot.
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T ~ battle
E
of Mndlci mas fought on December 18, 1845. On
this field Britons met Sikhs for the first time as foes; and
there was founded a mutual respect, confirmed three days
later at Firozshah, which has lived to the present day.
The force under Raja La1 Singh has been estimated by
Cunningham as under ' two thousand infantry, supported by
about twenty-two pieces of mtillery, and eight or ten thousand
horsemen.'
Capt. ~icolson's estimate, from native report,
fairly agrees with these figures ; they are probably as accurate
as any which can now be supplied, and may bo considered
approximate. It should, however, be recorded that the Commander-in-Chief, in his oecial despatch, made a very different
estimate of the strength of his enemy. ' They were said to
consist of from 15,000 to 20,000 infantry, about the same
force of cavalry, and forty guns.'
On the morning of the 18th the Raja advanced from
Firozshah towards Mudki, and sent forward a detachmont to
Cunningham's S i k h , p. 301.

Papm dc. p. 32.
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match and report the movements of the British army. On
our side, Broadfoot, with a party of Christie's horse, mas
similarly employed. When he arrived at Mudlri he found it
occupied by the Sikh advanced party, of whose strength. he was
necessarily ignorant. He immediately informed the Commander-in-Chief, who mas then about three miles behind.
Sir R. Gough formed his troops in order of battle and resumed the march. The Sikh advanced detachment retired on
their main body, and informed the Raja of the approach of
the British. The latter marched steadily on and reached
Muclki at noon ; finding it unoccupied, there was a disposition
to believe that Broadfoot's report of the Sikh occupation of
the village was a false alarm, and tho men, exhausted and
suffering grievously from thirst, lay down to await the arrival
of the baggage. Between two and three o'clock in the afternoon the camels began to come in ; their loads were removed,
and the men commenced to cook their food. The moment
seemed to the Raja propitious for the attack, and he advanced
accordingly. A scrap of paper was brought to Broadfoot, who
mas at lunchcon with the Governor-Generd. B e read it, and
said, ' The enemy is on us.' He rode at once to the front, and
gave immediate warning of the impending aitaclr. He was not
at first believed, and even the cloud of dust wllich appeared
in the direction of the enemy failed to convince the sceptical,
who attributed it to skirmishers.
That dust,' he energetically exclaimed, ' covers thousands ; it
covers the Sikh army.' . . . While the British troops mere yet
forming, he returned from his reconnaissance, galloped up to the
Commander-in-Chief, and gracefully salutiug him, pointed to the
rising cloud of dust ahead, and said,. 'There, your Excellency, is
the Sikh army I ' I t was the Political Agent malting over the
frontier to the s~lclier.~
The Sikh guns opened fire, and afforded convincing te8timony to. the accuracy of the b gent's information. The
British artillery replied ; the cavaly mas sent forward, some
to turn 'the right, and the others the left, of the enemy's line,
which in length far exceeded that of the advancing British
infantry. The cavalry manmuvre was brilliantly successful ;
the irregular Sikh cavalry was swept away on either side,
3

Calcutb Review, No. xvi, vol. viii, nrt. vi.
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and the guns even, for the moment, were silenced. The infantry continued to advance, and drove the Sikhs in front of
them, ' using that never failing weapon, the bayonet, whenever the enemy stood. Night only saved them from worse
disaster, for this stout conflict mas maintained during an hour
and a half of dim starlight, amidst a c l o d of dust from the
sandy plain, which yet more obscnred every object.'
Fifteen
guns were taken, and next day, apparently; two more mere
brought from the field to the fort of Mudki, thus making in all
seventeen guns ~ a p t u r e d . ~
Our loss mas heavy; 215 Europeans and natives of all
ranks mere killed, and 657 were vounded. The enemy's loss
cannot be ascertained.
Of the officers who were killed, the most distinguished
at the time were Major-Generals Sir R. H. Sale, G.C.B.,
Quartermaster-Genera1 of the Queen's troops, and Sir J.
MoCaskill, R.C.B. and K.H. The former mas struck by a
grape shot, and the wound proved to be mortal ; the latter was
shot dead on the field. Both mere veteran officers, whose services were of a highly distinguished order, and the former had
especially a deserved reputation for great personal gallintry.
I n a previous part of this work, the facts related tend to
show that Sale, though personally most brave, was, like many
other good men, unduly fearful of responsibility, and therefore scarcely equal to the position in which he mas placed
during the critical period of the siege of Jdalabad. It is,
therefore, a duty as well as 'a pleasure to record, as fully as
space will permit, the leading events of his distinguished
career. He was born in 1792, and entered the 3'6th Regiment
in 1795. He had a long and honourable record of service in
the field ; the principal sieges, battles, and campaigns at which
he was present bcing : Seringapatam, 1799, medal ; storming
of the Travancore lines, 1809 ; capture of the Mauritius, 1816 ;
first Burmese war, 1824-25, C.B. ; first Afghan war, 1838-41,
including the siege of Ghazni, at which he commanded the
main column of the attack, and the operations in Kohistan
which resulted in the surrender of Dost Muhammad; commanded the garrison of Jalalabad during the siege, 1841-43 ;
Papers dc. p. 32. Commander-in-Chief's despatoh, ~ e c e b b e r19,1846.
Paper dc. p. 24.
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served with the army under Gen. Pollock, 1842, G.C.B.
and three medals. He fell gallantly at the battle of Mudki,
1845, after more than fifty years' service."
In the House of Lords, the late Lord Ripon, in expressing
the regret felt for his loss, remarked : ' One of the most distinguished men in that or in any other army fell in that battle.
Who does not know the name of Sir Robert Sale ? Who can
forget the services he has rendered to his country and his
sovereign ? ' I n the House of Commons Sir R. Peel similarly
bore testimony to the value of his services.
Sir John i\dcCaslrill, too, had seen much service, both in the
Peninsular war and in India. It mill be recollecked that he
ommanded the force which took Istalif. H e joined the army
in 1797, and mas, therefore, but two years junior to Sir R.
Sale. His meritorious services were also acknowledged in both
Houses of Parliament.
Amongst the wounded who afterwards rose to distinction
may be mentioned Major P. Grant, D.A.G., dangerously
wounded; Capt. Herbert B. Edwardes, A.D.C., slightly
wounded ; Lieut. G. Reynell Taylor, very severely mounded ;
and Lieut. Edward Lake.
The, following extract from Mr. Cust's memorandum is
interesting and graphic.
I found the Governor-Generalsitting under a tree writing letters.
the Sikh army was &mzciy iqzforcc.
Our whole army turned out, the sepoys in their dhotees.7 letwing
their food. It was 4 P.H. I overtook Broadfoot md the GovernorGeneral, and stuck to them ; we were under a heavy fire. Regiment
after regiment passed by us, md the Governor-General pointed out
the direction of the advance. We saw old Gen. McC+slrillkilled. We
'henrd the cheers in the hont when the first battery was taken.
We passed through it, saw the dead and dying ; we saw Sir Robert
Sale lying wounded on a gun, and many friends. The firing had
now ceased, and the battle mas won.
Of

a, sudden we hewd that

...

The only other account which should be quoted, and which
has not, as far as is known, been previously published, is one
0 This sooo&i
of Sir R. Sale's
services is taken from an obituary
notice in t h e . Morning Herald of
February 24,1846.

' D h o h , clhoti, is the waist cloth.
Hindus when cooking strip themselves
to their dhotis.
cc2
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found in an intercepted letter from a father present at the
battle on the Sikh side, to his son in Lahore. I t has at any
rate the merit of being brief, and is probably not a very incorrect description of what took place.
The Ghorcharrns would not come on; the British charged;
the Sikhs ran ; lots killed and all or nearly all the guns losL8
After the oction the Sikhs seem to have retired on their
main body at Firozshah, and the British to the village of
I~fudki.~
On the next clay, December 19, it was expected that the
Sikhs would renew their attack; the British troops were
therefore for many hours under arms, but though dust was
seen which betokened the presence of the enemy, our men
mere unmolested. That evening Capt. S. A. Abbott, an Assistant to Major Broadfoot, accompanying the 29th Toot, the 1st
European L.I., the 11th N.I., and four heavy guns, arrived
after 'an arduous and harassing march. I t is not clear
whether the value of Cnpt. Abbott's services on this occasion
has been fully recognised. I n a remarkably short space of
time he had succeeded in carrying the message to the troops
that they were wanted, and in piloting them to the front. The
presence of these troops was of vital importance to the army,
which even with them was scarcely adequate to the task they
had to perform. The Governor-General appreciated this, and
warinly thanked Capt. Abbott for his exertions.'

' Capt. Nicolson's diary. The
Ghorcharras were the irregular
cavnlry.
Calcutta Review, No. xviii.
vol. ix. art. vi. p. 621.
The Abbott family have rendered
varied and meritorious services to their
country. Four brothers were in the
B.I.C.S. Major-Gen. Augustus Abbott,
C.B., of the Bengal Artillery, had
medals for Bhartpur, Ghazni, Jnlalabad, and Kabul.; he also had, but did
not wear, the Order of the Durani
Empire. He wns honorary A.D.C. to the
Governor-Gscqral, and died in 1867.
Major-Gen Sir Fred. Abbott, Kt.,
C.B. Bengnl Xngineers, has mednls for

Ava, Xubul, and Sobraon. He was for
many years Governor 01 Addiscombe
College, Member of the Council of
Military Xducation, and of the Commission for National Defences.
Gen. James Abbott, C.B., Bengal
Artillery, has medals for Chilinnwala
and Gujrat ; he also m m service a t
Bhartpur, and oommanded an expedition against the Eassanxais of the
Bltrck Mountain. He is best known,
perhaps, for his adventurous journey
to ILhivn to negotiate the release of
Russian prisoners, and as in charge
of the district of Hazara in the Punjab,
the headquarters of which,Abbottabad,
is named after him.
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On the evening of this day, Sir IT. Hardinge tendered hie
services, as second in commmd in the field, to Sir H. Gough,
who accepted the offer mith pleasure.=
On the 20th, the British force completed the duty of
burying their dead. Broadfoot and his Assistants were busy
recording the information collected regarding the Sikh entrenched position at Firozshah.
The information went to show that the position was entrenched'
on three sides, surmounted with gun8 of very heavy metal. It was
somewllat in the shape of a horseshoe.
The north face commanded the Loodeanah and Ferozepore road ;
the south, the road by which we were approaching ; and the west, the
position of Ferozepore. The eastern fsce was open and unprotected.
That the position was attaclred on the strongest faces was not dm
to want of information supplied by Brosdfont, . . but to the desire
of the Chiefs to relieve Ferozepore, which was considered to be in
dang~r,md with a view to forming a junction with its garrison before
the attach was deli~ered.~

.

During the evening of December 20, instructions were
sent to Sir John Littler to move out from Firoxpur towiuds
Mudki with as strong a force as he could spare after providing
for the safety of his post. ITe made his arrangements mith
great promptitude and skill, completely deceiving Tej Singh,
the Sikh commander, who for some time was unaware that
.Littler had marched.
The plan arranged by the Commander-in-Chief and the
Governor-General was, that after a junction with Littler's
force had bein effected, the combined army should assault the
Sikh position in such a way ae to interpose, at any rate, a
considerable part of the British army between the Sikhs at
Firozshah and the station of Fhozpur.
To give effect to this, the troops, under the cornmind of
Major-Gen. Saunders A. Abbott,
Bengnl Army, has a medal and clasp
for Mudki and Ferozshah (severely
wounded). A.D.C. to the GovernorGeneral. Served in the Civil Department in the Punjab and Ouah; and
after ho had rotired from the service,
Railway
was Agent for the S. P. &,D.
Co. at Lahore.

A fifth brother, Keith B. Abbott,
served mith oredit for many yeare in
tho Consular Department. Was Consul-General at Tabreez in Persia, and
afterwards at Odessa, whore he c2iod
in 1873. Order of the Lion and Sun.
2 Papers (ec. p. 36.
a Gen. Abbott's Epis& dc.
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Sir Hugh Gough, marched on the morning of ~ e c e m b e r 3 1
along the road from M~~udlcito Firozpur. The sick and
wounded wore left at Mudlri, with two regiments of Native
Infantry4 for their protection. The road lay nearly f o u r d e s
to the south of the Sikh position, opposite to which, tqwardi
midday, a halt was made to enable Littler to join, and ad'
vantage was taken by officers and men to eat ? hasty meal
,
if they could get it, and enjoy a little rest. , During this halt an incident occurred, which is of interest
as illustrating the extreme delicacy of the position occupied by
Sir Henry Hudinge. H e was by his own offer serving as a
lieutennnt-general under the Commander-in-Chief; but he
remained the responsible Governor-General of In'din. Whilst
he and his Staff mere resting awl getting sometking to eat,
Sir Hugh Gough arrived, and with characteristic impetuosity
'
urged an immediate attack on the Sikh position, without
waiting longer for Littler. The gravity of the situation was :
perceived by the G.overnor-General, and his resolution wis
formed. He retired for a short space with the Commancler-inChief, pointed out to him that, though second in command aa
far as leading the troops was concerned, he mas still responsible
for the safety and welfare of British India, mcl therefore must,
in his capacity of Governor-General, sanction nothing which
in his opinion would imperil either. He considered thyt to
attack without waiting for Littler's force was to incur an unnecessary risk of failure, and therefore he pronounced against
the proposczl.
I1
Opinions differ as to the wisdom of the Governor-General's
., /
decision in this matter. This question need not be discussed
just now ; at present we are mainly concerned with recording
events as they happened, as far as we have been able to discover them ; and the fact here recorded is at once unusual and '
important. The Governor-General as supreme ruler in India
'
took the responsibility of superseding the Commancler-in.
Chief in the field.
Littler's arrival was awaited; he was tolerably punctual, ;
and it is recorded in despatches that the junction mas complete
by half-past one o'clock. The small plan at the commencement of this chapter shows in a general way the disposition
' Papers dc,p. 27. Governor-General'e despatch. '
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of the British and Sikh forces, and mill, it is hoped, aseist the
reader to follow the description of the battle.
The army mas formed in four divisions ; the first, under Sir
Harry Smith, being in reserve. The other three were thus
arranged: on the right the aecond division, commanded by
Major-Gen. Gilbert ; in the centre the third division, under
Brigadier Wallace ; and on the extreme left the fourth division,
under Major-Gen. Sir J. Littler. The artillery was under
Brigadier Brooke, and was principally massed between Wallace's and Gilbert's divisions.
The Sikh position was very irregular in shape and roughly
traced. The longer sides towards the east and west may be
said to have faced Nudlri and Firozpur respectively. The entrenchments were not formidable as fortifications ; that is,
neither were the ditches deep nor the ramparts high. They
mere simply good shelter trenches, well defended by a wellappointed and easily movable artillery supported by a numerous and determined body of infantry.
Sir John Littler's division was on the left, and with his
left thrown forward he appears to have commenced the
attack. The Commander-in-Chief led the right wing, and Sir
H. Hardinge commanded the 1 e f t . V t mas nearly four o'cloclr
when the battle commenced. Littler's men advanced under a
most g a b g and destructive fire to within 150 yards of the
batteries, when they were ordered to charge. Had they done
so mith vigour, they would, in spite of the havoc and slaughter,
have effected a lodgment; indeed, it is probable, in that case,
that the loss of life would have been less. Unfortunately,
they did not press home the charge; the 62nd halted and
wheeled about, under an order, it has been said;of the Brigadier i n command." I n vain did Sir John urge them to seize
the prize which was within their grasp ; and, ignorant of the
order referred to, he naturally concluded that the arrest of the
advance, and the retrograde movement, were the result of
panic. This attack, therefore, failed ; and the division, with
greatly reduced numbers, passed the night in the vicinity of
the spot occupied by the left of Wallace's division prior to the
advance, and out of shot.
? Papcrs dc. p. 37.
Compare CalcuttaRevicw, 8 0 . xi.

6

vol. vi. art. vi. p. 273 ; and hfaogregor's
Sikhs,vol. ii. p. 106.
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It sho~lclbe mentioncd, that as Wallace's division advanced,
they met the 14th N.I., who mere retiring. That regiment,
with its colours, joined the advancing troops, and returned to
a more successful assault.
The attack on the south face would seem to have been
delayed longer than mas intended. As the line advanced, it
became evident that its length extended considerably on
either side beyond the limits of the immediately opposite.part.
of the Sikh entrenchment.
The first result of this was that the men crowaed towards
the centre, and before long got in front of our own guns. The
Sikh artillery f i e was most destructive. Capt. Abbott was sent
back to bring np the guns ; he had scarcely returned, when his
horse was shot and fell under him. H e rose, but was immediately struck down by t m c ~bullets, one in the shoulder, one
in the arm, in such a may as to show that the Sikhs had
established a cross fire. Broadfoot, who mas on horseback,
called ont to him to get up, and greatly to his surprise he
fonncl hc could obey. The next moment it mas Broadfoot's
turn ; he %as shot in thc thigh, and mas either thrown from
his horse, or dismounted to examine the nature of his wound.
He considered it insufficient to stop him, remounted, and rode
on cheering some men into the trenches.
The attack mas resolntely made, and the Sikh resistance
was most determined. The result wes a partial success,
achieved at a terrible sacrifice of life. It is difficnlt to trace
precisely the part played by each regiment. Ln the confusion
of the attack it is probable that the relativc positions of the
regimentswere changed, and that this has led to someambiguity
in the various descriptions of the battle. In n general way it
may be said that the Sikh batteries mere carried at the point
of the bayonet; but the Sikhs retired no farther from them
than their tents and camp in the immediate rear, from whence
they opened a severe mnslretry fire.
As the a s s i ~ d twas being made, the Governor-General and
his StaB appear to have moved towards .the right. I t was to
the right of the centre of the sonth face that Broadfoot rode
into thc Sikh battery, and there he was killed : shot through
t h e arm and heart, he fell dead. Abbott, noticing some hesitation in two companies of the Both, and finding that all their
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officers had been killed, put himself at their head. They
responded to his order, charged the entrenchments, and fired
a volley into the Sikh tents, which were set on fire, and the
blaze spread along the line. The different regiments penetrated
different distances into the Sikh camp. The despatches and
some other accounts seem to show that those on the right got
farthest in ; and, indeed, the reserve under Sir Harry Smith
and part of the 1st E.L.I. are said to have reached the village
' of Firozshah and swept the Sikhs out of a great part of their
camp.a H M ' s 3rd Dragoons added to the reputation they
had so justly acquired at Nudki. They were sent against a
. battery from which the Sikhs maintained a heavy fiie. They
chnrged, and carried itthe leaders filling up the yawning trench with their own numbers,
and those who followed crossing on a living bridge of their comrades.
. . Baving put the artillerymen to death and silenced the battery,
this gallant band faccd the whole Khalsa army within the entrenchment, wept through their camp with loud huzzas over tents, ropes,
pegs, guns, fires, and magazines, cutting down all that opposed their
passage; and, having traversed the enemy's position from side to
side, emerged among their friends, with numbers thinned indeed,
but ' covered with imperishable glory.'"

'

.

The combat was continued with obstinacy on either side
till night fell, and even then it did not cease. Numerous explosions of mines or magazines occurred, one of which took
effect under the feet of the 1st E.L.I., the distinguished regiment of which William Broadfoot had been adjutant; and
rending it in twain scattered the survivors on either side.
The brave men, however, when no longer able to find their
own regiment, attached themselves to the nearest and continued the struggle: The Sikh fire was so destructive; and
successful progress in the dark' so improbable, that it was
decided .to withdraw the troops from the entrenchments,
restore-some degree of order, and await the dawn. Accord.ingly a position from 300 to 400 yards distant from the south
face of the. Sikh camp was selected, and there were gathered
together the remnants of Gilbert's and Wallace's divisions.
T , The movements of the reserve
under Sir Harry Smith are involved
in cansidehble obscurity. The dentch in mhioh they are described is

far from boind either clear or distinct.
T h War in InrZia :Devpatchcs&c.
Cakulla Review, No. ix. vol. vi.
art. vi. p. 276. ,
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Their combined'strength did not exceed that of one division, and
the men were eshansterl, hungry, and thirsty. They vere put
under Gen. Gilbert's commilncl, mcl with them mere Sir H,
Gough and Sir Henry Hardinge, who were indefatigable in
visiting the various regiments or detachments, encouraging
the men, and, with Gen. Gilbert, showing an example of
calmness and fortitnde most valuable in that trying time.
Thus order was restored, and the men lay down30 rest.
As has been already stated, the movements of the reserve are
somewhat doubtf~d. The tl-oops under Sir H. Smith are said to
have penetrated to the village of Firozshah, to have held it for
some time, and eventnally awing the night to have retired to
Misriwda, distant about two miles to the south or south-west.
The Sikhs, haying recovered that part of their position,
appear to have somewhat cautionsly returned to the batteries
on the south face. They manned some guns and opened fire
whenever they could discover the position of any. part of the
British force. On one occasion the fire was so harassing, that
Sir Henry Eardinge called on the 80th and 1st E.L.I. to
charge the batlery.
Lieut.-Col. Bunbury, assisted by Lieut.-Col. Wood, my aide-aecamp, led the attack, on which occasion the latter officer mas
wounded. The guns were spiked, the enemy driven away with loss,
and this part of our line left undisturbed for the remainder of the
night.'
Fortnnately for ns, insubordination and licence prevailed
in the Sikh camp : the Alralis plundered the tents of La1
Singh, the Sikh commander-in-chief; a general riot ensued,
and the remnants of discipline were lost. This was not
known to our leaders ; had it been realised, they would have
been spared a night of anxiety unparalleled in our experience
of war in India. The prospect, it cannot be disputed, was
gloomy in the extreme. The Sikhs had practically recovered
the whole of their entrenched camp. The remnant of Sir
John Littler's division was away in a village due west of
Firozshah, Sir IIarry Smith's division was two miles distant
in *other direction, each ignorant of the position and intentions of the other, and of those of the exhausted division
and heaclquarters which alone remained on the field.
Papers dc. p. 44.
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It is not a matter of surprise that some officers mere unequal to the emergency, and suggested retreat on Firozpur ;
nor mill 'it astonish anyone acquainted with the impetuous
gallantry of the Commander-in-Chief, and the quieter but
not inferior resolution of the Governor-General, that such
suggestions met mith the reception which they deserved.
The two Chiefs met in the night and decided, mithout
hesitation, that the attack must be at once resumed in the
morning, and that the result must be victory or death.
In case of disaster, which was far from impossible, the
Governor-Governor sent orders to Mudki, where Mr. Currie
was in charge of the official papers of the Government of
India, and Mr. Cust of the records of the Agency, for the destruction of all State papers. Sir Henry's son Charles,who mas
private secretary, being a civilian, was ordered off the field..
Major Somerset conveyed the order, and was mortally mounded
about five minutes afterwards. Mr. Hardinge passed the night
with Major Brind's battery, and rejoined the Governor-General
next morning immediately after the Sikh camp hadbeen carried.
Prince Waldemar of, Prussia and his suite were also desired to
leave the field, but not before Dr. Boffmeister had been killed.
Whilst thus the eituation of the British, as far as could be '
hewn to their leaders, mas well nigh desperateJ2there is no
doubt that the courage and resolution of the S f i s had been
severely tried by the day's fighting, and had much abated.
Theh position, defended by an artillery greatly superior in
number and weight of guns to that of their assailants, had
been stormed at the point of the bayonet ; whilst, i s has been
recorded, the 3rd Dragoons had ridden over and through their
camp, unchecked by opposition or by obstacles. Such shocks
aie not without their effect, and cannot be sustained mith impunity. One result was manifest in the insub~rdinationand
riot already mentioned. And so it happened that when dawn
at last appeared, and the one division on the field, which had
been led forward in the dark close'to the edge of the entrenchment, and there lay concealed, arose and delivered its
'\The position of the British mas
unneccssarily aggravated by the action
of an oficer in the Adjutant-General's
Department, mho, presumably acting
under some unoontrollable impulse of
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a mind unequal to the situation,
ordered several regiments to retire
from the field to Firozpur. The
order mas obeyed by a considerable
portion of the force.

!
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assault, a success mas achieved mhich decided the result of
the battle.
As in the proceedings of the previous day, so' in the
nccounts of what took place on the morning of the 22nd,
differences and discrepaucies are to be found. 1n the despatches of the Commander-in-Chief, and of Sir ET. Hardinge
as second in command, it is stated that Gough led the right,
ancl Hardinge the left ; but Najor-Gen. Gilbert has reported
thus :
The front of the left of my division was led into action by his
Escellency the Commander-in-Chief, and the right by the Right
Hon. the Lieut.-Gen. Sir H. Hardinge, and I myself lending her
3hjesty's 80th Foot ; and notwithst~ndiugthe ~dvancomas made
under 0 tremendous fire of heavy guns, the enemy's entrenchment
was retaken, battery after battery, nt the bayonet's point.3

It is not, perhaps, of much importance to iix precisely the
posts occupied by the two leaders. Sir Henry Hardinge had
sent his son Arthur, the only unwounded member of his Staff,
with Col. Benson to bring up Sir J. Littler and his diviaion ;
but the advance was not delayed till they arrived. On hearing
the firing commence, Capt. Hardinge galloped on and rejoined
his father, who, mith,the Commander-in-Chief and the officers
of their Staff, rode thirty yards in front of the British line
to prevent the men from firing.
The assault mas made on the south face, which mas
carried ; the troops then turned, swept eastwards, keeping the
village of Pirozshah on their left, and emerged victorious on
the plain to the north. There they were formed in line,
~ ~ nreceived
d
their two leaders with loud cheers. Many
standards, seventy-three guns, and the whole Sikh position,
mere in possession of the victors.
But their work was not yet clone. Tej Singh, who commanded the force which threatened Firozpur, either attracted
by the cannonade, or more probably informed by some of the
fugitive Sikhs that the fortune of the day was going against
them, brought up his m y , principally cavalry, and a lark0
field of artillery. By this time Sir J. Littler and Sir Harry
a

Major-Qen. Gilbert's deapntch to
Dec.

the Commander-in-Chief,dated

34,1846. Tar in I d i a : Despatches
&c. second edition, 1846, p. 70.
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Smith, with their men, had joined; but at no moment mas
the situation of the British more critical than vhen Tej
Sin'gh's fresh troops drove in our wearied cavalry parties,
whose horses could not even muster a trot. Our soldiere
$ere exhausted and starving : there was no ammunition for
the~guns. Fortunately the Sikh commander did not know to
what extremity we mere reduced. He made a strenuous
effort to regain the position, -was repulsed, but immediately
renewed the contest, and opened a heavy fire from his artillery.
Our grins could not reply, but the best that could be done was
done : a bold front was shown to the enemy, and preparations
were made indicative of an intention to attack him on either
flank.4 Meanwhile Tej Singh became aware of the loss and
carnage which had attended our capture of the position; and
considering that an assault when we were the defenders would
be hopeless, he withdrew his troops, to the intense relief of the
British leaders."
Thus, after a prolonged and determined struggle, which
had lasted with but little interruption for twenty-four hours,
the British remained masters of the Geld, and the Sikhs, defeated but not demoralised, retreated towards the Sutlej.
The British loss during the twod ays' fighting amounted
to 694 killed and 1,721 wounded ; in all, 2,415 of all ranks.
This description of the battle of Firozshah hae been compiled from many sources, some of which have been accessible to
the public and others have not. Endeavour has been made to
omit what is merely conjecture, and to verify the statements

' Papers A%.

p. 38.
This is %he reason given by Tej
Singh himself for his innction, and it
seems sufficient, Qen. 8. A. Abbott
bas recorded the following remnrks on
tho subject: 'It has been said that Tej
Singh, alarmed by the movement of
the troops which deserted the &Id
the previous evening, thinking it a
threatening flank movement, desisted
from the attack ; but he informed the
writer of these lines, some time afterwards, that finding the loss we had
sustained in cnpturing the poeition, ns
cvidented by the numbers slain, he
gave it up os hopeless when we wero

the defenders.' (Ep'sods&c.) This nccount has been recently confirmed by
Mnjor-Gen. R. Young,R.E., who, being
present soon after at an interview
between Henry Lawrence and Tej
Singh, hennl the former ask the latter
why he withdrew. Tej Singh replied
as indioated in the text. The retrograde movement of our cavalry and
some of our artillery on Firozpur, in
obedience to an ~~nauthorised
order,
may lixve nevertheless influenced the
Sardar ; that it did so is believed by
some whose opportunities for observing, and nbility to deduce correctly,
entitle their opinion to consideration.
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made ; but the difficulty of making a trustworthy and complete
account of circumstances and movements, in themselves involved in confusion and obscurity, as well as of rgconciling
evidence apparently conflicting, is fully realised.
I
The sufferings of the troops, both wounded &I unwounded,
may be more easily imagined than described. As far as can
be ascertained, it mould seem that, mith the exception of some
limited refreshment about noon of' the 21st, neither food nor
water which could be used mas available till the evening or
night of the 22nd. A very scanty supply of rum was served
out during the night of the 21st. Dead bodies had been
thrown into the wells at Pirozshah by the Sikhs in order to
make the water undrinkable. There was no field hospital,
nor were medical stores, instruments, or appliances procurable,
save those attached to regimental hospitals. Capt. Abbott,
who, though severely wounded, had with great gallantry continued to serve mherever he could be useful, .has thus described the night of December 22 :
The Governor-General bivouacked under u, tree that night with
a miserably reduced Staff, of which I was one, desperately hungry.
But fortunately during the night some refreshments came up. The
next morning, [the 23rdl I accompnniod Sir Henry Hardinge on an
elephant to Ferozepore.
There Abbott's wounds were for the first time attended to;
he mas laid up for six weeks, during which he mas often
visited by S h Henry, and 'properly supplied with every necessary by the well-lulown Buxoo, the head butler.' The other
mounded occupants of his tent were Herbert Edmarcles and
Paul E h e s , now Sir F. P. Haines, who afterwards became
Commahder-in-Chief im India.
Of those killed, the foremost place in Sir Eenry Eardinge's
despatches is assigned to George Broadfoot, because ofhis official position and the value of his services, political and military. The same compliment may be appropriately paid in this
book to him whose services form its most prominent feature.
The paragraphs in which his death is recorded are as follows :
first in despatch as second in command :
It is nom with great pain that I lime to record the irreparable
loss I have sustained . . in tho death of Major Broadfoot, of the
Madras Army, my Political Agent. He was thrown from his horse

.
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by a shot, i n d I failed in prevding upon him to Ieave the field. He
remounted, and shortly afterwards received a mortal wound. He was
as breve as he was able in every branch of the political and military
service.=

\

Again, in a letter to the Secret Committee:
I have now to conclude this despatch by expressing my deep

concern for the loss, in the action of the 21st instant, of that most
invaluable officer, Major Broadfoot, my Political Agent for these
Btates. He was wounded hnd thrown off his horse at my side, but
I failed in prevailing on him to retire. He remounted his horse,
and shortly afterwards received a mortal wound in lending on the
troops against the battery in our front. I entertained the highest
opinion of his abilities. H e mas second to none in this accomplished
service, in every qualification by whioh the political or military
interests of the East India Compmy could be advanced; and I shall
be most gratified if, at a season of more leisure, some special mark
of honour can be conferred, by which his great merits and glorious
death may be perpetuated.
Major George Broadfoot mas the Iast of three brothers, who
held appointments in the Company's army, and all these have fallen
in battle, in the service of their country?

Brigadier Wallace ' fell bravely at the head of his troops.'
Major Somerset was mortally wounded about the same time
that Broadfoot was killed; h e ' was shot through the body,
conducting himself with the hereditary courage of his race.
He was always foremost where difficulties required to be
overcome.'
Capt. P. Nicolson, whose name has often appeared in these
pages, was killed on the 21st in the assault on the western
face led by Sir J. Littler. The Governor-General 'has recorded that he ' was a most able and gallant oficer.'
The officers of the Agency, Major Broadfoot's Assistants,
mentioned in the despatch of the Governor-General to the
Secret Committee, were Capt. Abbott, Lieut. Lake, Capt..
Mills, and Mr. Cust ; Mr. Currie's services as Chief Secretary
to the Government of Lndia were also warmly aclmowledged.
For a complete list of the officers killed and wounded; or
specially mentioned, reference must be made to the despatches
which are printed and available to the public. The selection
*

papers dc. p. 46. De~pipatchof
Lieut.-Gen. Sir H.Eardinge.

Pupws dc.p.28. Despatchof the
Govornor-General, datedDec. 31,1845.
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of the name8 here recorded is not intended to be in any way
invidious, but is made because of their connection with bhjor
Broadfoot, either in the conduct of the business of the Agency;
.
or as, for the time, fellow members of the Staff of the. GoverporGeneral."
After the battle the British nrmy marched to Sultan-.
khanmala, where they destroyed about 80,000 lbs. of gunpowder collected by the Sikhs ; and afterwards the head:
quarters moved towards the Sutlej in the neighbomhoocl of
Atari and Butamala, in tho direction of Earike. There they
remained awaiting ammunition and reinforcements.
Prom Firozpur the Governor-General issued the usual,
notiiications, proclamations, and general orders.
On Christmas Day, 1845, Rh.jor Broadfoot's body,'with
that of Capt. Hore, Assist~bntMilitary Secretary, who had
been lrillecl abont the same time and near the same place, as
brought into Firozpur. He mas bnried with military honours,
the Governor-General and his Staff attending the funeral.
I t is appropriate to record here letters from persons woU
qualified to jndge of broad foot'^^ character and merits; the
reader, who has accompanied us so far, can form his own
estimnte of the man ns a soldier, as an administrator, and as a
diplomatist.
On December 30, Mr. Cust, his Personal Assistnnt, wrote
to Broadfoot's only surviving brother as follows :
Camp, Ferozepore : December 30, 1845.

My dear Sir,-It is my painful duty to announce to you the
death of your brother, Major George Broadfoot, in whose demise I
have lost a valued and esteemed friend, and the East India Company
one of their most distinguished ma talented servants. Your
brother's end was caused by a shot through the heart while accompanying the Governor-Generd on the battle-field of Berozshahr
on December 21. He was first wounded through both thighs, and
thrown off his horse ; but with that gallantry which distinguished
him through life, he again mounted his horse, when dmost immediately he was pierced through the heart and arm, an3 fell dead.
His remains were brought in and buried with the usual honours i ~ t
Ferozepore, in the presence of the Governor-General.
Gapt. Herries and Capt. Munro,
both A.D.C., were killed at Dludki.
Capt. nore at Pirozshah. All the

Staff were killed or wounded except
Capt. Arthur Hardinge.
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Everyone bears testimony to the singular talents, and noble and
heroic character, that distinguished your lamented brotl2er; but'it
'remains to those who knew him intimately as I did, to spealc of his
kin$ness of heart, his benevolence, his wonderful and almost universal information. I have lived with hirn as his private secretary
for'more than a year, and have sincerely to regret his loss, both in
'a public and private view.

.

.-

.

Yours LC.
Ronxn~OUST.
I T h e Governor-General wrote t h u s to Mr. Alexander
. Broadfoot :
Camp, Ferozpoor : January 1,1846.
'

My dear 8ir,--You and I have sustained an irreparable loss.
Pour able and distinguished brother fell by a grape shot in the
battle of Ferozshah on December 21, whilst bravely animating the
troops to do their duty. The first shot threw hirn off hi8 horse by
my side. I in vain entreated him to retire. His invincible cournge
induced him to remount, and he was killed as we took the batter
.in our front.
I caused him to be brought in here and buried in the military
burial ground ; my chaplain apd all of us, who admired and esteemed
him, attending at this last mournful ceremony.
His abilities were of the highest order ; and in all the relations
of Life, whether public or private, the force of his character was
felt and appreciated.
I n my despatch to the Committee of the E.I.C. I have expressed
my sentiments of my late friend. I send you a copy. If ever I
should have the felicity of malring your acquaintance, I should be
most happy to express to you how sincerely I was attached to him.
I remain &c.
I never can replace him.

H. EARDINGE.

And again :
Camp, Ferozpoor : January 13,1846.

My dear Sir,-My invaluable friend, your late brother, being an
officer on the Madras Establishment, I wrote a letter to the nfarquis
of Tweeddale, desiring that the services of Major Broadfoot might
be noticed in a general order to be published to the whole of the
Madras Army, to which he belonged.
Scarcely a day passes in tho midst of these stirring scenes which
does not forcibly remind me of the loss the service has sustained in
your adrnirabl~brother.
The Arab on which he mas mounted has had two bullets extracted, and mill recover. I am now the owner of the animal, and
I

DD
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with care he will be fit to be ridden, and always be a potected
fwourite of my stud.=
Mr. Cust d l have written to you on matters relating to your
brother's affairs.
'
Believe me &c.

,

;

H. ELL~DINGI~.
The general order referred to, dated J a n u a r y 10, 1846, is
as follows :
Sir,-I am directed by the Governor-General to state, for the inforniation of the Most Noble the Governor in Council of Fort Saint
George, that in the battle fought at Ferozshnh, on December 21,
Brevet Major Rroadfoot, C.B.,of the 34th Regiment, Madras Army,
was killed in action.
2. The Governor-General desires me to observe, that the career ,
of this brave o5cer had been so highly distinguished during the
Afghan war, and in the defence of Jellalabad, and now so gloriously
closed in the hour of victory (for he fell in.$ho enemy's camp, which
had been carried), that he deems it his dut'' to the &fa&as Army to
cause the circumstances under which he died to be promulgated for
the satisfaction of that army.
3. .Major Broadfoot's remarkable intelligence had induced the
Governor-General, in the latter end of 1844, to appoint him to be
his Political Agent on the North-Western Frontier. In the performance of this very arduous duty, he on all occasions evinced
great ability and judgment.
4. In reporting the death of this most able officer to the home
nuthorities, the Governor-General has expressed his sense of his
merits in tho following words.
5. Major Broadfoot's remains were laid in the burial ground
of this cantonment, by the side of Sir Robert Sale's a n d ' M ~ j o r
Somerset's, with the military honours due to his rank; the GovernorGeneral and his Staff, and Ihe civil authorities., attending the
funeral.
6. The Governor-General deeply regrets the loss which the
public service has sustained by the death of this distinguished
I hnve &c.
\
of5cer.
J. STUART,
Lieutenant-Colonel,
~ e c r e t i r yto the G o v e m c n t of Inclia, Military Department.

. . .'

Sir Henry's son, the present Lord
Hardinge, has remarked : ' I often rode
this horse myself; so did the GovernorGenerlll, who was very fond of him.
The shot passed clean through the

withers. He was kept in tho Governor-General's stable till he left India."
The .quotation is omitted, ns it
has already been made. See page
390.

.
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Lie&.-Col. TI. Havelock to h5.s~Bvoadfoot.
Simla : October YO, 1846.

My dear Miss Broadfoot,-Three or four days ago your letter of
the 5th ultimo reached me, and I cannot describe the emotion with
which I received a communication from one so near to my lost and
ever lamented friend. How often, in my evening rides at this place,
do I look up as I pass it at the house on a lofty eminence which
George Broadfoot occupied last year, and dmost expect to see his
well-known figure pacing his favourite verandah ; and then when I
awake to the reality of my loss, with how heavy a heart do I move,on
around the mountain, kept baclc from the sin of repining only by the
remembrance of God's presence, of the innulnerable comforts and
blessings with which my cup still overflows, and of the necessity of
calmly acquiescing in the inscrutable decrees of Providence, which,
though painful and seemingly severe, are assuredly benevolent and
wise I

.

. .
I rejoice indeed to hear of the pensions granted to you and your

sister, as a tribute of respect to the memory of dear Broadfoot.
Lord Hardinge told me a few days before that this arrangement had
been or would be made. His Lordship's regard for your brother,
my lamented friend, was perfectly enthusiastic. To love and admire
him, indeed, it mas only necessary to understand, and not to envy;
but to compass these two WRS a difficulty too great for small men
and bad mon ; and you will conceive that we sre not exempt from the
plague of selfish sciolists *in India &nymore than in other countries.
I have been attempting a memoir of my friend, lo be published
either in the paper called the ' Friend of India ' or the ' Calcutta
Review.' A part of it is already in type ; and I took some extracts
from the journal to aid me. I have felt, indeed, at every step that
the time, as you observe, masmot yet come to speak plainly about
Jellahbad, whilst regarding Maulinain my information was deficient.
However, if my sketch is only finished, it shall, I will take care, be
sent to you, and I think I must venture then to asl; of you to aid
me with facts to enable me to m i t e more fully at some future period.
You mill not find the journals when they reach you very ample, for the
entries in them were evidently mado in meat
- haste intwo small books.
There is attached, however, a very valuable memorandum of the
proceedings of the council of war at Jellalnbad, in which I may say
your brother George's firmness mainly contributed to the salvatioi
of Sale's force. Of this he had previously sent me a copy. The
most valuable pages i n the journal are those which contain a record

...
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This word is doubtful ; the original is difficult to read.
u

1,

2

,

LSTRACTS PROX SPEECHES

404

'CR.

xrf

of Broadfoot's own views during the blocltad~of Jellalabad, which
are clear and convincing, at times almost prophetic.
Believe me kc.
H. HATELOOK.-

. ..

Lord Ellenboroz~ghto Miss Broadjoot.
Southam House : April 12, 1846.

(Extrnct.)

Madnm,-I have read with the most sincere interest, but with
much pain, your letter.
you must well h o w the personal regard as well as the public
confidence I reposed in your brother.
Of the seven officers who had been on my personal staff and wcre
present in the late battles, four were lrilled bnd three were wounded ;
of these, one, I fear, mortally ; but deeply as I lament the misfo~.tunes
of all of them, I feel that on public grounds I must give my greatest
sorrow to the fate of your brother ; while I h o w at the same time
that I lost in him one of the truest friends I made in Inllia, where
I hope 'Imade many.
Time will, I trust, give tranquillity of mind to you and your
sister ; but the loss you have sustained is in all respects irreparable.
I beg YOU to believe me kc.
ELLENBOROUGH.

...

.

On Monday, March 2, 1846, Major Broedfoot's death was
recorded as a, public calamity in both Houses of Parliament.
The following are extracts from tho speeches in which the
thanks of Parliament were conveyed to the Army of the Sutlej.
There is a n inaccuracy in the Earl of Ripon's speech, but it is
of little consequence. Broadfoot had held the post of Agent
for about fourtxen months only, not for two years and a half;
but he had previously acquired considerable knowledge of the
country and of some of the leading d e n .
I n the House of Lords, the E a r l of Ripon, after bearing
testimony t o the value of the services of the Governor-General,
the Commander-in-Chief, and the Army of the Sutlej generally, and nfter deploring the loss of Sir Robert Sale and
Sir J. McCaslrill, proceeded to say :
There was another individual who fell in this action, whom I
cannot help noticing, even if it should appear to be somewhat invidious to do so, because it is impossible to mention all who fell .on
this occasion: I mcan Major Broadfoot, one who has singular
demands upon our respect and gratitude, as a political servant of

,
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the Company, as well as in his military capacity. He had been two
years and a Lalf Political Agent of the Governor-General in those
quarters, and performed his duties in a manner which won for him
universal respect and admiration. Be knew the country and he
h e w the people, and of all men v a s perhaps the most fitted to be
employed in so delicate and difficult a mission. Admirably, however, as he performed his civil duties, he did not forget what belonged to his military character. If he had any fault, it was that of
/being too for~vard. He was always first in the fray, and in this instance he paid the penalty of his gallant character. The tribute
paid to him by the Governor-General is no more than is just and
deserved; and though I have no right to panegy~isehim as an
officer, yet, kuowing what he has done in his political character, I
thought I was bound to notice the irreparablo loss which we Lave
sustained by the death of that individual.
I n t h e House of Commons, in his speech on the same
subject, Sir Robert Peel said :
We have, Sir, also to deplore the loss of Sir J. IfcCaskill, to whom
a brief but touching testimony of approbation is borne in the despatch of the Commander-in-Chief, as well as one of the most elnillent
men in the civil and military services of India-Major Broadfoot.
K t h a t gentleman the highest confidence was placed by everyone
who came in contact with him. He obtained the applause of every
civil and military authority in the country, and his prudence and skill
as a civilian were only equalled by his ardour and bravery in the field.
He was, I believe, the last of three brothers, all of whom have died in
the service of their country on the field of battle. Major Broadfoot
was present with Sir R. Sale duririg the siege of Jellalabad, and
took a most conspicuous part in its defence. I t is mournful, Sir,
that we should have to deplore the loss in the same conflict of two
gallant men so devoted to their country's service as Sir R.Sale and
Major Broadfoot.

h

1

The following letter from the E a r l of Ripon to Miss
Broadfoot has a n interest because it is from the person to
mhom Major Broadfoot's secret reports were submitted in
t h e ordinary c o ~ u s eof business. H e mas therefore specially
qualified t o pronounce a n opinion on the value of t h e Agent's
services.
Putnay Hcath : April 14, 1846.

h

Madam,-I

have the honour to acknowledge yonr letter of the
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8th inst., and beg you will acccpt my grateful thanks for the manner
in which YOU have expressed pourself in respect to what was stated by
me in the House of Lords regarding your lamented brother. I can
claim no other merit in having so spoken of him than that of having
spoken the literal truth : and the manner in which my observations
were received by the House satisfied me that those to whom they
were addressed fully sympathised with my own feelings.

I have no right to intrude upon you, or other of Major Broadfoot's family, with my personal condolence. But next to those
higher sources of consolation to which you refer, it must be grateful to you to loiow the universal admiration and respect in which
Major Brodfoot's memory is held, not merely by those who knew
him, but by the public at large. No one not connected with his
family can entertain those feelings more strongly than I do.
I have &"
RIPON.
Over Broadfoot's grave a t Firozpw his friend Colin Mackenzie caused a stone to be pleced, on which there is a brief
inscription, in which h e is termed ' the foremost m&nin India.'
Excoption has, not unnaturally perhaps, been taken to the
expression ; the benevolent ascribing it to the well-known
enthusiastic admiration of his friend. But the opinion there
expressed mas shared by many well qualified to judge. It
might be less briefly but more accurately clefinecl thus : that
Broadfoot, in the eminence of serviccs rendered, and the brilliant promise of services to come, hecl distancecl a11 cornpetitors of his own stancling, and had passed the greater
number of his seniors.
Amongst those who appear to have concurred with Colin
Maclrenzie in his estimation of Broaclfoot's value, may be
mentioned Sir Henry Havelock and Sir Herbert Edvardes.
The former was by nature rather cold and prudent than enthusiastic, ~ n c ltherefore what he h a s said on the subject is
entitled to veight.
In 1848, i n seconding a n address to Sir George Clerk in
Bombay, Havelock said : '
Now, of the defenders of Jellalebad, Sir Robert Sale, Col.
Dennie, and greater t h m either-greater than any and all that
fought for the defence of that old mall-Major George Broadfoot
are in their soldiers' graves.

,
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Further, in a letter dated March 9, 1849, h e remarked

To my youngest son, born in June 1647, I have ventured to give
the names of George Broadfoot. If he lives to look upon a battlefield, surely his heart will not fail him when he thinks of this prefix
to his father's designati~n.~

.

And again on J u n e 5, 1856, in a letter to this son :
. I have just returned horn the tomb of the great man after whom
you are named-Major
George 13roadfoot. He is called in the
inscription on it, from the pen of his friend Colin Macltenzie, ' the
foremost man in India,' and truly in intellect and resolution he
was.'

Sir E e r b e r t Edwardes was a younger man t h a n Broadfoot,
I-Iaveloclr was older. The younger man thus wrote qfter a
description of t h e battle of Firozshah :
Foremost among the dead, as he was for ever foremost among
the living, let us weep over GEORGEBROADFOOT,
with whose life
there left this earth one of the noblest spirits that ever lit upon it.
Alas, that even the memory of such a man should not be sacred
from slander, calumny, and lies-lies as black as his name was

..

fair/.
A more honourable man than George Broadfoot never lived.

...

whatever may have been Lord Ellenborough's deficiencies, he was
undoubtedly possessed of that keen insight into character which is,
to statesmen and governors, a diviner's ~ o d .
A civil reformer was wanted in Madmain: Broadfoot was
selected ; and scarcely mere the abuses of a corrupt administration
in those provinces cleared away, than he was chosen to succeed Col. Richmond in the important charge of the North-West
Frontier. A higher compliment could not have been paid by the
Government than in tLus calling him from one extremity of the
Empire to another. The nature of our relations with the Punjab at
this crisis has been fully entered into at the commencement of this
article ; and the ' Papers laid before Parliament ' supply us with
sbundanti evidence, and indeed the most repeated and solemn
assurances, that the course which Sir H. Hardinge wished to steer
through that stormy sea was the one which promised most effectually
to maintain peace. The danger is throughout admitted to be great ;
fears even are anxiously confessed that mar cannot be avoided ; but
peace is declared to be the Governor-General's policy ; and for its
a

Mcmairs o j Sir H.Havelock dc. p. 1G7.

Ibid. p. 215.
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preservation the Governor-General is ready to incur t%e reproach of
infatuation and neglect, to sacrifice everything except the national
hmzoz~r. When, therefore, this same Governor-General, who has
staked all on peace, finds himself plunged in war-and that mar
threatening to embarrass his whole administrntion if not endanger
the very stability of the Empire-it would have been only too consistent with weak human nature, and especially hard, ungrateful,
statesman nature, if he had at once thrown the whole blame of the
frustration of his policy on the incapacity or treachery of the Agent
who should have carried it out. That that Agent was dead, would
only have made the plan more feasible, and surprised us less ; for
it is astonishing how uncomplainingly the dead bear the burdens of
the living ! Sir Henry Hardinge, however, was too true a soldier
to ask any man to fight his battles ; aud he pronounced over Broadfoot's tomb-or rather over his grave, for those were not the days
of tombs-that romarkable eulogy, that ' he was second to none in
this acconzplished service.' No man can read that passage of Sir
Henry Hartlinge's despatch, wherein he laments the untimely death
of his Agent, and expresses his determination ' ttt a season of more
leisure to confer some special mark of honour, by which his great
merits and glorious death may be perpetuated,' without a full conviction that it came from the hea~t,and was written of one who
had done his duty ably and conscie?~tiozislyto the Govarmzent. Let
those, therefore, who are not behind the scenes, and have no means
of judgiug what Broadfoot either did or &d not; who have no
access to public documents, and who could possibly know nothing
of a man who had no conjidant in State affairs ; rkflect for a moment
on what is implied in the charge of ' forcing on the war,' and pause
ere they vilify the memory which the Governor-General of India
and tho Prime Minister of England have delighted to
These observations might well have been kept in mind by
some who have undertaken to mrite tho history of those times.
I n some cases the accusation was made through ignorance,.
in others from causes of a different character ; but it is trusted
t h a t the papers now published form a complete reply, a n d m a y
be held t o entirely refute the charge.
The opinion of Broadfoot's character held b y an older and
by a younger m a n have been expressed : t h e sentiments of
t h e Governor-General, who was Broadfoot's immediate official
superior, are declared in the following extracts :t h e first is from
a letter to Nr. Alexander Broadfoot, dated N a y 18, 1846.
Galcutla Rariew, No. xi. vol. vi. nrt. vi. pp. 282-284.'
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I shall never cease to regret the loss of your excellent brother,
on my own and the public account. He united a greater variety of
admirable qbalities than any other officer I have met with in the
Indian Army.

.

T h e next is from s letter to Miss Brocldfoot :
Great Stanhope Street : July 4,1849.

. . . All your excellent brother's letters will bear the severest

scrutiny in proof of the integrity and judgment with which all hi#
political and diplomatic duties mere transacted, his private letters
always confirming his public acts ; and though written at moments
of great fatigue, show in every line the energy and ability of his
superior mind. I accidentally perused a memoir of his on Jellalabad,
which induced me to come to the decision that he was the ablest
man I could select for the most difficult station ; and had his ardent
courage been of a less heroic stamp, he might have refrained from
further conflict after his first wound, which threw him off his horse
by my side. But, guided by his noble courage, as long as he could
sit his horse he felt he could be useful at a most critical moment of
the battle ; and at the close of the assault on the enemy's batteries
he received his mortal wound at the very moment of our success.
There mas a project of building a church at Ferozpoor when I
left India, which I hope will shortly be carried into execution, on
the inside walls of which I have ordered a tablet in gun-metal to
be erected as a testimonial of my personal friendship for the dear
friend me have lost.
You are aware that the E.I.C. feel the greatest aifficulty in laying
down any rule by which selections could be determined upon for
raising public monuments at their expense to the memory of officers
dying in their service.
In your brave brother's instance the monument ordered by the
ofhers of the Madras Army mill, however, be a n honourable and
lasting testimonial to his fame ; whilst my more humble tribute, as
a personal friend, mill, on every Sabbath day, remind every young
officer of the meritorious life and heroic death of the most accomplished officer of the Indian Army, near the spot where I attended
his burial after the battle of Ferozshnhur.
I will not dwell on this subject. The perpetuation of his fame
will be secured in the Presidency, and near the spot where ho devoted
his life to his country ; and in Madras, which army can claim the
honour of lending Broadfoot to Bengal, his memory will survive
as long as the British power in India.
Yours kc.
HARDINGE.

Two more espressions of Hevclock's opinion seem worthy
of record here. The first is to Mrs. Anderson, a distant connection of the Eroadfoot family.
George Broadfoot was my most intimate hiend. Our intimacy
was not indeed of long duration, for it begnn in the defile of Khoord
Ci~bool,and ended on the bloody field of Peroeeshahur. Bnt I not
only ever regarded him; and think him still, a giant in intellect and
resolution amongst ordinary men, but I mas attraoted in a manner
which I should in vain attempt to describe, by the truthfulness of
his mind, the largeness and tenderness of his heart, and the more
than Roman self-devotion of his character.
The other is a quotation from the 'Memoirs of Sir H.
Havelock.'

...

Ln the annals of British India
there is no name more
illustrious tlmn that of George Broaclfoot. I.Iaveloclr, his bosom
ftiend, remarks of him : ' No person of common discernment could
have enjoyed opportur~itiesof knowing him intimately without perceiving that he was eminently, as old Paoli described the youthful
Nilpoleon, " one of Plutarch's men," a man formed, if his life had
been spared;to play n leading part in great events, and astonish
those who gazed around and after him, by the vigour and grasp of
his intellect, his natural talent for mar and policy, his cool aud
sound judgment, his habit and powers of generalisation, his moral
courage and personal intrepidity, and his uncompromising love of
truth.'
S ~ TE e n r y Lawrence, who succeeded Broadfoot on the
frontier, and who could not be correctly described ns his
enthusiastic admirer, has recorded t h a t h e 'had no eqnal on
the frontier, and perhaps few in India.'
These opinions and estimates of Broadfoot's character
and ability, held by distinguished men, having been freely
quoted, there is n o necessity to tldd further praise, which
might, moreover, be attributed to exaggeration not unnatural
under the circumstances.
As an aclrnowleclgment of his services the Court of Directors continued the dlomance of 2001. a pear which he had
made to his two unmarried sisters.
The following letter from Sir Henry Hardinge to the Earl
Marshman's Life of Havelock,
p. 86.

' Gakutta Rsuiew.No.xvi.pol. viii.
art. vi. note, p. 476.

of Ellenborough is full of interest : i t was written on t h e eighth
day after t h e battle, whilst recollection vas fresh.
Camp, Ferozpoor : December 30,1845.

My dear Lord Ellenborough,-The despatches will inform you
that the Sikhs have crossed the Sutlege in great force, that we
moved up the Umballa force to support Ferozpoor, and that we have
fought a very severe battle, driving the enemy out of his entrenched
position defended by 60,000 men and 108 pieces of cannon, of which
we have now 91 pieces in the fort here. No accident or disaster
has occurred, and the eriemy is now on the other side of the river.
As far back as November 15 the Silrks began to assemble their
forces. Major Broadfoot demanded explanations : no answer was
sent. The army was held in readiness to move; the accounts of
the Sikh preparations perpetually varied, and all o w best politicians
decided that the Sikhs would never cross the river. I reached
Umballa on the 2nd, and dismissed the Lahore Vakeel until he
should bring with him some explanation in reply to Major Broadfoot's remonstrance, considering his residence improper whilst his
Court continued to treat the Political Agent's letter with disregard.
On the 6th I marched towards Loodiana. No infantry or artillery
had moved from Lahore, and the movement appeared to be much
;I been in 1843 and 1644.
the same as similar demonstrations
However, we were prepared with 4,00
xels, and Broadfoot had
laid in supplies on the routes by which \e troops, if required, would
have to march.
On December 8, I ordered the Umballa forces to move forward,
and also those from Meernt, becauso the preparations of cattle and
artillery stores indicated some l a ~ g e rmovement than usual. Still
no aggression had been committed. The S i b s had a right to move
to their bank of the river, m d the only act of hoetility was in the
silence of the Durbar in affording no explanation. On the 11th we
were in full march. On the 13th I heard the enemy had crossed
the river, followed by infantry and artillery.
When our force came near Loodiana, I galloped over, inspected
the fort, and ordered the Brigadier to be ready to march in twentyfour hours with all his force on Bussian, restricting our defences to
-the forl, and leaving in it the old and d r m men. To leave two
or even three regiments in such a defenceless cantonment appeared
to me to be an encouragement to an active enemy to cut such a force
off. I therefore took every regiment, drafting their weakly men
into the fort. Brigadier Wheeler marched at once on Bussian with
5,000 infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and twelve field gims. The
Umballa force was one day in his rear, and was 7,000 strong. After
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a rapid march on Moodkee, mhich me reached on the 18th, having
closed up the rear columns as we approached Ferozpoor, we were
apprised, shortly after our arrival, that the Sikh army mas close at
hand, and intended to attack us. This turned out to be a portion
of the Sikh army, which, believing our force to be much weaker
than it was, find that me had not closed up, wished to surprise us.
We stood to our arms, met the Sikh forces, overthrew them, pursued
them for three miles in the dark, and captured seventeen guns.
N e had the two hill regiments and two Native Infantry regiments with some heavy guns one march in our rear ; they joined us
the following day.
We then found that the Sikhs had entrenched themselves in a
camp at Ferozshah, ten miles from Ferozpoor, and ten miles from
our camp at Moodkee ; that their force was estimated at from $0,000
to 60,000 men and 108 pieces of cannon. Tej Sing with 20,000 men
invested 17'erozpoor on the side of the g h a ~ t s .I ~t mas evident to me
that no attack would be made on Ferozpoor, but that the enemy,
disconcerted by the rapidity of our march, mould attempt to intercept
the Umballa force, and fight it separately.
The troops being much fatigued, we halted the 20th to refresh.
On that night I wrote to Littler to say we should march by our
left, woid the entrenched camp until joined by him, and mhon
united attack the enemy.
We left 2 B%f Native Infantry a t Moodkee to protect our
wounded and the camp equipages ; and we marched at faux o'clock
across the country about 10,000 men and forty pieces of artillery.
At half-past one o'clock we saw a'dense cloud of dust, mhich proved
to be Littler with 5,000 infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and
tmenty-one guns; The junction was then complete.
We then moved to the attack of Ferozshah, formed our Line,
marched through a jungle, and, in spite of all obstacles, the centre
left, which I commanded, carried the enemy's bntteries and that
part of the camp adjoining to the guns. The tumbrils and loose
powder soon set the tents and provender on fire. I t mas also dark,
and we could only hold our ground on the skirts of the burning
camp. I t was impossible to traverse it. I therefore collected the
men, and made them lie down whilst the other portions of the
enemy's camp, about a mile and a half long, continued to fire their
artillery ; the infantry being driven out by parties of our men on
the right and left. Still the tmo or three batteries on the farthest
side of the Sikh camp continned to cannonade us. Littler had been
repulsed on the extreme left attack ; Smith with the reserve mas not
to be found in the dark ; and the two biig@es I had led, and E
Fords or ferries.

TWOregiments were left.
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portion of the right led by Gough, mere the main force on mhich wo
relied for'securing our victory and completing it the nest morning
when daylight should return. We had fired into each other at
Moodkee, and I determined to run no such risk here. The enemy's
artillery fired as signals to the Silrhs that the camp still resisted, and
during the night fresh troops were brought up. Before dawn nle
reformed our men carefully, and having formed our line, supported
by horse artillery, we moved by our right, Qough taking the right
and I the centre; we swept along their whole camp, carrying
battery after battery without a halt, and then drew up on the outside in an excellent line, the men hurrahing and the regimental
colours dropping as I and Gough passed along.
During the night I was obliged to attack the enemy's batteries
by a charge of the Both, in which Wood was wounded. Such was the
despondency at one time on hearing the Sikhs arrive in the camp
about midnight, that weak suggestions were mado mhich had better
be buried in oblivion. Gough came to me on this subject : I at
once said we must fight it out ; that me should carry the position
in the morning, or die in the attempt. He cordially concurred, and
we certainly did it in good style. All my Staff excopt Arthur had
been killed or wounded; but (301. Birch, Col. Parsons, and young
TjTest and Arthur, were with me. I rode Meanee thirty yards in
front of the line to prevent our men from firing, and we carried
everything by the bayonet at one vigorous sweep.
Thus we settled this affair, which the darlmess of the preceding
night, and the sudden explosion of powder, and the bnrning of the
camp, had rendered of necessity incomplete. The enemy appeared
in large force about eight o'clock : we formed in line to oppose
him. After a cann'onade he retired ; again reappeared at eleven,
and also at three o'cloclr. Our Native Cavalry did not behnve
well. The body guard very well at Moodltee. The 3rd Dragoons
on every occasion behaved admirably, going through everythillg.
They come in to-morrow, being very low in numbers from their
heavy losses.
The British infantry, a8 usual, carried the day, I can't say I
admire sepoy fighting.
It is a fine sight to see the soventy-fourpieces talien a t Ferozshah
in our fort. The seventeen pieces will come in in a few days from
&toodkee; me have amongst them the two six-pounders given by
Lord William Bentinck to Runjeet Singh.
My position has been most p a i n f ~ ;~ lI have had to exercise my
autl~orityvery
; but I mill enter into these matters on
some future occasion. I am so tired, I have been twice asleep
whilst attempting to write this letter.

..
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When pnt in orders as second in command, I made Broadfoot
and his Assistant my aides-de-camp. I have had five aides-de-camp
'
killed and five mounded. The assault of the battery mas as hot a
job as I ever had.
'
Poor Broadfoot was struck off his horse. I entreated him to
retire. He got on his horse, and mas shortly afterwards mortally
mouuded. Herries, and Somerset, and Nunro, lrilled, and a Capt.
&re of the hIilitary Secretary Department. The reports are that
.,
the Sikhs lost 4,000 men. Our loss in killed and mounded is 2,200 ;
the lrilled nearly half the wounded, attributable to its being an
artillery battle.
This republican army has more vigour and resolution in it than
any with which we have yet had to contend. I have great donbts
whether we can cross this season. I cannot tell you the anxiety of
watching every movement made for fear of some fatal mistalte. It
is cruel.
Ever &c.
11. BARDINQB.
'

Reference is made in this letter to losses at Muclki from
regiments firing into each other. This mas not wholly avoided
at Firozshah; in the confnsion, smoke, and clarlcness, regiments behind did unfortunately fire into those in front.
I t will have been noticed that Sir Henry was unfavourably
impressed with sepoy fighting. Dr. Macgregor, in describing
the battle, has made some admirable remarks on the differences
of constitution between the European and the native soldier.
The latter, though more abstemious, collapses sooner than the
former if deprived of food and water: at Pirozshah many
had reached that stage ; soon after, when the sepoys fought,
properly fed, alongside of Europeans at Sobraon, they f~dly
maintained their reputation for courage nnd gallantry, and
Sir Henry was not slow in recognising the fact.
The news of these battles reached England towards the
end of February before the despatches arrived. The Government and people were greatly grntified by the successes, and
weight was given to the fact that the Sikh aggression
was unprovoked, that the war mas on our part a strictly
tlefensive one, and that no desire of conquest nor want of
extreme forbearance had occasioned the rupture. The despatches arrived 011 February 23, when the Pnrk and Tower
guns announced the victories to the public. The news was
thus commented on :

I

1
I

1

I

1

.CH. XYI

ARRIVAL OF THE NEWS I N ENGLAND

415

The anx& of India do not record any acts of mar more important in their bearing upon the great interests and security of our
Empire, or more honourable to those brave men by whom the victory has been achieved.
Of Sir Henry Rardinge it mas recorded that whatever of
energy, foresight, skilful combination, and prudence, could be
expected in a person filling his high situation, had been throughout and without ceasing manifested by him.
Entire approbation of the whole of his conduct, from the
time when he firet arrived in the North-West Provinces and
had an opportunity of ascertaining the state of affairs at
Lahore, was expressed. He was consiclered to have been
right in pursuing to the very last the pacific policy which he
had, from the commencement, adopted as the leading principle
of his conduct in respect to the Sikh Government.
H e was just%ed in abstaining from m a h g any forward
military movement beyond such as mere necessary for defence.
This course could not fail to deprive the Sikh Government
of any ground for ascribing hostile intentions to the British
Government ; such were almaye disclaimed, and never entertsined by the Governor-General.
The steps taken were considered to be admirably suited to
meet the crisis and to repel tha danger.
The concentration of the Loodiaaa force with that from Umballa
at the point of Bussian, which placed him in a condition to move
forward without hesitation to the relief of Ferozpore, and the sltill
and judgment with which, after the action neer Moodkee, he directed
the operations of the army with a view to a junction with the force
uuder Sir J. Littler, deserve the highest praise for promptitude and
accuracy of combincttion.
This march completely parelysea the Sikh army. They could
no longer hope to take Ferozpore without previously obtaining a
great victory in a generd action ; and they. were at once reduced to
the necessity of &ting upon the defensive.
By the victories ' the doubts and fears of the wavering had
been dispelled; the confidence and zeal of our friends confirmed ; and the conviction of our superior power established
amongst all. Such are the immediate results of this brilliant
opening of the campaign.'
MS.records.

'

This forms a very complete approval of the GovernorGeneral's policy, and of 'his concluct of the war in concert
with the Commancler-in-Chief, I t mould appear, however,
that the full severity of the struggle, the temporary prostration
of the victors in consequence, and the resources and stubborn
energy of the vnnquishecl, were not at first fully realised.
- The very heavy losses we. had sustained at Mudki and
Phozshah, and the inaction afterwards, led very naturally to
severe criticism. They were facts not to be disputed ; ancl
from them the critics, according to their nature, abilities,
and information, made inferences, some no doubt sound, but
others entirely wrong.
The policy of the overn nor-Gkneral, and the Agent by
whom it was carried out, ware assailed. I t was inferred that
the Governor-General, having received paczc instructionu
from England, obeyed them with slavish fear, to the neglect
of the safety ancl honour of our arms. I t was a140 inferred
that the conduct of the business of the Agency was such as to
provoke war rather than to maintain peace. That thore is
no just ground for these inferences ie, we trust, clear to the
careful reader of the oviilence furnished in this work. Both
the Governor-General and the Agent, following implicitly the
policy and opinion declared by Lord Ellenborough, desired
beyond everything to maintain the Sikh power in the Punjab,
as the best possible barrier for British India against Afghani s t m and the other RIusalman states. In order to effect this,
forbearance was carried, as the Agent had plainly reported, to
the verge of danger. This policy was defeated by the Sikh
army, which, inverting the usnal order, exacted obedience from
its officers, and dictated to the Government. The pay of the
soldiers was doubled, whilst the supply of money to meet the
incrense was neglected. The resnlt was inevitable : as the exhaustion of the treasury became imminent, it followed that the
soldiers must either go without pay, or help themselves from
the treasure of their neighbours. They preferred the latter
alternative, and believed in their ability to plunder and sack
the country as far as Delhi ; and this belief was adroitly made
use of by the Darbar to relieve themselves from a pressuro
which had become intolerable. I t is quite unnecessary to
seek for more remote causes of war, or to advance inferences
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for nhich there was no foundation beyond the nssertions of
personal opinion.
Another a i d more plausible accusation is, that with the
evidence and information in their possession, the GovernorGeneral and his advisers committed a grave error of judgment
in believing to the last that the Sikhs would not, as an army,
cross the Sutlej and fight.
I t is easy to be wise after the event. We must recollect
that the Sikhs had before, more than once, made similar
demonstrations, but had invariably, from one cause or another,
retired without actually violating the frontier. The GovernorGeneral and the political officers, conscious that they mere
straining every nerve to maintain peace, believed that their
efforts now, as before, might succeed. They might justifiably
doubt whether the Sikh army in full force mould be mad
enough to cross the river and involve itself in a struggle which
must ultimately end in the destruction of the power of one or
other of the combatants. Prom all that can be gathered in
the course of a careful examination of extensive private as
well as public correspondence, the fact seems to be, that,
though striving to maintain peace, the Governor-General and
his advisers were aware that war was more or lcss imminent ;
but it mas hoped to the last that, for the present at least, it
might possibly be prevented.
This being so, the preparations for the defence of the
frontier, commenced with such commendable forethought by
Lord Ellenborough, were continued with increased vigour, as
circumstances seemed to demand, by Sir Henry Hardinge.
These, it will be observed, were for defensive, not offensive,
war ; and they were carried on as quietly and unosteatatiously
as possible, to avoid alarming the Sikhs, and thereby precipitating the crisis which it was desired to avert. Nevertheless they were real and effective. When Lord Ellenborough
left, the available strength on the whole frontier, exclusive of
the hill stations, whose garrisons were unchanged, amounted
to 17,612 men and sixty-six guns ; when war broke out,
40,523 men and ninety-four guns were available. E ~ e nwith
this, we now h o w , the margin of safety was dangerously
appromhed.
It has been shown that the policy and the mcasurcs uf
E E
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the Governor-General and his Agent were criticised by some :
others condemned the military conduct of the campaign.
They asserted that, though we were victorious, our battles
mere gained at an unnecessary sacrifice, and the impetuosity
of the Commander-in-Chief mas blamed.
The time when this question can be fully sifted has, perhaps, scarcely arrived. Till all clocuments bearing on the
matter can be examined, and possibly made public, it would
be manifestly premature to pronounce a final opinion. Those
who holcl that the Comruander-&Chief v a s free from blame,
urge that the political necessities of the case were permitted
by the Governor-General to overrule prudent military preparation. They further consider that the Governor-General
mode a mistake in not accepting the Commander-in-Chief's
proposal to attack Firozshah before Littler's force joined.
Much might be urged for and against the proposal; for the
present purpose, however, it is enough to record that the
Governor-General, himself a n experienced soldier, deliberately
rejected it as introducing an avoidable element of danger.
It has been recorded, that after Mudki the GovernorGeneral tendered his services as second in command of the
army.
This arrangement has been praised and condemned.
Generally, perhaps, the praise has prevailed. The exigency
was great, and, in the present instance, it may have been
the simplest solution of a delicate matter.
At; the same time the objections appear stronger than the
advantages. The Governor-General is entrusted with powers involving responsibility from which no act of his own can set him
free. By accepting any subordinate position he merely makes
the exercise of these powers, should the necessity arise, more
difficult and invidious. This view appears to have been held
hy the English Government. They recognised the emergency
of the moment, and the great immediate advantage of the
course taken ; but as R question of principle, and with a view
to the future, they vere of opinion that :
I t is impossible that me should not feel that it might be productive
of serious inconvenience, if not injury, to the public service, if ,the
political head of the Gove$n!nmenf, who has to decide upon the
objects for the attainment of which the military means of the

,
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Government are to be appIied, should, in the application of those
means, and in the endesvour to attain those objects, serve in a
subordinate military capa~ity.~
The war in progress was one of no ordinary nature ; the
warlike spirit of the Sikhs, their great military resources and
geographical position, gave to it an unusual importance, alld
ceused it to be attended with unusual risk. It was possible
that at one moment military operations mould have to be
subordinated to political considerations, whilst at another
these wonld have to give wny to military necessity. Hence
it mas desirable, in a case like the present one, that the
conduct of the civil and military affairs should be entrusted to
one person : ' and that individual can obviously be no other
than the Governor-Generd of Indin.'
It was pointed out that this arrangement did not imply
want of confidence either in the provisional successor to the
over nor-~eneral, or in the Commander-in-Chief or other
military officers ; but was a special arrangement to suit special
circumstances.
Ons other matter should be noticed here. In certain doscriptions of the battles it has been thought necessary to infer
and assert treachery on the part of the Sikh leaders, Rajn
La1 Singh and Sardar Tej Singh, to account for the success
of the British, rather than, as would seem sufficient, to attribute it to the vnlour and self-devotion of our brave soldiers.
The latter has at any rate the advantage of being a fwt,
whilst the former is an inference formed on no sufficient basis
that we have been able to discover. It would have been, according t , our
~ ideas, natural enough in a Sikh historian to
excuse fnilure by alleging treachery on the part of their leaders ;
yet the old Sikhs, immediately after the events, as is recorded
by Col. Lawrence, and some years later, as we can testify,
llever put forward any such accusation. They were not as a
nation, and assuredly they had no cause to be, ashamed of the
result of measuring their young strength wilh ours in its
maturity. They have since, alongside of us and under our
banners, given ample proof of steadiness in danger eqnal to
that of any troops in the world.
?
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Now, whilst the men, the Khalsa, did not accuse their
officers of treachery, the officers, on the other hand-and this
seems a strong argument-did not, when we prevailed, claim
any reward for supposed treacherous conduct. On the contrary, like their men, they were rather disposed to boast of
their deeds.
And further, it should be clearly understood, all assertions
to the contrary notwithstanding, that the Khalsa was supreme
throughout the campaign. The soldiers, through their panchayats, ruled not only their officers, but the State. They
could make war or peace. With the men unanimous, the
leaders, even if so inclined, had no chance of employing successful treachery. They could gain over no serious number
of the Sikh army with mhich, at the critical moment, they
might desert to the British. As little did they dare at Firozshah to propose that the Sikhs should leave their entrenchments and fight the British in the open, or make any military
movement which would have the effect of weakening the
defence. I n the temper of the men at the time, either proposal, or even a suspicion that either was entertained, would
have led to a prompt execution of the leader who had thus
rendered himself obnoxious.
These considerations seem ample to dispose of the oft
repeated assertion of treachery ; but in order to ascertain as
far as possible how it arose, and upon what it was based, considerable inquiry has been made. The result appears to show
that the accusition mas f i s t made from the Sikh side, by one
of the European adventurers in the Sikh service; and Tej
Singh, rather than La1 Singh, is selected as the chief culprit,
though all the officers are considered to have been implicated.
No clear evidence of treachery is adduced ; the accusation is
based on speeches said to have been made by the men to
their leaders, of which the. authenticity is, to say the least,
doubtful; so much so that the author who published them
remarked that many of the stories attributing treachery and
cowardice to Tej Singh were not to be implicitly believed.=
Treachery is further inferred from the conduct of the camp ~ g ;n but, unfortunately for the value of this inference, it is
in other parts of the work clearly shown that the regimental
Carmichael Smyth's Histmy tCc. pp. 180-184.
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panchayats ruled, and that the oBcers were more or lees
ciphem4
The charge is repeated with much greater weight in
Cunningham's 'History of the Sikhs.' Capt. Cunningham
appears to have based it mainly on inference, thus : the destruction of the Khalsa army meant the salvation of the
chiefs ; the leaders, therefore, desired nothing more than that
the British should prevail, and consequently he saw in the
conduct .of the campaign what satisfied him of the treachery
of La1 Singh and Tej Singh."
Against the former, in addition to what is inferred, it is
stated in a note that ' it was sufficiently certain and notorious
a t the time that L d Singh was in communication with Capt.
Nicolson, the British Agent at Ferozpoor; but owing to the
untimely death of that officer, the detailu of the overtures
made, and expectations held out, cannot now be satisfactorily
known.'
Fortunately sufficient evidence exists to show that
Cunningham was mistaken in supposing that Capt. Nicolson
held out any espectations to La1 Singh. In the first place
Capt. Nicolson mas not the British Agent at Firozpur, but
he was the British Agent's Assistant, precisely as Cunningham mas another of his Assistants at that time stationed at
Bahriwalpur ; and no one had better reason to lrnom that the
Agent's Assistants were not authorised to hold out eupectations to Punjab chiefs, or to have political dealings with
them beyond referriug them to the Agent, should any overtures be made.
Raja La1 Singh, and no doubt others ,of the Sikh leaders,
were sufficiently far-seeing to allow for the possibility of the
defeat of their army by the British ; and most of the chiefs
would have yished, if possible, to provide against this event.
One way of saving themselves, which would at once recommend
itself to the Oriental mind, was to be able to show that they
had acted as far as possible as friends to the English; and
when they had done otherwise, that it was under compulsion.
Such a negotiation had a double advantage. If the E ~ ~ g l i s h ,
deceived by it, neglected any precaution and ~uffered defeat,
then additional merit on behalf of the chief or leader ~vho
Cnrmichael S m y t h ' ~H.istor?j t t c . p. 172.
"unningharn'~ S i k h s , p. 299.

Ibid. p. 304.
Ibid. p. 299, note.
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organiscd the plan might be claimed. If, on the contrary,
the English mere victorious, then the vanquished leader
might claim, certainly immunity from punishment, possibly
reward.
The success of snch a negotiation mould be, to put it
mathematically, inversely as the penetration of the British
Agent. The less able man would entertain the proposal, ancl
permit his plans and view to be affected by it ; the more able
woulcl treat it with the contempt vhich it deservecl.
In the letters ancl papera consulted by the editor of this
book-and the search has extended over a large area of docnments, and has been minntc-no evidence whatever of any
snch negotiation on the part of Tej Singh has been discovered.
On December 1 2 , 1845, Raje La1 Singh made overtures of
the nutiwe above indicated to Capt. Nicolson. They were
such as he could at any moment disavow under the plea of
compulsion. Nicolson, not having taken upon himself the
responsibility of cleclining to discuss such a matter, reported
the Raja's proposals to Broadfoot on December 18, and before
the letter could have arrived the action a t Mudki was fought.
The precise proposals need not be recorded ; they were of a
nature, one would imagine, to excite suspicion even in the
unwary; bnt one expression in Nicolson's letter must be
quoted as directly contradicting the insinuation that espectations had been held out to La1 Singh. It is as follows:
' I have made no terms with him, even personal. . .'
Foiled in this instance, the Raja once more attempted a
similar negotiation, this time mith Broaclfoot himself, and immediately before the battle of Fhozshah. Broodfoot was killed
within a few honrs, and so left no record of the transaction ;
an eyewitness, however, has described mith what; scorn and
contempt he received the message, and the short and decisive
answer he gave.
An event occurred during this short halt or interval which
affords a fitting opportunity for correcting a certain historical inaccuracy repented recently in the ' Life of Lord Lawrence ;' viz. a
rumour to the effect that Raja La1 Singh had soldhis army into the
power of the British.
So far from such being the case, it was during this short in-

.

The halt made bear Firoaslmh to enable Littler to join.
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terval that La1 Singh did send emissaries to Brondfoot with some
such proposition ; but the proposition was indignantly rejected,
with a reply that if he caught La1 Singh he would hang him to the
first tree he calne to. Nor is there mything to shorn that any snch
influence mas exerted ; but, on the contrary, the xha.lsa stuck to their
gnns and died at them like brave men, and this is well borne out by
the hoary losses we sustained in cnpturing them.9
The following extracts from articles in the ' C d c u t t a
R.eview ' bear upon this subject, and are entitled to respect.
One of the articles is known to have been written by t h e late
Sir Henry Lawrence, and there is some probability that both
articles proceeded from the same pen.
~ f t e rhaving pointed out .the absurdity of some of t h e
accusations made ageinst the Sikh leaders, the reviewer h a s
remarked :
All this talk of treachery tends to a wrong impression. No m e n
could have exerted themselves more than did the majority of the
Sikh generals ; and even Tej Singh and La1 Singh, once engaged,
had no choice but to fight. One proof that the chiefs did act
honestly by their men thm is, that lww they pretend to no credit
for treachery, but rather boast of their prowess during the war.'
With reference to the assertions of treachery on t h e p a r t
of the Sikh leaders, made in Cunningham's 'History,' t h e
vriter i n the ' Calcutta Review,' who evidently wrote with
cognisance of the facts, observed :
I t is obvious that Capt. Cunningham has not penetrated the
designs of the Sikh leaders. Their treachery was rather against
than for ns. Thet they pretended to serve us is true ; but it is not
- true that they did serve us.
On the 12th La1 Sing opened a
conlmu~licationwith Capt. Nicolson, making a merit of sending
round the Sikh cavalry by Earilte. As the first movement was to
have been on Ferozepore, the cavalry would have been of little use ;
and La1 Singh mes aware that, in taking this step, he was earning,
or endeavouring to earn, the favour of the Eritish at the smallest
possible cost to the Sikhs. On the 19tI1, after the battle of Mudlti,
La1 Singh's agent came to Major Broadfoot, and was dismissed with
a rebul~e.~I'rom that day to February 7 no colnmunication of nny

...

'

Gen.S. A. hbbott's Episoda dc.
Calcutta licview, vol. ix. p. 523,

Probably referring t o the proposnls made to Broadfoot on Dec. 21.
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kind was received from La1 Singh or from Tej Singh. It is believed
that the former sent Col. Lawrence a ~lietuhof the Sikh entrenchments at Sobmon ; but our engineer officers had gained by that
time the information that ~ v odesired to possess, and the Sirdar's
communication was of little or no value to us. L d Singh was
wounded at Ferozshuhur ; he was with the Sikh army after its defeat
at Sobraon, and only quitted it after the arrival of the British at
Lahore.
We cannot perceive, indeed, that he threw any obstacle in the
way of the success of the Khnlsa. .
The treachery of Tej Singh is equally doubtful. This Sirdar is
pronounced to be a traitor because he did not attack the British on
the morning of December 22. But our army had then just beaten
the Sikhs at Ferozshuhur, and captured their camp equipage and
eighty pieces of artillery. Flying from our attaclring columns, the
routed S i k h fell back on Tej Singh's force, and carried dismay into
its ranks. Had he known that the Eritish had exhausted their
ammunition, we do not doubt that 110 would have advanced to give
us battle. I t is said, indeed, that he did offer to lead his regiments
to tho attack, but that they declined so hazardous an enterprise.
If not, the Punches were with the army, and they could have decreed
the attack3

..

It is gratifying to find similar opinions expressed by Sir Lepel
Griffin in the ' Punjab Chiefs,' a work of great interest and
merit .4
Persistent reiteration of the accusation h a s made it necessary to state at some length the reasons why the assertion of
treachery on the part of the Sikh leaders is rejected. The
charge, as far as we can ascertain, is absolutely unfounded.
The following extracts from a long letter to Lord Ellenborough, though necessarily repeating mnch already told, a r e
interesting. The situation natnrally caused Mr. Currie great
anxiety ; and it is instructive t o notice that he, like many
others, in time of trouble, turned to Lord Ellenborough for
advice and assistance.
Camp,Perozepore : January 1, 1846.

My Lord,-Sir Henry Hardinge has, I Itnow, written to your
Lordship today, and from his letter and the despatches, which will,
I kope, be shown to yon, you will hear that we have had very sharp

' Cnlcz~tlaReuicrto, vol. xi.

pp. $23-558.

' Pp. 38-40

nnd 63, (id.
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work of i t lately. From the state in which the Lahore Durbar and
the Sikh army have been for the last eighteen months. no one could
have mticipited the unity of purpose- they suddenly displayed of
invading the British-territories, or the vigorous exertions they have
made to render their invasion effectual. The posts of Ferozepore
and Loodinna had both been strengthened by Sir Henry Hardingo,
but neither of them was in a condition to withstand for any length
of time the weight of the whole Silih army concentrated upon it.
Vhen, therefore, Ferozepore was invested by the overwhelmiilg
force"&hich the Sikhs passed O V G ~the Shtlege with exbee&n&
celerity, the relief of that fort became a matter of great anxiety
and difficulty. Fortunately Sir Henry Hardinge was in advance of
Umballa, and approaching the frontier at the time. The disposition
he made of the available forces, and the rapid marches by nrhich we
rea,ohecl the neighbourhood of Ferozepore, are described in the despetch to the S.C.,5 and in Sir H.I-Iarange's letter to Lord Ripon.
The whole was certainly admirably managed ; and though the long
marches not only harassed but dispirited the troops, especially the
nntives, the result has been entirely successful.
Ferozepore is relieved ; the ~ i l r harmy has been beaten in two
severe actions ; all their cannon and ammunition, camp equipage kc.
taken, and the routed troops driven across the Sutlege.
In both actions the British troops fought under great disadvnntuges. At Moodkee they hsd had a succession of forced marches
with short supplies, and had just come twenty-two miles, many being
still behind, when the enemy came down in great force to the att,nck.
The troops mere hardly under arms before the Sikhs were upon us ;
and when the action commenced, there was not much more tliau an
hour of daylight remaining.
-

Night soon closed in ; we were in low tree jungle, and the ddst
v a s eucessive : all this added to the confusion. The troops got pellme11 together, and it was impossible to distinguish fiiend from foe, or
to tell where anyone was. The enemy mere beaten back with heavy
loss, and seventeen guns out of twenty-four they brought with thei;
were captured; but in the confusion our troops fired upon one
another. Twice was I with Sir Henry under a heavy and destructive fire of grape and musketry from our own guns ; and I ain
satisfied, so is Sir H. II., that half Ihe casualties at Moodliee were
from the fire of our own people.
I was not a t Pherooshuhur, or Ferozeshah as the Commanderin-Chief is determined to call it. Sir H. 13. had given me a writtcn

' S.C.

Secret Committee.
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positive order to remain behind ; but I have had the above circumstances related to me by Sir EI. H. and many others ; and I assure
you the fate of our army, and with it the fate of India, was for a,
time very critical, and redeemed .
by the personal exertions and
decision of the Governor-General. Hom h e mas exposed, may be
gathered from the fate of his Staff. His young son, Arthur, and
Benson were the only two with him not either killed or wounded.
Though the thing has been handsomely done, the loss on our side
is very heavy.

..

There is one other point which I wish to mention. Considering
Sir Henry Hardinge's position, and the circumstances of the present
times, some one capable of administeriug the duties temporarily
should be made provisional Governor-General. If anything were
to happen to Sir Henry Hardinge, -would be for some months
Governor-General! snd in these critical times it is fearful to think
what might be the consequences. Sir G. Arthur is the fittest man
in Indin for the provisional appointment.
I have witten you a long letter, my Lord, and I knom you don't
like long letters ; but the urgency of the case must be my excuse.
I have considered it my duty to make known the facts I have stated
to your Lordship, that you may communicate them, in confidence,
to those who have it in their power to apply the remedy.'
We have heard little f r o h Lahore since the tidings of,the defeat
and flight of the invincible Ilhalsa mas known there. We have
reason to fear that Loodiana, which has been necessarily left with
small protection, will be plundered and burnt. This will have
e bad moral effect, and do much mischief; but Amritsur is a more
important place !
Mrs. Currie is at Saharnnpore, .where she is doing all she can
to befriend poor Mrs. Somerset in her affliction.
I am &c.
P. CURRIE.
Some interesting letters and information about events of
t h e first Sikh war, subsequent to t h e battle of F i r o z s h ~ h have
,
been collected ; but t h e limit assigned t o this book prevents
their being now published. Moreover, as this is a record of
Major Broadfoot's services; it i s appropriately closed at his
death. H i s career was short b u t brilliant: as a soldier, exceptionally so.; nnd in the conduct of civil administration and
of diplomatic duties, neither his enemies nor those jealous of
his success could discover a blot t o espose, o r a transaction
which would not benr t h e severest scrutiny.
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Of the few survivors who h e m George Broadfoot, those
whom we have met are unanimous as to the deep impression
bhich he made on them ; they still loolr back on him as one of
the most rising men of the time. The great majority of them
cordially assent to the fervent eulogies of Mackenzie and Ravelock already cited ;6 and to this day they lament the life prematurely cut short on the field of Firozshah in the midst of
n, great career.
We cannot more suitably close this book than by transcribing the inscription on the Madras memorial.
@tr
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orders of Government of Indin,
276-277 ; letter from Gen. Venturn, 277-278; interview with
Vnkil, 279-280, 281, 282 ; letter
from Private Secretary, boats, 283286 ; letter from Sir C. Nnpier,
288 ; letter from Havelock, 280290 ; letter from Lord Ellenborough, 200-201, 292 ; letter to
Lord Ellenborough, 297 ; viola-

IFDEX

mand of the corps, 12 ; receiires
political appointment, 13; ddngerously ill, 10, 38 ; killed, 40, 41,
42, 43 ; Afghans wish to revenge
his death, 51, 62, 100, 109, 122,
125, 166, 168, 186, 393

187

Brunnow, Baron, 179
Brydon, Dr., 41, 60, 67, 68, 98
BhgtI, Boogty, kc., 251, 252, 254,
255, 263, 274, 283,288

Bukkur, 7
Bunbury, Lieut.-Col., 394
Bundelkhnnd, Bundlecund,

406-410, 411, 414, 41G, 418, 422,
4'23, 426; inscription on Madras
memorial, 427

Broadfoot, James Sntherland, birth,
appointed to Bengal Engineers, 2 ;
early distinction, 4 ; Indus bridge,
7 ; -surveys Ghilai country, 8 ;
explores the Gomal route, 9 ; value
of his reports, 9 ; killed at Parwin,
9 ; Afghan accouut of his death,
10; reputation, 19, 43, 109, 165,
168,18(j

Broadfoot, Miss, 352, 403, 404, 405,
4b9

Brondfoot, Lieut. 'bvilliarn, birth,
appointed to 1st European Regiment, 2 ; early distinotion, 4 ;
a t B h i h n , &c., 9; enlists
Hazaras, 9 ; q ~ ~ e s t i oofn the corn-

254,

291

Burma, Burmese, 33, 52, 82, 119,
194, 195,198, 203,211, 304

Burn, Capt., 44
Burnes, Sir Alexander, mission to
Knbul, 5,13,19 ; desires to succeed
Nacnaghten, 23 ; erroneous idea
of Ghilnis, 28, 29; quoted, 30 ;
killed, 40, 41, 42, 122; why
murdered, 122-123, 125, 342
Burnes, Lieut., killed, 40, 41
Bussean, 378, 381, 411, 415
B u t a d l h , 400
Butkhhk (Bootkhnk), expedition to,
26, 30; night nttaok nt, 31-33,
34,161,192

Bygrave, Capt., 80,153,162
'

CALCUTTA,
19 note 2, 61, 64, 83, 64,
123, 168, 169, 173, 186, 187, 188,
196, 198, 212, 213, 267, 272, 290,
303, 321, 336, 341, 350
Calcutta Review,' 403, 423
Cameron, Mr. C. EL,quoted, 35, 105,
199, 231, 235
Cameron, Mrs., 105, 118, 199 ; remarl<son Lord Ellenborough, 201,
281
Campbell, Dr., 163, 161

Canning, Sir S., afterwards Lord
Stratford de Redcliffe, 179
Carnatio, 57
Casement, Sir W., quoted, 94, 200
Cawnpore, 234, 266, 275
Chahhr biyh, 58, 79
Chambnl, Ohumbul, 214

.

. i,

Broadfoot, Rev. William, 2
Broke, Capt., 304
Brooke, Brigadier, 391
Brougham, Lord, 179
Brown, Dr., ~fterwnrdsSir J. Campbell, anecdote of Broadfoot, 88
note 5, 307, 853
Bruen, Sergeant, 58, 144 ?cote 2,

373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379,
38'2; a t Mitdki, 385, $87, 388,
389; killed at Firozshah, 392,
398, 399 ; buried, 400 ; letters
about his death, 400-404; loss

regretted i n both Houses of Parliament, 404406 ; his grave, 406 ;
opinions held by eminent men,

.

CHAMBAL

BROADFOOT

tion of frontier resolutely resented, 298-300 ; his action
commended, 300 ; letter to hliss
Sutherlnnd, 301 ; letter to Lord
305 ;
Ellenborough, 303-305,
letter from Lord Ellenborough,
307,308,310, 311; complimentary
letter from Sir H. Hardinge, 312,
313 ; his assistants, 314 ; his
reply to Sir H. Harclinge, 316316, 318, 320 ; letter to hlr.
Currie, 320-321, 322 ; letter to
Governor-General, 323-326, 327,
328, 329, 330; rejects Gultib
Singh's overtures, 330-331; on
Leech's death, 332, 333 ; letter to
Private Secretary, 334337 ; letter
from Governor-General, 337-338,
339, 341; letter from GorernorGeneral, 342-343, 344 ; lettor to
Government of India, 345-348,
349, 350, 362; his health, 353,
354 ; letter to Private secretary,
356, 357, 358, 359, 300, 361; he
warns the Darbhr, 362; warns
Cornmander.in-Chief, and. Sir J.
Littler, 362-363 ; Sir H. Gough's
reply, 363 ; arranges supplies,
364 ; reports to Government, 364 ;
instructs assistants, 3G5-368, 369 ;
letters from Currie, 370 ; joins
Governor-General's camp, 371,

.
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INDEX
DARBAR

374 ; cnse ngainst British, 375,
376,411, 416, 425
Dariyir Khan, Duriyn Khar, 289
Darwin, 204
Dawes. Lieut. Uichnel. 30 : his coolness; 34, 36,30, 42,43,46, 51,75,
92.121.122
De ~radiut:, Sir Hew, 2 note 1;
Mnrion, 2 note 1
Delafosse, Msjor, 160
Del~rnolte,Gen., 293
Delhi, 11, 12, 6?, 97, 173, 175, 18G,
187, 211, 229, 291, 306 nolo 7,
350, 356, 359, 374, 416
DeLhi Gnxette,' 131, 133, 144 notos
a, b, I08
Demonstration, 26 ; defined, 26 m l e
7
Dennie, Col., C.B., 34, 35, 38, 43,
45, 46, 43, 59, 62, 69, 70, 71, 71
no& g and i, 72,72 noto 1, 73 note
n, 75 note s, 76, 77, 86, 90, 91;
killed, 92, 101, 105, 122,406
Dern, Deyrnh Doon, 363
Dern Ismiil Xhdn, I), 340
Derajht, 261
de St. Arua~fl,'RI.,283
Desa Singh, Mnjithin, 221
Deyrah, 251, 274, 289
Dhanna Singh, 232
Dhyhn Singh, Raju, 220, 221, 222,
2'23 : murdered. 224. 244

Dinapur, 275
Discourngement in troops, 42 ;
remedied, 42-43 ;the chief dsnger,
52. 82, 86.98
Dogrn, 315
Dost Muhammnd KhIbhn, BbkkzBi,
Dost Mahomed, Amir of Khbul,
5 ; his views misrepresented, 6,
8 ; a wanderer in Turltestun, 9 ;
action at Parwin 'pass, 9-10 ;
surrender, 10, 50, 68, 09, 183, 326
Dowson, Lieut., 45
Dowson's horse, 116
Duleep Singh, Maharaja, 220 ; proclaimed, 224, 225, 230, 231, 244,
245, 247, 257, 269, 270, 279, 292,
292, 301 ; position of, cis-Eiutlej,
3015, 311, 317, 325, 336, 340, 346,
348,360
Dilmltis, 255 .
Dundaa, Mr. .H., aiterwnrds Lord
Melville, 173, 174
Durand, Sir H. M., quoted, 6, 7, 35,
41, 62, 63, 64; letter from Bave-

ELPIIIRST

lock, 65-66 ; letter to Brondfoo
66 ; quoted, 74 xote 7 ; quoted,
78, 197, 202, 214; appointed to
Tennsserim, 214, 283, 242, 240,
298
E A ~ T ~ Q
at C
Jalhlhbftd,
~ ~ E 82, 07
Edwariles, Sir R. B., quoted, 6, 1 4
mle 4 ; on Iiavelock and Brondfoot, 41, 94, 307, 308; on situation at Lahore, 367 ; quoted, 358,
361 ; on supplies for army, 382,
387, 398, 406 ; vindication of
Broatlfoot, 407-408
Edwards, Mr., Under Secretary, 258,
259, 960, 330, 337, 366
Elienbeth, Queen, 302
Ellenborough, Lord, 21 note 3, 6 6 ;
arrives in Calcutta, 83; his
correspondence, 83-84 ;his policy,
8 5 ; his notification of victory
April 7, 94-95 ; addresses Broedfoot, 9 5 ; the reply, 95-96, 100 ;
recognises Pollock's services, 100101; effect of his orders, 101,
104, 106 ; his orders to Pollock
and Nott, 110-111 ; subordinates
politiculs to generals, 111, 113,
117, 120, 122; his opinion of
Broadfoot, 123-124 ; appoints him
A.D.C., 124-125, 164, 155, 167;
receives JalLlhbriil garrison, 169,
170,172 ; letter and memoyandum
from Lord Wellesley, 173-179 ;
corresponcleuce, 179 ; his policy,
180-181, 183, 184, 185, 186 ;
impartial in exercise of patronage,
187, 189, 192; extracts from
letters. 193 ; to the Queen and
Duke of Wellington, 194-195,
196, 200, 201, 202; quarrel with
Directors, 205-206; his recnll,
207-210 ; he justifies Broadfoot's
appointment, 211 ; maxims, 212,
916, 217, 226, 228,229, 230, 233 ;
letter from Broadfoot, 241-242,
248 ; letter from Sir R.Bardinge,
248 ; letter from Broadfoot, 264266, 274, 290; letter from Sir
H. Htrrange, 291-294, 296 ;
letter from Broadfoot, 308-305 ;
letter to Brondfoot, 307, 310, 311,
313 ; letter from Sir H. Hnrdinge,
316-318 ; another, 326-827 ;
a n o t h ~ r ,354-356, 404, 411, 416,
417,424
Elmhirst, Lieut., ~ t h ~ e ~ i r n e150,
nt,
164

ELPHINSTONR

Elphinstone, Lord, 4, 5 ; latter to
Col. Cullen, 4, 16,43,99, 107, 164
Elphinstone, Col. Buller, 166
Elphinstone, Gen., 22, 24; ill and
unable for business, 24-29, 50,
59, 73 note o, 74 nole q , 79, 82,
102,126,127, 128 ; Broadfoot and
Pottinger's remarlcs on, 165
Engineers employed with Bengal
force. 7
~ n & n h , Government of, 10, 162,
172,174, 176, 178, 179, 181, 183,
184 ; difference with Directors,
207, 209 ; commend orders to
Agent's assistants, 246; attention
directed to Punjab, 248; approve
policy towards Punjab, 248, 273 ;
approve Agent's proceedings, 300 ;
pacific policy ordered, 312 ;

approve Sir H. Hardinge's visit
to frontier, 319, 321, 328 ;
minute interference with India
dangerous, 334-335, 337, 341,
350, 414, 415, 41G ; on GovernorGeneral as second in commnnd,
418-419

' Englishman,' newspaper,

GOODWYN

274, 275, 276, 277, 284, 285, 286,
291, 293, 298, 303, 311, 317, 338,
339, 341, 345, 348, 349, 351, 366,
35G, 360, 361, 362, 363, 365, 36G,
368, 370, 371, 372, 374, 375, 376,
382, 383, 389, 390, 391, 395, 396,
398, 400, 406; tablet in ehurch
at, 409, 411, 412, 415, 433, 436
Firozshhh, Ferozshuhur, &c., 383,
383 note 9, 384, 388, 989 ; battle
of, 389-398, 400, 401, 402, 409,
410, 412, 413, 414, 416, 418, 420,
422, 434,425,426,427
Pitxgerald, Lord, 111,175,195,196 ;
died, 206
Porsyth, Dr. J., 112; his skill and
services. 113-114. 144 note z. 155:
cidetship, given'to son of; 169;
187, 192

Forsyth, Mr. A. G., cadetship asked
for, 114, 169
Porsyth, Mrs., 114, 115, 169
Prance IPrcnch), 3, 173, 174, 190,
217, 2 i 8 , 306 nole 7
Praser, Capt., 2nd B.C., wounded,
9,

lo

52, G4,
133 ; Broadfoot's letter to, 134152, 144
Erskine, Hon. C., 364
Esr6, 381

Praser, Major, 124
' Friend of India,' quoted, 37, 176,

Europe, increased intercourse with,

GANDA
S I N G H W ~372
L~,
Gandamak (Gundumnk), 29, 37, 38,

334

Ewart, Major, 80
Eyre, Lieut. V., afterwards Sir
Vincent, Commissary of Ordnance, 24, 112, 125, 236 ; his
narrative, 126, 129
Eyre, Mrs., 153
PANE,Sir H., 6
Parangi, Peringee, 79, 102
Furldkot, 303
Fatehhbhd, 45 ; passngo of rearguard through, 45, 129, 132, 134,
163

Pntehpur Sikri (Puttehpore Sikri),
11

Patieh Jang, 155,162
Patteh I(hhn, Tiwhna, 340
Patteh Singh, Nhn, 221, 225 ; death
of, 287
Fhzilka, 358
Penwick, Capt., 37
Firozpur, Perozpore, Ferczepore,
&c., 6, 16, 62, 129, 166, 167, 186,
211, 215, 221, 225, 226, 227, 229,
234, 248, 249, 250, 251, 257, 258,

19R, 285, 403

41, 57, 103, 129, 130, 134, 136,
153, 157, 161
Ganges, 198, 370
Gardener, Col., in Sikh service, 346
Gardiner, Col., 191
Garrison orders, 45, 86-87, 88-89
Ghwilgnrh, 128
Gerrard, Cnpt., 45, 53
Ghaznl, Ghnxnee, 6 ; capturo of, 8,
9 ; Mnhmud of, 30, 155, 156, 180,
186

Ghilzi, pl. of Ghilzd, tribe in Afghanistan, 8 ; insurrection of, 8 ;
suppers on service against, 23;
Envoy's opinion of, 27 ; Burnes's
opinion of, 28; expedition against,
30, 35, 37, 66, 70, 149 mlc m,
150 nole m, 156,158
Qhulbm HusainwLIB, 365
Gilbert, Qen., letter from Broadfoot,
250; again, 255, 391, 993, 394,
396

Gobnrdhan, 11
Gomal Pass, 9
Goodwyn, Lieut., Bengal Engineers,
355

436

INDEX
GORAKHPUR

Gorakhpur, Goruckpore, 12
Gough, Sir H.,Commander-in-Chief,
afterwards Viscount, 214, 215,
233, 234, 267, 249; letter to
Broadfoot, 250, 255, 257,3(;0,261,
265, 266; letter toBrondfoot, 267275, 288; invitation to Mandarin,
289, 293, 335, 338, 355, 356, 358,
362 ; orders up troops, 363, 3G4,
366, 368, 370, 373, 380, 381; at
Rlildkl, 384-386, 389; at Firozshah, 389-398, 404, 413, 418, 410
Governor-General, see name of
office-holder
Govincl, 10th Ghrfi, '216, 219
Govindgarh, 282
Gownn, Col., 275
Grant, Capt., 275
Grant, Nsjor P., now P.M. Sir
Pntriok, 256 note 2, 387
Greathed, Mr., 192
Grifin, Sir Lepel, qooteil, 287 notc
4, 424
Gruel~en,Count, 329 m t e 4
GulBb Siugh, Raja, aftemnrds
Maharaja of Jamm6 and Kashmir,
220, 222, 230, 251, 234, 238, 241,
259, 261, 266, 272, 274, 275, 279,
282, 287, 291, 292, 294, 295, 296,
297, 302, 303, 304, 306, 308, 310,
311, 317, 318, 319, 321, 329 ; his
proposals, 330, 333, 337, 348,351,
354,370,372, 375
Gundooee, 274
G6rkhns (Ghoorlcas, Lo.), recruited,
12, 13 ; charaoter of, 40
Gurmulth Singh, Bhni, 236
Giirkmi'r, 229, 309
Gustnvus Adolphus, 191
Gwalior, 196, 203, 216, 248

HAFTKOTAL,160
Hnidar Ali, 128, 306 note 7
Haines, Capt. I?. P., now Gen. Sir
I?., 398
HBii. Ali. 150 mts nb
E I & ~~ n i 375
,
Hhnsi, 363
Hardinge, Sir E., afterwards Viscount, sucoeeds Ellenborough,
207, 208, 210, 214; his previous
services. 216-218.230 : displeased
about ~ u o h e t ~ i n g h ' s tieaeure,
231 ; appoints Broadfoot agent,
232 ; letter to Lord Ellenborough,
233-234, 241,24!2, 2847 ; letters to
Lord Ellenborough, 248-249 ; coniidoutial memorandum to Brond-

HAVELOCK

foot, 257, 260, 266, 270 ; letter to
Lord Ellenborongh, 274.276, 277,
280 ; opinion of Broadfoot, 281 ;
letter to Lord Ellenborough, 282 ;
instructions about boats, 283-286,
290, 291; letter to Lord Ellenborough, 291-294, 267; letter to
Lord EUenborough, 2!17,300, 307,
308, 310; letter to Lord Ellenborough, 311 ; complimentary letter to Brondfoot, 312 ; prepares to
visit frontier, 313,314 ; letter from
Broadfoot, 315-316; letter to Lord
Ellenborough, 316-318, 320, 321,
322 ; letter from Broadfoot, 323326 ; letter to Lord Ellenborough,
336-327, 3117, 329, 330, 333, 334,
335, 337,341 ; letter to Broadfoot,
342-343, 344, 359, 354, 356, 356,
367, 359, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368,
369, 370 ; summons Broadfoot,
370, 371, 372 ; postpones advance
of troops, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377,
378,380,381 ; issues proclamation,
381, 383, 385, 388, 389 ; a t Biroaehnh, 389-398 ; extrncts from despatohes, 398-399, 400, 402,103,
404, 407, 408; extracts from letters, 409; letter to Lord Ellenborough, 411-414, 414, 415, 416,
417, 418 ; a s second in command,
418-419,424,425,426,427
Rardinge, Cnpt. A., now Gen. Sir A,,
396, 400 nob 8, 413, 425
Rardinge, Mr. C. S., now Viscount,
Private Seoretnry to GovernorGeneral, letter to Broadfoot, 247,
271, 318,324, 326,329, 332 ; letter
from Brondfoot, 334-337,355,356,
395, 402 m t c 9
Bardinge, Lady Emily, 217
Bare, Archdeacon, 290
Harem, Zennnn, of Kabul royal
fnmily, 12, 1 3 ; of Rnnjit Singh,
220
Harike, Hureekee, 229,298,360,367,
371, 372, 375, 400, 423
' Earkarn,' Hurknru, 198
Hnstings, Lord, 197
Hastings, Warren, 210
Hsvelook, Sir H., life quoted, 13;
Broudfoot's o ~ i n i o nof. 39. 40. 41.
42, 43, 52, 54; 60,62 ; .letter from
Brocrdioot, 62-64 ; reply, 64-65 ;
letter to Durnnd, 66-66, 67, 70,
74, 7 1 notes o, q, 79, 82, 91, 92 ;
in Broadfoot's place, April 7, 98,
102,106 ; at Mhm6 IIhel, 135-162 ;
nt Isthlif, 163, 166, 188,197, 198;

HAYELOCK

letter to Broadfoot, 214,288; letter
to Broadfoot, 289-290, 307, 367;
letter to Miss Broadfoot, 403;
memoir of Broadfoot, 403, 406,
407 ; opinion of Droedfoot, 410,
427

~t&lock, Mrs., 64,199
Hny, Capt:, 127
Hazhra. Punjab.
- . district of, 261.
319

Haxhra, Afghan8 enlisted, 9, 13;
character, 40
HazJri bhgh, or garden, 221
Herst, 6; siege raised, 6, 22, 56,
209 n o b 8
Herries, Capt., 400 n o b 8, 414
litill, Lord, 191
Hillier, Capt., 106
Billier, Mrs., 122
Eimalaya, 242, 294
Hindh Khsh, 159
Hindusthnis, recruited, 12, 13, 40,
89, 236; in Sikh nnny, 269
Rlra S ~ n g h ,Raja, 220, 224, 225,
226, 227, 228 ; appeals to Rhhlsa
against Attar Singh and Britlsh,
22R, 230, 231, 234, 238, 241, 242;
failure of hi8 policy, 243, 244;
flight and death of, 245, 246, 24!),
266, 266, 264, 276, 292, 310, 317,
347

Hlra Singh, Sardhr, brother of R&ni
Jindhn, 208
Hishrak, Rissaruk, 66, 143, 150
Hodges, Mr., 342, 343
Hodgson, Mr., 364
FIotlgson, Mr., 128, 124
Hoffmeister, Dr., 329 noh 4 ; killed,
396

-

Hol~ombo,Lieut., 67 note a
Holkar, 238
Ilore, Capt., 400, 414
Ho~tages,36 ; with the Afghans, GO,
65, 69, 70, 71 notes h and k , 72,
73, 73 note o, 74, 109
Hhgli, Hooghly, 336
Huish, Malor, 26th N.I., 133; at
MdmJ Xhel, 134-152,159, 191
Hukm Singh, 232
Hunt, Mr., G. Broadfoot's early
promise, 2
Husain Khan, 236
I ~ ~ a r s s274
s~,
Imi~muddin,Shekh, 228
Irupey, Miss, 106
Indin, 1,3 ; Government of, 5, 10 ;
and Major D'hrcy Todd, 22 ; relicf

from, 42, 52 ; security of, 55, 56 ;
Government of, 61 ; indignation
against, 68, 72, 73, 75 note r , 83,
101,118,119 ; danger of defensive
measures in, 120, 121, 126, 128,
162, 171, 174 ; tenure of, rests on
niilitnry basis, 174,178, 178 ; education in, 179 ; policy of Government of, 180-181 ; dissatisfied
with Tenasaerim administrntion,
188, 206, 209 ; relations with Ranjit Singh, 219,220, 221, 222, 224,
229 ; correspondence about Suchet
Singh's treasure, 230-231 ; about
village of Mowrun, 232, 233, 237,
238 ; supreme on left bank Sutlej,
240 ; Broadfoot's reports to, 242.
&c.; approve orders to Agent's
assistants, 246 ; orders to Agent,
247,261; orders regarding Napier's
expedition, 263-264, 266 ; orders
on Agent's letter to Sir H. Gough,
276,277,279,281; approve Agent's
proceedings, 300, 302, 323, 325,
327, 328, 329, 332, 334, 335, 336;
Sikh complaints of, 338, 339, 341,
342,3G!!, 365 ; striving to maintain
peace, 367, 368, 379
Indus, river, 6 ; passage of, 7 ;
referred to as the Attock, 16, 85,
180, 198 ; flood of 1841, 223, 225,
242, 270, 283, 285, 312, 327, 340
Ireland, 179, 217
Isthlif, 6G ; described, 163 ; captured,
164, 387

J ~ n ~ l r93
i,
Jnbalpur, -Jubbulpore, 204
Jacquemont, M. Victor, quoted, 219
Jagdnlak, Jugdulluck, 36, 43, 66,
137.128.150 wotes m.. 92.. 151.157.
.
.
158'
'
Jalcrbnis, 255
Jalhlhbhd (Jellalabnd, kc.), 3,14 note
4; Monteath's force sent to, 27; necessity for magazine at, 29,30,42,
44, 45 ; arrival of Sale's brigade at,
46; described, 47-48; defence of,4795 ; lirst sortie, 48 ; second sortie,
49, 50, GO, 61; schema for evncuation of, 61,62,64,65 ; oouncils of
war in, 67-77 ; evacuation of, 69,.
74 noto p, 75, 75 note r , 77, 81.
82 ; earthquake at, 82, 86, '90;
action, April 7, 91-94 ; 'That'
illustrious garrison,' 94 ; Mnckenzie's arrival, 96, 98, 100, 101,
108, 109 ; Pollock's force at,>lO,

INDEX
KIRKPATRICK
Kirkpntriolr, Col., 173, 174
Kirkwnll, 2, 427
Kishen Chand, Rai, Vakil, 221;
interview with Agent, 237-240 ;
nslcs explanstion from Agent, 2G1;
nsked to explain movement of
Sikhs, 271, 277, 279, 280, 298,
299, 318, 321, 324, 325, 326, 329,
331, 335, 338, 339, 340, 343, 344,
348, 362 ; dism~ssed,376, 411
Xoh dbmbn, 163
,Kohislbn, of Khbul, 9, 99, 152
Kolhi~pur;Colnpoor, 294
Eorhn, 123
Xot Isn IChLn, 298
Kot Rbngrn, 261
ICot Kaplira, 298
R6di Khel (Koodce Xhel), 64, G5,
133,135-152
Kunar, 116 ?tote 2

.

L i n n S I N ~ H Miybn,
,
226; bravo
denth of, 245
Lhdwa, Rnja of, 338
Lnfont. Col.. 349
~ n h n a ' ~ i n g~h ,k n Singh,
a
hlajlthia,
221, 245, 2G5

Lahore, 221, 222, 223, 225,228, 229,
232, 238, 240, 241, 244, 245, 248,
249, 250, 256, 260, 261, 2G7;
political situation at, 2G9, 275,
279. 282. 291. 295, 29G. 297. 302,

hlACKENZIE
Ligny, 217
Limerick, 289
Littler, Sir J., 249, 268, 275, 354,
3G1, 362, 363,365, 366, 374, 382 ;

a t Birozshbh, 359-398, 399, 412,
415. 418

~ o c h , ' ~ r : 20,
~ . ,43, 100, 112; letter
from Brondfoot, 112-115, 153 ;
letter from Broadfoot, 1G9, 379
Loch, Miss, 115, 155, 170
Logsr, river and valley in Afghanistan, 66
Lohbni merchants, 9
London, 2, 81, 109 ; Gazette, 171,
212, 334, 336, 341, 342, 353, 378,
427
Londonderry, Marquis of, 217
Lord, Dr. Percivnl, lrilled, 9
Lucknow, 233

Ludhiirnn (Loodhinna, Loodeenna,
LQc.),12, 16, 57, 106,216,234,235,
282, 293, 298, YO6 note 7,
342, 348, 361, 363, 366, 367,
372, 378, 381, 382, 983, 389,
415, 425,426
Lughmhn, 68, 79, 93, 97, 98, 109,
116 note 2, 118
Lughminl, GG
Lun~ley,Major-Gen., G I , 8 1
242,
315,
370,
411,

MACARTNEY,
Lieut., 127

h.IcCaslril1, Gen. Sir J., 133 ; nt
Mhn16 Khel, 134-152, 159; nt
Isthlif, 163-165, 18!1, 266 ; lrilled,
380, 387, 404, 405

415

Lnlre, Lord, 175, 177
Lake, Lieut. Edwnra, a f t e r w ~ r d s
Gen., 307, 308, 376, 387, 399
Lib1 Sinch. Adhlnti., 338.. 339.. 347,.
349, 3z1; 376

Lkl Singh, Raja, 228, 271,~295,304,
306, 308, 311, 316, 318, 347, 348,
352, 371, 383, 384, 385, 394;
ncoused of treachery, 419-424
Lnne, Dr., 214
Langihna, 383
Latbla, 382
Lnwrenoe, Sir G., GO, 102
Lawrence, Sir Henry, 60, 82, 116
note 2, quoted, 129, 162, 193, 209;
letter to Brondfoot, 235, 289, 380,
381, 397 note 5, 410, 419, 423,
424
Leech, Mnjor R., C.B., death, 338,
359. 376

Macgregor, Cnpt., afterwards Sir
George, polit~calagent, 26 ; joins
hfonteath, 34 ; negotiates, 35, 42,
43, 49, 60, 61, 54, 55, 58, 59,
60, 62, 63, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72,
72 noto nz, 73, 74, 74 note q , 75,
76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 92, 108, 109,
116, 116 note 2, 117, 125, 142,
143, 162
Macgregor, Dr., 414

Mnclrenzie, Colin (afterwards Gen.
and C.B.), 3, 11-13, 33 ; services
at Khurd Kabul Pass, 34, 35, 38,
41, 50, 55 ; a prisoner, 55,58, 69,
73 n o t e o ; sent to JalklAbAd, 96,
97, 99, 100; Brondloot's eulogy,
102; charactcr admired by Alghans, 103; he returns to captivity, 103 ; services deserve
reward, 104, 106, 109, 115, 118,
120, 121, 125, 126, 153, 166, 108,
199, 236; oreuts tombetone ta
Broadfoot, 406, 407,427

..
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Maukeson, Capt., afterwards Lieut..
Col, and C.U.,political officer nt
PeshSaar, 14, 49, 51, 63, 67, 72,
78, 108; letter from Broadfoot,
109, 3.59, 359 note 9; succeeds
Leech, 375
McLeod, Lieut. Norman, Enginaera,
7

~ c ~ e oCapt..W.
d,
C., 212
McLeod, Nrs., 212, 213
Blacnnghten, Sir W., envoy, 6, 10,
19 ; reports arrival of royal
families, 20; Governor of Bombay,
2'3 ; orders regarding Nonteath's
expedition, 24-20, 28 ; erroneons
idea of Ghilzi power, 26 ; killed,
40 ; had sumn~onedNott nnd Sale,
41, 50, 51, 53, 54, 56, 72, 76, 98,
99, 102, 121, 123, 123, 125, 126,
165,175,176,177

McNeill. Sir J.. 22
~ + d d o o k , ~ ~ r . ~ . , ~ f t e r wSir
a rT.,
ds
62, 66,194, 200,317

M a d r s , 2, 3, 4, 17, 107, 174, 193,
204, 211, 318, 359, 401; genernl
order. 402 : Broadfoot memorial,
409, ,127

.

Magdhln, 378
Mnhbrcijpur, 163, 203, 207,357
Mallmud, of Ghazni, 30
Mahomed Ali, 67
Rfahthb Singh, 317, 347
Majithn, Majeeta, 347
bfalcomson, Dr. John, 3, 5, 15, 18,
56, 51, 59, 63; letter from Broadfoot, 96-100 ; another letter, 101102 ; letter to Miss Broadfoot, 107;
to Geu. CuUen, 107-108,109,125;
letter from Broad£oot, 166, 166;
death and services, 204
Milwi, 306 note 7
Milwir, of Punjhb, 315, 315 note 2
iIf6.mil Khel, destruction of fort at,
44. 53. 64 nolc 4 : Pollock's de~Ldbt,803

Mangla, Mungla, 244,271, 272, 292,
346, 347, 370

Mani Mhjra, 378
Marbtha, Mahratta, &c., 128, 173,
302, 306 note 7
Mnrris, Murrees, 251, 283, 258
Marshman, J o h n C., quoted, 13, 64,
quoted, 160,188,215, 290
Martaban, 198
Matthews, Capt., 127
Maulmain, Maulmein, Moulmein, 4,
M, 66, 171, 167 ; Brorrclfoot's

.' .'2ji.

arrival at, 188, 192,195,198,190,~

;
,y
f<' : r .

L

..'

aio,

214, ~90,302,403,407
Mn~.tle,Lieut.,34,45-46,49,78,100,
116,117 ; a t M h 6 Khel, 136152,
193, 248, 368
Itlneirrl, 288
Mcditerrnnenn, 242
Mcenn Rleer, Miyan Ueer, 345, 346
hfeerut, 234,285, 203,363,370, 376 ;
supplien for troops from, 376-377,
381, 411
Meemblt~gGhunsee, 274
Metcnlfe, Mr, T.,324
,
Mukcalfe, Ur. a n d Mrs., 12
Midnupur, 275
Miller, Hugh, quoted, 204
Mills, Capt. C., 282, 314, 338, 349,
861, 364, 867, 374, 375, 376,
309
MisriwClrl, 894
ivlotmt, Cornet, 9 note 9
Moban Lal, 334, 341, 342, 343
IvIohmand, 70 note f
Mokam Chand, Diw6n, 221
Monson, Col., 177
Monteath, Col. T., C.B., 28-24, 2626 ; commands expedition, 30-33,
3.1, 38, 40, 44, 53, 62, 64, G6, 69,
70, 74, 76,77, 70, 80, 90, 91,112,
118
Montgomery, Sir R.,21 note 3
Moore, Sir John, 98, 216
' Morning Herald,' 387
Mountnin train, Bncl&ouse'a, 34,
45, 157, 158

-

., i

, .i':
i-.

.,
-..:
$

I

Mowran, difference with DnrbBr
about villnge, 232,239, 240
Mddlri, hIooJltee, 380, 381, 382,383 ;
battle of, 384-388, 369, 390, 391,
393, 395,412, 413,414, 415,416,
418,428,425

Muhammad Akbar Khhn, kills envoy,
40, 50,51, 69,60, 68,69,70,71, 79,
82, 89, 91 ; defeated April 7, 9293, 94 ; sends Mackenzie to negotiate, 96, 97,98, 103,106, 126,127,
134, 151, 163, 156, 159, 160, 223,
269
Muhnmmad Shbh Ilhhn, 115, 118,
1fO

MI!%,
155
Mull, Madras officer, 39
hlulrdj, Diwhn, 263
M1Lltdn. 242, 251, 252,264,263,273,
274, 291,527, 369 note 8
Munro, Capt., 400 note 6,414
Mutiny, in Sikh troops, 13-14 ; in
escort of convoy,'l4 ; in Punjab,
14-13, 232, 229 ; in Company's

.

I
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MUTINY

'sopoys, 227, 257 ; in Sikh troops,

N;&, 11,12, 350
Nuzafnrhb6d, 241, 2G1
Mysore, 128, 369, 360
N d a n ~ , 2 3 2 ,282, 374
h'irdir Shlrh, 116 mlc 2
Nngar, 379
Nnin SJlrh,Brondfoot'schief servant,
308
Nhnnk, Giud, founder of Sikh sect,
218
Nho Nihdl Singh, Kunwnr,221; dies,
222, 303
Nnpier, Cnpt., now Lord Nnpier of
hfagdhla, 378
Nnpier, Sir C. J., 248; letter to
Broadfoot, 251, 263 ; letter to
Broadfoot. 254. 263. 264 ; letter to
b road foot; 27'3, 283; 'lettor to
Broadfoot, 288, 294,296, 305, 307,
332, 343
Napicr, Sir W., quoted, 217, 305
Napoleon Ronnparto, 156, 410
Nnrbndh, Nerbudda, 204
Nnsiri, Nusseeree, 199
Nesve, Mr. and Mrs., 12
Nep41, 123, 209, 306 note 7
Nicolls, Sir Jasper, Commnndor-inChief, 61, 83, 84,189, 191, 194
Nicolfion, Cnpt.P., 249,250,258, 303,
311, 341, 348, 349, 360, 354, 359,
360,. 361, 362, 364 ; instructions
fromBroadfoot, 365-367,368, 371,
372, 374, 375, 376, quoted, 379,
380, 382, 384; killed, 399, 421,
'

422

~ i n i i44,

Ningrhhhr, 69
Niznm of ~aida;bbhd,170, 173,187
Norris. Sir W.. 290
b or ton, ~ i e u t . 31,
; 33
, Nott, Sir Mr., 41, 83, 86, 110, 111,
130, 154; reuches Kabul, 161;
anger a t delay, 162,165, 169,170,
172, 181,184, 248
Ndrnddh, Fakir, 346

Orienld Club, 213
Oriolla, Connt, 829 note 4, 333
Orltney Islands, 2, 427
Orr, . Lieut., quartermaster with
convoy, 17'; on servicein Zarmnt,.
23, 39, 68,437, 88, 89 ; praised by
Broadfoot, 100, 132, 130, 1 4 4
note z , 166, 170, 187, 236, 379
Oudh, King of, 179
Outram, Capt., afterwards Sir J.,.
commands against Ghilzis, 8,
109,283, 294, 322
Ovnns, Col., 294
oxus, 9
PAOEM~N,
1 0 note 1
Palmerston, Lord, condemna w i t h
drawnl, 182
Pnnhla, 283, 294
Pnnchdyat (punohnyet), 16 ; defined,
16 note 5 , 17, 223, 227, 261, 291,
292, 293, 295, 306, 306, 316, 337,
321, 345, 347, 348, 354, 869, 420,
421
Pani6r, Punniar, 203
Paoli, 410
Pari Dnrra, 36
Paris, 217
Parsons, Col., 318, 413
Pnrthb Sinyh, Kunwar, murdered,
224
ParvrBn Pass, action at, 9 ; J. Broadfoot killed, 9-10, 165
Patidla, 232, 282, 374, 376
Paton, Cn.pt., 39
Pnttlc, Col., 1 2
Peel, Sir Robert, dcfendswithdrzwa1,
182,189.248 ; extract from speech
in Commons, 405,408
Pegu, 304
Pehon, 376
Pelly, Cnpt., now Sir L., anecdote
of Brondfoot, 168 note 2
Persia, 22, 181, 281
Persinn, 236, 254, 336
Peshhwnr, Peshawur, 6, 13, 14, 1 4
nolc 4 ; Brondfoot ill at, 18, 47,
60. 52. 53. 59. 60. 67. 68. 72. 76.
,~

OOHTERLONY,
Sir D.,805 n o b 7 , 3 3 9
O'Connell, Dan.. 187
Ogle, Major, g t h ~ e g i m e n t65,
, 133;
at Mhmd Khel, 146-162
Oldficld, Cnpt., 34, 46-46, 49, 62,
65, 66, 70, 71, 74 q w b p , 77
Orders from ofioer who capitulates
are void, 56, 74, 74-75 note p

,.-,---,-...,--.

lab, iiz, 165,167,

192,221,223:
261, 311, 319, 326, 327, 337, 3G1

P.
e-~ hnolhlr.
-.-.
. 112
-

Peshora ~iAgh;220, 227, 228, 229,
245, 256, 265, 274, 282, 202, 308,
311, 317, 319, 326 ; dent11 of,
340, 344, 345, 354
Phillaur, 371, 372
Piyou, Liout., Engineers, 7

JNDBX
PINDARI

SALE

Pindbri, 293
Piper's Hill, 48, 40
Pitt, IVillinm, 173, 174
Plutarch, 410
Polloclr, Sir G., 62, 64 7wte 4, 73
note 0, 79, 80 ; appointed to command army of relief, 81 ; his
services, 82, 83, 86, 90, 91 ;
arrives at Jalirlhbbd, 93, 97, 98.
09, 100; thnnked by GovernorGeneral, 101, 105, 108, 109,110,
111, 113, 115, 117, 118, 124, 1'29,
130, 131, 133; at MSmli Khel,
134-152, 156, 157, 150, 160 ;
reachesI<abul,lGl, 162, 165, 1613,
169, 170, 172, 178, 181, 194, 189,
191, 200, 234, 248
Pousonby, Capt., wounded, 9
Poltinger, Eldred, defender of Herat,
6, 56, 57, 80, 78, 97, le6, 165,
161, 163
Prinsep, hIr. 11. Thoby, 30, 54, 59,
104, 105, 106, 109, 118, 119, 120,
l e l , 122, 183, quoted, 1'24
prisoner^, see also Hostages, 60, 72,
74, 79, 93, 97; question of
rnnsom, 100, 105, 115, 118, 156,
159 ; releasod, 161, 172, 178, 181
Protectedstntes, soo Cis.Sutlej states
Prussia, King of, 217
Puldji, Poolnyee, 251, 254, '273, 274
Punjab, 1, 2, Y ; Broadfoot's march
through, 13 ; Sikh otticers to
nccompnny, 14 ; anarchy in, 16 ;.
Broadfoot's march through, 1321, 53, 86 ; carriage procurable
in, ll!l, 120, 128, 180, 183, 184,
194 ; sketch of history :I. to death
Ranjit Singh, 218-221; 11. to.
death Sher Singh, T21-224; 111.
to outbrealr of first Sikh war,
224-383 ; dialect of, 237 ; assistant
agents not to correspond with,
2.16; must be Sikh or British,
312; population, 333, 355, 407,
416

Ranjlt Singh, Runjeet Singh, 5 ; his
ability, 18, 218, consolidates Sikh
power, 219 ; desanbed, 219, 220,
s
221 ;
221; members of h ~ court,
death, 221,222 ; his policy abandoned, 225, 23'2, 238 ; his respect
for British frontier, 239, 240, 266,
268, 269, 270, 280, 297, 316, 319,
321, 324, 326, 326, 339, 341, 344,
345, 360, 362, 413
Ranliw Singh, Mdjithin, 221, 295,

R ~ J P U R381
A,
Bajplit, 270, 311, 317
Rhjputhna, 306 note 7
Rdm Dhs, Gh.6, 320
Rdm Dihl, Vakil at Pirozpur, 230,
246, 258,318, 321, 329,331,335,
341, 398, 350, 351,360, 365
R i ~ mSingh, Uhai, 221 ; overtures
to Agent, 272, 305, 321, 339, 344,
911
.Rangoon, 198

DOH

~ a l & o n a n ,289
Rntnil Wazir, 295
Ravensburg, Count, see Waldemar
XBvi, Ravee, 167, 168
Richmond, Col., C.B., 160 ; Agent
N.W.B., 194, 191i ; uppointed to
Lucknow, 214, 216, 224, 225 ; orders to, about Attar Singh's escape, 229, 230 ; orders to, about
Snchat Singh's treasure, 231, 23'2,
293,234, 239, 240, 241, 247, 278,
321,325, 338, 407
Ripon, Earl of, 206, 210, 201, 322,
336, 943 ; evlruct from speech in
Lords, 404 ; letter to Niss Broad.
foot, 4013-406, 425
Robertson, Mr. T. C., Lieut..
Governor N.W.P., 20-21, 84
Rohri, 6
Roleia, 216
Rilpar, 371
Russia, intrigues in Persia and
Kabul, 5,181,183,184
SABZ.ALKOT,
Subzulcote, 254
SQgar, Saugor, 195, 276
Sahhranpur, 363, 426
Saidd, 15
Sdighbn, 9
.Sniyid Muhammad IIhirn, Chief of
Paghmdn, 10 note 1
Sale. Sir R.. commands in Xohistan.
9 j joins' Montenth, 30 ; his do:
spatches, 31, 33; wouuded, 33,
34 ; sends back part of his force,
35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 45; arrives
a t Jaldlhbbd, 46, 47, 48, 49 ; his
despatches, 52, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63,
G7, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74 note g,
76,77, 79, 82 ; his ' after orders,'
86-87, 89, 9 1 ; commands action
April 7, 92-93, 94, 95, 101, 107,
108, 1.15, 121, 122, 125, 127, l2D,
130, 134, 136 note a, 149 note 1,
I50 note m, 156, 158, 171, 178,
190, 198, 200, 358 ; killed, 386;

I
1

SMITH

SALE

his saniccs, 380-387, 402, 404,
I

I

405,400

Sale, Lady, quoted, 10 mb 1, 50,

127
Salwin, Salwoen, 196,197
S ~ m b n h376
,
Samangnrh, 283
Samni, Bcgam, 25G
Sandars, Cspt., Engineers, 7, 1G3 ;
killed at Nahiirbjpur, 203
Suppers and Miners, Bengnl, 157,
168,285,289 nole 8
Sappers, S h i h Shujn'e, nftermnrds
Broadfool's Sappers, 3,9,10-11 ;
George Urondfoot appointed LO
command, 12;described byhlarshman, 13 ; inutiny in. 14; tools
and stores for, 23-20 ; with MonIcnth's expedition, 30 ; cngnged a t
Butlthhk, 31-33; at Ehurd K~hbul,
34 ; nt Jagdalak, 30-37,39; composition and character of, 40, 45,
49; their services, 58, 60 ; monlioned in 'niter orders,' 86-87,
93,115,117, 126-127, 128 ; snmmoncd to N6m6 lihul, 130,132 ;
at N6m6 U e l , 134-152 ;in post of
honour, 157, 158, 159, 160; a t
Isthlif, 164, 167 ; excitement on
getthg medals, 168,187,289,427
Sarehhli, 220
Snrubi, 150
Sittbra, 294
Shwan Md1, Diwim, 221,242,263
fihvnntwhri, 283,201,294
Beriton, Capt., afterwardtl Sir T
,

122
Sedan, 217
Sell Briha, 36,159
Sepoys, 226, 227, 247; con;trast
of pny with Sikhs, 249; inquiry
wglrrding, 257-259,268,270,271;
dnnger of Sikh example, 274,203,
338, 341, 349, 350; reliance on,

300,378,374,413,414
Serampur, Sermpore, 64,215
Seringapatam, 175
Shidi BngiLI, 93
Shkh Ahmad, AbdhIi, 5,116 note 2
Bhhhdern, 244
Shith Shujn, 5,G ; seated on Kabul
throne, 8; discontented, 10;harem
of, 13;tries to relieve Uurnes, 40,

47,50, 57, 67, 68, 69, 73, 76,
76 ?wte t, 85 ; murdered, 97,108;
his service abolished, 112, 116
nole 2, 121, 123, 124, 126, 168,
175,183,238
811611 Zarnhi, 13,10

Shnkespenr, Sir Riohmond, 161
Shhm Singh, chief of AtQi, 14,15.
221, 244; destroys Hira Singh,

245,295,800,363,368
Shellon, Brigadier, 17, 50, 79,82,

104,127

.

Shcr Muhammad, 273
Sher Singh, hlnharnja, 167, 218,
220,222,224;murdered, 224,226,

Siblkot, 317 .
Sikh, war, 1,2 ; army mutinous,
13-18 ; chiefs with convoy, 14 ;
co-operntion, 82,85, 86; services
in ILhLihnr, 93, 116 note 2, 120;
twmy on Sutlej, 167, 104, 215,
218,225,226 ; omens in camp of,
22G ; just complaint against
British, 228 ; impression mnde
by death of Bir Singh, 229;
grievances, 229-232; chiefs visit
Agent,230, 241,242;chiefs oppose
Hira Singh,243; disordcr in army,

245,247,253, 254, 255,257,258,
259 ; move towards Siitlej, 261 ;
army, 273, 279, 282; atrocities,
282,284 ; wish to mnintain power,
286,287 ; excesses of army, 292 ;
stnhle government unattainnblc,
2 0 ; army a t Jnmmu, 294-296,
302,305,312, 315, 316; wsrlike
prepamtiom, 318, 322 ; pacific
policy towards, 327,538,337,340,

350,951,365, 358, 3 0 , 365,366,
372; army advancing, 373,376;
cross Sutlej, 377, 379, 362; at
Miidkl, 384-388; a t Birozshah, ,
389-398,411,412, 418,415,416,
417;leaders accused of treachery,
419-421 ; cl~nrge investigated,
420-424; aocusntion rejected,
424 ; nrmy, 426
Sim, Col., Madras Engineers, 48,
213 ; story about, 214
Simla, 191,289 ; Broadfoot at, 307,
355,357,358
Simmons, Capt., 41st Regiment, 180
Simpson, commnnding column
against Bhgtls, 252,263
Sind, Scinde, Sindinn, 86,194, 196,

207,227,248,251, 253,264, 257,
258,259,273,285,287,297,343
Singapore, 196
Sirhind, 215,234,377,381
Smith, General, afterwards Sir
Early, 20-31, 189, 199, 290;
nl Birozshnh, 301-308,412

VAN-ADNEW

SYITI!

Smith, 'Yardam,' Capt. R.N., 241 i
services, 903-304
Sluyth, Major Carrnichael, 270
Sobraon, 298, 300, 414, 424
Sodhi Diwnn Singh, 344
Sodhis, 320
tlonicrset, Lord Fitxroy, 189, 100
Somcrset, Major, killed, 395, 399,
402, 414
Somerset, Mrs., 426
Soinnhth, idol from, 30; gates, 169 ;
despatch, 183
Sonepnt, Soneput, 12
Spain, 190
Stacey, Brignclier, 164
' Standard,' quoted, 181
Stewnrt, Capt. A., E.L.I., 353
Stewart, Mrs., 453
Stewart, Col., 124
Sturt, Lieut., 7, 60
Subhthu, Soobnthoo, LC., 194, 234,
377, 378
Suohet Singh, Raja, 220, 224, 227 ;
hisdeath, 228 ; treasure, 229-231 ;
widow, 231 ; treasure, 230, 243 ;
widom, 316, 317, 329, 375
Sufed Koh, 135
Suldtur, 6, 264, 284, 285, 286, 291,
327
SultAn Jhn, 70
Sulthn I{hhnwhlh, 400
Sulthn Muhammad Khhn, 326
Surkhhb, 36 ; river, 185, 157
Sutherland. Miss. 212. 301
Sutlej, ~ u t i e g e ,&c, i67, 169, 194,
219, 225, 226, 228, 234, 239, 249,
250, 253, 265, 258, 259 ; Sikhs
move towards, 261, 262, 266, 268,
270, 271, 278, 275, 276: Sikhs
withdrawn from, 279 ; the'limit of
supremncy, 280, 284, 285, 28!),
291. 212 : crossed without leave.

375, 376;. S i k h cross, 379-381,
382, 388,. 397,. 400,. 404,. 411,. 417,.
425
Suttee, 224; plundered, 245, 347;
curse the Sikh sect, 348
Switzerland, 190
T.uh16~S H ~ H116
, note 2
Tait, Capt., 132
Talnins, 198
Talfourd, Sir T. N., 290
Talli, 372, 379
Talwandi, 298

Thra Singh, 220
Talang, fort, 134, 153
Tavi, Tawi, 204
Tavoy, 203, 241
Taylor, Col., 9th Regiment, 65, 131,
133,134-153, 159,191
Taylor, Lieut. Reynell, 387
Tej Singh, Sardbr, 280, 375, 389,
396, 397, 412 ; accused of
treauhery, 419-424
Tenasserim, provinces, 1,3, 63 note
3, 65, 66, 170, 171, 186, 195, 196,
198, 201, 203, 211, 214, 233, 241,
242, 303, 305,427
Tezin (Tazoen) district and forts in
Afghanistan, 23, 26, 8'2, 34, 35,
59, GO, 66, 73, 103, 126, 159 ;
action at, 160, 163
Thain, Major, 24, 127
Thancswar, Thunesar, &c., 371
Thirlwnll, Connop, Bishop, 290
Thomason, James, 20-21 ; services
and Lord Ddhousie's eulogium,
ib. ?rote 3, 66, 193, 260 ; his praise
of Broadfoot, 260, 290, 314, 354
Thomson, Cnpt. G., chief engineer,
7 ; his grent service at Cihnzni, 8
Thomson, Dr. T., 19 ; services, 19
not4 2
Tibet, 329
Ti116 tank, 294, 296
' Times ' commends withdrawal,
182 ; blames Aucklond's policy,
182 ; praises Ellenborough, 185
Tiph Sulthn, Tipoo, 128, 173, 174
Tira, Teera, 66
Todd, Major D'Arcy, 22
Tonge, 274
Tools and stores, 29
Tornbhz K h h , 63
Trevor, Capt., 41, 54
Tripartite treaty, 5-6
Tritton, Capt., 149 nok 1, 160
Troup, Capt., 41,153,161,192
Tulloch, Brigadier, 145,163
Turkistan, 9, 11, 159
T6t6, Tootoo, 66
Tweeddale, Marchioness of, 108
Tweeddale, Marquis of, 103,214,401
UDHAY
SINGH,Miyin, killed, 222
U16s, Ooloos, 37
Umarkot, Omercote, 261
Urd6, 236
VANS-AONEW,
Mr. P. A,, 368, B
note tl

INDEX
ZURNAT

VENTURA

Ventura, Oen., 221, 222, 256, 258,
270; letter to Brondfoot, 277-278,
289,321, 342
Vicovich, Russian Agent, 5
Victoria, be en, life attempted, lll112, 171, 191; letters from Lord
Ellenborough to, 194-1'35, 205,
886

Vimiera, 216
Vincent, Gen., 258
Vittoria, 217
W ~ E Sir
, C., 6, 320
Wnde, Capt. R.,52, 62, 69 d e e
W d n l , 382
Wdlh Jhh, 67
Wnldemnr. Prince of Prussin, 329,
332,333; 395
Wales, Prince of, 81
Wallace, Brigadier, 391, 392, 393,
399
Wallace, Sir W., 2 note 1
Wnrde, Col., 213
Wellesley, Marquis of, 57, 83, 101,
119,172,173;on governing India,
173-179,209, 210
Wellington, Duke of, 68,83,99, 111,
121, 128, 175, 176, 189, 190;
letters from Lord Ellenborou~h,

West, Lieot., 413
Westminster, 2
Wheeler, Brigadier, 372, 373, 381,
411
Whittingham, Sir S., 4
Wild, Brigadier, 60, 61, 67, 72,62,
119,120, 166
Wilkiuson, Oapt., 158, 18Y
Williums, Bir E., 61
Winohilsea, Lord, 217
Wood, Lieut..Col., 394,413
Woodburn, Capt., 60
Wynclham, Oapt., distinguished conduct, killed, 37, 39
Y O U N Lieut.
~,
R.,now Major-Geu.,
R.E., 223 mlc 6, 397 m l c 5
Yule. 001. H.. C.B., R.E., vii.; 308
8
Yusufzai, Eusofzye, &c., 13, 14 noto
4,140 ,tote m,221
Z A ~ Knb~,
N
Navhb. 70
Z a m b (Shhh, see Shhh Zamhn
Zenann, sec Etnrem
Zirn, 296, 298
Zurmat, Zoormut, prnvince
Afghanistnn, 23, 24,26,27
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A Course of

Divmity Lectures. By G s o n a n SALMON, D.D., Provost of Trinity ColLege,
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A BROREN STIRRUP-LEATHER.
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Sir Hector's Match.'

By CHARLESGRANVILLE,

Post 8vo. 2s. Gd.

LIFE OF SIR WILLIAM SIEMENS, F.R.S., Civil Engineer.
By WILLIAM POLE, F.R.S., Hon. Secretary of t h e InsLitute of Civil
Engineers. Portrait and Illustrations. 8vo.

TEE SCIENTIFIC PAPERS OF THE LATE SIR WILLIAM
SIEMENS, B.R.S. Illustrations. 3 vols

8vo.

STEPFIEN HISLOP : Pioneer Miasionary, md Nsturalist in
Central Indin. 1844-1863. By G E o l t n E ~ h f I 'LL.D.;
~ ~ , Author of ' L i f e of
Willinm Carey ' kc. Portrait and Illustrations. 8vo.

TI-IE INVISIBLE POWERS OF NATURE.
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8vo.

Some Elementary

By E. M. OAILLARD. post

PRINCIPAL SHAIRP AND HIS FRIENDS. By Professor
WM.KNIGHT, of St. Andrews University. Portrait. 8vo.
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LIFE OF GENERAL SIR CHARLES NAPIER, G.C.B.
By the Ron.
8vo. 12s.

Iv31. NAPIER

BRUCE. With Portrait and Maps.

Crown

'I hnvc never known nny lnstnnce of nu olllcor who hns s h o r n In n hlghor degroa thnt ho
posserses all tho qunlltles and qunhllcncious nccevsnry to onnble him to couduct g r r i t operacions.'
T m DUKEO W WI~.I.INWPOS.
'Wo draw ntb~utlouto the volumc ns ono thnt should bc found l o evory rcglmoutr~lllbrnry nod
la worthy perusal ovcrgwherc. I L Is ncwptmble ILS uivins for tho Brst tlmu in n courpnot furm tan
nccount of ouo of the b a t soldiers the Ei~glLhsrmy ever produced.'-Tne
Pm1.u.

PASSAGES I N THE MILITARY LIFE OF G,EN. SLR
GEORGE T. NAPIER, written by HIMSPJ,' for his Children. Edited by
his Son, Gen. WJI. C. E. XAPIER. With Portrait. Crown avo. 7s. 6d.
'A hook which not only throws some l l r h t o n t h o milItnry history of the Peninsulur Vnr, b u t
depict8 one of the bmc rcglm~ntnlolllwrsof hls dny, and mny servo ns n gwdc tn 11 who ~wplroto r k e
iu the prolewion of urmu. Sir Qcnrge Nnpicr war not only n ynllnnt nnd aklllul aoldlor hut his n ~ m o
will over stnod furth au ono ol tho mo8t dirtinguished pupils of thnt nrlble aollobl rollodd by
Wellington, whom hlghcst nilu wos not polsonnl disti~~~:tlon,
buc tho punotunl nnd full gerformnnce
of duty. Bis IUe wra in truth n militnry aoruon which cannot bo too much studhd by t h e who
servo their country.y.'-~rtl!?.hVWU~.

THE ENGLISH BATTLES AND SIEGES OF THE
PENINSULAR WAR. By Licut.-Gsn. SIR WILLIAM NAPIER, K.C.B.
With Portrait. Post avo.
'A volnme of deep Intarest and tlrnely n p p n r u c e , au serving Co b r l n ~belore the mind's eye tho
p m t baLtlm of ncnrlv holi r eeutllrv ngo. I n oxcnwttng the " D u t t l ~ rnlld S t r y ~ "frolu the Hlatory
o i tile Pcni~lsulur\Ytrr,they huvc b ~ d u m v h e dand
, Kori~n,Vimieru, nnd Corunnn rccnrn~~osol.'
SPKCTATO~.
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KHARTOUM. The

Tesbimony of a n Independent Eye-witness of the Heroiq Efforts for their
Rescue and Relief. By A. MMJDOXALD. Maps and Plaus. Crown 8vo. 128.

THE PERSONAL ADVENTURES AlUD EXPERIENCES
OF A XAGISTMTE DURING THE RISE, PROGRESS, AND SUPPRESSION OF THE INDIAN MUTINY. By MARKTHOENHILL,luto
Bellgal Civil Service. Crown 8vo. 128.

...

' T h e nuthor snw much durlnz the prOqrea3 of tho Mutiny whlch hns nevcr bean recorded a n d
writes dispn~nionntclynnd well,nlld wlth fulnesn of knowlcdgc.
Tha nutobiogrnphlml form df h h
nnrrat1.a makes i t duubly ent@rtslnhg.'-TLUES.

THE RISE OF THE BRITISH POWER IN THE
EAST. By the late Ron. M o u N ~ s T u a n ELPHINSTONE.
r
Being a Continuation of his History of India in the Hindoo and Mtahommedan Period.
Edited by Sir EDWAED
COLEBROOKD, Bart. With Maps. 8vo. 16s.
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